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PREFACE
This work is the first part of a projected lengthier 
study: the United States' response to the violent phase of
the Mexican Revolution, that period from the overthrow of 
Francisco I. Madero early in 1913 to the suppression of the 
Adolfo de la Huerta revolt in the spring of 1924. In the 
present portion, 1 have treated the period February, 1913, 
to January, 1916— from the deposition and murder of Madero 
to the so-called Santa Ysabel massacre and its immediate 
aftermath. Within that period, I have focused attention on 
the year 1915. The events of that critical twelve-month 
period determined in large part both the survival and the 
direction of the Mexican revolutionary movement and the 
future course of relations between the United States and 
Mexico for the balance of the decade.
Older interpretations of the 1913-1916 period, as 
well as earlier emphases relative to it, seem to me to be 
inadequate. I believe that scholars have overemphasized the 
influence of Woodrow Wilson in the shaping of United States- 
Mexican relations. At the same time, while not ignoring other 
determinants, they have paid them too little heed and have
iii
thereby failed not only to establish the importance of those 
determinants but in some instances even to identify them. 
Moreover, I believe that those scholars have attributed to 
the American President an undue degree of control over the 
execution of his administration's Mexican policies. There 
were other officials, both in Mexico and in Washington it­
self, who strongly influenced the implementation of those 
policies and who, on occasion, purposely frustrated their 
intent.
I attribute those oversights to the fact that 
earlier studies of the period are based primarily upon 
presidential papers and upon the memoirs and papers of 
cabinet officers and other persons who for the most part 
viewed Mexican affairs almost solely from the vantage points 
of the White House or one or the other of the several 
Executive departments. Although the voluminous records of 
the Department of State have indeed been employed in varying 
degree in the preparation of those studies, much of what 
those records reveal about conditions and developments in 
revolutionary Mexico and attitudes in the Department of 
State itself has been overlooked, misunderstood, or simply 
dismissed as irrelevant to the subject at hand. Conse­
quently, much of significance, not only with regard to the
evolution and execution of Wilsonian Mexican policy but to 
the determination of Mexican-American relations generally, 
heretofore has been largely neglected.
My intent, then, has been to reexamine the familiar 
events of the period under consideration in the light of a 
broader and more detailed study of the relevant State 
Department documents, particularly those pertinent to the 
Mexican petroleum industry, and thus to approach those 
events from a somewhat different perspective. In addition,
I have tried to test certain of the stereotypes and theses 
set forth in earlier studies of the period. In particular,
I have attempted to reevaluate the role of the American oil­
man in Mexico and the not infrequent assertion that he and 
other foreign investors in the republic were instrumental 
in obtaining United States armed intervention in that 
country on their behalf. Accordingly, I have emphasized the 
behavior of various special interest groups, both domestic 
and foreign, which attempted to influence the Mexican poli­
cies of the Wilson Administration and through those policies 
in turn, to dictate the course of events below the border.
I have devoted considerable attention, also, to the Mexican 
petroleum industry and developments within the petroleum 
province. These were critical factors in the determination
v
of Mexican-American relations and in the internal politics 
of revolutionary Mexico as well. Finally, I have sought 
first to reexamine the more important points of friction 
between the Wilson Administration and the Carrancista 
faction of the revolutionary movement and, second, to 
ascertain and explore the underlying causes for the failure 
of the short-lived Mexican-American rapprochement of 
October, 1915, and the subsequent armed intervention of the 
following spring.
Briefly, my views are as follows: (1) As a group
American oilmen in Mexico were well-disposed toward the 
Huerta Government and urged its recognition by the Wilson 
Administration. Rather than taking sides in the ensuing 
civil war, however, they preferred to remain neutral or to 
hedge by attempting to accommodate both factions. Although 
ultimately they did appeal to the Department of State for 
relief from revolutionary extortion and threats upon the 
lives of their employees, they did not for some time call 
for armed intervention or annexation of the oilfields. For 
the most part, they submitted to all demands made upon them 
by revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces alike with 
little more than a perfunctory protest. Only when the wells 
and production facilities were threatened with actual
physical destruction did they suggest United States inter­
vention, and then solely for the purpose of neutralizing 
the petroleum province for the duration of the fighting. 
Moreover, in seeking the support of their government their 
tone was almost always one of supplication rather than 
insistence. Not until after promulgation of the revolu­
tionary Constitution of 1917 and American entry into the 
First World War, at a time when the revolutionary regime 
had adopted an avowedly confiscatory petroleum policy, did 
the oilmen finally organize effectively and launch a 
vigorous defense of their property rights in Mexico. Then, 
and only then, did they become openly interventionist and 
advocate occupation of the petroleum province.
(2) Although oilmen and other American corporate 
and private investors in Mexico were slow to move effec­
tively against revolutionary encroachment, there were other 
special interest groups which shortly after the Constitu­
tionalist schism sought to enlist the support of the Wilson 
Administration in significantly altering the course of the 
revolutionary movement or in frustrating it altogether.
And, on more than one occasion, until de jure recognition 
of the Carranza regime in August, 1917, they very nearly 
succeeded. The most important of those groups, the
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Antirevolutionists, consisted of a number of lower-echelon 
officials within the Department of State. Concentrated in 
the Divisions of Mexican Affairs and Latin American Affairs, 
they strongly opposed the revolutionary movement on ideolo­
gical as well as on practical grounds. Admirers of the 
stable and prosperous Porfirian state, they viewed the 
Revolution as a colossal fraud perpetrated by cynical op­
portunists, a ruinous and seemingly endless contest for 
spoils and power. In short, they equated the struggle in 
Mexico with contemporary disorders in the chronically un­
stable Caribbean states. Accordingly, their proposed 
remedy for the "Mexican problem" was essentially the same 
as that already or shortly to be applied to Cuba, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic: the establishment
of an American protectorate over the republic and the in­
stallation of a pliable conservative or reactionary regime 
bound to the United States by treaty obligations similar to 
those embodied in the Platt Amendment.
Mexican exiles in the United States composed a 
second group of considerable importance in shaping Mexican- 
American relations during the period under consideration.
At one time or another, several of the more conservative 
or reactionary factions worked closely with the Antire­
volutionists in attempting to launch a successful
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counterrevolutionary venture from north of the border.
From early 1915 through de jure recognition of the Carranza 
regime, they constituted a serious threat to the survival 
of the revolutionary movement.
Finally, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United 
States, implacably opposed to the Revolution and especially 
hostile toward the Constitutionalists, played a significant 
role in the determination of Mexican-American relations. 
Throughout 1915 and for some time thereafter they apparently 
provided considerable financial and moral support for 
counterrevolutionary elements, unquestionably sought to 
obstruct and later to undo United States recognition of the 
Carranza regime, and both before and after that move pressed 
the Wilson Administration to interfere in the internal af­
fairs of the republic on behalf of the Mexican Church.
(3) Despite the fact that Wilson and Bryan despised 
the "concessionaire,1 particularly the oilman in Mexico, 
they refused to abandon the Mexican oilfields to destruction 
or expropriation by revolutionaries or by any other faction. 
Economic, political, and strategic exigencies forbade it.
In the first place, the Wilson Administration, in accord 
with the unfortunate Tyrrell Agreement, was pledged to 
protect foreign lives and property in the republic; second.
the Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding, the British Government 
would not tolerate interdiction of the production and export 
of Mexican petroleum, the primary source of fuel oil for the 
embattled Royal Navy; third, as the United States itself 
drifted ever closer to participation in the European con­
flict, the oil fields of Mexico assumed ever greater strate­
gic importance to Washington as well; and, finally, to have 
permitted revolutionary expropriation of legitimately ac­
quired petroleum properties in Mexico would have been to 
permit the establishment of an extremely dangerous precedent, 
one which would have invited repetition and jeopardized 
American overseas investment everywhere. Not even Wilson 
and Bryan, and certainly not Robert Lansing, were willing 
to run such a risk. Thus the Mexican petroleum industry 
was in a category unto itself. During the years immediately 
preceding and during American participation in the World 
War, it was held inviolate by the United States and Britain 
alike, and, in effect, internationalized. In that instance, 
at least, the President and others in his administration 
sympathetic to the Revolution readily accepted the premise 
that the national interests of the United States trans­
cended those of the Mexican people. Accordingly, then, the 
oilmen were permitted to enter into a marriage of convenience
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with Manuel Pelaez, the local-autonomist caudillo of tho 
petroleum province. Pelaez, supported by substantial sums 
allegedly extorted from the companies, successfully defied 
the revolutionary regime and denied it control of the oil­
fields. That relationship could never have developed and 
certainly could not have been maintained for any length of 
time without the tacit approval of the Department of State. 
Pelaez, however, proved the perfect cat's-paw for Washington, 
London, and the oilmen alike. And once that fact was appre­
ciated by those concerned, the relationship was allowed to 
stand. The Constitutionalists, of course, were fully cog­
nizant of that devious arrangement and deeply embittered by 
it. It clearly gave the lie to those self-denying prin­
ciples set forth in the President's Mobile Address of 
October, 1913, and was a primary cause of Constitutionalist 
fear of and hostility toward the Wilson Administration and 
American oilmen in Mexico.
(4) The primary cause of recurring- friction between 
the Carrancista faction and the Wilson Administration was 
the President's persistent meddling in Mexican affairs: 
first, in order to fulfill his rash pledge of November,
1913, to protect the lives and property of foreigners in the 
republic; second, because of the necessity to maintain order
in the petroleum province; and, third, because of Wilson's 
own vicarious participation in the revolutionary movement 
and his well-meaning but disastrous refusal to allow the 
Mexican people to work out their own destiny free of 
Wilsonian tutelage. Exacerbating the tension were a series 
of presidential blunders which intensified Carrancista 
antagonism toward the Wilson Administration and deepened 
the First Chief's suspicion of its underlying motives. 
Especially significant were the failure to inform Carranza 
in advance of the Veracruz operation and Wilson's subsequent 
refusal to withdraw American forces from the port following 
the demise of Huerta; the decision in late 1915 to break 
relations with the Constitutionalists and to recognize the 
new Conventionist regime; Washington's inexplicable solici­
tude for some prominent counterrevolutionary leaders; 
failure to curb the activities of the State Department Anti­
revolutionists; and, finally, the recurrent veiled threats 
to intervene militarily against the Constitutionalists in 
response to one or another of their acts that aroused the 
displeasure of officials in Washington. And there were 
other irritants as well. In retrospect, it is indeed sur­
prising that at some point between the Tampico incident and
de jure recognition of the Carranza regime formal hostilities
did not erupt between the United States and Mexico. 
Certainly, from the Mexican point of view, there was ample 
provocation.
(5) Recognition of the Carranza regime against the 
advice of the Antirevolutionists and over the urgent pro­
tests of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and American investors 
in Mexico was unquestionably premature. The resultant 
tenuous Mexican-American rapprochement was doomed from the 
start. Once recognized, the revolutionary government re­
ceived little sympathy and understanding and even less 
effective support from the Wilson Administration. At the 
same time, however, Washington expected and demanded a 
great deal from that government. In addition to eliminating 
Villa before he could retaliate against American interests 
in the North, it was expected to complete pacification of 
the republic, suppress the Texas Rebellion and the Indian 
uprisings of Sinaloa and Sonora, and protect foreign lives 
and property throughout Mexico. The United States itself, 
as subsequent events were to prove, would have been hard- 
pressed to complete such a task; for the Carrancistas it 
was patently impossible. Bankrupt, torn by factionalism, 
and weakened by disaffection, ineptness, and rampant corrup­
tion, the Carranza regime was incapable of responding
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effectively to any one of the manifold formidable challenges 
confronting it. Consequently, as the year 1915 drew to a 
close, Mexico again appeared on the verge of anarchy. By 
that time, too, the Wilson Administration had a number of 
legitimate and very serious grievances against the Carran­
cistas, and relations between the two governments were ra­
pidly approaching a nadir. For some time, moreover, 
officials in Washington had been receiving increasingly 
discouraging reports on the state of affairs in Mexico.
Thus, by early January, 1916, what little confidence those 
officials had in the ability of the Carranza regime to 
endure, much less to fulfill its obligations to the United 
States, was almost completely dispelled. Certainly State 
Department representatives and perhaps even the President 
himself were resigned to its imminent collapse. The Santa 
Ysabel massacre and the apparently dilatory Carrancista 
response strained relations to the breaking point. In that 
incendiary atmosphere, under the goad of election-year 
partisan politics, the Wilson Administration was bound, 
sooner or later, to intervene militarily in Mexico. The 
Columbus raid was anticlimactic.
As suggested above, the principal sources upon which 
this study is based are published and unpublished documents
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of the Department of State: Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States; Records of the Department 
of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910- 
1929; and especially. Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. In 
addition, I have made considerable use of several congres­
sional publications, the papers and memoirs of contemporary 
statesmen, the New York Times, and a number of secondary 
accounts of the period under consideration.
xv
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ABSTRACT
In February, 1913, counterrevolutionaries overthrew 
the government of Francisco I. Madero ,< established a dicta­
torship under Victoriano Huerta, and subsequently murdered 
the deposed president. Those events, in turn, provoked up­
risings in both the north and south of Mexico and formation 
of the Constitutionalist party, a diverse coalition of old 
and new revolutionary elements under the nominal leadership 
of Venustiano Carranza. Simultaneously, a well-meaning but 
misguided Woodrow Wilson, ignorant of Mexican affairs and 
insensitive to the intensity of Mexican nationalism, deter­
mined to oust the usurper and to restore legitimate consti­
tutional government to the neighboring republic. So began 
an unprecedented American interference in the internal affairs 
of Mexico.
Disregarding the advice of authorities on Mexican 
matters, the President initiated and vigorously pursued an 
aggressive diplomatic campaign to force Huerta's resignation. 
In so doing, he repeatedly violated Mexican sovereignty, 
offended all Mexican factions, and rashly assumed full 
responsibility for the protection of foreign lives
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and property in Mexico, thereby placing his administration 
irrevocably at odds with the revolutionary movement. Finally, 
in April, 1914, in a desperate attempt to force Huerta from 
power, the President ordered the seizure and occupation of 
Veracruz. Although achieving its immediate objective, that 
act aroused the hostility and suspicion of the Constitu­
tionalists and very nearly precipitated a major Mexican- 
American conflict. Undeterred, Wilson continued to meddle 
in Mexican affairs through the summer of 1914, cultivating 
Carranza's principal rival and completing alienation of the 
dominant wing of the revolutionary movement.
In the ensuing factional strife, the President again 
ignored the advice of informed sources, broke relations with 
Carranza, and declared for the dissident Convention of 
Aguascalientes. By early 1915, the Conventionist regime was 
moribund, Wilson was faced with a., unpalatable choice: 
recognition of the intractable Carranza and loss of all 
control over the subsequent course of events in Mexico or 
armed intervention in an attempt to establish a pliable and 
cooperative puppet regime. Increasingly preoccupied with the 
war in Europe and anxious to disengage from Mexican affairs, 
the President seriously considered joint Pan-American inter­
vention and an imposed settlement of the Mexican civil war.
Taking advantage of Wilson's distraction and dislike of 
Carranza, a group of lesser State Department officials made 
common cause with Mexican reactionaries and sought Adminis­
tration support for a counterrevolutionary settlement of the 
Mexican problem. Their ultimate goals were to frustrate the 
Revolution and to establish an American protectorate over 
Mexico. They very nearly succeeded. In the final analysis, 
however, neither Wilson nor Lansing would countenance the 
scheme.
Eventually, Carrancista military victories and dis­
covery of a German plot to prolong Mexican-American tension 
prompted a thorough re-evaluation of Wilsonian Mexican policy. 
Consequently, in October, 1915, the President grudgingly 
extended de facto recognition to the Carranza regime. That 
government, in turn, was pledged to complete pacification, 
halt border raids, and protect foreign lives and property 
throughout Mexico. It was an impossible task. By early 1916, 
the republic was again on the verge of anarchy, and legitimate 
American grievances against Carranza were mounting. Offi­
cials in Washington, meanwhile, had all but lost faith in the 
ability of the Carranza regime to endure, much less to fulfill 
its obligations to the United States. Its collapse appeared 
imminent. In that climate of mutual distrust and disillusion­
ment the atrocity at Santa Ysabel occurred. Given the
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violent reaction of the American people, particularly along 
the Southwestern frontier, and the exigencies of election- 
year politics, preventive armed intervention in Mexico was 
a foregone conclusion. Villa's Columbus raid was anticli- 
mactic.
The principal sources utilized in this study are 
published and unpublished records of the Department of State.
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Chapter 1
WOODROW WILSON AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION:
THE INITIAL RESPONSE
I.
On the afternoon of May 24, 1911, angry crowds 
surged through the streets of Mexico City. Demanding the 
resignation of President Porfirio Diaz, they massed before 
the National Palace, overflowed the plaza, and invaded the 
galleries of Congress. The end of an era was at hand. The 
Porfirian edifice, a monument to political stability, fell 
crashing to earth. Some thirty years of material progress 
and domestic tranquillity gave way to more than a decade of 
wanton destruction and savage factional strife. Not until 
the late nineteen-twenties did the bloodshed cease and 
Mexico again return to the rule of law. When the fighting 
was over the Old Regime had passed forever. In its place 
stood the Mexican Nation.^-
1Among the principal general works in English 
treating the Mexican Revolution are the standard history 
of Mexico, Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (3rd 
ed., rev. and enl.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960) 
Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (2nd ed.; New York 
D. Appleton-Century Company, 19 42); Howard F. Cline, The
1
The demise of Porfirian Mexico was due in large part 
to the efforts of one of its own disaffected sons, Francisco 
I. Madero, scion of one of the great aristocratic families 
of northern Mexico. Convinced that the regeneration of his 
country could be achieved only through effective suffrage 
and a return to legitimate constitutional government, Madero 
declared his opposition to the Diaz dictatorship and announced 
his intention to seek the presidency in the election of 1910. 
Candid, idealistic, and incredibly naive, Madero at first 
evoked only amused contempt in the capital. As opposition 
to the reelection of Diaz spread throughout Mexico, however.
United States and Mexico (3rd ed., rev. and enl.; New York: 
Atheneum, 1963); and William Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico,
The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (New York: Double­
day & Company, 1968), hereafter cited as Heroic Mexico. A 
useful general account of the Revolution in Spanish is 
Jesus Silva Herzog, Breve Historia de la Revolucion Mexicans 
(2 vols.; Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1962), 
hereafter cited as Breve Historia. More detailed specialized 
studies include Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: 
Genesis Under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press,
19 52), hereafter cited as Genesis Under Madero; Kenneth J. 
Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1969), hereafter cited as Huerta; Michael C. 
Meyer, Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolu­
tion, 1910-1915 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967) 
hereafter cited as Orozco; Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revo­
lution. 1914-1916: The Convention of Aguascalientes (New York: 
The Citadel Press, 19 63), hereafter cited as The Mexican Revo­
lution: Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of 
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 
hereafter cited as Madero; and John Womack, Jr., Zapata and 
the Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1969), 
hereafter cited as Zapata.
amusement turned to apprehension. Madero was jailed at 
San Luis Potosi. Escaping to the United States in the fall 
of 1910, he sought in vain to organize an effective uprising 
against the dictator. Finally, in February 1911, he re­
crossed the border to join the Chihuahua insurrectionists
2
under Pascual Orozco.
Shortly after returning to Mexico, Madero emerged 
as ideological leader of a powerful revolutionary coalition. 
During the weeks that followed his return, the Maderistas, 
or Antireelectionists, extended their control over most of 
northern Mexico. Meanwhile, south of the capital,
Emiliano Zapata led the peasants of Morelos against the 
great hacendados, confiscating the land and redistributing 
it among his indigent followers.^ In still other parts of 
the republic lesser chieftains rose in rebellion, increas­
ing the pressure on a government already on the verge of 
collapse. Paralysis gripped the capital. Surrounded by
2
Ross, Madero, 135; Cumberland, Genesis Under 
Madero, 129; and Meyer, Orozco, 27-29. The origins of both 
the Maderista movement and the popular insurrections in 
northern Mexico are best treated in the three aforementioned 
works.
3Parkes, A History of Mexico, 327-328; Cline, The 
United States and Mexico, 127; Womack, Zapata, 87-96,
39 3-404. Zapata's program was embodied in the Plan of 
Ayala, proclaimed in November, 1911, and in an agrarian 
law of October, 1915. Ibid., 393-411.
incompetence, apathy, and defeatism, the old dictator was 
unable to mount an effective defense. On May 21, far to 
the north in Ciudad Juarez, his most trusted agents sold 
out to the Revolution.^ Pour days later, in the wake of 
violent demonstrations, Porfirio Diaz stepped down.
The joy of the Mexican people was short-lived. As 
previously determined at Ciudad Juarez, a provisional 
government composed largely of former Porfiristas assumed 
control in Mexico City pending national elections in the 
fall. Recovering rapidly from the shock of defeat, con­
servative and reactionary elements subverted the interim 
government and joined in a widespread conspiracy to frus­
trate reform. The hapless Madero, shrinking from leader­
ship, played directly into their hands. At the same time, 
factional bitterness threatened to destroy the revolutionary 
coalition at the very moment when unity was most sorely 
needed. Nonetheless, in October 1911, in what was 
"probably the freest election ever held in Mexico," Madero 
was chosen president of the republic.^ United States 
recognition quickly followed.6
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 121-124; 
Johnson, Heroic Mexico, 64-65.
6Parkes, A History of Mexico, 326.
6Cline, The United States and Mexico, 129.
Despite his success at the polls, Madero was unable 
to consolidate his victory. He was concerned primarily 
with political reform, with establishing effective suffrage 
and genuine constitutional democracy. When those goals 
were achieved, he believed, desperately needed social and 
economic reforms would naturally follow through the normal 
legislative process. As a moderate, however, Madero was 
immediately suspect. His personal following rapidly fell 
away. Conservatives feared change and resisted his pro­
grams, while many of his former comrades-in-arms angrily 
denounced him as a Judas betraying the Revolution. As 
opposition to his administration mounted, Madero was 
forced to rely increasingly upon the old Porfirista Federal 
army to maintain order. Soon after the inauguration 
Zapata's acraristas resumed their campaign of expropria­
tion against the hacendados of Guerrero and Morelos.
General Victoriano Huerta, chief of the Federal army, was 
sent to the southern sierra where he succeeded in momen­
tarily containing, if not breaking, the Zapatista revolt. 
The result was the further estrangement of Madero from his 
erstwhile revolutionary allies. Some months later, during 
the fall of 1912, Huerta was again called upon to suppress 
armed rebellion. Three successive counterrevolutions, the
last led by the old dictator's nephew, General Felix Diaz, 
were put down in short order. By the beginning of the new 
year, then, all serious overt opposition to the Madero 
Government had been overcome. But stability was merely an 
illusion.
Strong and implacable covert opposition to both
Madero and his program of moderate reform persisted. Arrayed
against the President were the powerful and reactionary
Mexican Church, the great hacendados, the majority of the
officer corps of the Federal army, and virtually all Mexican
conservatives. So too were many foreigners resident in the
republic and most American and European corporations with
large investments in Mexico. Among those persons most
deeply antagonistic to the President was the United States
7
Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson. The unabashed champion of 
American business interests in Mexico, Wilson was closely
Q
associated with the Guggenheim enterprises. The Guggenheims, 
in turn, controlled the huge American Smelting and Refining 
Company (ASARCO) whose principal competitor in northern Mexico
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, 235-236? Ross, 
Madero, 237-240.
Q
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 128-130;
Parkes, A History of Mexico, 330.
was a mining and smelting company owned by the Madero
family. In addition to those considerations, Wilson soon
developed an intense personal dislike of Madero himself.
He availed himself of every opportunity to harass the
President, to frustrate his programs, and to discredit his
administration abroad.10 g0 biased were the Ambassador's
reports on conditions in Mexico that State Department
1 1officials eventually discounted them all together. Yet 
Wilson was not recalled. The consequences were tragic.
On February 9, 1913, Generals Diaz and Bernardo 
Reyes, having suborned a large part of the army, rose again 
against the Madero Government, Reyes was killed almost im­
mediately. Nonetheless, for more than a week the capital 
was a battleground between Felicistas and Federal troops 
under Victoriano Huerta. Then, on February 17, Huerta 
arranged a secret meeting with his adversary. The result
q
Ross, Madero, 3, 237. ASARCO, with home offices 
in New York, was one of the largest foreign investors in 
Mexico. Its holdings included producing mines in seven 
north-central Mexican states and five multi-million-dollar 
lead and copper smelting plants at Monterrey, Chihuahua City 
Matehuala, Aguascalientes, and Verladena. Moody1s Manual 
of Railroads and Corporation Securities, Industrial Section, 
1919 (New York: Poor's Publishing Company, 1919) 2122-2127.
^Ross, Madero, 237-239.
iaTbid., 239
was the infamous Pact of the Ciudadela by which the General 
agreed to betray his chief and share the spoils with Diaz. 
Accordingly, on the following afternoon, at Huerta's com­
mand, Madero and Vice-President Jose M. Pino Suarez were 
arrested and imprisoned. The General then informed Congress 
and the several state governors of his action and announced 
his assumption of power. To President Taft he coolly ad­
dressed the following message: "I have the honor to inform
you that I have overthrown this Government. The armed 
forces support me, and from now on pea^a and prosperity 
will reign.
Henry Lane Wilson was instrumental in the overthrow 
of Madero.^ Cumberland observes that while the Taft ad­
ministration itself was not particularly opposed to the 
Mexican President, Wilson as its "official representative" 
was known to be "exceedingly antagonistic." And since 
Washington gave its agent "at least tacit support in his 
activities,1 Cumberland concludes, "it may be said that the
12Huerta to Taft, February 18, 1913, U.S., Depart­
ment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1913 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1920), 721. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 
1913.
13Ross, Madero, 293-311; Cumberland, Genesis Under
Madero, 243.
American government was hostile."'*'4 Certainly it seemed so 
to informed Mexicans. That impression, in turn, unquestion­
ably encouraged Madero's domestic opponents. They had a 
powerful ally in Wilson and they knew,it. Indeed, upon con­
clusion of the Pact of the Ciudadela, the conspirators
straightway advised the Ambassador of the meeting and in-
15formed him that Madero's removal was imminent.
16Wilson was elated. The following day, some hours
before the coup was actually executed, he proceeded to wire
Washington that Madero had fallen. Then, "not content
merely to watch developments," the Ambassador "took an active
1 7part in determining the course of events." Following 
Madero's arrest, he summoned Diaz and Huerta to the Embassy 
where he presided over negotiation of the so-called Pact 
of the Embassy. Essentially a reaffirmation and elabora­
tion of the Ciudadela agreement, it provided for the immediate 
installation of Huerta as provisional president, the appoint­
ment of a predominantly Felicista cabinet, and a mutual
14Ibid., 258.
15Wilson to Knox, February 17, 1913, Foreign 
Relations, 1913, 718.
l6Wilson to Knox, February 18, 1913, Ibid., 720-721.
17Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, 238.
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guarantee that under no circumstances would a Maderista 
restoration be permitted. It was further understood that 
Huerta would ultimately step down and support Diaz' 
candidacy in the next regular e l e c t i o n . W i l s o n  was more 
than satisfied with the "happy outcome of events . . . ."^9 
From that point on, he was among the most vociferous ad­
vocates of the Huerta regime.
Anxious to legitimize his position, Huerta obtained 
the resignations of Madero and Pino Suarez in exchange for 
a pledge to them of safe conduct out of the country. Then, 
through the intimidation of Congress and clever manipula­
tion of the presidential succession law, the General emerged 
as legal provisional president of the republic.20 Mean­
while, both in Mexico and abroad, apprehension mounted over 
the fate of Madero and his deputy. And with good cause. 
Despite a flood of pleas for clemency the prisoners were 
doomed. Early in the pre-dawn of February 23 they were 
removed from their cells and shot to death, allegedly while
l*8lbid., Ross, Madero, 310-311.
•t-9Wilson to Knox, February 18, 1913. Foreign
Relations, 1913, 720-721.
20Grieb, Huerta, 21-23; Cumberland, Genesis Under
Madero, 239.
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21attempting to escape. Henry Lane Wilson did not protest.
On the contrary, he readily accepted Huerta’s explanation
of the incident and, with his own endorsement, passed it on
to the Secretary of State. At the same time, he strongly
recommended to his superiors that Washington immediately
22extend full recognition to the new regime.
Wilson was either "unaware or indifferent" to the
wave of revulsion against Huerta then sweeping the United 
23States. Outraged liberals, albeit for vastly different 
reasons, added their demands for intervention to those al­
ready voiced by Americans resident in Mexico or those with
O A
large investments in the republic. But Taft steadfastly 
refused to be pushed into war, particularly a war which he 
believed would be fought solely for "the purposes of ex­
ploitation and g a i n . N o r  would he extend immediate 
recognition to Huerta. Instead, Taft hoped to use the 
matter of recognition as leverage in winning prompt and
21Ross, Madero. 328-329; Grieb, Huerta, 27-29.






satisfactory settlement of a number of unresolved disputes
26between the United States and Mexico. Washington, then,
assumed de facto relations with the new regime while denying
it de -jure recognition. The effectiveness of that measure
was markedly reduced, however, when Great Britain, Germany,
France, and a number of other states with envoys in the
Mexican capital subsequently extended full recognition to
the Huerta regime on the ground that it was in fact the
27legitimate constitutional government of Mexico.
Kenneth J. Grieb contends that Huerta "sincerely 
wished to help his people and considered further economic 
development the most effective method" of doing so. The 
General, however, "failed to perceive that the necessary 
protection of foreign interests antagonized the poverty- 
stricken peons who comprised the overwhelming majority of 
the Mexican people." Moreover, he was "firmly convinced 
that Mexico was not prepared for democracy," that such a 
system was doomed to failure in his country. In sum, Huerta 
believed that "only a strong government" could control the
26Ibid.
27Arthur Link, Wilson; The New Freedom (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1956), 348.
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republic "sufficiently to promote its development." Mexico, 
he informed 0'Shaughnessy some months after the coup, was
no
"not ready for any government save a dictatorship,"
The General's plan to reconstruct the centralized 
Porfirian state drew immediate opposition from a number of 
regional caudillos. In northern Mexico Governors Venustiano 
Carranza of Coahuila and Abram Gonzalez of Chihuahua re­
fused to accept the provisional government. Huertistas in 
Chihuahua countered by hurling Gonzalez beneath a moving 
train. That brutal assassination, following hard on the
n o
Grieb, Huerta, 51. Huerta's views clearly re­
flected his background and personal experience. An Indian 
from the State of Jalisco, he entered the Military College 
in 1871 and was commissioned a lieutenant soon after. For 
some forty years, Huerta served Porfirio Diaz, assisting in 
the suppression of the sporadic revolts that marked the 
early days of the regime and directing the work of the 
Geological Survey Commission in various parts of the re­
public. While still only a captain of engineers, he de­
vised the plan for a Mexican General Staff and was himself 
appointed to that body. He was subsequently promoted to 
brigadier general following campaigns against the Yaqui and 
Maya Indians. Upon the ouster of Diaz, Huerta offered his 
services to Madero. Soon he was sent to the North to put 
down the revolt under Pascual Orozco. But his success in 
that endeavor aroused the fears of the Maderos, and Huerta 
was removed from command and recalled to the capital. Con­
sequently, Orozco rose once again, and for a second time 
Madero called upon the General to restore order. He did so 
and was promoted to major general. Ill at the time of the 
first Felix Diaz revolt in October, 1912, Huerta played no 
part in its suppression. Nonetheless, by February, 1913, 
he was generally acknowledged to be "the greatest man in the 
Mexican Army." By that date, too, he had developed a pro­
found dislike of the Maderos and a deep contempt for parlia­
mentary democracy. New York Times, January 14, 1916.
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murder of the President, provoked armed rebellion in the 
29North. On March 26, 1913, disaffected northerners pro­
claimed the Plan of Guadalupe, a brief political declara­
tion reiterating Madero1s earlier insistence upon the 
restoration of genuine constitutional government. At the 
same time, Carranza, who had emerged as nominal leader of 
the dissidents, organized the Constitutionalist Army and 
assumed the title of First Chief. Some days later he pro­
claimed himself provisional president of the republic.3^
Never a single cohesive unit, the so-called Con­
stitutionalists were bound together solely by a mutual ani­
mosity toward the usurper. The new revolutionary movement 
was basically a coalition of regional strongmen, each with 
his own private army/ his own "brain trust" of intellectual 
sycophants, and his own highly personal revolutionary 
"philosophy." Perhaps the one common bond in their re­
spective pasts was earlier participation in the Maderista 
movement. In addition to Carranza, the most important of 
the northern factional leaders were Alvaro Obregon, ranchero 
and former school teacher and industrial worker from the
29Cline, The United States and Mexico, 136; Johnson, 
Heroic Mexico, 147-152; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 8-9.
30Ibid.; Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 351; Silva 
Herzog, Breve Historia, II, 19.
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State of Sonora; Francisco Villa, erstwhile bandit and bitter 
personal enemy of Huerta; and Pablo Gonzalez, commander of 
Carranza's personal following and an ardent if self-seeking 
revolutionary. South of the capital, in the rugged moun­
tains of Morelos, Emiliano Zapata and his bands of agra-
31ristas made common cause with the men of the north.
II.
On March 4, 1913, barely a week after Madero's 
murder, Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as President of the 
United States. From the Mexican capital Henry Lane Wilson 
renewed his bid for de jure recognition of the Huerta regime. 
Supported by Latin American specialists in the Department 
of State, the Ambassador pointed out that failure to re­
cognize the General’s government would encourage still new
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 136-139.
"To the Constitutionalist cause," Cline declares, "rallied 
a motley collection, all nominal subordinates of the First 
Chief . . . Their concepts of Mexico as a nation were but 
enlarged and hazy projections of the way of life in their 
respective patrias chicas . . . Chiefs and subchiefs professed 
loyalty to one or another of the four main divisions of the 
Constitutionalists. Shifting from one to another was fre­
quent. Whether a large band, a larger body, or one of the 
main hordes, each unit preserved a wide autonomy; the cement 
holding the Constitutionalists together was not ideology 
but personalities and success of guerrilla leaders, here­
tofore unknown persons . . . Locally, and for various reasons, 
the Constitutionalist groups were determined to oust the 
Usurper . . . ." Ibid., 136-138,
revolutionary ventures, thereby jeopardizing American lives
and property in Mexico.32 State Department Counselor John
Bassett Moore reminded the President that traditional
United States policy called for recognition of de facto
33governments regardless of their origins. Additional
pressure for recognition came from the large American
colony in Mexico City and from individuals and corporations
with substantial investments in the republic. Huerta
alone, it was contended, was capable of protecting the
lives of the some forty thousand Americans resident in
Mexico and guarantying the estimated one billion dollars'
worth of American property in that country.3^
Advocates of recognition argued in vain. The
President had been disgusted by the usurpation and outraged
35by the murder of the deposed Madero. He could not con­
done the overthrow of a legitimate government, much less 
the execution of its duly elected officials. Moreover, he
32Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 348-349.
33Ibid., 349.
3^Ibid.; Grieb, Huerta, 72.
35Ibid., 4 3; Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Era, 1910-1917, The New American Nation Series, 
eds. Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963), 109 (Hereafter cited as Woodrow 
Wilson and the Progressive Era).
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was convinced that American acquiescence in the Huerta coup
would almost certainly encourage similar adventures in
other Latin American countries. Consequently, shortly
after his inauguration, Wilson made his position clear:
The United States could not and would not sympathize "with
those who seek to seize the power of government to advance
their own personal interests or ambitions."3® Thus the
President adopted "constitutional legitimacy" as the
fundamental requisite for American de jure recognition.
It was a policy, observes Arthur Link, adopted "not
blindly, but in the face of clear warnings from Counselor
Moore that it was historically and legally unsound and
could lead only to immeasurable interference in Mexican 
37a f f a i r s . A n d  so it did. Nonetheless, for far too long, 
the President stubbornly adhered to his original position.
Unfortunately, upon assuming office and for some 
time thereafter, Wilson badly misunderstood both the temper 
of the Mexican people and the nature of the revolutionary 
movement. Moreover, as Howard Cline maintains, the Presi­
dent was "unprepared by experience or inclination to handle 
delicate international matters." He tended to "project his
36New York Times, March 12, 1913.
37Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 350.
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domestic policy— where he could control the situation—  
into international affairs" and tried to "control those 
elements in the same manner" that he forced bills through 
C o n g r e s s . The convergence of such serious liabilities 
predictably produced deplorable results. Not until the 
summer of 1915, long after irreparable damage had been 
done to Mexican-American relations, did the President 
finally grasp the full significance of the Mexican Revo­
lution and begin to deal realistically with the problems 
arising from it.
For months after his inauguration Wilson believed 
that the Mexican people "were fully prepared for democracy 
in the American style." He assumed that there was little 
basic difference between Mexican culture and society and 
that of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Those obvious differences 
that could not be overlooked he dismissed as merely super­
ficial rather than fundamental. His early approach to the 
Mexican question was "predicated on the belief that if the 
Mexicans would hold a free election and follow constitu­
tional practices their troubles would e v a p o r a t e . "39 por 
two and a half years, despite over-whelming evidence to the
38ciine, The United States and Mexico, 140.
39Ibid.
contrary, he stubbornly clung to that dogma. "Unfortunately 
Cline concludes, "Woodrow Wilson in 1913 was a man with a 
single view of Mexico and that one was wrong." The Presi­
dent, "in a program of moral imperialism . . . placed the 
weight of the United States behind a continuous, sometimes 
devious, effort to force the Mexican nation to meet his ill- 
conceived specifications."4® One mistake followed another.
To his credit, Wilson moved slowly in formulating 
a definite Mexican policy. He soon came to despise and 
distrust Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, but allowed that 
official to remain at his post another six months while he 
sought to inform himself on the true state of affairs in 
Mexico. Meanwhile, in March, 1913, the New York World and 
several other leading journals launched a fierce attack on 
the Ambassador, exposing his participation in the Huerta 
coup. In addition to that damning evidence, the Ambassador 
was further discredited by the patent falsity of his reports 
concerning the subsequent civil strife in Mexico.41 Finally
40Ibid., 141.
41Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 
1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1944), 180-181 (Hereafter cited as The Wilson Era: 
Years of Peace).
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in July, he was recalled. For some time thereafter the 
ranking American diplomatic representative in the Mexican 
capital was Charge d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy, him­
self an admirer of Huerta.^ Not until March 1917 did a 
fully accredited American ambassador return to Mexico City.
During the spring of 1913, pressure upon the Presi­
dent to recognize the Huerta regime mounted on all sides.
It came from such close friends and advisors c3 Cleveland 
H. Dodge and Colonel Edward M. House; from Secretary of 
War Lindley H. Garrison and Secretary of the Interior 
Franklin K. Lane; from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey; and finally and increasingly from American
a  n
investors in Mexico. Ultimately, in a cabinet meeting 
on May 2 3, the matter of recognition came to a head. The 
President and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan were 
convinced that the great majority of the Mexican people were 
opposed to Huerta and that recognition of the General's 
regime would be "wrong from every consideration.1 Strong 
support for their position came from Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels and Secretary of Agriculture David F. 
Houston. Only Lane and Garrison openly questioned the
42Grieb, Huerta, 88.
^Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 181-182; 
Grieb, Huerta, 73.
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President's decision to withhold recognition from the Huerta 
regime.44 In subsequently announcing that decision, Wilson 
expressed both indignation and alarm at the intensity of 
pressure brought to bear on the White House by American in­
vestors in Mexico: "I have to pause," he declared to the
assembled Cabinet, "and remind myself that I am President 
of the United States and not of a small group of Americans 
with vested interests in Mexico."46 He was to remind him­
self of that fact many times in the years that followed.
Earlier in the month, the President had begun to 
move toward a more active role in Mexican affairs. On 
May 6, Julius Kruttschnitt, Chairman of the Board of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad, a firm with large interests in 
Mexico, submitted to Colonel House a plan for restoring 
peace in Mexico.46 Drafted by Kansas City attorney Delbert 
J. Haff, himself an investor in the Mexican oil industry,
44Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 182.
45Ibid.; Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know 
Him (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921), 147.
46Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 351. The Southern 
* Pacific Company's principal interests in the republic were 
the highly profitable Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico, 
whose track extended some 1200 miles down the west coast 
of Mexico, and the East Coast Oil Company, a substantial 
producer of crude oil in the fields around Tampico.
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the plan was alleged to have the support of such major in­
vestors in Mexico as the Greene Cananea Copper Company; 
Phelps, Dodge and Company; and E. L. Doheny's Mexican 
Petroleum Company.^ In mid-May, Wilson's friend and ad­
visor, Cleveland H. Dodge of Phelps, Dodge and Company, one 
of the world's great copper producers, brought Haff to the 
White House for a personal interview with the President.
The attorney presented his plan to Wilson and urged its 
adoption. Haff called for the conditional recognition of 
Huerta's government contingent upon the General's agreeing 
to cooperate with the Constitutionalists in holding early 
elections to choose a permanent government. Wilson liked
4^Ibid. The aforementioned corporations were among 
the dozen largest foreign enterprises in Mexico. The 
Greene Cananea Copper Company, controlled by Boston capital, 
held a large number of mining claims and more than 15,000 
acres in the north Mexican state of Sonora. Its producing 
agent, the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, operated at 
Cananea, Sonora, some forty miles below the Arizona border. 
Moody's Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities, 
Industrial Section, 1919, 2516-2518. Phelps, Dodge & Com­
pany, with home offices in New York, controlled the Mocte- 
zuma Copper Company which, in turn, worked the Pilares Mine 
at Nacozari, Sonora, a company town some ninety miles south 
of Douglas, Arizona. Ibid., 1645-1647. The Mexican 
Petroleum Company, with home offices in New York and Los 
Angeles, held through its several producing subsidiaries 
in excess of 600,000 acres - approximately 1000 square 
miles - in the heart of the Mexican Gulf Coast oilfields.
In addition to its oil interests, the company also had a 
large investment in stock-raising in the same region.
Ibid., 2707-2710.
the plan. It seemed to him to offer a simple and equitable
4 Rsolution to the problem. Still he hesitated to adopt the 
proposal. A revised plan, submitted some days later by 
Kruttschnitt, was more to his liking. It omitted alto­
gether conditional recognition of the General, merely sug­
gesting American mediation to bring about national elections. 
It is clear, then, that both the President and his would-be 
advisors utterly failed to grasp the situation below the 
border. Neither began to comprehend the profundity of the 
passions aroused.
In the end Wilson chose to pigeonhole mediation, 
deciding instead to withhold recognition. His distrust of 
Henry Lane Wilson was by then complete and he was thoroughly 
confused by the flood of conflicting reports on conditions
• ♦ Cf)xn the neighboring republic. At that point, acknowledging 
his ignorance of Mexican affairs, he sent the first of a 
succession of special presidential envoys to Mexico to ob­
tain accurate information upon which to construct a sound
49Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 351,
49Ibid., 352.
50Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 181.
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Mexican policy. Late in May, 1913, the President asked his
personal friend and biographer, William Bayard Hale, to go
to the Mexican capital and make a first-hand study of the 
51situation.
III.
Although Hale knew almost nothing about Mexico, he 
was trusted implicitly by .Wilson. Consequently, his reports 
strongly influenced the President's position on Mexico
c 9
during the summer of 1913. Remaining in the Mexican
capital from June through August, Hale "largely confirmed
the President's own intuitive judgement of Huerta" and
53painted a bleak future for the troubled republic. The 
General, Hale believed, would never retire voluntarily; yet 
his continuance in power was certain to lead inevitably to
51Ibid.
52Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 354.
53Ibid. Hale described Huerta as an "ape-like old 
man, of almost pure Indian blood. He may almost be said to 
subsist on alcohol. Drunk or only half-drunk (he is never 
sober), he never loses a certain shrewdness. He has been a 
life-long soldier, and one of the best in Mexico, and he 
knows no methods but those of force.” Ibid. Given the 
President's own stern moral standards, Hale's portrait of 
Huerta almost certainly strengthened Wilson's resolve to 
force the General from office. In addition, it doubtless 
enhanced his sense of moral ascendancy vis a vis Mexican 
political leaders, an unfortunate characteristic manifested 
time and again by what must have struck those leaders as an 
insufferable self-righteousness.
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bankruptcy and chaos. If Huerta was not soon removed. Hale 
predicted, the United States eventually would be forced to 
occupy the republic. Wilson's agent was unimpressed with 
the General's opponents. He considerably underestimated 
both the popularity and the power of the Constitutionalist 
movement, dismissing it as relatively unimportant and of 
little value in solving the immediate problems raised by 
the Huerta c o u p . ^
Further discouraging reports came from a second 
unofficial agent sent out by the Secretary of State to in­
vestigate the revolutionary coalition. Reginald F. Del Valle, 
"an obscure friend of Bryan's," proceeded in early June to 
Carranza's headquarters in northern Mexico. There he con­
ferred with most of the important Constitutionalist leaders.
He too was unimpressed. The Del Valle mission. Link declares, 
was "not merely a fiasco . . . but a positive disaster." The 
agent's analysis of the revolutionary movement was "gravely 
misleading" at a time when it was imperative that Wilson 
and Bryan have accurate information. Bryan's man "com­
pletely misjudged or confused everything that he heard and 
saw." Relying upon his estimate of the political situation
54ibid., 354-355.
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in Mexico, there was no way that Washington could have 
taken the Constitutionalist movement seriously. Del Valle 
erred still further by stopping in Mexico City while en 
route to Zapata's headquarters in Morelos. While in the 
capital he foolishly exposed the nature of his mission in
northern Mexico, further poisoning relations between Washing-
55ton and the Huerta Government.
By midsummer, 1913, due in large part to the alarm­
ing reports of Hale and Del Valle, Wilson and Bryan were con­
vinced that they must move at once to forestall the complete 
collapse of Mexican society and subsequent American occupa­
tion of large areas of the republic. The Huerta Government, 
it was believed, was on the verge of bankruptcy. From 
Washington, at least, its dissolution appeared immiment. 
Wilson anticipated subsequent anarchy and xenophobic out­
bursts against the foreign community. He was equally cer­
tain that European governments with citizens and extensive 
interests in the republic would not hesitate to intervene, 
the Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding, should Washington prove
c c
unwilling or unable to provide adequate protection. More­




destruction of American properties in Mexico would unques­
tionably give rise to intense domestic pressure for armed 
intervention. For those reasons, then, Wilson and Bryan 
believed that they must stabilize the Mexican situation as 
rapidly as possible. The alternative appeared to be eventual 
armed intervention and, ultimately, war with Mexico.
Late in July, the President and the Secretary of 
State moved toward a positive settlement of the Mexican 
question. The discredited Henry Lane Wilson was recalled, 
the Kruttschnitt-Haff mediation plan revived and modified, 
and a former governor of Minnesota, John Lind, was appointed 
confidential agent to present the amended plan to the Huerta 
Government. Lind was instructed to offer American media­
tion of the civil war and to accompany that offer with four 
demands: (1) an armistice between Huerta's Federal forces
and those of the Constitutionalists (2) a pledge of early
57Ibid., 356. Lind, a friend of Bryan, was a pro­
gressive Democrat with a reputation for combatting the 
trusts. He knew virtually nothing of Mexico, spoke no 
Spanish, and had no prior experience in diplomacy. Grieb 
accurately describes him as "singularly unqualified." Lind 
"inspired devotion among his supporters and hatred among 
those he opposed, and he reciprocated these feelings." In 
addition, he was a "rabid anti-Catholic," certainly no asset 
in Mexico. Nonetheless, his domestic political record and 
his "anti-imperialist and anti-big-business views" strongly 
commended him to Wilson and Bryan. They thought alike, 
and that was enough. Grieb, Huerta, 92.
and free elections in which all factions would be allowed 
to participate (3) the General's pledge not to be a candi­
date, and (4) the acquiescence of all parties in the results 
of the election and mutual cooperation in supporting the
C Q
new administration. ° On paper at least the American plan 
appeared to offer an ideal solution to the Mexican problem. 
Unfortunately, it was never put to the test. "If John Lind 
had possessed every art and talent and genius of ail the 
diplomats of a century," reminisced Josephus Daniels, "he 
could not have secured the consent of Huerta to eliminate 
himself, or persuade Carranza and Villa to lay down their 
arms. The noble purpose failed . . - . "59
Huerta reacted angrily to Lind's overtures, denounc­
ing Washington's interference in Mexican affairs and threat­
ening to "resist with arms" any further meddling.®9 How­
ever, despite the General's official hostility, Lind was able 
to confer at length with Foreign Secretary Federico Gamboa. 
Huerta's spokesman unequivocally rejected Lind's proposals,
5®Address of the President... Embodying the Presi­
dent's Instructions to Mr. Lind..., August 27, 1913,
Foreign Relations, 1913, 822.
59
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 182.
6nuNew York Times, August 9, 1913.
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insisting instead upon recognition of the General's regime
C 1
and a formal exchange of ambassadors. Realizing that he 
had made no progress whatsoever, Lind offered to sweeten 
the deal with a large American loan to the de facto govern­
ment. But Huerta indignantly rejected the bribe. Frustrated, 
Wilson's agent sought and shortly obtained permission to in­
timidate the General. If Huerta continued to resist American 
demands, Lind warned, the United States would be forced 
either to recognize the Constitutionalists or to intervene 
itself in the Mexican imbroglio. Huerta stood fast. He 
sensed the bluff and called it. In a final meeting between 
Lind and Gamboa, the Secretary noted that Mexican law pro­
hibited a provisional president from standing for reelection. 
Grasping at straws, Lind chose to interpret that chance re­
mark as evidence of Huerta's acceptance of the American de­
mands and so reported it to Washington. Gamboa {and Huerta), 
of course, intended nothing of the sort.^
On August 27, shortly after Lind left Mexico City, 
Wilson went before a joint session of Congress to explain
^Grieb, Huerta, 96-99. The ridiculousness of the 
American position was revealed with telling effect in 
Gamboa's formal reply to Lind on August 16. Doubtless the 
President was stung. See Reply of... Gamboa to the Propo­
sals of... Lind, August 16, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, 
823-827.
6 9
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 146.
his Mexican policy. It was his first major public statement 
on the situation in the neighboring republic. The President 
discussed in full the Lind mission and expressed deep re­
gret at its apparent failure. Still, he reminded his lis­
teners, the United States could not in justice impose its 
will upon the Mexican people. "Clearly," he continued, 
"everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done 
with calm and disinterested deliberation." The United States 
could "afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really 
great nation," one "which realizes its own strength and 
scorns to misuse it." In closing, Wilson urged all Americans 
still in Mexico to withdraw from that country. Meanwhile,
his administration would adopt a neutral position and embargo
6 1arms shipments to both Mexican factions.
The President's speech was well-received both by the 
press and by the majority of the American people.64 The 
neutral stance and the policy of non-interference proved 
immensely popular. Moreover, immediately ensuing events in 
Mexico appeared to vindicate Wilson's forebearance. Early 
in September, Huerta announced his intention to retire from
OJAddress of the President... Embodying the Presi­
dent's Instructions to Mr. Lind..., August 27, 1913, Foreign 
Relations, 1913, 822-823.
64New York Times, August 28, 1913.
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office. Shortly thereafter, Gamboa was designated presi­
dential candidate of the conservative Catholic Party, and 
the objectionable Felix Diaz was dispatched to Japan on a 
lengthy diplomatic mission.^ At last the way seemed clear 
for a return to true constitutional government in Mexico.
Highly pleased, Bryan declared that the United 
States stood ready to extend full recognition to Gamboa 
should he emerge the victor in the projected October 26 
election. The fact that the Constitutionalists and the 
Mexican Liberal Party might boycott the polls and continue 
the civil war in no way affected the Secretary's decision.
It was a "simple solution," Link observes, "but a hopelessly 
unrealistic one." The Catholic Party was a distinct minority 
dominated by former Porfiristas. Clearly reactionary and 
avowedly opposed to reform, it singularly failed to repre­
sent the revolutionary aspirations of the majority of the 
Mexican people. At the same time, however, the Constitu­
tionalists, the one faction capable of fulfilling those as­
pirations, stood discredited in the eyes of the President 
and the Secretary of State. Although Huerta's opponents had
^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 363-364; Grieb, 
Huerta, 104.
6^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 364.
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neither organized a government nor drafted a constitution, 
they were still the obvious heirs of the Madcro Revolu­
tion.^^ It was folly to assume that they would accept a 
president not of their own choosing, to say nothing of a 
protege of the usurper.
Among Wilson's advisors William Bayard Hale alone 
had come to recognize that salient fact. Proceeding to 
Washington late in September, he succeeded in impressing 
upon the President the necessity of Constitutionalist
6 Qparticipation in the approaching election. Bryan then 
opened negotiations with Carranza, calling upon him to co­
operate in arranging an armistice and in choosing a new 
government for the republic. Rejecting the Secretary's 
proposal, the First Chief denounced compromise as a solu­
tion to his country's problems. It was his intent, he
informed Bryan, to forcibly eject Huerta and bring all of
69Mexico under revolutionary control.
Hammering home the point, Constitutionalist troops 
shortly seized the strategic rail center of Torreon. Fall
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 9; Gruening, 
Mexico and Its Heritage, 98-99.
^®Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 364-365.
69Ibid., 365.
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of the "key to Huerta's defenses in northern Mexico" re­
sulted in near-panic in the capital, precipitating a politi­
cal crisis which forced the General's hand.^ On October 10 
the Chamber of Deputies, grown weary of Huerta and hedging 
against his downfall, threatened to adjourn and reconvene 
in Constitutionalist territory. Moving swiftly to quell 
incipient rebellion, Huerta dismissed Congress and jailed 
more than a hundred disaffected deputies. Firmly in control, 
the General reiterated his intention to retire and announced 
that elections would be held on October 26 as s c h e d u l e d .  7 3 *
In Washington the President expressed dismay and in­
dignation at the vigorous suppression of Huerta's opposition. 
In a strongly-worded note to the Mexican Foreign Office, he 
protested the "lawless methods" employed by the General, 
branding the dissolution of Congress and imprisonment of 
the deputies as "an act of bad faith toward the United 
States." Huerta's acts had destroyed all possibility of a 
free and fair election, he charged, and because of that
70 Ibid.; Cline, The United States and Mexico, 147; 
Edith O 'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1916), 6-7; O'Shaughnessy to Bryan,
October 11, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, 836; Silva Herzog, 
Breve Historia, II, 14-16.
73-0'Shaughnessy to Bryan, October 11 and 23, Ibid., 
836-837 and 848-849.
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fact the United States could not accept the results of
7 2such an election or recognize the government chosen thereby.
Considering themselves freed from their prior pledge 
to uphold the results of the October 26 elections, Wilson 
and Bryan moved rapidly to forestall European recognition 
of Huerta's successor and to isolate and force from office 
the dictator himself. ^  Their determination to achieve 
those ends was greatly intensified by certain indiscreet 
remarks attributed to the new British Ambassador to Mexico, 
remarks which led, in turn, to a serious misunderstanding 
with the British Foreign Office. At the heart of the 
matter lay two all but irreconciliable issues; (1) The 
British Government's concern for the security of its citizens' 
huge investment in Mexico, particularly in the strategi­
cally vital Mexican oil industry, and (2) the obsessive 
distrust of and antagonism toward "the interests", regard­
less of nationality, shared by Wilson and Bryan, and their
^Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, October 13, 1913, Ibid.,
838.
7 3Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,
117; Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters 
(8 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1927- 
19 39), IV, 274-275 (hereafter cited as Woodrow Wilson).
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mutual revulsion against and opposition to Dollar or Pound
T  A
Sterling Diplomacy.
Already, on October 8, Lind had complained to 
Bryan that Sir Weetman Pearson, Lord Cowdray, "controlled" 
the Huerta Government. The largest single foreign investor 
in Mexico, Cowdray owned and operated the big Mexican 
Eagle Oil Company (Aguila Company). The Aguila had re- 
fineries at Tampico and Minatitlan and drilling rights to 
some 1.6 million a c r e s . B y  1913, it was virtually the
British investment in Mexico's railways, banks, 
mines, public utilities, and petroleum industry was immense, 
approaching or rivalling that of the American investors.
Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914; The Di­
plomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 196 8) , 19-21 (hereafter cited as Diplomacy 
of Anglo-American Conflict). The opposition of Wilson and 
Bryan to economic imperialism is well documented. See, for 
example. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 277; John Morton 
Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 86-87; Daniels, The Wilson 
Era: Years of Peace, 157; Lincoln Steffans, The Autobiography 
of Lincoln Steffans (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1931), 736; and Richard Challener, "William Jennings Bryan," 
An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1961), 82-83 (hereafter cited as "Bryan," An Uncertain 
Tradition).
75J. A. Spender, Weetman Pearson, First Lord Cowdray 
(London: Cassell and Company, 1930), 171 (hereafter cited 
as Lord Cowdray).
sole supplier of fuel oil to the Royal Navy.?** Obviously 
it was in the interest of the British Government to pro­
tect the Cowdray concern from excessive taxation as well 
as from the ravages of civil war. However, that government 
could not intervene to assure the unchecked flow of fuel 
oil without violating the Monroe Doctrine and thereby 
risking a serious confrontation with the United States.
Its only recourse, then, lay in supporting the de facto 
government in return for whatever degree of protection 
that government was willing to afford to British invest­
ments in Mexico. Thus the British Foreign Office, upon 
extending recognition to the Huerta regime, had sought 
and duly obtained the aforementioned guaranties.7? Lind,
"who was as anti-British as he was gullible," was by no 
means alone in assuming that there was a much closer 
working relationship than truly existed between Cowdray 
and Whitehall in the shaping of Britain's Mexican policy.7®
7^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 152; Link, 
Wilson: The New Freedom, 370. For a somewhat differing 
view of the importance of Mexican oil to the British Govern­
ment see Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 
173-174.
77Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 116n.
7ftLink, Wilson: The New Freedom, 371; Grieb,
Huerta, 130,
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Both Wilson and Bryan had for some time suspected as much. 
By mid-October, they were firmly if erroneously convinced 
of it.
On October 11, the day after the purge of Huerta's 
congressional opposition, the new British Ambassador, Sir 
Lionel Carden, arrived in the Mexican capital. Proceeding 
at once to the National Palace, he "ostentatiously" pre­
sented his credentials to the General, in effect endorsing 
the latter's stern measures of the previous day.^® Then, 
on October 21, after Lind had dispatched several more 
messages to Washington charging collusion between Cowdray, 
Carden, and Huerta, the British Ambassador conducted the 
unfortunate interview which was to precipitate an Anglo- 
American crisis over Mexico. Carden informed reporters 
that his government had no intention of withdrawing recog­
nition from the Huerta regime. The American Government, he 
observed, failed to understand the gravity of the situa­
tion in Mexico. Elections offered no solution; quite the 
contrary. A purge of dissident elements and rule by a 
strong man was far more in order. It was "ridiculous," he 
concluded, to suppose that such a man could be found in a
79 Cline, The United States and Mexico, 148.
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"haphazard election under the present circumstances."^
True or not, the Ambassador’s remarks were unquestionably
tactless and certain to arouse indignation in Washington.
And so they did.
Wilson was incensed by Carden's statement. It
seemed to confirm the most serious of Lind's charges and
the worst of the President's suspicions. Anti-British
feeling in Washington "grew suddenly to proportions so
dangerous as to menace friendly Anglo-American relations.
Wilson was now convinced that Huerta had maintained his
position largely through the moral and financial support of
interested European powers, principally Great Britain, France,
and Germany. He was particularly vexed at Whitehall since
other European governments with interests in Mexico had
agreed to follow Britain's lead in their relations with 
82the republic. Moreover, the support given to Huerta by 
the Europeans had been extended "without regard to the 
wishes or purposes of the United States." Had that support
*^New York Times, October 22, 1913.
81Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 371.
82
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 148; Calvert, 
Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 233.
39
been withheld, the President believed, the Huerta Government
83would have collapsed months earlier. Certainly the dic­
tator would have been forced to accept American mediation.
Wilson's position on European relations with Mexico 
was expressed in a smoldering memorandum to Bryan written 
shortly after receipt of the Carden statement. The Secre­
tary was instructed to embody the President's views on the 
matter in a circular note which Wilson intended to send to 
the pertinent governments. Accordingly, in a sharply- 
worded draft, Bryan declared that while the United States 
had larger investments in Mexico and more of its citizens 
resident therein than did any other nation, its treatment 
of Mexico had been dictated not by those material interests 
but by the moral and political questions involved. Re­
grettably, he charged, "European financiers," aided by the 
recognition extended Huerta by their respective governments
and acting in return for "commercial concessions," had
84given the usurper the means to perpetuate his power.
Clearly the Secretary had Cowdray foremost in mind. 
Lind and Nelson O'Shaughnessy, both confirmed Anglophobes,
83Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 367-368. 
84Ibid., 368.
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had succeeded by late October in convincing Wilson and
Bryan that Cowdray and Carden were indeed in collusion and
actively engaged in frustrating the President’s Mexican 
85policy. Further "evidence" allegedly attesting to the 
existence of a conspiracy between the Cowdray interests 
and the British Government was proffered by the oilman's 
principal competitor, Henry Clay Pierce of the Waters
85Ibid., 371-372. The charges against both men 
were largely groundless yet, in view of the circumstances, 
understandable. Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Con- 
flict, 173-177 and 246. Nonetheless, "a more displeasing 
appointment (than Carden's) could scarcely have been made. 
Carden had been serving for several years in the British 
legations in Central America and the West Indies, was an 
economic imperialist in viewpoint, and notoriously anti- 
American." Bryan's predecessor, Philander Knox, had twice 
tried and failed to have Carden recalled from his post 
in Cuba. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 261. The belief 
that Carden was anti-American and pro-oil, that is pro- 
Cowdray, was accepted without question in Washington. 
Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 181. Without
doubt, Carden was anti-American and apparently with good 
cause. The German Ambassador to Mexico, recounting a 
conversation with Carden, provided a fascinating glimpse 
of the other side of the coin: "He (Carden) tells me
that in Cuba, Guatamala and other Latin American countries 
he has always met the same opponents: the Americans. He
has always found them people of bad faith, unbelievable 
crooks, swindlers . . .  He has often attempted to reach an 
understanding with Americans; always they have broken their 
word . . .Sir Lionel thinks that now he has run the United 
States to earth in Mexico, 'now there is a chance of 
exploding that most foolish of all theories: the Monroe
Doctrine.'" Quoted in Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo- 
American Conflict, 259.
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ft 6Pierce Oil Company. Finally, reports from the American 
ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, seemed to 
corroborate the allegations. Complaining bitterly that 
British policy in Mexico was totally amoral, Page insisted 
that the Foreign Office sought stability in the republic
8^Ibid., 96-98 and 179. The Waters Pierce Oil 
Company, owned one-third by Henry Clay Pierce and two- 
thirds by Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company, had enjoyed 
a monopoly of the retail oil trade in Mexico for some 
thirty years when Lord Cowdray entered the Mexican oil 
business in 1903. The company produced no oil in Mexico 
itself, instead importing crude to its refinery at Tampico. 
Thus the Viscount, with production in the Mexican states 
of Chiapas, Tabasco, and Veracruz and, eventually, re­
fineries at both Tampico and Minatitlan, was able to 
undersell Waters Pierce Oil Company in the Mexican market. 
Cowdray approached Pierce in 1903 in an attempt to divide 
the market equitably, but was rebuffed. A second attempt 
in 190 8 also failed. Soon Cowdray controlled between 
eighty and ninety per cent of the Mexican market. From 
1910 through 1914 Pierce waged an unrelenting propaganda 
campaign against Cowdray in the international press in an 
attempt to deny him access to funds needed for further 
exploration and development. Therein was born the charge 
that the Viscount had bribed and corrupted the Diaz 
Government and, after 1911, each succeeding regime through 
1914. The same source was also responsible for the charge 
that ultimately imperiled Anglo-American amity in the 
fall of 1913: that Cowdray used his influence within the 
British Government to win support for Huerta and that he 
received valuable concessions from the General in return. 
Interestingly, the Standard Oil Company was embarrassed 
by Pierce's conduct and formally apologized to Cowdray in
1912. The following year, the tie between Pierce and the 
Rockefeller interests was severed, and Pierce alone con­
trolled the Waters Pierce Oil Company. The scurrilous 
attacks on Cowdray thus continued well into 1914. Spender, 
Lord Cowdray, 163-170.
solely "for the sake of financial interests.1,87 From the 
welter of charges the following disturbing and unsavory 
picture began to emerge: Cowdray was the "sinister power"
behind Huerta. In exchange for liberal new concessions, 
the oilman had extended large loans to the General thereby 
enabling him to remain in power. Moreover, as a major 
contributor to the Liberal Party, Cowdray was in a position 
to dominate the Foreign Office. Carden, then, was "merely 
Cowdray's mouthpiece in Mexico." The motivating factor, 
of course, was control and monopoly of the Mexican petroleum 
industry by the Aguila Company and, through it, by the
O Q
British Government.
Link, Calvert, and Cowdray's biographer, J. A. 
Spender, all dismiss the charges against the Viscount as 
fabrication or gross exaggeration.89 Nonetheless, the 
charges were generally accepted in Administration circles, 
and there is no evidence that they were ever seriously 
challenged thereafter.
87Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 371.
"ibid., 372; Grieb, Huerta, 132-134; Calvert, 
Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 229-231, 234, and 245.
89Ibid., 173-176, 182-183, and 275-277; Link, Wilson 
The New Freedom, 372; Spender, Lord Cowdray, 189ff.
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Reworked by Bryan, the President's memorandum was 
passed on to State Department Counselor John Bassett Moore 
for final polishing. Wilson meant to dispatch the finished 
note shortly after the results of the Mexican election were 
made public. He fully expected the return of Huerta or a 
Huertista puppet and hoped that the circular note would
induce the several European governments to withhold recog-
. . 90nitron from the new regime.
While Moore studied the draft with dismay, the 
President proceeded to Mobile, Alabama. There, on Octo­
ber 27, he delivered one of the more important addresses 
of his career. It dealt primarily with the Wilson Adminis­
tration’s future relations with Latin America. Generally, 
the Mobile Address consisted first of a sharp denunciation 
of the "concessionaires" or foreign businessmen alleged to 
be exploiting the Latin American republics and, second, of
the President's pledge of American assistance in halting
91
that exploitation. Delivered the day after the Mexican
^^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 148-149; 
Grieb, Huerta, 114.
91New York Times, October 28, 1913. Por complete 
text see Ray stannard Baker and William E. Dodds (eds.).
The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, The New Democracy 
(2 vols.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1926), I, 64-69 
(hereafter cited as Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson).
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elections, in which Huerta had been returned to the presi­
dency as anticipated, Wilson’s words were aimed specifically 
at Whitehall, Cowdray, and the General. They were intended 
to serve as a prelude to the blunt, more forceful circular 
notes then in preparation. Their meaning was clear. If 
the Europeans refused to cooperate with the United States 
in peacefully forcing Huerta's retirement, the President 
would have no choice but to turn to unilateral armed inter­
vention to obtain that end. In foreswearing annexationist 
designs on Latin America, Cline explains, Wilson was assuring 
the Mexican people that any future intervention by the 
United States would be for "idealistic" rather than "impe­
rialistic" ends. In addition, he was anticipating and deny­
ing in advance Republican demands for annexation of part or 
all of Mexico. Finally, the President left no doubt but 
that Huerta must go, and that the United States was pre­
pared to resort to any means short of an actual declaration
92of war to assure his removal.
Q o
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 150. European 
reaction to the Mobile Address was "stormy." Grieb, Huerta, 
115. Calvert records the response of the British Foreign 
Office: "The President is very sanguine about the future of 
Latin-America after the opening of the Canal... His state­
ment that the U. S. will never again seek one additional 
foot of territory by conquest is the most important statement 
in the speech, but this does not preclude the acquisition
Upon Wilson's return to Washington, the Counselor 
"read him an unforgettable lesson on international manners, 
especially those concerning recognition and impugning the 
motives of friends.' Grudgingly accepting Moore's 
rebuke, the President retreated from the extreme position 
set forth in his original memorandum. The draft circular 
note was quietly shelved, and no further mention was made 
of the alleged hostile intrigues of British and other 
European business interests in Mexico. The charges, how­
ever, were not forgotten. Wilson and Bryan, at least, con­
tinued to believe the worst.
of territory by other means than conquest... The speech is 
a fine one to read, but its ideas do not seem very practical. 
Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 252. Un­
doubtedly to European statesmen and to their Latin American 
counterparts as well the President of the United States 
appeared to be either a complete cynic or an utter fool. 
Grieb, Huerta, 116-117. His actions were without prece­
dent and hence beyond comprehension.
93Cline, The United States and Mexico, 150. 
"Recognition," Moore informed the President, "is an act 
performed in the ordinary course of diplomatic relations.
As the independent States of America are not protectorates 
of the United States, we do not supervise their diplomatic 
relations; and it has never before been considered neces­
sary for Foreign Powers to ask our consent to their 
recognition of an American Government, or to explain to 
us their reasons for such a step. Nor can there be any 
doubt that the American Governments would themselves deeply 
resent any attempt on our part to assume such a super­
vision. " Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict,
252.
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Ultimately, it was the British Government which took 
the initiative in attempting to dispel Anglo-American mis­
understanding over Mexico. Shortly after Wilson drafted 
his intemperate condemnation of British activities in the 
republic, the gist of the memorandum was leaked to the 
Washington press corps. In that way the Foreign Office
Q A
was made aware of the President's displeasure. Anxious 
to allay Wilson's suspicions. Prime Minister Herbert 
Asquith immediately declared that his government had no 
intention of intervening in Mexico, nor was it in any way 
attempting to thwart American aims in that country. The 
Prime Minister's statement was followed by the timely dis­
patch of Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, to 
the United States to confer directly with the President.
Arriving in Washington early in November, Tyrrell 
pledged his government's full cooperation in the removal 
of Huerta and in persuading Germany and France to follow 
suit. In return, however, Tyrrell sought and obtained the 
President's guarantee of American protection for British
lives and property in Mexico following the General’s
95demise. Under the circumstances Wilson could hardly have
94Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 373.
95Ibid., 376.
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denied Tyrrell's request. Having insisted that the 
Europeans recognize American preeminence in dealing with 
Mexico, he had automatically assumed for his own govern­
ment responsibility for the lives and property of all 
foreigners in the republic. It was an onerous obligation 
all but impossible to fulfill. Moreover, and of far 
graver consequence, it was for many years to prove an 
insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of normal 
amicable relations between the United States and the 
future revolutionary governments of Mexico.
The Tyrrell mission resulted in a new Anglo- 
American accord on Mexico and thus, indirectly, to a 
similar accord between the United States and other 
nations with interests in the republic. Although Grey 
did not withdraw recognition from the Huerta regime, the 
General was informed that he could expect no further 
assistance from the British Government. Further dis­
engagement was manifested by the subsequent withdrawal 
of Carden from the British Embassy in Mexico City. By
late November 1913, Wilson's scheme for the diplomatic
96isolation of Huerta appeared to have succeeded.
96Ibid., 377.
Chapter 2
WILSON VS. HUERTA: INTERVENTION 
AT VERACRUZ
I.
Undeterred by American opposition, Huerta had pro­
ceeded as planned with the October 26 elections. The polls 
had returned a Huertista Congress which, in turn, had 
promptly declared the presidential election null and void 
and proclaimed the General ad interim president until a 
new election could be held the following July.^" Indignant 
and frustrated, Wilson responded with a virtual ultimatum. 
The election was fraudulent, he charged, and in contra­
vention of the General's earlier pledge to retire. If 
Huerta refused to step down voluntarily he could expect 
"very serious practical measures" to force his retirement. 
In his stead, Wilson suggested the General should make way
•^ 0'Shaughnessy to Bryan, October 26 and December 10, 
1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, 850 and 866; Silva Ilerzog, 
Breve Historia, II, 62-63. The Constitutionalists had boy­
cotted the elections on the correct assumption that Huertista 
control of the election machinery would assure a Huertista 
victory. The elections were indeed a farce, and the outcome 
was never in doubt. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 280.
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for a new provisional junta composed of persons associated 
as little as possible with the dictatorship.
By the end of October, when the President's warning 
reached Mexico City, Huerta had begun to discount the flow 
of admonishments from Washington. He was well informed on 
American domestic politics and because of it questioned 
Wilson's readiness to follow up his threats with commensurate 
action. Bryan and Daniels, the two cabinet members most 
concerned with Mexican affairs, were both renowned pacifists, 
and the President himself was known to be strongly opposed 
to armed intervention. A Republican minority was indeed 
demanding intervention, but Wilson could ill afford dicta­
tion of Administration foreign policy by the opposition 
party. Finally, with Congress itself divided over the 
Mexican question and American relations with the Constitu­
tionalists far from cordial, Huerta had little fear of immi­
nent armed intervention by the United States.4 Accordingly, 
he ignored Wilson's threat and affirmed his intention to re­
tain the presidency.^
2Grieb, Huerta, 111.
•^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 150-151.
4Ibid.
5New York Times, November 4, 1913.
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Huerta's gamble paid off. In Washington Wilson 
briefly considered declaring war on Mexico, blockading its 
ports, and sealing off its northern and southern borders 
with American troops. It was a plan that went far beyond 
the President's attempts to isolate Huerta diplomatically, 
and that was designed to deprive the General of customs
revenues and cut off the flow of foreign arms and munitions
to the Federal army. However, as the General anticipated, 
Wilson shrank from armed intervention. Instead, the Presi­
dent turned again to moral suasion and diplomatic coercion. 
In addition, his new offensive against Huerta called for 
close cooperation with the Constitutionalists. It was 
assumed that Carranza would welcome American assistance in 
his drive on the Mexican capital and that he would cooperate
with the United States in return for that aid. On this pre­
mise John Hale was sent to Nogales in mid-November to confer
7
with Carranza.
Grieb, Huerta, 112; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Era, 120. The origins of this scheme are ob­
scure. Doubtless it grew out of one of the several contin­
gency plans prepared by the General Staff in anticipation 
of a possible conflict with Mexico. In the future it be­
came something of a standard blueprint for conquest of the 
republic and reappeared with great regularity whenever in­
terventionist sentiment mounted in the United States. Its 
advocates were legion and diverse, from Wilson and Bryan 
on the one hand to Edward L. Doheny and William Randolph 
Hearst on the other.
7/Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 382.
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Hale offered repeal of the embargo on arms shipments 
to the Constitutionalists. In return he asked for Carranza's 
cooperation in negotiating an armistice with the Huertistas 
and for the First Chief's pledge to protect American lives 
and property in northern Mexico. For the second time Carranza 
refused to work with Washington. He wanted no assistance 
from the United States, he informed Hale, only repeal of the 
arms embargo. Nor would he tolerate American interference 
in the internal affairs of the republic. Armed intervention 
was inexcusable under any circumstances, he declared, and 
bluntly warned Wilson's emissary against it. The Constitu­
tionalists themselves would execute sweeping social and 
economic reforms by decree. Only then would they consider 
popular elections and a return to constitutional government.^ 
Wilson was "deeply disturbed" by Carranza's rebuff, and
Grieb, Huerta, 112. In 1912, President Taft had 
placed an embargo on the export of arms and ammunition to 
all Mexican revolutionary factions. Although a large amount 
of war materiel was subsequently smuggled across the border 
into northern Mexico, the embargo was effective enough to 
seriously inhibit sustained offensive operations by the Con­
stitutionalists. On the other hand, it was a boon to the de 
facto Government. Controlling the major ports, the Government 
was able to freely receive large shipments of arms from a- 
broad. Thus repeal of the embargo was a primary diplomatic 
objective not only of the Constitutionalists but of all other 
factions opposed to the de facto Government at any given 
moment.
9Ibid., 113; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era, 121.
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especially so by the First Chief's program as outlined to 
Hale. It was a "crushing blow," Link concludes, to the 
President's plans for steering the Mexican Revolution into 
"democratic and constitutional channels."I®
Huerta was heartened by the President's failure to 
reach an understanding with the Constitutionalists. Early 
in November, following conclusion of the Anglo-American ac­
cord on Mexico, he had seriously considered resignation.^ 
However, he rallied strongly in the wake of the American re­
versal at Nogales and was delighted with the President's de-
12cision to maintain the arms embargo. During the weeks that 
followed, Huerta's position grew more secure. The Constitu­
tionalist offensive in the north bogged down,1  ^Wilson
l^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 383.
i;LIbid., 385. 12Ibid., 384.
13Meyer, Orozco, 109; Grieb, Huerta, 66; Cline, The 
United States and Mexico, 154. Early in December, the tide 
of battle turned in favor of the dictator. On December 13, 
Federal troops recaptured Torreon, shattering the Constitu­
tionalist offensive in the North and temporarily halting 
Carranza's progress toward the capital. Link, Wilson: The 
New Freedom, 388. At the same time, the Constitutionalist 
drive on the coveted Huasteca oilfields was frustrated by 
American intervention. Acting on orders from Washington, 
Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, commander of American naval forces 
off the east coast of Mexico, warned the Constitutionalists 
away from the strategic refining and oil shipping centers of 
Tampico and Tuxpam. New York Times, December 10, 11, and 13, 
1913; Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 282. As
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reverted to a passive policy of watching and w a i t i n g , a n d  
the President's plan to isolate the regime diplomatically 
produced no immediate ill effects. Meanwhile, landowners, 
businessmen and Mexican Church hierarchy, frightened by the 
violent rhetoric of the Constitutionalists, threw their
full support behind the de facto government as the sole
15bulwark against threatened revolutionary excesses. J Funds 
raised from these sources, in addition to forced loans 
wrung from large foreign firms operating in Mexico, assured 
the solvency of the regime. Still able to pay the generals
much as Wilson by then longed for a Constitutionalist 
victory, he dared not risk destruction of the oilfields and 
the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Ameri­
can and European investments. "Oil was too fragile an in­
dustry," Calvert observes, "... and too important to be 
endangered by nationalism. It was taken into the inter­
national system, and so lifted out of domestic politics, 
until a new and stronger state could assert its claims to 
it." Ibid., 292. In addition, the guarantee of American 
protection for foreign properties in Mexico, extended to 
Britain and indirectly to other nations with holdings in the 
republic only weeks before, bound the United States to main­
tain order and to preserve the peace in the oilfields. It 
was an onerous committment for the President, placing him in 
the embarrassing position of defending the very "concession­
aires" he had so strongly condemned at Mobile. Again and 
again that fateful obligation arose to frustrate the return 
of normal Mexican-American relations. It was truly the 
Achilles' heel of American Mexican policy, a curse which 
endured for years after the Wilson era and was not wholly 
dispelled until Franklin D. Roosevelt acquiesced in the 
nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938.
^New York Times, November 21, 1913.
l^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 387; Grieb, Huerta, 
118-119. ------------------------  ------
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and to purchase arms and munitions abroad, Huerta was stronger 
than ever by the end of 1913.^-®
Wilson, on the other hand, found himself in an awk­
ward position. Having announced to the world his intention
to force Huerta from office, he had singularly failed in 
17that endeavor. Bribery, threats and diplomatic isolation 
had proved ineffectual. So, too, had attempts to cooperate
 ^The immediate effect of Fletcher's bold action, the 
first of a succession of localized American interventions in 
the petroleum province, was to turn the Constitutionalists 
away from the coast. It was a serious setback for the revo­
lutionary cause and a windfall for Huerta. The Constitu­
tionalists were thereby denied access to ports through which 
they might receive desperately needed arms and ammunition. 
Moreover, the possessor of Tampico and Tuxpam was also the 
recipient of all revenues derived from taxes on the produc­
tion and export of petroleum products, one of the major 
sources of wealth in the republic. Link, Wilson: The New 
Freedom, 408; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 28 and 151; 
Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico, The Struggle for Modernity 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1968), 249 (hereafter 
cited as Mexico). Control of those revenues, in turn, 
enabled Huerta to put a formidable force in the field and to 
maintain it at full strength through the purchase of muni­
tions abroad. Until the Huertistas were driven from Tampico 
and Tuxpam, the dictatorship was capable of withstanding in­
definitely its internal opposition.
17x,On November 24, a circular note was sent to nations 
with interests in Mexico clarifying the position of the Wilson 
Administration vis a vis the Huerta regime. In it the Presi­
dent declared that if Huerta did not soon retire "by force 
of circumstances" it would "become the duty of the United 
States to use less peaceful means to put him out." Bryan 
to all embassies....November 24, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1914
(Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1922), 443- 
444 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1914).
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with the Constitutionalists. Armed intervention to depose
the dictator had been ruled out for fear of driving all
Mexican factions into a common alliance against the United 
18States. One option remained: Wilson could resign himself
to Carranza's intransigence, lift the arms embargo, and ex-
19tend diplomatic and moral support to the revolutionaries.
It was generally believed by Administration officials that 
such a course would greatly strengthen the Constitutionalists 
and hasten the fall of the Huerta regime.
The proposal to back Carranza came first from John 
Lind, the President's agent in Veracruz, early in December,
1913. u Lind continued to press his recommendation through 
the beginning of the new year. Returning to Washington after 
a Christmas conference with Lind at Pass Christian, Mississippi, 
Wilson "found a storm of criticism and ridicule of his policy
O I
of 'watchful waiting.' Lane and Garrison called for im­
mediate and "vigorous" action to depose Huerta and bring the 
civil war in Mexico to a close. Lane urged the President to 
choose a strong Mexican leader, establish him in the National
^®Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 386.
19Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 299. 20Ibid., 298-299.
21Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 184.
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Palace and extend to him the full support of the Administra­
tion. The Secretary went so far as to invite his colleagues 
to a private luncheon in order to better promote the fortunes 
of his personal choice for the Mexican presidency-~General 
Eduardo Iturbide, a prominent conservative politician and 
Huertista governor of the Federal District. Cabinet response
to Lane's proposal was negative, however, and the Secretary
22dropped the matter for the time being.
As pressure on the Administration to end the fighting
in Mexico mounted both at home and abroad, Wilson began to
move toward the adoption of Lind's recommendation of strong
23support for the Constitutionalists. During the same period.
22Ibid. The interest of Lane and, later, of other 
Administration officials in Iturbide is intriguing. In the 
spring of 1915, Lane again urged support for the General, 
cooperating with several lesser State Department officials 
in a concerted effort to win Wilson's support for a counter­
revolutionary movement headed by Iturbide. The enthusiasm 
of the General's American backers in the absence of some form 
of remuneration is inexplicable. Nonetheless, no conclusive 
evidence of scandal has ever emerged.
23Early in January, 1914, Huerta suspended interest 
payments on the Mexican debt, causing great consternation in 
European financial circles and prompting the British Govern­
ment to propose joint Anglo-American intervention to depose 
the dictator. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 300. At the same 
time, Representative Frederick H. Gillett, a powerful Massa­
chusetts Republican, sharply attacked the Administration's 
Mexican policy in a speech before the House. New York Times, 
January 16, 1914. The Congressman's address and accompanying 
journalistic criticism of that policy caused the President 
"no little anxiety." Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 303.
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developments in Mexico prompted Carranza to reconsider his 
relations with the United States. The bases for a mutually 
advantageous rapprochement now existed. Huerta's counter­
offensive in northern Mexico had split the revolutionary 
forces, seriously lowering their morale, while growing dis­
sension between Villa and Carranza threatened to splinter
24the movement still further. Meanwhile, atrocities perpe­
trated by the men of Villa's Division of the North aroused 
disgust and indignation in Europe and the United States, tar­
nishing the reputation of the Constitutionalist movement and 
sustaining the demand for armed intervention. Anxious to re­
furbish the revolutionary image, Carranza sent Luis Cabrera,
his principal advisor and ablest ambassador, to Washington to
25proselytize Administration officials.
On January 27, Cabrera met with State Department rep­
resentative William Phillips, explaining the Constitutionalist
26position and requesting repeal of the arms embargo. Shrewdly
O A
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 16-18; Cline, The 
United States and Mexico, 154.
25Ibid.
26^Phillips, at the time of his conference with Cabrera, 
was under consideration for the post of Third Assistant Secre­
tary of State and was so appointed in March, 1914. His career 
as an American diplomat spanned a period of almost fifty years. 
He left Harvard Law School in 1903 for a position in the
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skirting Carranza's political ambitions, Cabrera stressed 
instead the First Chief's plans for social and economic re­
form. Only legal and constitutional means would be employed 
in executing the reform program, he assured Phillips. Pro­
perty rights would be respected, and foreign investors need
i
not fear confiscation or the nullification of "just" con­
cessions. Wilson was both impressed and relieved by Cabrera's 
statement.27 It was precisely what he wanted to hear at the 
moment, and he accepted it in toto. If the First Chief was 
indeed the sincere and selfless reformer that his spokesman 
made him out to be, the President could, in good conscience,
American Embassy at London. Thereafter, he served as Second 
Secretary of the American Legation at Peking, 1905-1907;
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of 
State, 1908-1909; Third Assistant Secretary of State, 1909; 
and, for the next three years, Secretary to the American Am­
bassador to Great Britain. He rejoined the State Department 
in 1914 as Third Assistant Secretary, serving in that capa­
city until appointed Assistant Secretary in January, 1917.
In 1922, he was promoted to Undersecretary and subsequently 
served in a number of ambassadorial posts until his retire­
ment after the Second World War. U.S., Department of State, 
Register of the Department of State, 1924 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1924), 176 (hereafter cited as 
Register, 1924); New York Times, February 24, 1968. Phillips 
took a strong interest in Mexican affairs during the period 
1914 to 1929. As one of the very few high-ranking officials 
in the Department whose tenure remained unbroken during that 
period, his opinions on Mexican matters were frequently soli­
cited by the several Secretaries of State under whom he served.
27Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 389.
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support him wholeheartedly. Cabrera offered Wilson an 
apparently simple escape from a complex and agonizing dilemma. 
The President eagerly accepted.
Shortly after the Phillips-Cabrera conference, Wilson 
abandoned his original plan for the creation of a coalition 
government in Mexico, deciding instead to back the Constitu­
tionalists exclusively.^® Accordingly, he appealed to Grey 
to continue withholding British support from Huerta, and in 
a new circular note to interested nations he endeavored to 
explain the sudden shift of American policy. The Mexican 
civil war, he declared, could best be settled by the Mexican 
people themselves. The only alternative to an all Mexican 
solution was massive foreign intervention; and that, he warned,
28Ibid. Cabrera convinced Wilson that the problem 
was economic and social rather than political and that at 
the heart of the problem lay the system of land tenure. Land 
ownership and economic and political power were concentrated 
in the hands of a small conservative propertied class strongly 
represented in the Huerta government. It was clear to Wilson 
that a coalition government including members of the land­
owning class would not effectively represent the landless 
peasantry. At the same time, he realized that a new Mexican 
government created through American intervention and supported 
by American armed forces would ultimately fail because all 
Mexicans would unite against it. Only the Constitutionalists, 
who were firmly committed to agrarian reform, truly repre­
sented the submerged masses. The obvious course for the 
Wilson Administration appeared to be one of "hands off" with 
regard to the civil war, coupled with strong moral support 
for the Constitutionalists. Walter V. Scholes and Marie V. 
Scholes, "Wilson, Grey, and Huerta," Pacific Historical Review, 
XXXVIII (May, 1968), 153-156 (hereafter cited as PHR).
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"would be the beginning of a still more difficult problem."29 
Then, on February 3, shortly after dispatching the circular 
notes, Wilson lifted the embargo on the shipment of arms and 
munitions to Mexican revolutionaries.2®
29Bryan to Page, January 29, 1914, Foreign Relations, 
1914, 445; Bryan to all diplomatic missions, January 31, 1914, 
Ibid., 446-447.
^Proclamation revoking the proclamation of March 14, 
1912, prohibiting the exportation of arms or munitions of war 
to Mexico, February 3, 1914, Ibid., 448. In late 1913 and 
early 1914 the British Government grew increasingly appre­
hensive over the apparent lack of foresight in Washington. 
Wilson and Bryan were obsessed with driving Huerta from power 
but seemed to have no definite plans beyond that point. Grey 
feared a long period of "disorder and destruction," during 
which British as well as other foreign investments would be 
ravaged, or armed intervention and subsequent occupation by 
the United States. He preferred the latter simply to "shorten 
the agony." But after the Tyrrell accord of the previous 
November, Grey was reluctant to urge policy on Washington. 
Scholes and Scholes, "Wilson, Grey, and Huerta," PHR, 152- 
153. The Phillips-Cabrera conference changed that. Wilson's 
sudden enthusiasm for the Constitutionalists, particularly 
for Villa, frightened the British. Grieb, Huerta, 140. That 
faction they judged to be "totally incompetent to govern... 
and unable to cope with the anarchy which inevitably would 
follow Huerta's ouster." Accordingly, Grey initiated a new 
round of highly secret talks with Wilson and Bryan. In mid- 
February, 1914, T. B. Hohler, Carden's replacement, stopped 
in Washington on his way to Mexico City to discuss with the 
President and Secretary of State the disturbing change in the 
Wilson Administration's Mexican policy. Grey's objective was 
to make sure that the United States "understood what it was 
doing" and to guarantee the protection of British interests 
in Mexico. Following conferences with Wilson and Bryan,
Hohler reported that both men had been completely won over by 
Cabrera. In fact, their arguments for backing the Constitu­
tionalists followed "even to the slightest detail" a recently- 
published pamphlet by Cabrera defending that faction. Even
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II.
During the weeks that followed, Wilson awaited the 
anticipated Constitutionalist victory with growing impatience. 
Yet by the end of March Huerta was still securely ensconced 
in the National Palace. Largely because of the American 
naval presence off the coast of Mexico, Huertista forces 
remained in control of the vital Gulf ports whose revenues 
maintained the solvency and thus the stability of the dicta­
torship. Meanwhile, Carranza's pledge to uphold foreign 
concessions in exchange for repeal of the arms embargo had 
disillusioned large numbers of Mexicans and had actually 
strengthened Huerta's position. The First Chief stood dis­
credited as defender of the concessionaire, while the General
31emerged as the champion of Mexican nationalism. Wilson
more alarming to Hohler was American gullibility with regard 
to Pancho Villa. Despite the fact that Cabrera represented 
Carranza, Wilson and Bryan appeared to favor Villa instead. 
Indeed the President saw Villa as a "sort of Robin Hood" and 
anticipated his eventual emergence as head of the revolu­
tionary movement. Hohler cited Villa's deplorable record to 
no avail. Neither Wilson nor Bryan would listen. Thus the 
British attempt to dissuade the President from proceeding 
along his radical new course failed, and Grey's worst fears 
were realized. Scholes and Scholes, "Wilson, Grey, and Huerta," 
PHR, 153-157.
31ciine, The United States and Mexico, 154. Again, 
Wilson's pledge to protect foreign interests in Mexico served 
to frustrate his plans for an early end to the civil war.
His insistence upon Carranza's guarantee for the safety of
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watched helplessly from the sidelines, "trapped by his own 
essentially reckless promises."-*^
Link suspects that the President "must have tried 
many times during March and early April of 1914 to discover
some way to intervene and depose Huerta without risking an
33actual war. And yet there seemed no way out." As the 
necessity for eventual American military intervention grew 
more apparent, Wilson began to rationalize it. Again, 
Cabrera's facile phrases eased the way. Carranza's repre­
sentative had considerably broadened the President's per­
spective on the Revolution. For the first time, Wilson had 
begun to grasp the real significance of that epic struggle.
On April 27, shortly after ordering the occupation of Vera­
cruz, he discussed his enlightenment with columnist Samuel G. 
Blythe. The President pictured Mexico's plight as similar
foreign investments cost the Constitutionalists whatever claim 
they might have had to moral ascendancy over the Huertistas 
and, consequently, considerable support from the Mexican 
people at a critical stage in the struggle. Moreover, it 
compounded the damage already done the Constitutionalist cause 
the previous December when Admiral Fletcher had turned General 
Gonzalez away from the oilfields and the ports of the Huasteca. 
The cumulative effect of both measures was to strengthen 
Huerta's position, weaken the Constitutionalists, and prolong 
the conflict that Wilson was so anxious to end. Ironically, 
it also rendered all but inevitable the very action that the 
President wanted most to avoid - American armed intervention 
to depose the Huerta regime.
32Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 392. 33Ibid.
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to that of revolutionary France more than a century past.34 
The Mexican Revolution, he believed, was fully as "profound’' 
as its European predecessor.33 Following Cabrera's artful 
promotion of the revolutionary movement, the President was 
"convinced that the Constitutionalists intended to effect a 
genuine economic and social regeneration and to lead the 
Mexican masses eventually to political democracy."3® He 
could ask no more himself.
"It was inevitable," Link asserts, "that a man of 
Wilson's active disposition would also believe that the 
United States could not refuse the opportunity, even the 
duty, to help the Mexican people."*w  And in his interview 
with Blythe the President said as much: The Mexican people,
he assured the reporter, should be allowed to work out their 
own destiny. But the United States would always stand ready 
to impose guidance when necessary. It was not his intention 
to "turn back," Wilson declared, until he had "assurances
34Samuel G. Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Con­
versation with President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 
CLXXXVI (May 23, 1914), 4.
35Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 393.
36Ibid. 37Ibid
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that the great and crying wrongs the people have endured are
l O
in process of satisfactory adjustment.''
So the President prepared himself, both to order 
armed intervention and subsequently to defend that order. It 
is clear that for some time prior to the occupation of Vera­
cruz, he was seeking "moral justification" for greater par­
ticipation in Mexican affairs. Nonetheless, Link contends,
the "process of rationalization was unconscious, automatic,
39and completely satisfying." And indeed the evidence 
appears to bear out his contention. When the opportunity to 
intervene finally did present itself Wilson, secure in his 
self-righteousness, seized it with alacrity.
The break that Wilson sought came early in April, 
shortly after Villa's stunning victory over the Federal army 
at Torreon. As Huertista forces fell back in disarray, Con­
stitutionalist columns overran the remaining Federal outposts 
in northern Mexico and turned again in the direction of the
jaBlythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with 
President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 4 and 71.
J^Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 393. Grieb records
the British interpretation of the President's position: "Grey
concluded that Wilson was now compelled to force Huerta from 
power, because his pronouncements had 'created a situation in 
which the personal credit of the President and Secretary of 
State was involved.' In this sense, Huerta's retirement had 
become a 'point of honor for the United States.'" Grieb, 
Huerta. 139.
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Gulf coast. As before, the prime objectives were the ports 
of Tampico and Tuxpam and the adjacent Huasteca oilfields. 
The decision to move again into the petroleum province was ' 
a fateful one, virtually assuring a greater or lesser degree 
of foreign intervention.
Tampico, six miles up the Panuco River from the open 
Gulf, was the center of the Mexican petroleum industry. As 
such, it was one of the most strategically important cities 
in the world in 1914.^® Poreign-owned oil installations
40Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, Woodrow Wilson. 
and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 
6-7 (hereafter cited as An Affair of Honor); George Marvin,
"The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, XXXIV (August, 1917), 
374; Thomas H. Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District'1 
(Tampico: American Consular Service, 1912), 3-5, File ho. 5344, 
Everette L. DeGolyer Papers, Southern Methodist University 
Library; Everette L. DeGolyer, "The Petroleum Industry of 
Mexico" (1920), File no. 5220, Ibid. DeGolyer was considered 
by many of his colleagues to have been the oil industry's 
foremost geologist. He first went to Mexico in 1909 to con­
duct field studies of the petroleum province for Dr. C.
Willard Hayes, Chief Geologist for the United States Geologi­
cal Survey. When Hayes resigned from government service in 
1911 to become vice-president in charge of production for 
Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company, he appointed DeGolyer chief 
geologist for the firm. DeGolyer had already made a name for 
himself as discoverer of the great Potrero del Llano No. 4, 
one of the most prolific oil wells in the history of the in­
dustry. As chief geologist he conducted a number of pioneer 
studies of Mexican Gulf Coast geology. In 1914, he moved to 
New York, establishing himself as the most eminent independent 
consulting geologist in the country. In 1918, he went to 
London to participate in the sale of the Aguila Oil Company 
to the Royal Dutch-Shell interests, ultimately using his share 
of the profits to organize the highly successful Amerada
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valued in the millions of dollars were strung out for miles 
along the banks of the Panuco. Tampico itself, which had 
only recently evolved from a collection of "miserable mud 
huts to a city of paved streets and American homes and a 
semblance of sanitation," had a foreign population second 
only to that of the capital.^ Its rapid growth was the 
direct result of the phenomenal development of the Huasteca 
oil industry. In many respects it resembled the oil boom 
towns of Louisiana, East Texas and Oklahoma; indeed most of 
its American residents were recent arrivals from the Gulf 
Coast or Midcontinent oil fields. In short, Tampico in 1914
Petroleum Company. The oil industry owes a great debt to 
DeGolyer for his early research in the field of geophysics 
and more specifically for his application of the principles 
of seismology to petroleum exploration. DeGolyer was also 
highly regarded in literary circles as resuscitator and 
chairman of the board of The Saturday Review. During World 
War II, he served on several government advisory boards and 
headed missions to Mexico and the Middle East. At the time 
of his death in 1956, DeGolyer was president of Amerada 
Petroleum Company and a partner in the consulting firm of 
DeGolyer and McNaughton. New York Times, December 15, 1956. 
The DeGolyer Papers are an excellent source of information 
on the technical aspects of the Mexican oil industry during 
its formative years.
^*Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 6-7; Carleton Beals, 
"The First Wild Oil Rush in Mexico," Current History, XXVII 
(March, 1928), 855-856.
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was virtually an American colony.^ Yet despite that fact 
the city was by no means inviolate. For the next six years 
it was among the most coveted prizes in a savage and san­
guinary civil war, and on more than one occasion skirmishing 
flared within the heart of the city. American and European 
oilmen, as well as their respective governments, were natu­
rally alarmed by the prospect of fighting in and around 
Tampico. A stray round could spell disaster, sending millions 
of dollars worth of property spiraling upward in smoke. More­
over, the lives of several thousand foreign workers and their 
families were at stake. Given the xenophobia of the revolu­
tionaries, there could be no guarantee for their safety.
^Ibid.; Charles W. Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of 
Mexico (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1966), 23 et passim. 
Hamilton joined Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company in 1912. For 
the next three years he worked under the direction of E.L. 
DeGolyer in both the Huasteca and Tehuantepec petroleum 
provinces, becoming thoroughly familiar with the Mexican 
oil industry. In 1916, he was appointed chief geologist 
for the Mellon interests' Mexican Gulf Oil Company. The 
following year, he became general agent for that company# 
remaining in Mexico in that capacity until 1923. Hamilton 
eventually retired in 1957 as a vice-president of Gulf Oil 
Corporation. Although Hamilton's book is largely anecdotal, 
it is the only published first-hand account of the great 
Huasteca oil boom of the early twentieth century. It is 
invaluable both in capturing the flavor of the times and 
in bringing into focus the sometimes placid, sometimes 
perilous day-to-day life of the American oilman in revo­
lutionary Mexico.
Of still greater concern to the oilmen was the fate 
of the oilfields themselves. Lying just west of Tampico 
and extending some eighty miles down the coastal plain to 
Tuxpam, the principal oil-producing zone embraced some 
21,000 square miles.43 From a mere 10,000 barrels of oil in 
1901, production had steadily increased to almost 4,000,000 
barrels in 1910. The following year it rose sharply to over
12,000,000 and by 1913 it had climbed to some 26,000,000 
barrels.44 Mexican production was exceeded only by that of 
the United States and Russia, and it was generally believed 
by oilmen that Mexico would soon surpass even those giants of 
the industry.43 The peculiar structure of the oil-bearing 
formations in the Huasteca fields created a unique situation; 
great gushers that flowed thousands of barrels per day.46
43DeGolyer, "The Petroleum Industry of Mexico," 
DeGolyer Papers; Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District, 
Ibid.; Everette L. DeGolyer, "Mexico as a Source of Petroleum 
and Its Products" (1919), File no. 5220, Ibid. There were 
two general regions in Mexico in which petroleum was produced- 
the important Tampico-Tuxpam region or Huasteca Veracruzana 
along the Gulf coastal plain and the barely explored Tehuan­
tepec Tabasco region. Virtually all commercial production 
came from the so-called Huasteca fields which, in turn, were 
divided into two general groups— those of the Panuco River 
Valley (northern) and those of the Tuxpam district (southern). 
Ibid.
44Ibid.
45Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District," Ibid.
46DeGolyer, "Mexico as a Source of Petroleum and Its 
Products," Ibid.
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The legendary wells, Potrero del Llano No. 4 and Juan 
Casiano No. 7, each produced more oil in a comparable period 
than any single field along the American Gulf coast, while 
production from the Gulf coast fields came from hundreds if 
not thousands of wells.47 During the boom years of the Mexi~ 
can oil industry, from 1912 to 1925, virtually the entire 
production of the country came from no more than a few hun­
dred fantastically prolific wells.4® Obviously, the
47Ibid.
4®As late as 1919 fewer than 1000 wells had been 
drilled in all of Mexico, and many of those were located in 
the relatively unproductive Tehuantepec-Tabasco region or 
were dry holes. It was a rare year when more than 100 new 
wells were drilled. Ibid. In 1917, when Mexican production 
first surpassed that of Russia and was exceeded only by that 
of the United States, a mere 174 wells produced more than
55,000,000 barrels of oil. Merrill Rippy, "The Mexican Oil 
Industry," Essays in Mexican History, ed. Thomas Cutner and 
Carlos E. Castaneda (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958),
253. In 1910, the Aguila Oil Company brought in the great 
Potrero del Llano No. 4. The well flowed unchecked for sixty 
days, the oil moving down the Tuxpam River to the Gulf and 
blanketing the beaches for hundreds of miles, north and south 
of Tampico. When the gusher was finally controlled, it 
gauged a flow of approximately 100,000 barrels of oil per day. 
It continued to flow at a phenominal rate for eight years, 
producing over 100,000,000 barrels of oil. DeGolyer, "The 
Petroleum Industry of Mexico," DeGolyer Papers. In the same 
year, Doheny's Huasteca Petroleum Company completed the Juan 
Casiano No. 7 which flowed at 60,000 barrels per day and pro­
duced over 100,000,000 barrels in less than a decade. Testi­
mony of Edward L. Doheny, September 11, 1919, U.S., Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Mexican 
Affairs, 66 Cong., 2 sess. (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.:
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destruction of a single producing well in the Huasteca could
49be catastrophic.
Fire represented the gravest threat to the wells, 
and the smoldering remains of the great Dos Bocas crater 
served as a constant reminder to nervous field superinten­
dents in Tampico. It was almost inevitable that large-scale 
military operations in the petroleum province would be at­
tended by fire, and realization of the fact caused great 
apprehension, not only among the oilmen, but among all who 
understood the threat to the oilfields and were concerned for
Government Printing Office, 1920) , 242 (hereafter cited as 
IMA). In 1916, the Doheny company brought in what was perhaps 
the greatest well in the history of the industry, Cerro Azul 
No. 4, which attained a flow in excess of 260,000 barrels 
per day before capping. Ibid.
^ I n  1908, the Pearson (Cowdray) interests com­
pleted San Diego No. 3 or Dos Bocas as it came to be known.
The extreme subsurface pressure opened fissures in the ground 
around the well, emitting gas and oil which was immediately 
ignited by sparks from the boilers. "Soon the hole began 
to crater - drilling rig, derrick, pumps and boilers, all 
disappeared. In spite of anything a man could do an oil field 
was lost. Instead of another Spindletop there was only an 
ever enlarging crater spewing forth hot salt water, gobs of 
asphalt and sulphurous vapors...." Some four years later, 
the crater had grown to some forty acres in area and the hot 
water and vapors had destroyed all life for some distance a- 
round it. Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of Mexico, 74-75.
San Diego No. 3 was believed by one expert to have been even 
larger than Cerro Azul No. 4. DeGolyer, "The Petroleum In­
dustry of Mexico," DeGolyer Papers. The disaster at Dos 
Bocas destroyed not only San Diego No. 3 but the underlying 
reservoir as well. An entire oilfield was thus destroyed be­
fore it could ever be brought into commercial production. Hun­
dreds of millions of dollars worth of oil was lost.
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the future welfare of the Mexican p e o p l e . it was generally 
conceded that fighting in the vicinity of the oil camps would 
force evacuation of the crews and temporary abandonment of the 
wells. That prospect, too, aroused considerable anxiety be­
cause of still another peculiarity of the Huasteca fields: 
unusually high subsurface pressures. Unlike most wells in 
the United States and in other producing zones of the world, 
those of the Huasteca required constant attention. In some 
instances subsurface pressures were so great that new wells 
could not be shut in, and partial choking could be effected 
only at great risk of explosion, fire, and the subsequent 
cratering and destruction of the well. Under these circum­
stances a broken flow line, a malfunctioning pump or valve, 
or even the slightest spark might set off an uncontrollable 
conflagration, devastating the countryside for miles around.
Taxation on the production and exportation of crude 
oil and its by-products was by the late teens the single 
largest source of revenue for the Mexican Government. Cum­
berland, Mexico, 249. Rapid reconstruction of the republic 
during the post-war period was contingent largely upon main­
taining a high rate of production in the Huasteca oilfields. 
Constitutionalist leaders were certainly aware of the value 
of the oilfields and of the important role the oil industry 
would play in reconstruction. Yet initially they apparently 
failed to comprehend the seriousness of the threat to the 
industry posed by the Huasteca campaign. The fact that the 
oilfields survived the civil war is little short of miracu­
lous. They did so in spite of the Constitutionalists.
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Again, the Dos Bocas disaster and several less spectacular 
fires stood as grim evidence of the dangers inherent in 
inattentiveness and careless production practices.
With so much at stake —  in lives, in money, and in 
strategic considerations —  the Huasteca was truly an inter­
national powder keg. As the Constitutionalists again ap­
proached Tampico, tension mounted among both Huertista de­
fenders and the foreign naval forces stationed in the road­
stead to safeguard the lives and interests of their respective 
nationals. On April 9, in this strained atmosphere, a 
legitimate misunderstanding between a Federal officer and a 
group of American sailors led to the arrest and brief de­
tention of the sailors and, ultimately, to a serious con­
frontation between the United States and the Huerta regime. 
Although the prisoners were speedily released and an apology 
conveyed to Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander of American 
naval units off Tampico, the matter did not end there. Mayo 
informed General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, military governor 
of the State of Tamaulipas, that he expected the court martial 
of the arresting officer, a written apology from the General, 
and a twenty-one-gun salute to the American flag. The Mexican
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commander was given twenty-four hours to comply with Mayo's 
demands. ^
At the suggestion of Charge d*Affaires Nelson O'Shaugh- 
nessy, Huerta himself sent a formal apology to Bryan and pro­
mised to court martial the officer in question. He refused, 
however, to accede to Mayo's demand for a salute, requesting 
instead that it be rescinded.^2 But Bryan, despite Daniels' 
hesitancy, chose to back the Admiral. His sole concession to 
Huerta was an extension of the deadline. It was Bryan's 
belief that the dictator was deliberately testing the Adminis­
tration and that the incident at Tampico should be used to 
impress upon the General the error of his ways. Moreover, 
the opportunity was at hand to demonstrate to Huerta the de­
termination of the United States to force his resignation, 
and Bryan was reluctant to let it pass. Accordingly, when
5^*Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 20-26; Cline, The United 
States and Mexico, 157. A strongly nationalistic Mexican 
interpretation of the Tampico incident is set forth in 
Roberto Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana 
(13th ed.; 2 vols.; Mexico City: Libro Mex, 1965), I, 182- 
183.
52Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 187. 
Huerta's strength rested largely upon his recently-acquired 
reputation as the defender of Mexican sovereignty. He dared 
not imperil that reputation by submitting to Mayo's demand 
for a salute to the American flag. Cline, The United States 
and Mexico, 156.
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the Secretary informed Wilson of developments at Tampico, he
53strongly endorsed Mayo's action.
While Mexican-American tension mounted over Huerta's 
procrastination, two lesser incidents, the arrest of an 
American sailor at Veracruz and the unaccountable disruption 
of communications between Washington and Mexico City, aggra­
vated the situation. Coming so close together on the heels 
of the affront at Tampico, these incidents appeared to confirm
Bryan's suspicions of a plot to humiliate and discredit the 
54United States. Still, Link suggests, the crisis might have
passed as suddenly as it had arisen had not the President
been "seeking a pretext at this precise moment for launching
55large-scale military operations against Huerta." And, in­
deed, in the subsequent Blythe interview, Wilson referred to 
the period immediately before intervention as the "psycho­
logical moment." His meaning was clear. There had been "no 
great disaster like the sinking of the Maine,” he explained 
to Blythe, "but there was an adequate reason for our action
53Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 189.
54Cline, The United States and Mexico, 156; Baker, 
Woodrow Wilson, XV, 317.
55Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 395.
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in this culminating insult in a series of insults to our
56country and our flag."
Wilson refused to act decisively, however, until he
could confer with John Lind, recently returned from Mexico.
Lind, by the spring of 1914, had become a strong proponent
of armed intervention and did nothing to counter the Presi-
57dent's own drift in that direction. Consequently, on
April 14, after discussing the Tampico crisis first with Lind
and then with the Cabinet, Wilson decided to make a strong
naval demonstration against Huerta. A blockade of Mexican
Gulf ports might follow. The entire Atlantic fleet, including
seven battleships and a regiment of marines, was ordered to
Mexican waters to join the units already off Tampico and 
58Veracruz. Brushing aside the navy's warning that such a 
concentration might provoke armed resistance, Wilson persisted 
in his plan to force a showdown with Huerta.^9 The following
^6Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with 
President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 71. On the other 
hand, Daniels records that shortly after the President ap­
proved Bryan's reply to Huerta he expressed strong doubt as 
to the rectitude of his course. Daniels had "never seen the 
President so disturbed." The thought that he might be the 
"cause of the loss of lives of many young men" weighed 
heavily on his mind. Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 
189.
57Cline, The United States and Mexico, 157.
58Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 319.
59ciine, The United States and Mexico, 157
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day he conferred with leading members of the congressional 
committees on foreign affairs, informing them of the steps 
already taken in warning that it might soon become necessary 
to use the army and navy to settle the Tampico dispute. If 
Huerta continued to resist Washington's demands, he disclosed, 
American forces would be ordered to seize Tampico and Veracruz 
and blockade both coasts of Mexico. Wilson was confident 
that these operations could be executed without a declaration 
of war. Still, he intended to seek congressional approval 
before taking such bold action.60
Response to the President's proposal was favorable. 
Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, powerful chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, assured Wilson that 
under the circumstances there was no need for congressional 
approval. The President, he declared, had the power to seize 
Tampico if such a step appeared necessary to protect American 
lives and property. Most of his colleagues concurred.61 
Jingoistic sentiment in Congress was running high. Dis- 
cussing the meeting with reporters. Democratic Senator William 
E. Chilton of West Virginia expressed congressional consensus




at the moment: "I'd make them salute the flag if we had to 
blow up the whole place."62 "They were hot," Daniels recalls, 
"ready to pass any law desired."62
But Wilson did not want war. He still believed that 
Huerta could be bluffed if the show of force was sufficient. 
Naval commanders were thus ordered to avoid hostilities.64 
Meanwhile, as the fleet steamed toward Mexican waters, a 
series of "ridiculous exchanges" passed between Wilson and 
Huerta.65 Growing increasingly impatient, the President 
continued to press for immediate fulfillment of the American 
demand. But Huerta, his position in the capital growing 
shakier by the day, dared not submit. By the 18th, with the 
fleet due off Tampico the following morning, Wilson decided 
that he could wait no longer. Tapping out a new ultimatum 
on his own typewriter, the President gave Huerta one more day 
to fire the salute. If the General refused, Wilson would go 
before Congress and initiate "such action as may be necessary
62New York Times, April 15, 1914.
63Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 190.
64Cline, The United States and Mexico, 157.
65Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 397.
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6fi
to enforce the respect due the national's flag." Huerta 
continued to stall, and the deadline passed.
The General himself had taught Wilson the folly of 
idle threats. Having finally learned his lesson at the cost 
of considerable humiliation, the President moved at once to 
follow up his ultimatum with action instead of words. Going 
before a joint session of Congress on the afternoon of the 
20th, he reviewed the development of the Tampico crisis and 
requested congressional approval of a draft resolution em­
powering him to use the armed forces against Huerta to vindi­
cate "the dignity of the United States."®^ At the same time 
he stressed that there would be no war with Mexico; the United 
States was at odds with the dictator, not with the Mexican 
people. While a majority of both Congress and the general 
public agreed wholeheartedly with Wilson that strong action 
against the de facto government was indeed warranted, many 
of them questioned the grounds for such action as set forth
£ O
in his address. The President was right, they believed, but 
for the wrong reasons.
66Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, April 18, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1914, 468.
67uew York Times, April 21, 1914. Already there was 
talk in Washington of sending American marines or regular army 
troops to Mexico City to evacuate the American colony therein. 
Ibid., April 20 and 21, 1914.
**®Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 327.
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Lodge, whose earlier advocacy of bold presidential 
action was perhaps instrumental in committing Wilson to his 
present course, now led the opposition to the President's 
resolution. The Senator was displeased with the wording of 
both the speech and the resolution which he criticized as 
"weak and insufficient." For the United States to open 
hostilities without a declaration of war seemed highly irregu­
lar to Lodge, and for the Administration to go to such lengths 
against one man was simply ludicrous. Before he would approve 
the resolution, the Senator declared, all references to Huerta 
as the cause for intervention would have to be deleted and 
the true causes, the murder of American citizens and the de­
struction of American property, inserted instead.69 Wilson,
69Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of 
Nations (New York: Charles Scribners' sons, 1925), 13-14.
Lodge received strong support from the venerable Elihu Root 
who clearly and concisely stated the classic interventionist 
position. "If there were nothing else but the incident re­
ferred to in the resolution," Root queried, "would the Ameri­
can government have thought for a moment of treating this 
poor, weak country in this peremptory way?" Hardly so, he 
believed. On the other hand, lying behind the insult to the 
flag were the real reasons for intervention: "years of violence 
and anarchy in Mexico... hundreds of American lives sacrificed, 
millions of American property destroyed, and thousands of 
Americans reduced to poverty to-day through the destruction 
of their property.... It is a justification lying not in 
Victoriano Huerta or in his conduct alone, but in the uni­
versal condition of affairs in Mexico." U.S., Congressional 
Record, Containing the Debates and Proceedings, 63 Cong.,
2 sess., 1914, LI, 6986-6987 (hereafter cited as Cong. Rec.?.
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however, had deliberately refrained from including a specific 
bill of particulars for fear of inflaming public opinion and 
arousing demands for just such action as the Senator sought.^ 
Thus an impasse developed at the very time when speed was of 
the essence. Unknown to Lodge, important new developments in 
Mexico, word of which had reached Washington shortly before 
the President addressed Congress, threatened to completely 
frustrate Administration plans for forcing Huerta*s retire­
ment. Only immediate American intervention could salvage 
those plans. But Wilson's resolution, although it passed the 
House the same day, was stopped cold in the Senate. There 
it was delayed, amended, and finally approved only after Ameri­
can marines had gone ashore at Veracruz. Lodge's opposition 
had forced the President to act alone and, rightly or wrongly, 
it was upon Wilson alone that the onus of Veracruz descended.
?°Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 327. Doubtless the Presi­
dent also realized that a list of wrongs inflicted upon Ameri­
cans and other foreigners in Mexico would clearly indicate 
that the great majority of such offenses was committed not by 
Huertistas but by one or the other of the several revolutionary 
factions, and that the most grievous offenders were to be found 
among the ranks of the very faction that the Administration 
now so enthusiastically supported. Indeed, it might well have 
been argued on practical as opposed to moral grounds that the 
United States should have intervened on behalf of Huerta 
rather than the Constitutionalists. The logic of that argu­
ment, from the point of view of the foreign investor or the 
foreign resident in Mexico, was indisputable and became in­
creasingly apparent after the Constitutionalist victory. 
Doubtless it occurred many times to Administration officials 
in their subsequent relations with the revolutionary government.
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On the morning of the 20th the President had learned 
that in the absence of a declaration of war his projected 
naval blockade of Mexican ports would not affect neutral 
shipping. At the same time he was informed that Huerta had 
just received a large shipment of arms from Europe and that 
a second still larger shipment was expected to arrive at Vera­
cruz almost any day aboard the German steamer Ypiranga.
Fearing that the arms might again turn the tide of battle in 
favor of the General, Wilson abandoned his original plan for 
a naval demonstration and blockade and began to consider ways 
to prevent the Ypiranga1s cargo from reaching its destination.
Upon delivering his message to Congress, the President 
hurried to the White House to join Lind, the Secretaries of 
State, War and the Navy, and high-ranking army and navy 
officers in drafting a new plan of operations. Late in the 
evening the conferees reached agreement on a "comprehensive 
plan" for the occupation of Tampico and Veracruz, the possible 
dispatch of an expedition from Veracruz to the Mexican capital, 
and a blockade of both coasts of the republic. The new scheme, 
considerably bolder than Wilson's original plan to force
71Cline, The United States and Mexico, 158.
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Huerta's submission, was to go into effect as soon as the 
Atlantic fleet reached Mexican waters.72
Very likely the conferees were influenced both by 
word of deteriorating conditions in the Huasteca and by the 
fact that the United States had already intervened in that 
province to a limited degree. Fighting between Federal troops 
and Constitutionalists in and around Tampico posed a serious 
threat to its extensive storage and refining facilities and 
had provoked repeated appeals for relief from the oilmen. 
Already, on April 11, Henry Clay Pierce had complained to 
Bryan that Federal gunboats had inexplicably bombarded the 
Pierce Oil Company refinery. The Secretary had responded by 
ordering Mayo to obtain a cease-fire, but Huerta denounced 
the order as a violation of Mexican sovereignty and the Con­
stitutionalists continued to probe the city's defenses.73 
Thus the threat to the oil industry remained. Some of the 
conferees, particularly Garrison, viewed that threat as a 
matter of the gravest concern and urged the occupation of 
Tampico.^ Daniels recounts that the President's military
72Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 399.
73Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 318; Quirk, An Affair 
of Honor, 7-19.
74Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 192.
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advisors wanted to go still further. They sought a formal 
declaration of war against Mexico and, according to the Sec­
retary, hoped to "annex all the country to Panama to the 
domain of the United States." Wilson, however, was interested 
only in toppling Huerta, not in the acquisition of territory
*JC
or the defense of property rights. His will prevailed.
Early the following morning, Bryan was awakened by 
word from Veracruz that the Ypiranga had arrived off the bar 
and was ejected to enter the harbor later in the day. In 
a series of urgent pre-dawn telephone conversations, Wilson, 
Bryan, Daniels, and Garrison agreed that the plan completed 
only a few hours earlier must be set aside for the time being 
and immediate steps taken to prevent the arms shipment from 
reaching Huertista forces. In the absence of a formal blockade, 
however, seizure of the Ypiranga would constitute a violation 
of international law and could conceivably lead to serious 
complications with Germany.7** Ultimately, at Daniels' sug­
gestion, it was decided to take the custom house at Veracruz 
and impound the arms as they were unloaded. At first Wilson 
hesitated, but when Daniels warned that the arms might well 
be turned against American soldiers in the near future, the
75Ibid. 76Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 399
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President relented.77 Neither he nor his civilian advisors 
anticipated armed resistance from the Huertista garrison, 
assuming that it would be intimidated by the impressive dis­
play of military might standing off the bar.78 Shortly be­
fore dawn, Daniels wired the fateful order to Admiral Fletcher:
"Seize custom house. Do not permit war supplies to be de-
7Qlivered to Huerta government or to any other party." In 
the excitement of the moment a serious oversight was committed—  
no one thought to inform Carranza.
Fletcher immediately contacted the American Consul at 
Veracruz, William W. Canada, requesting that he confer with 
the Huertista conmander, General Gustavo Maass, and make arrange­
ments for peaceful transfer of the custom house and wharves 
to American forces. With the way assumed to be clear, several 
hundred marines and blue-jackets landed and quickly took pos­
session of the waterfront. The initial critical phase of 
the operation had passed without incident. Shortly before 
noon, however, Mexican soldiers and civilians opened fire on 
the landing party and sporadic firing continued well into the
77Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 19 3.
?®Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 77; Cline, The United 
States and Mexico, 159.
78New York Times, April 22, 1914.
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night. Early the following morning Fletcher was reenforced 
by the main body of the Atlantic fleet under Admiral Charles 
J. Badger. Some three thousand men went ashore and in a 
daylong battle broke Mexican resistance and occupied the 
city.80
Mexican reaction was violent. Anti-American demon­
strations flared throughout the republic. On the 22nd 
Huerta severed relations with the United States and exhorted 
all factions to join in repelling the invader. Along the 
tense northern border both sides prepared for war. And, 
indeed, for several days after the occupation of Veracruz, 
war between the United States and a united Mexican people 
appeared a certainty.8^ Wilson, who was "profoundly un­
nerved" by news of the bloodshed at Veracruz, had blundered 
badly and knew it.®^ Moreover, in failed to give Carranza
8°Ibid.; Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 85-102; Silva 
Herzog, Breve Historia, II, 74-75. The Ypiranga entered the 
inner harbor at Veracruz on April 23 but did not discharge 
its cargo of arms. Ultimately, after a lengthy circuitous 
voyage, it delivered its cargo to Huertista officials at 
Puerta Mexico, south of Veracruz. Although the arms eventu­
ally reached Mexico City, they arrived too late to save 
Huerta. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 151-152.
81Link, Wilsons The Mew Freedom, 400. See, for 
example, New York Times, April 23, 24, 25, and 26, 1914.
8^Link, Wilsons The New Freedom, 402
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advance notice of the landing, he had aroused in Constitu­
tionalist leaders a deep and lasting suspicion of American 
motives. With regard to Carranza and several of the more 
important sub-chiefs, the damage appears to have been irre­
parable. Certainly relations between Washington and the 
dominant Carrancista wing of the Constitutionalist movement 
were never again the same.**-*
Both at home and abroad the seizure of Veracruz 
proved a severe embarrassment to the President. Through 
his address to Congress and the unfortunate wording of the 
joint resolution, Wilson had misrepresented his motives, not 
only to the legislators, but to the American people and the 
world-at-large. That the President should so overreact to 
so slight a provocation seemed in retrospect absurd, not
B^When American forces entered Mexico in pursuit of 
Pancho Villa early in 1916 no amount of reassurance by Wilson 
Administration officials could allay Carranza's fears that 
the President had acquisitive designs on northern Mexico. 
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace. 202. A similar ob­
sessional fear of American annexation was manifested by 
Candido Aguilar, Constitutionalist commander in the Huasteca 
and later governor of the State of Veracruz and minister of
foreign affairs. The fact that the greater part of the oil­
fields fell under Aguilar's jurisdiction greatly exacerbated 
the distrust and animosity between the Constitutionalists 
and the oilmen. Aguilar, however, had some grounds for his 
fears. Joaquin Meade, La Huasteca Veracruzana (2 vols.; 
Mexico City: Editorial Citlaltepetl, 1962), IX, 146-147 and 
168-169.
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only to detached observers, but to many patriotic Americans 
as well.**4 A barrage of criticism, both foreign and domestic, 
was levelled at the Administration. Still more disturbing 
to Wilson, however, was the fact that the situation in Mexico 
was now completely beyond his control. He wanted desperately 
to disengage, but with the outbreak of hostilities a definite 
possibility he dared not withdraw from Veracruz. Possession 
of Mexico's major port was the one trump card in his hand 
and he could ill afford to discard it.
Consequently, on April 23, the Fifth Brigade com­
manded by General Frederick N. Funston sailed from Galveston 
to relieve the marines at Veracruz. At the same time, addi­
tional army units were sent to the border and the National 
Guard was alerted for call-up in the event of war.**^ Still, 
the more determined interventionists were disappointed, 
those in the Administration urging the President to retain 
the initiative and impose a settlement of the Mexican
84Baker, Woodrow Wilson. XV, 332; Link, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Progressive Bra, 124-125; Link, Wilson;
The New Freedom, 403-404.
B5New York Times, April 24, 1914
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86problem. Garrison, who anticipated a massacre of American
citizens in Mexico City, pressed Wilson to authorize an
expedition to the capital at once. The Secretary was no
less concerned over the fate of the oilfields, recommending
execution of the earlier plan to seize Tampico and occupy
87the petroleum province. However, both Bryan and Daniels 
strongly opposed further military operations against Huerta 
and so advised the President. Abhoring bloodshed and deeply 
grieved by the deaths at Veracruz, Wilson had no stomach 
for further fighting. Garrison's plans and other proposals 
for new offensive action against Huerta were rejected. In­
stead, the President retreated from his earlier belligerent 
stance, seeking to preclude a second round of hostilities
O  O
through the timely mediation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.00
86°°Quirk states that many Americans believed or hoped 
that Funston's 3000 soldiers "represented but a part of a 
larger expeditionary force which would pacify Mexico. Among 
these was their commander Frederick Funston; his chief. 
Secretary of War Garrison; the Republicans in the United 
States; most of the American newspapers; and abroad, the 
American colony in Mexico and the government of Great Britain, 
which was disturbed because of the mistreatment of British 
nationals by revolutionaries such as Villa." Quirk, An 
Affair of Honor, 123*




Carranza's reaction to the seizure of Veracruz posed 
a grave threat to Wilson's plans for American participation 
in the reconstruction of Mexico as well as to future Mexican- 
American amity in general. On April 22, while fighting still 
ranged in the streets of Veracruz, the First Chief had been 
informed by an Administration spokesman that the United 
States had no intention of "intervening” in Mexico. The 
Veracruz expedition, he was assured, was aimed solely at
QQ
Huerta and should not be considered "intervention."0  ^ Al­
ready annoyed by the President's meddling in Mexican affairs 
and increasingly suspicious of his motives, Carranza was 
enraged by Wilson's semantic sophistry. Rejecting Washington's 
explanation, he insisted upon the immediate withdrawal of 
American forces from Veracruz. A blunt threat of war accom-
QQ
panied his demand.
Meanwhile, along the border, an explosive situation 
had developed. It was with the greatest difficulty that
®^Bryan to Carothers, April 21, 1914, Foreign Rela­
tions, 1914. 480. Cline notes that Wilson had his own special 
definition of "intervention.” To the President it implied 
the establishment of a protectorate and the "re-arrangement 
and control of Mexico's internal affairs.” Wilson did not 
consider the dispatch of troops into Mexico as either "inter­
vention” or "war" once he was convinced that the moral right 
was on his side. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 182.
90Carranza to Bryan, April 22, 1914, Foreign Relations, 
1914. 483-484.
cooler heads on both sides of the line prevented the out­
break of hostilities. At the height of the crisis, Pancho 
Villa stepped forward in the implausible role of peacemaker. 
For some time villa had schemed to depose Carranza and assume 
control of the revolutionary movement in his own right.®1 
Well aware of the necessity for Washington's support, he 
was anxious to cultivate the good will of the man in the 
White H o u s e . ® ^ Veracruz showed him the way. Upon receiving 
word of the landing. Villa hastened to Juarez to confer with 
George C. Carothers, Wilson's personal representative in 
northern Mexico. Professing his approval of the President's 
decision to occupy Veracruz, Carranza's rival promised to 
use his influence to head off an open break between Washington 
and the Constitutionalists.93
Commanding the loyalty of the majority of the troops 
in the revolutionary armies. Villa was in a position to make
®1Quirk, The Mexican Revolution. 26-27; Link, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Progressive Era. 128.
®2Link, Wilson: The Hew Freedom, 403; Clarence C.
Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: a Study in
Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1961), 120 (hereafter cited as The U. S. and Villa).
®3Carothers to Bryan, April 23, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1914. 485.
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good his pledge. His disaffection simultaneously cut the 
ground from beneath Carranza and greatly strengthened the 
President's hand. It gave Wilson room to maneuver, enabling 
him to retreat with a semblance of grace from an embarrassing 
and potentially disastrous cul-de-sac. At the same time, 
however, it caused him to reassess revolutionary leadership 
and on the basis of that erroneous estimate to embark upon 
still another ill-fated course in his pursuit of an accep­
table Mexican settlement. Wilson was grateful to Villa and 
deeply impressed with his apparent enthusiasm to work with 
the United States. For some time thereafter, despite over­
whelming evidence to the contrary, the President clung to 
the fantasy that Villa was a true patriot, an eminently 
reasonable man with whom he might cooperate closely in the re­
habilitation of the Mexican nation.94 But Wilson was wrong, 
and in the long run his misjudgement of Villa proved perhaps 
still more regrettable than the decision to intervene at 
Veracruz.
On April 24, with war still a distinct possibility, 
diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
94Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 129. 
Bryan, too, was completely taken in, as evidenced by his 
description of Villa as a "high-minded and noble citizen." 
Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 117.
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offered to mediate the differences between the United States
and Mexico. Wilson readily accepted, and little urging was
95required to win Huerta's acquiescence as well. Still, an 
effective and lasting settlement of the Mexican question de­
pended upon the willingness of the Constitutionalists to 
accept mediation. By the end of April, however, Carranza 
was on the verge of total military victory and was not disposed 
to settle for less. While acknowledging mediation "in prin­
ciple," the First Chief refused to send delegates to a con­
ference on Mexican-American differences and rejected the
mediators' plea for an armistice. Foreigners had no business
9 6meddling in Mexican affairs, he declared.
On May 19, shortly before the talks began at Niagara
Falls, Ontario, Carranza reiterated his intention to subdue
the republic by force of arms and to proceed with its recon-
97struction without interference from abroad. Wilson had 
been warned, but despite successively stronger protests 
against his persistent intervention in Mexican affairs, he
95Cline, The United States and Mexico, 161.
9 6"Carranza to the Mediators, May 3, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1914, 518-519.
97New York Times, May 20, 1914.
could not turn his back on the Revolution. With the passing 
of the Veracruz crisis he had regained his self-assurance, 
and by the time the conference opened he was as determined 
as ever to exert his personal influence over the movement. 
Consequently, he ignored Carranza's statement and proceeded 
to work through his representatives at the conference for a 
settlement assuring maximum American influence in post-war 
Mexico.® ®
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 409-411. On June 16, 
as the conference was drawing to a close, Carrancista agents 
Luis Cabrera and Rafael Zubaran Capmany met with the President* 
representatives in Buffalo, New York. In no uncertain terms 
they spelled out the Constitutionalist position with regard 
to the United States and the Mexican Revolution. The Revolu­
tion was an exclusively Mexican affair and so it would remain; 
under no circumstances would it be permitted to fall under 
American influence. Foreign interference in the War Between 
the States would have been intolerable to the American people 
in 1861, Cabrera reminded Wilson's envoys, and so it was to 
the Mexican people in 1914. Ibid., 412. The Buffalo meeting 
was a turning point. Prior to it, relations between Washing­
ton and the Constitutionalists, while hardly cordial, were 
relatively free from rancor. But following the seizure of 
Veracruz, Carranza had intensified his efforts to discourage 
further American meddling in Mexican affairs. Three times in 
less than two months he had strongly appealed to Wilson to 
exercise restraint and to respect the sovereignty of the 
Mexican Nation. Dismissing those remonstrances, the Presi­
dent continued to pursue his plans for controlling the revo­
lutionary movement. The failure of the Buffalo talks to stay 
his hand marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of re­
lations between the United States and the dominant Carrancista 
wing of the Constitutionalist movement. When the First Chief 
proved intractable, Wilson turned against him and sought to 
destroy him much as he had earlier destroyed Huerta. The Ad­
ministration backed first one rival and then another. When
94
Wilson was confident that sooner or later a satis­
factory arrangement with the Constitutionalists would be 
reached, one which would allow him to play an important 
role in determining the future course of the Revolution.
For the moment, however, his efforts were concentrated on 
the elimination of Huerta. Mediation appeared to offer an 
effective and far safer means to that end than did further 
armed intervention. But the President "had no intention of 
submitting to a genuine mediation."" Instead, he pressed 
mediators to obtain Huerta's resignation and to effect the 
organization of a provisional government composed entirely 
of Constitutionalists. In due course, he hoped, a permanent 
revolutionary government would be chosen, and it, in turn, 
would execute the necessary reforms.
The talks at Niagara Falls between the ABC mediators, 
Huerta's agents, and Wilson's "unofficial" representatives
Villa faltered, Wilson turned to Alvaro Obregon; and when 
Obregon remained loyal to his chief the President searched 
for still another catspaw. Eventually Wilson resigned him­
self to the First Chief's preeminence and ceased opposing 
him. However, a genuine rapprochement between Washington 
and Mexico City was out of the question for some time there­
after.
"ibid., 407 iOOibid.
were little more than a “staged show" conducted from the 
White H o u s e . T h e  real issuer the one which brought 
Huerta to the conference table, was the American occupation 
of Veracruz. Yet that issue was studiously ignored. In­
stead, at Wilson's behest, the conferees focused their at­
tention on the "internal problems" of the republic, jL.e., 
the Huerta dictatorship. By the end of June agreement had 
been reached on a draft protocol providing for the General's 
resignation and for the organization of a provisional govern­
ment. There was no assurance, however, that the new regime 
would be controlled by the Constitutionalists, and for that
reason the President forbade his representatives to sign 
102the document. The mediation attempt. Quirk concludes,
"resembled nothing so much as an elaborate quadrille from 
Alice in Wonderland in which nothing anyone did or said made 
sense to anyone else . . . .  Given the extreme intransigence 
on all sides, the mediation had little chance of success."'*'0 '^
Meanwhile, as the talks dragged on, Carranza's 
forces pushed slowly southward toward the capital. Early 
in May they had moved into the oilfields, and on the 14th
^°^Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 118; Cline, The United 
States and Mexico, 161.
•L02Ibid. *02Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 118.
Tampico itself had been occupied following evacuation of the 
Federal garrison. Thereafter, Huerta's days were numbered.
To a degree, then, mediation had served its purpose, at 
least from Wilson's point of view. As a "propaganda device," 
Cline observes, it "seemingly showed the world that Wilson 
was willing to listen to reason and to consult Latin America." 
In reality, of course, he was willing to do neither.^-04 Still 
more important, the talks served as a smokescreen obscuring 
the fact that American forces continued to occupy Veracruz 
in flagrant violation of Mexican sovereignty. So long as 
they remained, Huerta was cut off from Europe.
By early July the end was in sight. Loss of the 
principal Gulf ports denied the dictatorship the means of 
resupply from abroad. It also deprived the regime of customs 
receipts and the vital oil revenues of Tampico and Tuxpan. 
Huerta could neither purchase nor receive munitions, nor 
could he pay his restive troops. The General was finished.
On July 15 he submitted his resignation to Congress, made his 
way to Puerto Mexico, and boarded the Ypiranga for exile in 
France. In the capital Congress hurriedly organized a new
*04Cline, The United States and Mexico, 162.
provisional government. A Constitutionalist sympathizer, 
former Chief Justice Francisco Carbajal, was appointed 
provisional chief-of-state.
Chapter 3
THE CONTEST OVER OIL
I.
When American forces occupied Veracruz in the spring 
of 1914, the position of the foreign investor in Mexico, 
particularly that of the American investor, changed radically. 
In one stroke Woodrow Wilson not only doomed the Huerta re­
gime, unquestionably solicitious of foreign enterprise in 
Mexico, but greatly intensified the hostility of the Mexican 
people toward the United States and assured the ultimate 
triumph of a political faction firmly committed to ejection 
of the foreigner and confiscation of his investments.^-
Testimony of William F. Buckley, December 6, 1919, 
IMA, 767-843. Buckley, a Texan, had gone to Mexico in 1908, 
and was a resident of Mexico City at the time of his appear­
ance before the subcommittee. An attorney by profession, he 
had practiced law in the republic for some time before turning 
to speculation in real estate and oil leases. His holdings 
in Mexico he valued at several hundred thousand dollars. 
Buckley had been closely associated with the Huerta regime 
and had served as counsel to the Mexican delegation at the 
Niagara Conference of May-June, 1914. Roman Catholic, 
fluent in Spanish and widely acquainted with conservative 
and revolutionary leaders alike, he had a grasp of Mexican 
affairs perhaps unsurpassed among foreigners in the republic. 
Few were better qualified to assess the course of events in
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Almost immediately sharp differences arose between the vic­
torious Constitutionalists and American firms operating in 
the republic. Perhaps most important was the bitter and pro­
longed contest which grew out of the revolutionary govern­
ment's attempts to obtain a larger share of oil industry 
profits. The mutual suspicion and antagonism engendered by
Mexico in the decade following the Madero revolution.
Although Buckley disagreed strongly with the position of 
the Wilson Administration on Mexico, he opposed armed 
intervention and was not associated with any of the several 
interventionist groups then active in the United States.
Discussing the anti-Americanism of the Constitu­
tionalists, Buckley recalled a conversation with Carranza's 
principal advisor in the spring of 1914 "in which Mr. Cabrera 
very frankly told me that the menace of the American in 
Mexico must be removed and that the only way to do this 
was to drive him out of the country and take his property.” 
Again, in October, 1914, speaking at a banquet given in 
honor of the First Chief at Veracruz, Cabrera had "dilated 
on the aims of the revolution and stated that the Constitu­
tionalists were going to confiscate American property and 
take over American oil wells . . . Ibid., 796-797.
Buckley's testimony was corroborated by that of 
William W. Canada, American consul at Veracruz from 1897 
to 1918. Canada had attended the aforementioned banquet 
in the company of several other foreign consuls. He had 
been struck by the vehemence of Cabrera's words. While 
the bitterest diatribe had been aimed at Canada, similar 
remarks were addressed to the British and Cuban consuls. 
Cabrera professed to be speaking for the Carrancista faction 
generally. In retrospect, Canada observed, Cabrera's 
threats had been "carried out . .  and then some, I think." 
Testimony of William W. Canada, April 30, 1920, Ibid., 
2424-2425. See also Testimony of Charles E. Jones, May 17 
and 18, 1920, Ibid., 2889-3201, especially 2910-2929.
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this running battle led rather shortly to a more serious 
struggle for ultimate control of the industry itself. For
9
all involved the stakes were very high.
At least one revolutionary leader was prepared to 
nationalize the industry as early as 1913. Candido Aguilar, 
commander of the first Constitutionalist forces to penetrate
2
As early as 1914, when the industry was still in 
its developmental stage, capital investment in the produc­
tion of petroleum was estimated at $175,000,000. Clarence 
A. Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, U. S., Department of State, 
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal 
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (National Archives Microfilm 
Publication M-274) File no. 812.6363/124 (hereafter cited 
as SDR 812.00). Collapse of the Russian oil industry in the 
First World War, accompanied by increased use of oil-fueled 
vessels for both commercial and military purposes, "created 
a tremendous demand during the war for heavier grades of 
crude oil, such as those produced in Mexico." Consequently, 
the Mexican industry "underwent its greatest expansion during 
and immediately following the war ." Eugene Holman,
"American Oil Companies in Foreign Petroleum Operations,"
Our Oil Resources, ed., Leonard M. Fanning (New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1950, 38. In 1914, American firms accounted 
for 58% of Mexican production; by 1924, they were producing 
slightly over 80% of the total. Ibid., 39. By the latter 
year, American investment in the industry was estimated at 
$398,200,000. Rippy, "The Mexican Oil Industry," Essays in 
Mexican History, 256. In 1928, after seven straight years 
of steadily declining production, the Mexican Department of 
Commerce and Industry estimated total investment in the Mexi­
can oil industry at $1,050,535,000: American ($606,043,000), 
British ($354,776,000), Dutch ($71,191,000), Mexican ($11,582, 
000), miscellaneous ($6,993,000). Max Winkler, Investments 
of United States Capital in Latin America (Boston: World 
Peace Foundation, 1929), 224-225.
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the oilfields, seems to have had this end in mind for some 
time prior to commencement of the Huasteca campaign. As 
military chief and later as civil governor of the State of 
Veracruz, he posed a greater threat to the oilmen than did 
any other revolutionary leader. Personally close to Car­
ranza, able, intelligent and ruthless, he was a formidable
^Nationalization of the Mexican petroleum industry 
was by no means a new idea in 1913. It was implicit in 
the slogan "Mexico for the Mexicans," which considerably 
pre-dated the Carranza uprising. Nor was consideration 
of that course restricted to revolutionaries alone. In 
1913, Huertista delegates in the Chamber of Deputies 
"considered the creation of a national oil company—  
apparently the first such proposal in the world— as a chal­
lenge to foreign control." Harvey O 'Conner, World Crisis 
in Oil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 108.
Moreover, at least one member of the General's cabinet 
strongly urged nationalization of the industry. Miller 
to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
Clarence Miller served as consul and vice-consul 
at Tampico from 1910 through 1921. Prior to his appoint­
ment, he had been employed in Washington as an attorney 
for the Bureau of Pensions and, later, for the Bureau of 
Corporations. Miller's influence in shaping the Wilson 
Administration's Mexican policy was considerable. He was 
Washington's principal source of information on developments 
in the Huasteca, particularly those relating to the petro­
leum industry. Certainly he was the Administration's most 
creditable source in that respect. Miller was widely 
acquainted with foreign oilmen and Mexican officials alike 
and was thoroughly familiar with the mechanics of the 
Mexican oil industry. On more than one occasion he was 
called upon to mediate disputes between the oilmen and 
Huertista or Carrancista bureaucrats. Few, if any, of the 
Administration's representatives in Mexico played so 
important a role over such an extended period of time.
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adversary.4 During the chaotic aftermath of the Veracruz 
landing, the first of a series of recurring crises for the 
oilmen, Aguilar emerged as the principal obstacle to extended
4Aguilar was among the inner circle of Constitutiona­
list leadership. As "de facto boss of Vera Cruz'1 in 1913, 
he had "thrown his influence, his patronage, and his financial 
backing on the side of the First Chief during a critical 
period in the letter's political fortunes." Marvin, "The 
Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, 376. His influence and 
prestige within the Carrancista faction was enhanced by his 
engagement and eventual marriage to the First Chief's 
daughter. In 1914, he was appointed preconstitutional 
governor of Veracruz and was subsequently "elected" to that 
post. In 1916, he was appointed minister of foreign rela­
tions and served briefly in that capacity before reassuming 
the governorship of his native state. Aguilar was one of 
the few prominent Carrancistas to remain loyal to his chief 
in the revolution of 1920. Although one of the principal 
figures in the De la Huerta revolution of 1923-1924, he was 
allowed to return from exile in the United States during the 
Calles regime. He was subsequently elected senator for the 
state of Veracruz and was able to reestablish himself as jefe 
politico in Jalapa during the 1930's. John W. F. Dulles, 
Yesterday in Mexico, A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 34, 237, 260-262, 
629, 674 (hereafter cited as Yesterday in Mexico). A former 
comrade-in-arms, General Salvador Alvarado, the radical 
Carrancista governor of the Yucatan, described Aguilar in 
1920 as "notoriously anti-American" and a "perfect tool and 
henchman for Carranza." Despite Aguilar's success in dealing 
with the oilmen, Alvarado dismissed him as an "absolute nonen­
tity who never had any time to attend to any matters ex­
cept with both hands to grab all property or money, dis­
honestly or otherwise that he could lay his hands on." 
Moreover, he declared, it was "generally understood" that 
Aguilar was emotionally unstable and that in 1918 "for a time 
everybody knew that he was insane." Testimony of Jones, IMA, 
2929. Bumbler or not, Aguilar was undeniably a thorn in 
the side of the foreign oilman, and a painful one. See, for 
example, Meade, LaHuasteca Veracruzana, II, 172.
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foreign control of the Mexican oil industry. For the next 
five years, until the collapse of the Carranza regime in the 
spring of 1919, he was truly the nemesis of the oilmen.
For some months prior to the occupation of Veracruz, 
the Constitutionalists had waged a desultory campaign to 
wrest control of the Huasteca from Huertista forces and to 
drive them from Tampico and Tuxpam. Occasional skirmishing 
around the oil camps, accompanied by harassment of the 
workers, had caused some concern among company executives in 
Tampico. But frequent threats to fire the wells and murder 
foreign workers had been largely discounted. It was gene­
rally believed that American supervisory personnel in the 
field could cope with all but the most serious problems 
arising from the fighting. Although ill will existed be­
tween Constitutionalist soldiers and oilfield workers, par­
ticularly Americans, violent personal assaults on company 
employees were not anticipated. Consequently, few workers 
were armed. On the eve of Veracruz there appeared to be 
little cause for apprehension.
Overnight, conditions changed. Mexican reaction to 
seizure of the port was explosive. American workers, unarmed 
and isolated in the jungle camps below Tampico, feared for 
their lives. Almost immediately an exodus en masse from the
104
oilfields began. Arriving in Tampico, workers found the 
city seething with anti-Americanism. After a harrowing 
night under seige, most were evacuated to American warships 
off the Panuco bar.^ They protested in vain when the
^J. F. Lucey to Bryan, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/34; 
Testimony of Captain William M. Hanson, May 20, 1920, IMA, 
3223-3249. At the time of his testimony, Hanson, a senior 
captain in the Texas State Rangers, was serving as a special 
investigator for the subcommittee. Hanson had served for more 
than twenty years as deputy United States marshal along the 
Rio Grande boundary and as United States marshal for the 
southern district of Texas. In 1906, he had resigned from 
Federal service and emigrated to Mexico. There he purchased 
a large hacienda north of Tampico, organized the Mexican Land 
Company, and raised cattle and citrus fruit. He introduced 
scientific agriculture, organized a growers' association, 
and was soon one of the most prominent citizens in north­
eastern Mexico. In January, 1914, Hanson and other Americans 
residing in the vicinity of Tampico were ordered into the 
city by American consular officials to remove them from the 
path of advancing Constitutionalists under General Pablo 
Gonzalez. In Tampico they established themselves at the 
Southern Hotel and the Hotel Victoria, intending to return 
to their homes when order was restored in the interior.
On the day of the Veracruz landing, unruly crowds 
incited and armed by General Zaragoza, Federalist commander 
in the city, beseiged the two hotels. No help could be ex­
pected from American naval forces. Some time earlier,
Daniels had ordered Admiral Mayo to withdraw his squadron 
from the Panuco. Americans in Tampico were left to shift 
for themselves. Daniels' order, approved by President Wilson, 
was executed over the strong protest of Consul Miller and 
Admiral Mayo himself. Report of S. D. Lester, April 28, 1920, 
Ibid., 2452. Lester was a special investigator for the sub­
committee. His report consisted in large part of affidavits 
obtained from American citizens, both in and out of Mexico, 
who had testimony bearing on the treatment of Americans in 
revolutionary Mexico.
Through the night of April 21-22, Hanson, commanding 
a body of armed men in the Southern Hotel, succeeded in
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vessels weighed anchor for the United States. Some 2,800 
men, virtually the entire American labor force in the oil­
fields were thus prevented from returning to the job and
g
were eventually disembarked at Galveston.
holding the mob at bay. However, only the timely interven­
tion of German naval officers from the cruiser Dresden pre­
vented a pitched battle and the probable murder of the Ameri­
cans. Testimony of Hanson, Ibid., 3230-3233. Captain Koeh­
ler, commander of the German warship, had followed develop­
ments ashore with growing apprehension. Early in the morning 
of the 22nd, he ordered Zaragoza to disperse the mob immedi­
ately or the Dresden would clear the streets with her guns. 
Federal troops broke up the crowds. By dawn, however, the 
mob had reassembled and a fresh assault upon the hotels 
appeared imminent. Hanson made his way to the consulate, 
informing Miller that he could not restrain his men if the 
mob again approached the hotel. Miller, in turn, warned 
Zaragoza, who urged immediate evacuation of the Americans. 
Koehler and a very reluctant British naval officer agreed to 
transfer the Americans to Mayo's ships standing off the 
Panuco bar. By the end of the day, the evacuation had been 
completed. Report of Lester, Ibid., 2452; Testimony of Han­
son, Ibid., 3230-3233. See also Testimony of Michael A. 
Spellacy, January 9, 1920, Ibid., 939-956. In almost every 
instance testimony relating to the night of April 21-22 is 
marked by indignation and bitterness toward Administration 
officials and a lingering incredulity that those officials 
could have so cavalierly abandoned their countrymen in dis­
tress .
6Lucey to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, April 29, 1914, SDR 
812.6363/34. Americans composed the bulk of the non-Mexican 
labor force in the Huasteca oilfields. British, Dutch and 
other foreign firms relied heavily upon experienced oilfield 
workers from the United States in both exploration and pro­
duction. The evacuation of American workers thus inhibited 
or halted outright the operations of all firms but one, the 
British-owned Aguila. The Cowdray company employed enough 
British citizens to enable it to maintain operations through­
out the crisis. Until American workers returned to the 
Huasteca, the Aguila enjoyed an effective monopoly on the 
production and marketing of Mexican petroleum products.
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As Mexican wrath subsided, oil company managers, 
most of whom had remained in Tampico, were confronted with 
still a new and potentially far graver crisis. The oilfields 
had been all but abandoned in the rush to the city. All 
supervisory and skilled personnel had fled. Only a handful 
of Mexican laborers, and those of questionable loyalty, had 
remained behind. Meanwhile, the wells continued to flow, and 
oil poured into the storage pits. Normally, the surplus would 
be pumped into new pits or through pipelines to steel tanks 
around Tampico and Tuxpam. But with the camps deserted, con­
struction of new storage facilities ceased and the liklihood 
of pump malfunction greatly increased. When existing storage 
filled to capacity, the overflow would rapidly flood the 
surrounding countryside, creating extremely hazardous condi-
n
tions. Fire, the oilmen's nightmare, was bound to follow.
7W. A. Thompson to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/67. 
Thompson, a vice-president of the Texas Company, submitted to 
Bryan a vivid description of conditions in the oilfields, 
going to great lengths to impress upon the Secretary the 
dangers inherent in the current situation. In recent months, 
he explained, production had risen rapidly and now exceeded 
exports. There was a constant need, then, for new ground 
storage in the field. But American workers skilled in the 
construction of reservoirs had been taken to Galveston against 
their will and were forbidden by Administration officials to 
return to Tampico. Thompson noted that few of the wells were 
producing at full capacity, most being "pinched in" by chokes 
and valves which regulated flow. This limited production
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It was of the utmost importance, then, to return trained 
workers to the camps as soon as possible. Yet Administra­
tion officials, particularly the Secretary of the Navy, at 
first refused to cooperate with the companies in returning 
their employees. Daniels, in fact, expressed overt hostility
Q
to the Tampico refugees and to Americans in Mexico generally.
alone would soon exhaust existing storage facilities. Over­
flow and fire would certainly follow. "The whole surrounding 
country," he warned, " . . .  will become flooded with oil and 
I cannot see how this can occur without . . . fire. Once 
started, it will carry with or against the tide and wind. Rain 
cannot put it out, but instead would increase its violence . .
. . Such a fire would burn the entire oil country and doubt­
less a multitude of its inhabitants." And fire would melt the 
chokes on "pinched in" wells, more than tripling the current 
rate of flow. See also Lucey to Bryan, April 29, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/34 and E. T. Dumble to Senator T. A. Culberson, 
April 29, 1914. Dumble was president of the East Coast Oil 
Company, a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific Railroad.
Formerly Texas State Geologist, Dumble had conducted much of 
the early geological investigation of the Mexican Gulf Coast 
ind was perhaps better qualified than anyone in the industry 
to gauge the consequences of fire in the oilfields. His 
brief but forceful statement was almost identical with that 
of Thompson.
O
Report of Lester, IMA, 2448-2451. On or about May 1, 
1914, a committee representing the American community of 
Tampico submitted to the President, through the Secretaries 
of State, War, and the Navy, a petition calling upon the 
Administration to return the evacuees to their homes in and 
around Tampico and to afford them "suitable protection." It 
further requested that warships be stationed in the Panuco 
River and their commanders given instructions "similar to 
those . . . given to the commanders of war vessels of other 
nations who have successfully protected the lives and property 
of their citizens resident in Tampico and environs . . . ."
The petitioners also criticized the withdrawal of Mayo's ships
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The companies, too, were reluctant to return their men to 
the camps, but for a different reason. They feared for their 
lives. Constitutionalist and Huertista soldiers alike were 
embittered by the seizure of Veracruz, and their animosity
from the Panuco prior to the Veracruz landing. While in 
Washington, Captain Hanson and several other members of the 
committee called upon the aforementioned officials. The 
first interview, with Daniels, "was distressing and unfortu­
nate. The Secretary gave his callers his opinion of them, 
in terms that were neither kind nor just; this angered his 
callers who... behaved somewhat discourteously... showing 
little control of temper or tongue. The Secretary was ini­
tially to blame in that, without waiting to hear what his 
callers had to say, he gave them his uncomplimentary opinion 
of them, spoke of them as 'refugees,' called them adventurers 
who had gone to Mexico with buccaneering intent, and said 
that they should have come to him with greatful thanks for 
having rescued them" A more sympathetic hearing was accorded 
the committee by the Secretary of War, although he was the 
least able to assist the evacuees. Bryan, on the other hand, 
while cool to the committee, agreed to provide funds for the 
immediate relief of the group at Galveston and to accept 
written statements of protest from members of the committee.
Both Garrison and Senator. T. P. Gore of Oklahoma 
offered to arrange an interview with the President. The 
way was cleared by Gore, and all that remained was to fix 
the date. However, when Gore forwarded a copy of the evacuees' 
petition to the White House the President abruptly cancelled 
the interview. Ibid.
For the bias of Wilson and Daniels against Americans 
resident in or doing business in Mexico and their lack of 
concern over the fate of those individuals, see Lodge, The 
Senate and the League of Nations, 13-14; Daniels, The Wilson 
Era; Years of Peace, 181, 185-186; Cline, The United States 
and Mexico, 187; David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 56-59.
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toward American workers might prove difficult to contain.
Of still greater urgency, however, was arrangement of an 
immediate cease-fire in the vicinity of wells and storage 
facilities. But Constitutionalist commanders, already com- 
mitted to operations in the oilfields, refused to withdraw.
Fearing the worst, company executives appealed to 
their respective governments to intercede on their behalf. 
First, they sought to win guarantees from both Mexican factions 
that foreign workers would be allowed to return to the camps 
and resume work unmolested. Second, they hoped to halt 
fighting in the oilfields and around the storage and shipping 
facilities at Tampico and Tuxpam.^0 In accord with the
9Charles F. De Ganahl to Boaz Long, May 1, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/33. De Ganahl represented a group with producing 
wells in the Huasteca. "The forces of neither Federals nor 
Constitutionalists realize the danger involved." he complained. 
"An hour's work of ignorant soldiers would destroy values 
staggering in magnitude." See also Dumble to Bryan, May 4,
1914, SDR 812.6363/44 and Canada to Bryan, May 21, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/69.
^Thompson to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/67. 
Thompson urged "the great necessity of establishing a neutral 
zone in the oil country or of giving protection to the opera­
tors in the field without delay. If it is not possible or 
advisable to stop the conflict at Tampico let it go on, but 
insist on peace in the producing country." Thompson assured 
the Secretary that American workers in Galveston were ready to 
return to the oilfields, "but the responsibility of sending 
them back without protection is more than their employers should 
and will take. We are all in business for gain," he declared, 
"but we all put humanity and man's duty to man before profit.”
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Anglo-American agreement of the previous November, the Wilson 
Administration ultimately assumed responsibility for relief 
of the oil companies, European as well as American. Ironic­
ally, the task of defending those veritable archetypes of 
"Big Business" fell to one of their severest and most persis­
tent critics. The relationship between the oilmen and William 
Jennings Bryan had never been and never would be a cordial
During the height of the crisis, when destruction of 
the Mexican oil industry appeared a distinct possibility, 
representatives of several of the larger American firms had 
suggested to Bryan that the Administration work for the 
neutralization of the oilfields. The Secretary, in turn, 
discussed the matter with the President and with the British 
Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. Both approved the plan.
^ The following correspondence reveals the lack of 
rapport between the Secretary and the oilmen, and the cool­
ness of their relationship: Dumble to Bryan, May 4, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/44; Thompson to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812. 
6363/67; Bryan to A. F. Corwin, May 18, 1914, SDR 812.6363/68. 
Bryan was embarrassed by his role of protector of the "in­
terests." When Corwin, general manager of the Penn-Mex Fuel
Oil Company, wired his thanks to the Secretary for assistance 
rendered during the Huasteca crisis, Bryan tersely replied 
that the company's relief had come from Constitutionalist 
authorities and "not from this Government.1
l2Bryan to Spring-Rice, April 29, 1914, SDR 812. 
6363/60a.
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Bryan then opened communications with Huerta and Carranza in
an attempt to enlist their support for peace in the Huasteca.
On April 28, one week after the Veracruz landing,
urgent notes were dispatched to the opposing factional chiefs
calling upon them to cooperate with the companies in pre-
13venting disaster in the oilfields. Foreign oilmen, the 
Secretary observed, would not be the only losers in event 
that fire swept the oil camps. Rather, a "great national 
calamity" for the Mexican people would result. The greatest 
present and future source of revenue for the republic might 
well be lost forever. Moreover, thousands of Mexican workers, 
currently drawing the highest wages paid anywhere in Mexico, 
could conceivably lose their livelihood in a matter of hours. 
It was "vitally important," Bryan declared, not only in the 
interests of the companies and of the Mexican people but of 
"the world at large" that immediate steps be taken to pre­
clude a "wholly unnecessary and appalling" disaster. The 
Secretary then called for an armistice in the petroleum pro­
vince and guarantees for the safety of returning American 
workers. He expected written endorsements of his suggestions,
urging that field commanders of both factions be ordered to
14adhere to them immediately.
^3Bryan to Carothers, April 28, 1914, SDR 812.6363/29a.
14Ibid„
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Working closely with Spring-Rice and the Secretary 
of the Navy, Bryan then arranged for cooperation between Anglo- 
American naval forces off Tampico and the British consul in 
the city. Together they were to "induce'' Constitutionalist 
and Huertista commanders in the Huasteca to accept neutrali­
zation of the oilfields.^
Meanwhile, Bryan's notes of the 28th had served to 
aggravate already strained relations between Washington and 
the contending Mexican factions. Not content with having
Daniels to Bryan, April 30, 1914, SDR 812.6363/39. 
Although Mexican hostility toward foreigners in the Huasteca 
was focused almost entirely upon the American community at 
this time, Bryan's response was considerably milder than 
that of Spring-Rice. The British Ambassador displayed none 
of Bryan's hesitancy to defend the interests of his country­
men. He was prepared to demand rather than to suggest neu­
tralization of the oilfields. And he would have neutralized 
Tampico and Tuxpam as well. The combatants, he complained, 
were daily seizing the property of British citizens and other 
Europeans and sending it north to the border for resale in 
the United States. Both factions, he argued, should be made 
to "clearly understand that proper respect must be paid to 
the principles of international law and the property of 
neutrals." But Bryan overruled the Ambassador, fearing that 
the latter's demand for neutralization of the ports was ex­
cessive and a threat to the American plan to neutralize the 
oilfields only. Spring-Rice was annoyed, but he followed 
Bryan's lead, in accord with the Anglo-American agreement on 
Mexico. This instance was but one of many in which Adminis­
tration officials manifested their lack of concern for Ameri­
can and European property rights in Mexico. It was a position 
sharply in contrast with that adopted by other governments 
whose citizens resided in or had interests in the republic. 
Bryan to Spring-Rice, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/60a; 
Spring-Rice to Bryan, April 30 and May 1, 1914, SDR 812. 
6363/46,47.
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seized Veracruz, the Americans appeared to have designs on 
Tampico and the oilfields as well. Still more important 
from the Mexican point of view, compliance with Bryan's re­
quest for neutralization would seriously undermine Mexican 
sovereignty over the richest state in the republic and, in 
effect, internationalize the nation's most lucrative industry. 
Thereafter it would be but a short step to the establishment 
of an outright foreign protectorate over the petroleum pro­
vince,
Mexican leaders, irrespective of faction, were 
alarmed by the Secretary's proposal and angered by the 
manner in which it was being forced upon t h e m . A l t h o u g h  
by no means as humiliating as the seizure and occupation 
of Veracruz, the establishment of foreign control over the 
Huasteca would, in the long run, represent a far graver 
threat to the republic. Bryan's scheme, if executed, would 
set a precedent for the "neutralization1' of still other vital 
industries or provinces in which foreign capital was heavily 
invested. The implications for the future of Mexican inde­
pendence were frightening. Given the recent performances
l6Carothers to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/32; 
Spring-Rice to Bryan, May 3, 1914, SDR 812.6363/52; Bryan 
to R. E. Brooks, May 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/54c.
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of European and American imperialists in other areas of the 
Caribbean basin, it was not at all unreasonable to inter­
pret the seizure of Veracruz and the subsequent attempt to 
"neutralize" the Huasteca as the first steps in a multiphase 
subjugation and partition of the entire republic. Nor could 
the foreigner have asked for a more propitious moment to 
launch such a venture. Doubtless, many Mexicans did believe 
that invasion and possibly partition were in the offing.*^ 
The presence of a powerful Anglo-American squadron off the 
Panuco bar certainly lent credence to the allegation; re­
placement of the marines at Veracruz by regular army units 
appeared to many to confirm it.
The prospect of neutralization or internationaliza­
tion of the petroleum province was especially disconcerting 
to the Constitutionalists. A very large part of government 
revenues now came from taxation of the oil industry. For 
some time, Carranza and his aides had anticipated the 
seizure of Tampico and Tuxpam and the subsequent diversion 
of oil revenues to the revolutionary party. They were re­
lying heavily upon those funds to finance pacification and 
reconstruction of the republic, to say nothing of their own
^Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 107-108; Link, Wilson: 
The New Freedom, 400-405.
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"reimbursement” for services rendered the Revolution.^8 
Control of the Huasteca was thus of vital importance to 
the Constitutionalists and they meant to have it. With 
Huertista resistance on the wane, attainment of that end 
appeared imminent. Then came the Bryan note of April 28.
The Secretary's scheme threatened to completely up­
set Constitutionalist plans and, indirectly, to jeopardize 
the success of the entire revolutionary movement. Given to
^Cumberland, Mexico, 256-258; Womack, Zapata, 193. 
Of the Carrancistas, Womack states: "The new, nationalist
entrepreneurs who composed its Carranza's party high 
command and local cadres were intensely more deliberate 
than the Villistas. If they plundered, it was not for 
fun but on business. The fortunes the Carrancista generals 
sought were huge beyond the drifters' Villistas dreams, 
guaranteed, and... officially certified and socially 
acceptable. And to achieve them they had a positive, un­
equivocal policy. First they would purge the government 
completely.... And then they would organize their own 
regime, a sound system of reform in which they could 
succeed - to the presidency." See also Duval West to 
Woodrow Wilson, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/20721. West, 
one of a succession of executive agents dispatched to 
Mexico to gather intelligence for the President, inter­
viewed a number of Carrancista leaders in Veracruz in the 
spring of 1915. Luis Cabrera readily admitted to West that 
some leaders very close to Carranza were merely seekers of 
"personal advantage." And, West concluded, "general rumor 
has it that all around Carranza, including Cabrera, are 
engaged in enriching themselves." See also Testimony of 
Jones, IMA, 2916-2930. The SDR 812.00 series provides 
abundant evidence of grafting on a massive scale by 
Carrancista civil and military authorities.
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19wholesale speculation themselves, Constitutionalist 
leaders naturally assumed that the oilmen, if protected 
by American forces, would evade taxes and otherwise defraud
19Cumberland, Mexico, 256-258; Womack, Zapata, 193. 
Womack discusses the profiteering of General Pablo Gonzalez, 
commander of the Constitutionalist Army Corps of the North­
east and an intimate of the First Chief. Ibid., 259-260; 
Parkes, A History of Mexico, 359. Parkes states that the 
Carranza regime has been described, "perhaps with truth, 
as the most corrupt administration in the history of the 
country.” See also Testimony of Jones, IMA, 2916-2930.
The revelations of ex-Carrancista General Salvador Alvarado 
in the course of several conversations with Jones constitute 
a damning indictment of the integrity of Carrancista leader­
ship in general.
Jones, a journalist with considerable experience in 
Mexico and Central America, served as an unofficial agent 
for the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation from 
1915 through early 1920. Posing as a propagandist for 
hire, he successfully penetrated the Carrancista organiza­
tion in the United States. Early in 1917, representatives 
of the Mexican Foreign Office, then headed by Candido Aguilar, 
attempted to recruit Jones as "publicity director" for the 
Constitutionalist regime. In addition to refurbishing the 
Constitutionalist image in the American press, Jones was to 
advise Aguilar "as to exactly what was occurring here in 
Washington.1 Jones rejected the first offer but accepted 
a second one in early 1918 at the behest of A. Bruce Bielaski, 
Chief of the Bureau of Investigation. As a double agent,
Jones was eminently successful. His immediate superior 
penned the following commendation in May, 1919: Jones
more than anyone else is entitled to the credit for breaking 
up the activities throughout the United States of the Nica­
raguan, Guatamalan, Salvador, and Honduranian revolutionary 
movements. He has also furnished the Department of Justice 
as much, or more inside information pertaining to revolu­
tionary movements in Mexico as any man in this country.
Results secured by him regarding activities of German spies 
and propagandists in Mexico and along the border was of 
great value to the United States Government. I know of no 
man in the United States so thoroughly posted on Mexican
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20the revolutionary regime of desperately needed revenues. 
Moreover, the deceptively close alliance between the com­
panies and the Government of the United States appeared to 
pose a serious obstacle to realization of a primary if 
longer-range revolutionary objective, the recovery of sub­
soil wealth from foreign concessionaires. Once "neutralized,*1 
it was highly unlikely that the oilfields would ever revert 
to Mexican ownership. Given these considerations, Carranza 
was certain to reject Bryan's proposal. Better to sacrifice 
some of the fields than to lose them all.
and Central American affairs, and he is, without question, 
the most astute, accurate, and resourceful investigator I 
have ever met. . . .Ibid.,2889-2894. Although Jones' 
testimony at times borders on the sensational, much of it 
was corroborated by other witnesses and, more important, 
by documents in the SDR 812.00 series.
20Cumberland, Mexico, 249. "Despite the mutuality 
of interests and dependence, the government and the oil 
companies quarreled incessently, with each accusing the other 
of shoddy principles and shady practices.” Ibid. Cumber­
land's point is well taken. The feud between foreign oilmen 
and Carrancista officials at times approached the ridiculous. 
The former were obsessed with fear of confiscation and the 
possible loss of their entire investment in Mexico; the 
latter, with the fear that they were being duped, that they 
were not extracting all that they might from the companies. 
Yet it should have been obvious to the oilmen that for some 
time to come their capital, technology, and marketing struc­
ture would be indispensible to the Mexican oil industry.
It should have been equally obvious to the Carrancistas 
that in their frantic pursuit of the golden eggs they might 
well kill the goose that laid them.
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Meanwhile, for the First Chief and his lieutenants 
the foreign-owned oil companies were rapidly assuming tre­
mendous symbolic as well as strategic significance. Highly 
visible and maddeningly enduring, they were ever a source 
of frustration, humiliation and embarrassment to Mexican 
p a t r i o t s . T h e i r  presence served as a constant reminder 
that elements of the old order not only persisted but 
thrived. Their very existence, a challenge to Mexican 
sovereignty, seemed to mock the Revolution and that for 
which it stood. And so long as they remained they blocked 
recovery of the subsoil. Graver still, the companies rep­
resented a direct threat to the revolutionary movement it­
self, first by virtue of the support, involuntary or other­
wise, which they extended to domestic reactionaries and.
2-*-Ibid.? Testimony of Jones, IMA, 2958-2965. In 
December, 1919, Ignacio Bonillas, Carrancista Ambassador 
to the United States, attempted to hire Jones to discredit 
Senator Fall's investigation of Mexican affairs. During 
the course of their negotiations, Bonillas repeatedly ex­
pressed the conviction that American oilmen were seeking 
armed intervention through the proceedings of the subcommittee 
as well as through the activities of the National Associa­
tion for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico (NAPARM). 
Bonillas expressed "deep hatred" for NAPARM, its officers 
and members, and the man whom he believed to be the central 
figure in the alleged conspiracy against the Carranza re­
gime, Edward L. Doheny. Similar views were expressed by 
Ramon P. de Negri, Mexican consul-general and commercial 
agent in New York City, in conversations with Jones in 
October, 1919. Ibid., 2945-2952.
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second, by their persistent agitation abroad for interven-
22tion, diplomatic or military, on their own behalf. As 
long as foreign oilmen continued to operate in Mexico, 
armed intervention and the subsequent occupation of the
There is conclusive proof that the oilmen paid 
"protection” money to counterrevolutionary elements in the 
Huasteca. Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 282-287. However, 
there is strong disagreement over whether or not that 
assistance to Carranza's opponents was freely given. Car­
rancista officials and Carrancista propagandists and journa­
listic sympathizers in the United States repeatedly and 
vociferously charged that American oilmen were actively 
conspiring with local counterrevolutionaries to overthrow 
Carranza. See Testimony of Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, September 
8, 1919, IMA, 52-55, 63-68, 141; Testimony of L. J. DeBekker, 
September 15, 1919, Ibid., 331-370; Testimony of James G. 
McDonald, September 10, 1919, Ibid., 202-207. Doheny's 
testimony before the subcommittee, backed by corroborating 
documents, effectively refuted the charges and placed the 
burden of proof upon his accusers. They, in turn, performed 
very poorly before the subcommittee, singularly failed to 
substantiate their charges, and admitted that the bulk of 
their "evidence" against Doheny and other oilmen operating 
in Mexico was hearsay. On the other hand, foreign oilmen 
repeatedly appealed to their respective governments to 
intercede of their behalf in their running battle with the 
revolutionary regime. In this respect, the companies did 
represent a definite threat to the Carrancistas. At any 
time, diplomatic intercession could escalate into armed in­
tervention. Again, there is disagreement as to whether or 
not the oilmen actually sought armed intervention and occu­
pation of the Huasteca. Cline contends that "the American 
petroleum companies" diligently pursued intervention in the 
Huasteca in 1918. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 187. 
O'Conner is more specific, stating that E. J. Sadler, presi­
dent of the Transcontinental Oil Company, a Standard sub­
sidiary, called for occupation of the petroleum province 
in 1918. O'Conner, World Crisis in Oil, 108. Link differs. 
Through 1916, at least, he believes the oilmen were innocent 
of the charges brought against them. Link, Wilson: Con­
fusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University
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Huasteca remained a distinct possibility. Collectively, 
then, the foreign-owned oil companies became the bete noire 
of Mexican revolutionary leadership. Until they were broken, 
dispossessed, and driven from the country, the Revolution 
would not be secure.
While Bryan awaited replies to his notes of April 28, 
European and American oil interests continued to press the 
Administration for prompt action of their behalf. On 
April 29, the Secretary conferred with Captain J. F. Lucey, 
spokesman for a consortium of British, Dutch, and American 
oil companies with operations in Mexico. Introduced to 
Bryan by Boaz Long, Chief of the Department's Latin American 
Division, Lucey discussed the plight of the Mexican oil in­
dustry from the viewpoint of European investors.23 British
Press, 1964), 220-221 {hereafter cited as Wilson: Confusions 
and Crises). See also Testimony of Ira Jewell Williams, 
September 20, 1919, IMA, 604-607. Williams was a former 
president of the Panuco-Boston Oil Company, a major Mexican 
producer, and a member of the Association of Producers of 
Petroleum in Mexico (APPM). Speaking for the Association, 
Williams denied that its members sought armed intervention 
in Mexico and challenged "our calumniators" (particularly 
Inman) to prove their allegations. No proof was forthcoming.
23Lucey to Bryan, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/34. 
Lucey represented John Hays Hammond's International Petroleum 
Company; the Corona Oil Company, a Royal Dutch-Shell sub­
sidiary; and the British-owned Veracruz Oil Syndicate. Lucey 
himself was head of the J. F. Lucey Company of California 
and the Southern Well Works Company of Chattanooga, both
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and Dutch oilmen, he informed the Secretary, were dismayed 
by the flight of American workers and puzzled by the de­
cision to evacuate them from Mexico. European oil execu­
tives had been under the impression that United States 
naval forces would occupy Tampico in the event of such 
troubles as had recently arisen. This, they “understood/' 
was to have been "the policy of the American Government." 
However, nothing of the sort had occurred. Consequently, 
most of the European oil camps had been abandoned along 
with those of the American firms. It was imperative, Lucey 
concluded, that American workers be returned to the oil­
fields immediately and that Washington guarantee their
O A
safety. Thus for the Administration there appeared to 
be no escaping decisive action with regard to the Huasteca.
While both Huerta and Carranza responded promptly 
to Bryan's note, neither would accept his proposal in toto.
with holdings in the Huasteca. Lucey's meeting with Bryan 
represented one of several early attempts by the oilmen to 
achieve collective international cooperation in defense of 
their mutual interests. The obvious necessity for such con­
certed action led eventually to establishment of the Associa­
tion of Petroleum Producers in Mexico.
24Ibid
122
Each consented to the return of American workers, pledging 
protection for foreign lives and property in their respec­
tive spheres of influence. But neutralization of the oil­
fields was another matter altogether. Constitutionalists
and Huertistas alike dismissed the plan as impractical and
2 5all but impossible to implement. Carranza bluntly re­
jected the scheme, shrewdly observing that "should such 
benefits (neutralization of the oilfields) be established 
for some foreigners, others would have the right to expect
the same privilege causing great damage to the speediness
26of our triumph." Neutralization was a dead letter. The 
plan to "induce" acceptance of Bryan's proposal was aban­
doned in the face of unequivocal resistance.27 Already 
anxious to withdraw from Veracruz and determined to avoid 
further armed intervention, Wilson and Bryan could do no 
more than lecture the belligerents on the folly of their 
current course.
Early in May, conditions in the Huasteca worsened. 
Constitutionalist commanders, ignoring Carranza's pledge to
25Carothers to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/32; 
Bryan to R. E. Brooks, May 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/54c.
26Carothers to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/32.
27Ibid.
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Bryan, were openly hostile to returning Americans. Conse­
quently, few workers proceeded on to the camps. At the 
same time, however, the Constitutionalists permitted workers
of other nationalities, mostly British subjects, to go about
28their business unmolested. Adding to the Secretary's 
chagrin, the British chose this awkward moment to withdraw 
their support from Bryan's demand for protection. Both 
Admiral Craddock and the British Consul at Tampico urged 
Spring-Rice to discourage the return of American workers to 
the oilfields. Reappearance of the Americans, they conten­
ded, would enrage Mexican patriots and thereby endanger the
29lives of all foreign workers in the Huasteca. However,
O Q
Bryan to Marion Letcher, May 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/ 
54b. Letcher was United States consul at Chihuahua.
29Miller to Bryan, May 7, 1914, SDR 812.6363/53.
The British position was certainly questionable. American 
consular officials at Tampico suggested that Anglo-American 
competition for control of the Mexican oil industry lay be­
hind Craddock's action. With American and other foreign 
oil camps deserted, each passing day strengthened the Aguila*s 
position vis-a-vis its competition. See Miller to Bryan,
May 9, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
Despite the accord of November 1913, Anglo-American 
cooperation with regard to the Huasteca was limited. The 
Tampico evacuees, particularly, were embittered by British 
indifference to their plight, by the reluctance of British 
naval officers to assist in the evacuation, and by the 
"attitude of unfriendliness" manifested by those officers. 
Report of Lester, IMA, 2451-2452.
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reports from American agents near Carranza indicated that 
the First Chief was indeed striving to make good his pledge. 
New orders calling for the protection of American workers 
had recently been issued to field commanders. Most sub-
on
ordinates appeared inclined to obey. w The principal 
question mark was Candido Aguilar.
Consul Clarence Miller, meanwhile, had performed an 
invaluable service in obtaining additional storage facilities 
in Tampico for the great torrent of oil flowing up from the 
unattended fields to the south. But this was merely a stop­
gap. When the tanks were filled and the valves closed at 
Tampico, oil from the wellheads would begin to spread across 
the countryside creating the conditions that oilmen dreaded. 
Unless workers returned to the camps immediately to con­
struct new storage pits, the industry faced disaster. 
Desperate, Miller implored the Secretary to have all com­
panies with tanker fleets dispatch their vessels to Tampico 
at once.33.
If Bryan was upset by the obstructionist tactics of 
British officials at Tampico, the Consul was much more so. 
Negotiating with General Zaragoza, Huertista commander in
30Letcher to Bryan, May 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/63.
31Miller to Bryan, May 7, 1914, SDR 812.6363/53.
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the city, Miller had obtained important concessions. The 
General agreed to permit disembarkation of American workers 
and promised safe conduct through Federal lines. However, 
British naval officers under Craddock's command inexpli­
cably refused to allow disembarkation.32 Miller, long 
resident in Tampico and thoroughly familiar with the prob­
lems of the oil industry, recognized that time was now 
vitally important. Unless workers were permitted to return 
to the camps at once, irreparable damage would almost cer­
tainly follow. There was no doubt in Miller's mind that 
American oil interests were being deliberately sacrificed 
for the benefit of their British competitors. "It appears 
absolutely unjust," he fumed, "to compel American interests 
to be left abandoned for the benefit of others under such 
circumstances." In closing, the Consul pleaded with Bryan 
to intercede immediately on behalf of the American companies.33
Certainly Craddock's action seriously jeopardized 
American participation in the Mexican oil industry, and there 
can be no doubt that the Admiral was cognizant of the fact.
In addition to the threat of immense physical loss, the com­
panies now faced grave new problems arising from their in­
ability to pay off Mexican employees and meet royalty payments
32Miller to Bryan, May 9, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
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to lessors. Craddock's refusal to permit the return of 
company employees, including paymasters and fiscal agents, 
rendered impossible the fulfillment of such obligations. 
Consequently, unpaid Mexican workers, the sole remaining 
employees in the field, threatened to walk off the job at 
the very moment when their services were most urgently 
needed. Much more important in the long run, however, was 
the failure to meet contractual obligations to lessors. Non­
payment of royalties within the prescribed time constituted 
a breach of contract, justifying legal proceedings for the 
recovery of oil leases by the lessors.34 And nowhere did 
there exist a more determined group of would-be leasebreakers.
Most of the American oil properties had been obtained 
through long-term leasing from persons who either failed to 
grasp the magnitude of the subsoil wealth or who were under 
the impression that the land was worthless and the transaction 
a neat trick at the expense of the gringo.35 As well after
34Bryan to Carothers, May 8, 1914, SDR 812.6363/57d; 
Bryan to Canada, May 15, 1914, SDR 812.6363/64; J. M. Postelle 
to Bryan, May 11, 1914, SDR 812.6363/64.
35Testimony of Edward L. Doheny, September 11, 1919, 
IMA, 229. Persons willing to dispose of their land, Doheny 
recalled, "usually wanted to sell outright for cash or else 
receive a specific sum in cash annually for the right to 
the subsoil values." Some properties were obtained in fee 
simple and others by cash rental. None were obtained on a 
royalty basis because the landowners "did not have any faith
1 2 7
well blew in, however, the skeptics were converted, and not 
without considerable bitterness. Private litigation ini­
tiated by landowners to break the leases had begun almost 
immediately after the discovery wells were brought in. The 
companies had responded shrewdly by hiring Mexican lawyers, 
thereby enjoying near uniform success in preserving their 
leases. Now, however, with the British blocking the return 
of American employees, it appeared that American firms 
would be forced to default on royalty payments. Lawyers 
for the lessors would be quick to exploit their advantage, 
and many of the most productive properties would revert to
in the discovery of oil, because none had ever been dis­
covered. The material which promised a supply of oil was 
always considered a nuisance and a danger, and they would 
rather get some certain value for it than to run the risk 
of getting profit as the result of the exploitation.1 
Doheny and Cowdray owned the bulk of their lands outright. 
The oilmen who followed them for the most part obtained 
their properties through leasing and were thus vulnerable 
to dispossession. See also Testimony of Spellacy, Ibid., 
939-940. Spellacy's story was a common one in the early, 
formative years of the Mexican oil industry. Spellacy had 
gone to the Huasteca in 1908 or 1909 as a driller. In 
time, he had obtained some leases, secured the backing of 
a group of Los Angeles promoters, and launched his own 
producing company. He sold his crude oil to the big inte­
grated companies with refineries at Tampico or in the United 
States. Like Spellacy a number of small "independent" pro­
ducers enjoyed considerable success in the Huasteca until 
bought out or forced from the field by the hostility of 
Carrancista officials on the one hand and the cutthroat 
competition of the integrated giants on the other.
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the original holders. Few of the companies were strong 
enough to withstand such a blow. The result might well be 
greatly diminished American participation in the Mexican oil 
industry.
Fully aware of the threat to the oilmen, Miller re­
quested permission to draw on government funds to pay off
■57
Mexican workers and meet royalty payments for the companies. 
But Bryan, while expressing regret over the hardship of the 
oilmen, denied Miller's request. The Department could not 
advance funds to private interests, he informed the Consul.38
The Secretary was clearly reluctant to become involved 
in the affairs of the oil companies. His correspondence 
with consular officials in the Huasteca was marked by its 
restraint. Time and again, the Department's agents in the 
field pleaded with Bryan to act with greater vigor in the 
defense of hard-pressed American investors, but to no avail. 
Repeated appeals for coercive action were almost uniformly
36Among American producers, only the Doheny com­
panies were assured of emerging relatively unscathed from 
a lease-breaking campaign. And some Doheny properties, 
especially the most recently acquired, were held under long­
term leases.
37Miller to Bryan, May 9, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
38Bryan to Miller, May 14, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
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rejected. When called upon to alleviate the plight of the 
oilmen in particular, the Secretary manifested an obvious 
distaste for the task. Washington would do little for the 
oilmen per se.
On the other hand, the abstract principle of property 
rights was at stake, and the Administration rose to its de­
fense. On the vital issue of leases, the Secretary stood 
squarely behind the companies. On May 15, he informed 
Carranza that Constitutionalist authorities were expected 
to "perceive the justice of taking no action in forfeiture 
of leases until owners have had reasonable time to pay 
rent."39 Several days later, Bryan opened negotiations 
with representative of Great Britain and the Netherlands 
with a view to securing guarantees that no person or corpo­
ration, Mexican or foreign, would take "advantage of the ex­
ceptional conditions in the oil districts in the matter of 
leases, royalties and rentals . . . during the disturbed 
period.
39Bryan to Canada, May 15, 1914, SDR 812.6363/64.
^®Bryan to Canada, May 20, 1914, SDR 812.6363/70a.
It is highly probable that the Administration1s position 
was based upon political and strategic considerations. It 
will be recalled that Wilson and Bryan suspected that London's 
Mexican policy was shaped in accord with the interests of
130
Both governments subsequently agreed to cooperate
with the United States in preservation of the status quo in
41the Huasteca prior to the occupation of Veracruz. On
Lord Cowdray. Burton I. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of 
Walter H. Page (3 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, Page, 1924- 
1926), I, 202-203. Craddock's refusal to permit the return 
of American workers to the oilfields almost certainly deepened 
that suspicion. Anglo-American competition for control of 
the Mexican oil industry was no secret, and it was clear that 
Craddock's action threatened to upset the balance in the 
Huasteca and tip the scales permanently against future Ameri­
can participation. Had widespread leasebreaking begun as a 
result of the inability of American firms to meet their con­
tractual obligations, the principal beneficiaries would have 
been Cowdray's Aguila and the Royal Dutch-Shell's Corona 
Oil Company. They alone possessed the capital to re-lease 
proven producing properties wrested from American control. 
Given the growing hostility of the revolutionary regime, it 
is doubtful whether American firms would have attempted a 
come-back in Mexico. Certainly they would have been in no 
position to compete with the Europeans who would have acquired 
the best of the former American holdings the moment the origi­
nal contracts were voided. With the bulk of American compe­
tition eliminated, Anglo-Dutch oilmen (and their respective 
governments) would virtually monopolize the Mexican oil in­
dustry. That condition, in turn, would bestow upon the 
British Government in particular immense fiscal and political 
leverage over the revolutionary regime. Woodrow Wilson, ob­
sessed with exerting his own personal influence over the 
course of the Mexican Revolution, could not permit such a 
development. As distasteful, then, as protection of the oil 
companies was to the President, the possibility that the Revo­
lution might fall under the control of Cowdray or the Royal 
Dutch's aggressive Sir Henri Deterding was even more so. In 
view of those circumstances, it became necessary for Washing­
ton to intervene on behalf of the American firms. It should 
be noted, however, that at a later date, when the threat of 
dispossession came from the revolutionary government itself, 
the President's response to appeals for relief was, at best, 
half-hearted.
41Spring-Rice to Bryan, June 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/88; 
W.L.F.C. van Rappard to Bryan, June 2, 1914, Ibid. Van 
Rappard was the Netherlands Ambassador to the United States.
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May 13, while these talks were in progress, Tampico fell 
to Constitutionalist forces under General Pablo Gonzalez. 
Shortly thereafter, Craddock permitted the disembarkation 
of American workers.
Having done all that he was prepared to do on behalf 
of the oilmen, Bryan awaited the results of his efforts.
Early reports were favorable. On May 21, Miller informed 
the Secretary that Constitutionalist authorities in Tampico 
were complying-with Carranza's order and cooperating fully 
with returning American oilmen. Moreover, a welcome surprise 
awaited company superintendents. Workers returning to camps 
behind Constitutionalist lines found wells and storage 
facilities, believed to have been abandoned for more than a
A O
month, relatively undamaged. They credited this great
good fortune to the fidelity of Mexican employees, some of
whom had remained behind at considerable risk to themselves
43to protect the camps from fire and vandalism. For the 
moment it appeared that the crisis had passed. Then came 
alarming news from Tuxpam. Retreating Huertista forces had
42Miller to Bryan, May 21, 1914, SDR 812.6363/72.
43Ibid.; Thompson to Robert Lansing, May 29, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/85; Dumble to Bryan, May 4, 1914, SDR 812.6363/ 
44.
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suddenly halted in the middle of the Panuco fields and were 
"generally believed prepared to destroy all oil wells" if 
attempts were made to dislodge them.44 But some days later, 
as Constitutionalist units drove down the coast toward 
Tuxpam, the Huertistas quietly withdrew. Thereafter, the 
threat of physical destruction of the oilfields was minimal. 
For the oilmen, however, trouble had just begun.
II.
Upon withdrawal of the Huertistas from the Huasteca, 
Constitutionalist forces in the petroleum province were 
divided into two separate commands. The city of Tampico 
and the territory north of the Panuco River were adminis­
tered by General Luis Caballero, a political power in the 
border state of Tamaulipas.45 Presumably because of the 
proximity of his domain to the United States, Caballero was 
at least outwardly well disposed toward Americans. Thus, 
oilmen in the northern fields enjoyed a relative tran­
quillity altogether lacking below Tampico. That portion of 
the Huasteca lying south of the Panuco, including the port 
of Tuxpam and the greater part of the petroleum province.
44Miller to Bryan, May 21, 1914, SDR 812.6363/69.
45Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/106.
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fell to General Candido Aguilar. There the oilmen en­
countered immediate implacable hostility.
A native of the State of Veracruz, the General en­
joyed great popularity in its principal city and throughout 
the central portion of the state. His influence in this 
politically and economically strategic district made him 
indispensible to the First Chief. His marriage to Carranza's 
daughter further enhanced his power and prestige. Appointed 
military governor of Veracruz soon after the fall of the
Huerta regime, he became virtually sovereign in those areas
46of the state under his control. This was to prove most 
unfortunate for the oilmen.
The attitude of the inhabitants of the petroleum 
province toward the foreign firms was a factor of great 
importance in the struggle for control of the Mexican oil
Testimony of Spellacy, IMA, 955. Commenting on 
the harassment of American companies in Mexico, Spellacy 
declared that Carranza was apparently unable to control his 
powerful lieutenants, particularly in those areas where 
foreign firms proved susceptible to blackmail. In the state 
of Sonora, he noted, Governor Plutarco Elias Calles extorted 
large sums from American mining interests and refused to 
share his take with the revolutionary government. In 
Veracruz, Aguilar behaved in the same manner: "Oil men
have told me they get their orders from Carranza and take 
it on to the governor, and if he didn't tear it up he would 
write something insulting on it, telling him he was running 
Vera Cruz." See also Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," 
World's Work, 376.
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industry. Aguilar was intensely anti-American and apparently 
committed to the ruin of American and other foreign enter­
prise in the republic. Moreover, much of the population of 
the State of Veracruz, especially those in the vicinity of 
the occupied city, understandably shared his sentiments. 
Strong anti-Americanism persisted in the greater part of 
the state long after Funston1s force was withdrawn in Novem­
ber, 1914. Aguilar's persistent harassment of the oilmen 
in part reflected this antagonism.
In the vicinity of the oilfields themselves, however, 
sentiment varied widely. Anti-Americanism in the northern 
third of Veracruz, center of the oil industry, was consider­
ably less apparent than in the lower reaches of the state.^ 
And there were sound reasons for it. Foreign-owned oil 
companies paid the highest wages in the republic. In addi­
tion, a number of them provided Mexican employees with free 
housing, schooling, medical care, and other benefits rarely 
if ever enjoyed by workers elsewhere in Mexico. The standard 
of living for indigenous oil company employees was thus far
^Testimony of Spellacy, IMA, 940-949; Testimony 
of Doheny, Ibid., 237-238; Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales 
of Mexico, 74 et passim.
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above the national mean.^® While the cost to the companies 
of providing these services was substantial, the return 
therefrom was incalculable. The fidelity of Mexican workers 
during the April crisis speaks for itself.
In addition to the support of much of the labor 
force in northern Veracruz, the oilmen enjoyed the protection 
of General Manuel Pelaez, an invaluable if embarrassing 
ally. Pelaez was a landowner and rancher with holdings near
Tuxpam. Like other hacendados in the petroleum province, he
had leased his lands to foreign oilmen and anticipated a 
sizeable income from the development of his properties. 
Although locally prominent, Pelaez and his several brothers 
were not active politically prior to the Carrancista revolt. 
Initially, however, they were sympathetic to the new move­
ment. Then, in May, 1914, Candido Aguilar established him­
self in Tuxpam and began to systematically pillage the sur­
rounding countryside. Pelaez' stock was stolen, his money 
taken through forced "loans," and his hacienda put to the
torch. Other local landowners, large and small alike,
^Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 224-225, 233-238;
Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of Mexico, 238-239; Testimony 
of Spellacy, IMA, 940-942; Cumberland, Mexico, 309; Bryan 
to Carothers, April 28, 1914, SDR 812.6363/29a.
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suffered a similar fate. Pelaez had the "alternative of 
leaving the country or revolting, and he preferred the 
latter.
In the summer of 1914, Pelaez organized a small but 
effective band of irregulars almost all of whom had been 
victimized by Aguilar. By early 1915, his force had in­
creased in size from less than 100 to more than 3,500 men. 
The Pelaecistas were motivated by hatred and fear of the 
Constitutionalists, particularly of Candido Aguilar. They 
anticipated the nationalization of the petroleum industry 
and the confiscation of their own oil-rich properties. 
Promulgation of the revolutionary Constitution of 1917, 
which vested ownership of the subsoil in the nation, would 
confirm those fears and greatly augment Pelaez' following. 
Although frequently labelled "Villistas" or "Felicistas," 
the Huastecans were, in reality, "Pelaecistas." From its 
inception through the fall of 1918, the movement was almost
49Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 839-840; Paul Patterson 
Young, "Mexican Oil and American Diplomacy" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1934), 46-47; 
Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, 376. In 
the spring of 1914, "there were no political lines drawn... 
in the jungle, no Constitutionalistas or Huertistas or any 
other kind of the 'istas' then current. Aguilar brought 
politics with him." Ibid.
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exclusively a local phenomenon confined to the petroleum 
province.50 Nonetheless, its influence was far-reaching.
It was a major factor in determining the state of Mexican- 
American relations throughout the Carranza era.
By the end of 1914, Pelaez had consolidated his 
control of the oilfields. In the years that followed, he 
repeatedly frustrated attempts by successive Carrancista 
commanders to drive him from the province. For six years, 
until he cast his lot with Obregon in the spring of 1920, 
Pelaez was de facto ruler of the Huasteca. During the 
same period, Carrancista forces held the oil shipping ports 
of Tampico and Tuxpam. Despite the stalemate and inter­
mittent campaigning in the oilfields, production of petro­
leum continued uninterrupted. And well it might. Carranza 
and Pelaez alike were heavily dependent upon oil revenues 
for solvency. Crude oil was piped out of Pelaez' territory.
Ibid., 376-377; Young, "Mexican Oil and American 
Diplomacy," 48. In September, 1918, Pelaez opened nego­
tiations with Zapata, Obregon, and other anti-Carrancista 
caudillos in a bid for unity under himself. There is some 
indication that the General anticipated the backing of 
American corporate interests. Pelaecista military opera­
tions were extended into southern Veracruz and into the 
adjoining states of Puebla, Hidalgo, and San Luis Potosi. 
Failing to win adequate support beyond his power base, 
Pelaez threw his support to Obregon in April, 1920. Womack, 
Zapata, 310, 340-342, 360.
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where production taxes were levied, and into the Carrancista
spheres of influence, where export taxes and bar dues were
collected. It was an unusual arrangement, but a practical
51one for all concerned.
The Pelaecistas were well-disposed toward the oil- 
men, particularly toward Americans. They recognized the 
fact that the companies, especially if supported by their 
respective governments, constituted an effective deterrent 
to nationalization of the oil industry and confiscation of 
the oilfields. Moreover, they realized that the companies 
alone possessed the capital to develop Pelaecista oil lands 
and to pay the taxes and royalties that enabled the General 
to hold his own against the rapacious Aguilar. Finally, 
the companies proved highly susceptible to blackmail. In 
late 1914, Pelaez had obtained sizable loans from Doheny, 
Cowdray, and the American-owned Penn-Mex Fuel Oil Company.
In February, 1916, he demanded and received from the afore­
mentioned interests monthly payments ranging from 5,000 to
30,000 pesos in return for protection from bandits and
51Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, 
376-377; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 279-290.
-^Testimony of Spellacy, IMA, 954; Testimony of 
Buckley, Ibid., 840.
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Carrancista raiders. Smaller sums were extracted from
53other foreign firms operating in the Huasteca.
At first the oilmen resisted Pelaez, considering 
him a dangerous nuisance. However, by 1917, the oilmen 
grudgingly acknowledged his usefulness and willingly met 
his demand for payments in excess of $100,000 per month. 
Their change of heart was due to a number of factors: fear
that Carranza would enforce nationalization of the subsoil; 
increasing friction between the oilmen and the Carrancista 
regime; the apparent pro-German sympathies of the First 
Chief; the threat of German or I.W.W. sabotage; and, of 
more immediate importance, the growing lawlessness in the 
Huasteca, a condition ultimately attributable to the an­
tagonism of Candido Aguilar and other Carrancista officials 
in the states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz.54 In time, then, 
there evolved a sort of rough "marriage of convenience" 
between the oilmen on one hand and Pelaez and the people 
of the Huasteca on the other. However trying that rela­
tionship may have been, it unquestionably benefited both
53young, "Mexican Oil and American Diplomacy," 48; 
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 283-290; Marvin, "The Jeopardy 
of Tampico," World's Work, 377.
^4Young, "Mexican Oil and American Diplomacy,"
48-49; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 282-287.
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parties. Without it the foreign firms would not have 
survived for long the advent of the Carranza regime.
The oil companies1 difficulties with Aguilar began 
almost as soon as American workers crossed the Panuco. 
Carranza's pledge notwithstanding, the General refused to 
cooperate with the companies in returning their men to the 
southern fields. Indeed, instead of protecting American 
lives and property, Aguilar permitted his lieutenants to 
incite the populace to acts of violence against foreigners 
and foreign holdings in the southernmost fields. Further 
north, where local anti-foreign sentiment diminished, 
soldiers from Aguilar's own command, in the guise of 
bandits or deserters, struck at American oil camps in a 
series of destructive raids. Company employees were phy­
sically abused, payrolls and supplies stolen, and production 
and storage facilities damaged.^ Under these circumstances 
company superintendents in Tampico hesitated to restaff the
more remote camps or to send additional crews into the 
56field. Aguilar's campaign of intimidation against the 
oilmen not only delayed resumption of normal operations in
55Miller to Bryan, May 31, 1914, SDR 812.6363/82.
56Ibid.
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the southern fields but threatened to shut them down al­
together.57
Having been acquainted with the General for some 
time, Miller believed that conditions in the Panuco fields 
might become still more serious if allowed to drift. On 
May 31, he conveyed his fears to Bryan, urging the Secre­
tary to dispatch a warship to Tuxpam where Aguilar main­
tained temporary headquarters. Miller was convinced that 
only the threat or actual use of force would induce the 
General to abandon his current course. The Consul also 
expressed concern over the safety of American workers in 
the southern fields. Naval units off Tuxpam should be pre­
pared to rush aid to workers in beleaguered camps, he 
warned, and, if necessary, to evacuate all Americans from 
the district.5®
Bryan and Daniels alike concurred in Miller's analy­
sis of conditions in the southern fields. A warship was 
immediately ordered to Tuxpam despite receipt of a written 
guarantee from Aguilar affirming the inviolability of Ameri­
can lives and property in his command. Naval officers trans­
mitting the General's pledge had found him "very friendly
57Miller to Bryan, June 16, 1914, SDR 812.6363/111.
58Miller to Bryan, May 31, 1914, SDR 812.6363/82.
to foreigners, including Americans," but the Secretaries
59were unconvinced. Aguilar was suspect. His actions 
belied his words.®®
On June 6, Bryan received still further disturbing 
news from Miller. Some days earlier, the Consul reported, 
the president of the Tampico Chamber of Commerce had been 
called before General Caballero and informed that large 
sums of money were required for the purchase of munitions. 
Because the Huertistas had seized via forced "loans" vir­
tually all of the cash in Tampico prior to evacuating the 
city, the General had been unable to raise the requisite 
amount. A commission had been appointed to study possible 
sources of revenue and to determine the amount of assess­
ments. All businesses in Tampico were "expected" to con­
tribute. For the community of foreign oil companies the 
General suggested a contribution of 200,000 pesos (c. $100,000). 
The Tampico Oil Association, representing both European and
59Daniels to Bryan, June 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/98.
®®Miller to Bryan, June 16, 29, and 30, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/111,116, and 119.
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American firms, was to meet in special session to consider 
Caballero's demands.61
Several days later. Miller informed Bryan that the 
division of the Huasteca between Generals Caballero and 
Aguilar had been confirmed. The last of Caballero's troops 
had been withdrawn from northern Veracruz, leaving the 
majority of the oil camps without the slightest protection. 
Unarmed and at the mercy of roving bands of outlaws or off- 
duty soldiers from Aguilar's command, American and other 
foreign workers feared for their lives. The Consul was 
pessimistic. He had no illusions as to the kind of "pro­
tection" the oilmen could expect from Aguilar.®2
Miller believed that dual control of the petroleum 
province would lead to serious "complications" for the oil 
companies, particularly for those firms with operations in 
the more productive southern fields now under Aguilar's
gO
jurisdiction. He warned Bryan that the General could be
61Miller to Bryan, June 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/105. 
Subsequent correspondence between Miller and Bryan suggests 
that Caballero was successful in obtaining at least a 
part of the sum demanded. Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, 
SDR 812.6363/107.
62Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/106.
63Ibid
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expected to revert to type at any moment, resuming his 
earlier practice of extorting large sums of money from the 
oilmen. During the previous November, despite pledges to 
the contrary to both Hiller and Admiral Fletcher, Aguilar 
had forced $11,000 from two of the largest foreign firms 
in the Huasteca. Because those companies had surrendered 
to the General's demands. Miller asserted, "all companies 
may now have to pay voluntary contributions . . . ." Nor 
would the companies dare report those exactions to the 
Department of State. Field operations, wells, and pipelines 
were "completely at the mercy of General Aguilar."®4 He had 
the oilmen by the throat.
The Constitutionalists, Miller warned, could no 
longer be expected to settle for forced "loans" or "war 
taxes" such as those recently levied by General Caballero. 
Instead, he predicted, they would "spare no pains to 
collect 'voluntary loans', and diplomatic protests and
®4Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/107; 
Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of Mexico, 118-119. Hamilton 
states that Aguilar demanded and received from the Aguila 
and from Doheny*s Huasteca Petroleum Company alike suras of 
$100,000, horses, and a quantity of arms and ammunition. 
Doheny recalled that the sum paid Aguilar was $10,000. The 
payoff was made only after Doheny1s lieutenants conferred 
with President Wilson's personal representative in Veracruz, 
John Lind, and were assured by Lind that the Administration 
approved the company's action. Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 
276-277.
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promises would avail no more" than they had the previous 
N o v e m b e r . 65 Bryan could offer little in the way of conso­
lation. "In order to safeguard their possible future in­
terests," he advised Miller, "American citizens should be
66advised to pay oil production taxes under protest." It
67was a fateful directive.
^Miller to Bryan, June 13# 1914, SDR 812.6363/107. 
Miller's prediction was accurate. In the summer of 1914, 
Aguilar held up the principal producing companies in the 
southern fields "for $10,000 apiece on the threat of 
stopping their pumps." The only company which refused to 
comply was Cowdray's Aguila. "The consequent stoppage of 
its pumps caused leaks around the bonanza Potrero well," 
great loss of oil, and a surface fire which blazed for four 
months and cost the company far more than Aguilar had de­
manded. Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, 
376. The Aguila's misfortune served as an object lesson 
to those oilmen who would defy the General. Thereafter, 
Aguilar's demands were promptly met.
66Bryan to Miller, June 15, 1914, SDR 812.6363/91.
^Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 830-833. Buckley had 
little sympathy for American oilmen in Mexico. Their hard­
ships, he believed, could be attributed as much to their 
own timidity and ineptitude as to the indifference of the 
Wilson Administration: "There is no question that the oil
companies are right in their contention - there is no 
question that their properties were legitimately acquired, 
that they have been confiscated, and that they are entitled 
to the protection of the American Government. On the other 
hand, there is no question that these companies, through a 
weak and vacillating policy very similar to that followed 
by the American Government in handling the general Mexican 
situation, have in large measure brought on the present 
condition.... The oil companies... should stand on their 
rights and render more easy the efforts of their Government 
to protect them." Buckley believed that the oil company
146
On June 16, the Consul informed Bryan that conditions 
in the Panuco fields had deteriorated rapidly since Cabal­
lero's withdrawal from northern Veracruz. Hostility toward 
Americans in the southernmost camps was widespread causing 
"much uneasiness" among the workers. Anti-American 
demonstrations around the camps were increasing.
executives had failed to understand the Mexican situation 
and that their managers in the field had bungled negotia­
tions with the revolutionary regime. "When an American in 
Mexico is attacked by the authorities, in the absence of . . . 
protection . . .  from his own Government, if he is to stay 
there he must fight or bribe. The American with $5,000 
of property all in Mexico, and no resources in the United 
States— and this type of American constituted 80 per cent 
of those in Mexico— could not bribe and it has been hard 
for him to fight alone; some have fought and are still 
there. The great majority have lost their small property 
and were left no course but to abandon the country. The 
oil company, able to fight, has not had the courage to do 
so, and has fallen back on the one alternative— bribery . . . 
In adopting this contemptible policy, the oil companies 
have not only contributed to their present plight, but they 
have failed to seize that leadership in the fight for Ameri­
can rights in Mexico to which they were urged by circum­
stances, and in so failing they have done incalculable harm 
to the American of small means and to the American people 
and American prestige • . . The oil companies long ago 
accepted the theory of the American Government to the 
effect that American property in Mexico is not entitled to 
protection; their whole attitude has been one of apology. 
Apparently they have been of the opinion that they did not 
have the sympathy of the American people, and they have been 
loath to stand on their rights." Ibid. It was a shrewd 
analysis-blunt, accurate, and to the point. It concisely 
explained the development of the conplex relationship be­
tween the oilmen, the Wilson Administration, and the Car­
rancista regime.
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Caballero was powerless to curb these activities, and 
Aguilar, in whose command they were occurring, was not 
disposed to do so. Indeed, it appeared that the General 
himself was encouraging unrest in the south. Protection 
for company employees was now imperative. Without it, all 
work in the southern fields would soon come to a halt.**8
Late in June, almost a full month after Carranza 
promised security for foreign workers. Miller reported that 
intimidation continued. Apparently in defiance of the 
First Chief's order, Aguilar was deliberately withholding 
protection. And while "prominent citizens" of Panuco 
"fostered . . . secret anti-American meetings," the General 
was in the process of disarming the oilmen.*>9 All company 
employees, Mexican as well as foreign, had been ordered to 
turn in their weapons to Constitutionalist authorities. 
Persons found in possession of firearms after the deadline 
for their surrender would be considered "spies" and dis­
posed of a c c o r d i n g l y . 7 0  i t  was Miller's belief that the 
situation in the southern fields was more serious now than 
at any time since the seizure of Veracruz. American workers,
^Miller to Bryan, June 16, 1914, SDR 812.6363/111.
69Miller to Bryan, June 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/116.
70Ibid.
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he warned, would resist disarmament. He anticipated trouble. 
Accordingly, he had appealed directly to the General to 
rescind the arms decree and to comply with Carranza's 
order to extend protection to the oilmen. However, Miller 
believed that little could be expected from his entreaties.
71Instead, he foresaw a dangerous confrontation with Aguilar.
The General's response was unexpected. He not only
amended the arms decree to permit retention of sidearms,
but also dispatched a body of troops to the southern fields
72to protect the camps from marauding bands of outlaws.
Relief in Tampico was shortlived. The very night that the 
soldiers reached the Panuco district, they struck and 
plundered the American-owned National Oil Company camp.
Guns, horses, and a quantity of supplies were seized. Dis­
armed and badly shaken, American workers abandoned the camp
73for the safety of the city. There was no longer any mis­
taking Aguilar's position. Miller knew his man.
Finally aroused, Bryan instructed George C. Carothers, 
assigned to Constitutionalist headquarters at Monterrey, to 
"take up with Carranza at once" the situation in the Panuco
71Ibid.
72Miller to Bryan, June 30, 1914, SDR 812.6363/117.
73Miller to Bryan, June 30, 1914, SDR 812.6363/119.
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fields. Carothers was to “insist" that Aguilar provide 
adequate protection for the oilmen without further procras­
tination. In addition, the weapons decree must be res­
cinded without qualification. In closing, the Secretary 
observed that "this Government is deeply concerned over 
the alarming reports from the Panuco District and hopes
H  A
that immediate steps will be taken to remedy the situation." 
Carranza, doubtless mindful of the American presence at 
Veracruz, could ill afford to defy Washington at so critical 
a time. Until Huerta was disposed of, it behooved the Con­
stitutionalists to avoid further antagonizing the Secretary. 
And as it was clear that Bryan was growing impatient with 
Aguilar's duplicity, Carranza moved at once to curtail the 
anti-American activities of his headstrong son-in-law. 
Harassment of the oilmen declined sharply, and for the 
moment at least, tension subsided in the Huasteca.
III.
At the height of the crisis in the oilfields, Bryan 
received from Justice Department officials a confidential 
report pertaining to the alleged involvement of self-seeking
74Bryan to Carothers, July 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/122a.
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American corporate interests in Mexican revolutionary 
p o l i t i c s . O n  June 24, Assistant Attorney General Charles 
Warren forwarded to the Secretary a copy of a sensational 
article which had appeared some two weeks earlier in a 
leading Texas journal. Included with the article, which 
dealt primarily with the splintering of the Constitutionalist 
movement, was a corroborating report from Special Agent 
Robert C. Barnes, officer in charge of investigations in 
the border states. Doubtless these and accompanying docu­
ments confirmed Bryan's and the President's darkest suspi­
cions as to the unsavory role of American business interests 
in the Mexican imbroglio.
According to the article, carried in the June 8 edi­
tion of the San Antonio Express, the rupture between Carranza
and his principal lieutenant was the "result of financial
help and political intrigue on the part of large interests 
as the basis of a gigantic scheme to dominate the oil and 
mineral wealth of Mexico through concessions by Villa."
Federal officials in San Antonio considered the information
to he "wholly conclusive and of profound importance." Seve­
ral officials had been queried by representatives of the
75Charles Warren to Bryan, June 24, 1914, SDR 812.6363/
115.
1 5 1
Express in an effort to confirm the story. Although they
had declined to discuss the matter and "wondered how any
part of it had leaked,1' they had "admitted privately" that
7 6they regarded the account as completely accurate.
Early in the year, it was alleged, representatives 
of the Standard Oil Company and of the Guggenheims1 Ameri­
can Smelting and Refining Company had held a series of 
conferences with Villista agents at an El Paso hotel. In 
return for substantial financial assistance from those firms, 
Villa was supposed to have granted exclusive rights to ex­
ploit prime oil and mineral lands in northern Mexico. Be­
hind that deal lay a lurid tale of cutthroat competition 
for control of the republic's vast natural resources. For 
Progressives Wilson and Bryan the report doubtless proved 
a classic example of the machinations of the "malefactors 
of great wealth."
According to intelligence gathered by the Express,
"all of the trouble" below the border was due "entirely to 
a private war of the interests." Because of the immense 
concessions awarded Lord Cowdray by Porfirio Diaz, the Ameri­
can companies involved had agreed "to rally around anybody"
76Ibid.
to oust the dictator. Consequently, Madero had received 
their support. But Madero*s performance as president had 
displeased all of the interests, British as well as American. 
Thus when Cowdray offered his support to Victoriano Huerta, 
"there were none to interfere." In time, however, both 
Rockefeller and Guggenheim interests had begun "to chafe 
under the ascendancy of British financiers." Simultaneously, 
another revolution had grown out of popular revulsion for 
Huerta and indignation over the assassination of Madero.
At first, neither of the American giants had had 
cause for complaint against the Constitutionalists. But as 
that faction moved toward victory, difficulties had arisen. 
Carranza had begun to speak of "Mexico for the Mexicans," 
issuing proclamations "to the effect that his country's natu­
ral resources would be conserved for the country's good . . . 
At that point, "'big business' scented danger and began 
looking for an opportunity to further muss up the situation." 
Representatives of the American firms sounded Villa and came 
to terms with him. 77 As a result, "practically every
77Whatever the cause of the rupture between Villa 
and Carranza, there was indeed some substance to the alle­
gation that Villa and certain American firms operating in 
Mexico were willing to cooperate with one another in order 
to further their respective interests. Luis Cabrera was 
convinced that Felix Sommerfeld, Villa's principal agent in
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mineral concession worthy of the name in the States of 
Chihuahua and Sonora was willed, granted and bequeathed to 
the . . . American Smelting and Refining Company by orders 
of Villa." In exchange. Villa received "exceedingly remu­
nerative allowances."
Copies of the official documents granting the con­
cessions were transmitted to Carranza on the assumption 
that he would readily approve the deal. The final break 
between Villa and Carranza, the Express declared, dated 
from the First Chief's receipt of the documents. Carranza 
remonstrated strongly with Villa, endeavoring to persuade 
him to "undo his action." But both men were "obdurate." 
Finally, in mid-May, Carranza tired of arguing with Villa. 
"Grabbing the whole flood of papers," he "wrote in bold 
letters across the face of each: 'Annulled. V. Carranza.'"
the United States, was actually an agent for the Guggenheims 
and the Standard Oil Company. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 
95. In fact, the Rockefeller interests had been attempting 
to establish a position in Mexican petroleum production 
for some time prior to the alleged El Paso conference. In 
1912 it had considered acquisition of the Aguila, but Cow- 
dray's price was too high. In 1917, however, the Standard 
bought out the Transcontinental Petroleum Company, a small 
firm with good leases and a refinery at Tampico. Under the 
guidance of President E. J. Sadler, the Transcontinental 
soon became one of the leading producers in the Huasteca. 
O'Conner, World Crisis in Oil, 108-109.
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Villa responded with "hostile speech and unfriendly actions," 
whereupon the First Chief issued an order removing him from 
command.
Subsequent events relevant to the break between 
Villa and Carranza had been widely discussed in the American 
press, the Express continued, and those accounts differed 
little from the intelligence it had received from its own 
source in Mexico. Moreover, the San Antonio journal re­
vealed, considerable corroborating evidence had been gathered, 
evidence which coincided "so perfectly" with the report re­
ceived from its agent that there could be no doubt as to
78
the accuracy of the expose.
The official report of Special Agent Barnes strength­
ened the allegations made by the Express, shedding still 
newer light on the apparent involvement of American firms 
in Mexican revolutionary politics. According to Barnes, 
one Thompson, himself a former Justice Department operative, 
had recently returned to the United States after serving a 
stint as a Villista advisor. Calling at Federal offices in 
San Antonio, Thompson had passed on information implicating 
the Standard Oil Company in the development of the new
^®Warren to Bryan, June 24, 1914, SDR 812.6363/115.
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Villista movement. Representatives of that firm, "antici­
pating that they would be able to secure, and probably al­
ready had secured through Pancho Villa, valuable conces­
sions in Mexico, had been causing very favorable press 
reports to be sent out concerning him." However, the pro- 
Villa propaganda campaign, aimed at enlisting popular support 
in the United States for the Villista movement, had been 
initiated only after the futility of attempting to work 
with Carranza had become apparent. When company executives 
learned that the First Chief had annulled the concessions 
recently awarded the firm at El Paso, they threw their full 
support to Villa. Their ultimate objective was American 
recognition of a Villista regime in Mexico. Barnes endorsed 
Thompson's report without reservation, observing that the 
former agent was "probably in a position to know whereof he 
speaks." Heightening the aura of intrigue, Barnes told of 
an Associated Press reporter in El Paso who, upon threaten­
ing to expose the tie between Villa and the Rockefeller
79interests, had been "promptly transferred to Chicago."
In sum, the Justice Department report did incalculable 
damage to American and other foreign corporate interests in
79Ibid.
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Mexico. X£ the account was accepted at face value by
Wilson and Bryan, and there is no indication that it was
not, its effect on those interests was profound, indeed.
It cast a cloud of suspicion over the activities of two
of the largest American firms operating in the republic and,
by implication, over all foreign enterprise therein. The
report appeared to verify the President's contention that
all foreigners residing in or doing business in Mexico
80were bent on exploiting the Mexican people. Given Wilson's 
antagonism toward the "concessionaires," it seriously under­
mined the position of all foreign investors in Mexico and 
virtually assured that in the future they would receive 
something less than a sympathetic hearing in Washington.
IV.
Shortly after disclosure of the alleged Rockefeller-
Guggenheim conspiracy, Bryan received from Clarence Miller
81a lengthy study of the Mexican oil industry. Researched 
and written by the staff of the Tampico Consulate, it was
on
owQuirk, An Affair of Honor, 113; Arthur C. Veatch, 
"Oil, Great Britain and the United States," Foreign Affairs, 
IX (July, 1931), 669.
8lMiller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
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in large part a discussion of Mexican mineral law, tax 
structure within the industry, corporate profit and loss, 
and Anglo-American competition for control of the petroleum 
province. It refuted statistically a number of damaging 
allegations made by critics of American oilmen operating 
in Mexico, particularly the myth of the industry's fantastic 
profitability. In the wake of the damning evidence so re­
cently received from Justice Department officials, Miller's 
study may well have had a mitigating effect on the Adminis­
tration's attitude toward the companies. Certainly of con­
siderable importance was the revelation that the Rockefeller
interests were not as yet participants in the production
82end of the Mexican oil industry.
The study opened with a discussion of Mexican mineral 
law pertaining to the exploitation of petroleum and other
82Ibid. Miller drew a sharp distinction between the 
big integrated companies and the actual producers of crude
oil who took the "real risks" in the Huasteca: "Whenever
mention is made of the Producer of Petroleum, the abhorrent 
idea of Standard Oil comes up to inhibit a fair hearing for 
a class of business men who have nothing whatever to do with 
the business methods of the great refining concern.1 The 
majority of the companies operating in the Huasteca were in­
deed "independent" firms engaged solely in the production 
of crude, which they sold to the large refiners at Tampico 
or Tuxpam. See also Clarence W. Barron, The Mexican Problem 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 28-29 et passim.
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mineral fuels, noting that recent amendments of the law 
had been made for the express purpose of encouraging foreign 
investors to search for and develop deposits of coal and 
oil.83 The Mining Law of 1887 had limited taxes on the 
sale of mineral fuels to a mere four per cent of value, 
explicitly exempting them from any form of special taxa­
tion. But despite this seemingly favorable climate for 
investment, risks had remained high. For years, foreign 
capitalists had invested their money in ventures less 
speculative and more rewarding than exploration for petro­
leum. The exception was Edward L. Doheny, pioneer of the 
Mexican oil industry.8^
O  1
For discussions of Mexican mineral law see J.
Reuben Clark, Jr. "The Oil Settlement With Mexico," Foreign 
Affairs, VI (July, 1928), 600-614, and Marvin D. Bernstein, 
The Mexican Mining Industry, 1890-1950; A Study of the 
Interaction of Politics, Economics, and Technology (Albany: 
State University of New York, 1964), 18-19, 78-83, et passim 
(hereafter cited as Mexican Mining Industry).
8^Whatever Doheny1s shortcomings, he must be given 
full credit for the founding of the Mexican petroleum in­
dustry. His foresight, shrewdness, courage, and, above all, 
tenacity, in developing the great Huasteca oilfields were 
remarkable indeed. There are few parallels in the annals 
of the international petroleum industry. Doheny came up 
the hard way. With years of unsuccessful prospecting in 
the Southwest and Mexico behind him, he was no stranger to 
disappointment and failure. His big break came in 1892. 
While onlookers shook their heads, Doheny and a single 
partner, Charles A. Canfield toiled in the muck beneath 
the streets of Los Angeles to bring in the discovery well
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Doheny requested and received a guarantee against 
capricious taxation as well as an exemption from import 
duties on oil production equipment. These provisions and
of one of the largest California oilfields. Overnight a 
millionaire, Doheny could have retired. Instead, he and 
Canfield took a calculated risk, gambling on the presence 
of commercially exploitable petroleum reservoirs in the sub­
soil of the Mexican Gulf Coast. Again ignoring the advice 
of professional geologists, they staked all they owned on 
the Mexican venture. Where others had succumbed to the 
myriad obstacles of exploration and exploitation in the 
jungle, Doheny and Canfield persisted. It very nearly 
ruined them. Then in May, 1901, the Ebano discovery well 
was completed. Despite this initial success, the venture 
nearly foundered. Having sold his California interests to 
finance the Mexican enterprise, Doheny was deeply in debt 
and unable to secure further backing. At a critical moment 
for the partners, they were joined by Mexican geologist 
Ezequiel Ordonez. Upon the latter*s recommendation, a new 
drilling site was chosen. In April, 1904, the first well 
of outstanding commercial production came in. It was Los 
Angeles all over again. From the Ebano district, Doheny 
shifted operations south of the Panuco River in 1906. The 
same year, he organized two new producing companies, the 
Tuxpam Petroleum Company and the Tamiahua Petroleum Company. 
Early in 1907, he organized the famous Huasteca Petroleum 
Company, for years the largest producer of Mexican crude. 
Shortly thereafter, he consolidated his extensive holdings 
in a new parent organization, the Mexican Petroleum Company, 
Limited, of Delaware. While developing the Ebano field,
Doheny wildcatted his Huasteca properties. In September,
1910, the great Juan Casiano No. 7, a gusher, blew in at
70,000 barrels a day. Doheny was a millionaire again. The 
Doheny companies were the largest producers in Mexico. From 
1901 to April, 1925, when Doheny sold his Mexican interests 
to the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, they produced some 
560,000,000 barrels of oil. On the date of transfer they 
had reached peak production, gross receipts for the month 
^exceeding $10,000,000. The amount of the sale is disputed, 
ranging from a low of $16,000,000 to a high of $150,000,000. 
See Fritz L. Hoffmann, "Edward L. Doheny and the Beginnings 
of Petroleum Development in Mexico," Mid-America, XXIV (April, 
1942), 94-108; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 207-294; O'Conner, 
World Crisis in Oil, 105-110.
160
still other attractive concessions were written into the 
new Petroleum Law of 1901, a measure aimed at expediting 
foreign investment in the development of a domestic oil 
industry. In addition, contracts between foreign oilmen 
and the Mexican Government were to guarantee certain other 
privileges and tax exemptions to the companies for a 
period of ten years subsequent to the commencement of 
operations. By 1914, sixty-three foreign firms had taken 
advantage of this favorable legislation to follow in the 
path blazed by Doheny. With one exception the conduct of 
these firms, if at times unethical, had been scrupulously 
within the law.
The exception, however, was an extremely important 
one: Cowdray's Mexican Eagle Oil Company (Aguila). In
flagrant violation of the Petroleum Law of 1901, President 
Diaz had awarded the firm of S. Pearson and Sons, the parent 
company of the Cowdray organization, unusually favorable 
terms for the exploitation of Mexican petroleum. In 1906, 
the Aguila was licensed to operate in six states and granted 
exemption from certain taxes for a fifty-year period. In 
addition, the company was authorized to exploit federal 
lands and waters, an invaluable privilege denied its
85Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
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competitors. Besides exclusive access to the mineral 
wealth of the so-called federal zones, this award enabled 
the Aguila, if it so chose, to pirate oil from competitors 
by directional drilling from federal properties located in 
the midst of producing fields.**® Still another advantage 
enjoyed solely by the Cowdray firm was the privilege of 
shipping crude oil from the free port of Tuxpam, thereby 
escaping the special export tax levied on shipments passing 
through the Port of Tampico, a tax illegally imposed by the 
dictator in 1910.
In awarding these generous concessions to the Cowdray 
interests, Diaz seriously undermined the competitive position 
of American and other foreign oil companies vis a vis the 
Aguila. The way was thus opened for monopolization of the 
Mexican oil industry. Had Cowdray moved with greater alac­
rity, despite the Madero revolution and the turmoil that
**®Ibid. All bodies of water were considered federal 
property, as was a narrow strip of land along the banks.
Thus it was possible for the Aguila to drill wells on the 
banks or in the beds of streams or other bodies of water 
located on a competitor's productive properties. There is 
no evidence that the Aguila ever took advantage of this 
unique privilege, but the possibility that it might do so 
caused considerable apprehension among its competitors.
8^Ibid.; Spender, Lord Cowdray, 149-162.
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followed, he might well have achieved that end. As of the 
summer of 1914 and for sometime thereafter, he enjoyed a 
tremendous advantage over his competitors. The fact was 
distasteful to Miller, to say nothing of other oilmen.
Because of the British firm's favored position, other 
companies operated under severe handicaps: first, in the
search for oil; second, in the production of crude; and, 
third, in the export of petroleum products. In the vital 
area of production lay the gravest threat of all. If 
Aguila managers chose to exercise their full privileges 
in the federal zones, their competitors faced ruin.
Miller estimated American investment in the Huasteca 
at $175,000,000, a conservative figure, he believed, since 
he knew "positively" that it exceeded $100,000,000. Al­
though the industry was alleged to be "most profitable," 
such was not the case. Only three of the sixty-three 
companies operating in Mexico in 1914 had paid dividends.
And those firms were not returning their investment at a 
competitive rate. "The business," Miller asserted, "is 
distinctly not profitable."®®
88Ibid. As of 1914, the three companies referred to 
by Miller had made a total cash investment of $48,000,000 in 
the Mexican oil industry. The average rate of return to their 
respective shareholders was slightly better than five percent
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Indeed, until large-scale production could be de­
veloped, most companies in Mexico would continue to operate 
in the red. The initial cost of establishing a more or 
less permanent position in the Huasteca was exorbitant. 
Virtually all supplies and equipment had to be imported 
from the United States. Production sites were literally 
hacked out of the jungle, and considerable sums expended 
to make them habitable for foreign workers. In addition, 
an effective communications and transportation network had 
to be constructed where before arrival of the oilmen nothing 
of the sort had existed. Hoads, railroad spurs, pipelines, 
and telephone and telegraph lines were pushed through the 
wilderness to isolated camps, tying them to company offices 
and storage and shipping facilities in Tampico. Thus expen­
ditures far exceeded revenues in the early years of the 
Huasteca oil boom. In Mexico, as elsewhere, oilmen did not
on capital invested. Investors could have obtained a 
greater return on their money "in loan transactions."
Ibid. Until 1917, when the rate of production began to 
accelerate rapidly, conditions remained unchanged. Although 
by the latter date the number of oil-producing companies 
had risen from 63 to 340, the number paying dividends did 
not increase. Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World1s 
Work, 379. The sole American firm to declare a dividend 
prior to 1917 was Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company. 
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 243. Dividends were also paid 
by Cowdray's Aguila and by the Royal Dutch-Shell*s Corona.
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anticipate steady profits until some time after initial
89developmental work was completed.
Miller was concerned for American oilmen. He believed
that prospects for increased profitability in the future
were dim. "Each change of government1' meant increased
taxation; and taxation was "directed at industry and not
g n
at the idle rich." Diaz had imposed the aforementioned 
export tax in 1910; Madero, too, had violated the Petroleum 
Act of 1901 by arbitrarily adding another "special tax" in 
1912; next, the State of Veracruz had imposed its own 
illegal production and export taxes; and, finally, in 1913, 
Huerta had added still another production tax. As of July, 
1914, the companies were paying taxes at a rate occasionally
89Ibid. Hoffman, "Edward L. Doheny and the Be­
ginnings of Petroleum Development in Mexico," Mid- 
America, 100-107; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 209-210, 229, 
242-243; Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District,"
De GoIyer Papers; Barron, The Mexican Problem, 18-32, 
95-100.
90Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124. 
For additional discussion of taxation in the Mexican 
petroleum industry see Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 831- 
832; Harold E. Davis, "Mexican Petroleum Taxes," Hispanic 
American Historical Review, XII (November, 1932), 405- 
419 (hereafter cited as HAHR).
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exceeding fifty per cent of the gross value of crude at 
91the wellhead.
In addition to those burdensome levies, the companies 
also bore the high and rising cost of transporting the 
crude from the fields to Tampico and from that point on to 
foreign markets or to refineries in the United States. Thus
91Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124. 
Some five years later the companies were still paying taxes 
varying from a minimum of twenty per cent to over fifty 
per cent of the value of the oil at the wellhead. Testi­
mony of Buckley, IMA, 832, and Doheny, Ibid., 244. Ac­
cording to Mexican law, the export tax on crude oil could 
not exceed ten per cent of the value of the oil at the 
well. Yet the Mexican Government "openly and obviously" 
violated the law, Doheny declared. The Mexican petroleum 
commissioner valued the oil not at the wellhead, but at 
the port of New York where its value had been increased 
by the cost of transportation, an increase of two or three 
times the value at the wellhead. Ibid., 259. Doheny 
explained that despite the existence of extremely prolific 
wells in Mexico, the owners of many of those wells had no 
pipelines, no storage or harbor facilities, and no tankers 
to carry their oil to market. Consequently, oil in Mexico 
“has very much the same value... ice has... in Greenland.
If it could be transported to New York these warm days it 
would undoubtedly find a ready market and be very valuable, 
but nobody would pay a very high price for it at its present 
location. That is true of the oil underground in Mexico, 
even where wells have tapped it...." Taxes on Mexican 
oil, he believed, should be based on the value of the oil 
"at the derrick" and not at New York City "where American 
capital has expended millions... in building refineries 
and storage facilities and tank steamers for transporting 
it." Ibid., 243-244. See also Barron, The Mexican Problem, 
56.
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9 2operating costs were large and growing larger. Mean-^
while, companies which had pioneered the industry, in
effect at the invitation of the Mexican Government, and
justly expected a fair return on their investment were now
faced with the prospect of steadily shrinking profit mar- 
93gins. Yet conditions in the industry were clearly con­
ducive to movement in the opposite direction. The increasing 
disparity between potential and actual profitability, Miller
charged, was due to excessive and illegal taxation of the
94industry by Mexican authorities.
The oilmen, Miller declared, realized that the fiscal 
needs of the new Constitutionalist regime would necessarily
92Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 246.
9 1Nor did conditions improve with time. Discussing 
eroding profit margins in 1917, George Marvin identified 
excessive taxation and increasing operating expenses as the 
principal causes of the oilmen's discomfiture. A large 
number of companies, he explained, were delivering oil 
under long-term contracts, the "only way crude oil can be 
sold in bulk." Some of those contracts still had many 
months and years to run in 1917. But transportation costs 
had risen sharply, as much as 400 percent in some instances. 
Marvin cited one case in which a large American company had 
contracted to deliver Mexican oil in New York at one dollar 
per barrel but now paid two dollars per barrel for trans­
porting the oil in chartered tankers. Marvin, "The Jeopardy 
of Tampico," World's Work, 379.
94Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
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be "enormous." They feared that a significant increase in 
taxation was "imminent." Yet most companies operating in 
the Huasteca had invested too much in the Mexican oil in­
dustry to withdraw. At the moment, the Consul declared, 
that industry was the "least profitable business" in the 
republic. True, critics of the oilmen had made much of 
the speed with which they had returned to the fields in 
the face of great danger. To some this was proof enough 
of the "fabulous profitability" of the industry. Not so, 
Miller asserted. The oilmen had returned to the fields to 
"save what they had" and to preclude the occurrence of a 
major disaster.®5
Briefly stating the position of American oilmen in 
Mexico, the Consul explained that their principal fear was the 
possible loss of their capital "under form of law through 
ill-considered tax decrees . . . .” Legal encroachment upon 
the companies was a "danger . . . just as real as . . . con­
fiscation by armed force . . . and more insidious." The 
result. Miller declared, would be the same. Moreover, there 
was no redress for the confiscation of property under form 
of law. He strongly urged that "governmental interest" be
95Ibid
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“shown in defense of Americans against this form of 
threatened confiscation." Such a course was absolutely 
essential for preservation of the Mexican oil industry, 
for the protection of American investors, and for assuring 
the fuel supply of the United States Navy.96
It was the Consul's belief that if the Mexican Govern­
ment took fifty per cent of the oilmen's capital-return 
each year, few of the American companies could long afford 
to continue operations in the republic. Only recently, he 
reminded Bryan, Huerta's Secretary of Fomento had urged 
that the Mexican oil industry be nationalized and turned 
over completely to the Cowdray interests. “Unlimited 
taxation of the industry under the form of law" would 
almost surely produce that result, Miller concluded.97
Little more than a month after the submission of 
Miller's report on the Mexican oil industry, new develop­
ments in the Huasteca lent credence to his pessimistic 
predictions. In mid-August, Thomas Bevan, Miller's suc­
cessor at Tampico, forwarded to Bryan copies of two de­
crees issued by Candido Aguilar shortly before the fall of
96Ibid. 97Ibid
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9 8the Huerta regime. The first decree voided all real 
estate transfers concluded in the State of Veracruz during 
Huerta's tenure; the second required explicit approval of 
state authorities for any future transfers. The Governor's 
action was clearly aimed at the oilmen, and, in an accom­
panying statement, he denounced them in no uncertain terms. 
Petroleum lands held by foreign companies, he contended, 
had been acquired in a manner "detrimental to the owners" 
and through "unfair and one-sided contracts." Moreover, in 
the past, when their investments had been jeopardized, the 
companies had "solicited the aid of foreign armed forces." 
The predominance of foreign capital in the industry was 
clearly a threat to the Mexican nation. It was only just, 
the Governor declared, that "when the country passes through 
critical periods, the foreigner ought to bear the same 
losses as the natives." Concluding his statement, Aguilar
^Thomas H. Bevan to Bryan, August 14, 1914, SDR 
812.6363/130. Prior to his appointment as clerk at the 
Tampico consulate, Bevan had worked for the United States 
Geological Survey and later as private secretary to a 
United States Senator. From 1912 to 1916, he served as 
vice-consul at Tampico, succeeding Miller when the latter 
resigned briefly in the fall of 1914. Register, 1924,
96.
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warned that attempts to evade his decrees through clan­
destine contracts would be punishable by confiscation of
99
the properties involved.
Commenting on the Governor's action, Bevan noted 
that during the Huerta administration American and other 
foreign firms had invested large sums of money in new 
leases and land purchases. The decree voiding those trans­
actions deprived the companies of legally acquired property 
while providing no compensation for losses incurred. It 
was a costly blow to the oilmen. At the moment, Bevan 
informed the Secretary, legal representatives of the com­
panies were attempting to arrange a conference with the 
Governor in hopes of winning a measure of relief.100 It 
was well that the companies themselves took the initiative. 
Little effective aid could be expected from Washington."*'01
V.
The political situation in Mexico had been completely 
altered by the mid-July resignation and flight of Huerta.
^Bevan to Bryan, August 14, 1914, SDR 812.6363/130.
100Ibid.
101Arthur Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 
1914-1915 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 232 
(hereafter cited as Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality); Cline, 
The United States and Mexico, 171-172; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, 
V, 56-57; Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 414-416.
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So, too, was the relationship between the First Chief and 
Woodrow Wilson. Out of patience with the President's 
persistent meddling in Mexican affairs and no longer de­
pendent upon him for support against the usurper, Carranza 
forgot the Cabrera pledge and abandoned all semblance of 
cooperation with Washington. He refused to recognize the 
provisional government of Francisco Carbajal and pressed
on toward the capital. Abuse of foreigners and churchmen
102commenced anew. Immediately immense pressure was brought
to bear upon the Wilson Administration to curb xenophobic
102Testimony of Francis P. Joyce, April 29, 1920,
IMA, 2656-2653. Joyce, a Roman Catholic chaplain in the 
United States Army, was a member of the force occupying 
Veracruz from April to November, 1914. He was appalled at 
the brutal treatment of Roman Catholic clergy by Constitu­
tionalist soldiers and devoted much of his time to allevia­
ting the distress of those unfortunates. On the eve of 
the American withdrawal, Joyce appealed to John R. Silliman, 
Wilson's personal representative in Veracruz, for assistance 
in evacuating several hundred nuns from the city. Many had 
already been raped or otherwise abused, and Joyce had no 
illusions as to their fate when the city was turned over to 
Candido Aguilar. Like his chief and his intensely anti- 
Catholic predecessor, John Lind, Silliman was openly antago­
nistic to the Mexican Church. He refused to cooperate with 
Joyce, declaring that "the worst thing in Mexico, next to 
prostitution, is the Catholic Church, and both must go." 
Ibid., 26256a2657. For an account of the extreme anti­
clericalism of the Carrancistas see Testimony of Mother 
Elias de Sta Sacto, April 29, 1920, Ibid., 2649-2656. Mother 
Elias, a former Mother Superior of the Carmelite Order, 
witnessed the occupation of Mexico City by Carrancistas in 
late summer 1914.
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1 0 3and anticlerical excesses in Mexico, but to slight avaxl. 
Torn between humanitarianism and political expediency on the 
one hand and his strong commitment to the Revolution on the 
other, the President was inclined to procrastinate. His 
response to the baneful turn of events below the border was 
half-hearted and largely ineffective. Anticipating an orgy 
of looting and killing when Constitutionalist forces en­
tered Mexico City, Wilson and Bryan admonished Carranza to 
"behave responsibly" in occupying the capital. They would 
not tolerate the sacking of the city, they warned. Should 
it occur, the United States would withhold recognition from 
the new regime.
Glibly assuring the President that foreign lives 
and property were secure, Carranza entered the capital on 
August 20. Discipline dissolved. Disorder and bloodshed
■^0^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 62-6 3; Baker, 
Woodrow Wilson, V, 57; Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 798-799. 
Short of armed intervention, there was little effective 
action that the President could take in order to check 
Carrancista excesses in the capital. As Link observes:
"The Revolution was out of control at the very time that 




10 5followed. Shortly thereafter. Constitutionalist
officials seized the National Railways of Mexico, owned 
in part by European and American bondholders.106 Despite 
its recent threats, Washington demurred. Spokesmen for 
American interests in the republic were quick to upbraid 
the Administration for its equivocal defense of property 
rights. Unless the government took a firm stand on the 
matter, and soon, warned one irate investor, confiscation 
and destruction of American property would "spread un­
checked."10  ^ Time proved him correct. By the end of the 
summer, it was abundantly clear that the President had 
lost whatever influence he might have once had over Con­
stitutionalist leadership. His pledge to protect European 
and American interests under a revolutionary government 
became increasingly difficult to fulfill.
10^Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 798-799; Quirk, The 
Mexican Revolution, 62-63; Leon J. Canova to Bryan, August 27, 
1914, SDR 812.00/13013, 13020.
100Hitchler to Lansing, September 1, 1914, SDR 
812.6363/136. Several million dollars worth of the company's 
bonds were held by American investors. Ibid.; Silliman to 
Bryan, September 14, 1914, SDR 812.6363/136.
107W. J. Payne to Lansing, September 29, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/140. Payne was president of the National 
Petroleum Company, a firm with producing wells in the 
Huasteca.
Chapter 4
WILSON VS. THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS:
REVOLUTIONARY DISCORD AND THE 
BREAK WITH CARRANZA
I.
In September, 1914, Venustiano Carranza sat in the 
National Palace as provisional president of the Mexican 
Republic. His position, however, was scarcely less em­
barrassing than that of the man in the White House. Like 
Wilson, Carranza had recently experienced a considerable 
diminution of influence over the course of events in Mexico. 
He remained at the head of the Constitutionalist movement, 
but only at the sufferance of his generals. His command 
of the revolutionary armies was no more than nominal. Ef­
fective power rested in the hands of a dozen or more pro­
vincial caudillos, each pursuing his own tortuous path to 
the presidency.^
The most serious immediate threat to Carranza's
^uirk, The Mexican Revolution, 60, 69-70; Link,
Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 233.
174
175
authority came from Francisco Villa, commander of the
powerful Division of the North. Strongly antagonistic
toward Carranza and egged on by ambitious and disgruntled
advisors, Villa was determined to wrest control of the
2
revolutionary movement from his chief. By early 1914 he 
had established a virtually independent regime in the 
northern State of Chihuahua, hired propagandists and 
lobbyists in the United States, and commenced recruiting 
and equipping his own private army. The necessary funds 
were obtained through the sale of stolen cattle in the 
United States and through "loans" extorted from American 
and other foreign mining interests operating in northern 
Mexico.3
Villa fully appreciated the importance of Washing­
ton's favor. He assiduously courted the Administration,
"at all times and in all places" saying "what he thought...
2Ibid., 234-237; Louis M. Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson 
and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1916: A History of United 
States-Mexican Relations From the Murder of Madero Until 
Villa's Provocation Across the Border (New York: Exposition 
Press, 1967), 129-130 (hereafter cited as Wilson and the 
Mexican Revolution)• See also Clendenen, The U.S. and 
Villa, 93-94, 114-120.
-a
JIbid., 56; Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality,
235; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 130.
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Wilson and . . . Bryan wanted to hear."^ The Veracruz inci­
dent had proved a stroke of great good fortune for Villa, 
and he had shrewdly turned it to maximum advantage. Posing 
as the steadfast friend of the United States, he had suc­
ceeded in convincing Administration officials that he alone 
among the revolutionary hierarchy was capable of respon­
sible, disinterested leadership. For months, despite 
mounting evidence to the contrary, official Washington 
held to the myth of Villa the patriot.®
In June, 1914, the smoldering quarrel between Villa 
and Carranza flared into the open. Alarmed at the prospect 
of still new civil strife in Mexico, Wilson and Bryan strove 
to effect a reconciliation. Early in July, American agents 
and sub-chiefs representing the contending factions con­
ferred in Torreon and patched together a shaky truce.
4Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 245.
5
Ibid., 239. Link asserts that by midsummer 1914, 
Villa ”had already given ample demonstration . . .  of his 
utter temperamental incapacity to govern in his own right 
or to work in harness with the First Chief." It was clear 
that Villa "was fast becoming the tool of some of the most 
predatory elements in the revolutionary movement . . . .  It 
is difficult to understand how Wilson and Bryan could have 
failed to recognize what was clear to all disinterested 
observers, that Villa was essentially violent and destructive 
and therefore incapable of giving leadership to a great 
people." Ibid., 238-239.
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According to the Torreon Agreement, revolutionary generals 
were to convene in the capital upon the ejection of Huerta 
to organize a new constitutional government. Each delegate 
to the proposed convention was to represent a thousand 
revolutionary soldiers. **
Although factional differences were momentarily com­
promised, Villa's determination to dominate the revolu­
tionary movement assured eventual renewal of the contest. 
Already his Division of the North equaled or exceeded in 
size the combined forces of all other Constitutionalist 
commanders. And, as the date of the proposed convention 
approached, Villa sought to assure his control of that 
body by vigorously recruiting still new regiments. In­
forming Wilson of his plans, he revealed his intention to 
back his chief of artillery, General Felipe Angeles, for 
the presidency. Villa was certain of victory if the 
Carrancistas honored the Torreon Agreement. If, however, 
the First Chief reneged. Villa would forcibly install his 
candidate in the National Palace. He urged Wilson to use 
his influence to force Carranza's adherence to the pact.
6Carothers to Bryan, July 9, 1914, Foreign Relations,
1914, 559-560; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 41-42.
^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 237.
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He would make no move against the First Chief, Villa
assured the President, until he had received an acknow-
0
ledgement from the White House.
Villa's message reached Washington on August 1. 
Already disappointed in Carranza and increasingly well- 
disposed toward his rival, Wilson and Bryan leaped at the 
chance to play a greater role in Mexican affairs. The 
initiative lost in April appeared retrievable in August.
For some time, Administration officials had been inclined 
to favor Villa over other lesser-known revolutionary 
leaders. By mid-summer, he had emerged as the single 
admirable figure among the first rank of revolutionary 
leadership, the only one of the lot apparently genuinely
9
concerned with the welfare of his people. He alone ap­
peared capable of truly uniting the disparate revolutionary 
elements and restoring lasting peace to the republic. Ad­
ministration officials were further impressed by his 
eagerness to cooperate with Washington and to defer to 
the President's will. Villa's behavior contrasted sharply 
with the sullen contrariness of Carranza. It was an im­
portant factor in winning Washington's support.10
8Ibid. 9Ibid., 239.
10Clendenen, The U.S. and Villa, 121; Link, Wilson: 
Struggle for Neutrality, 239-240.
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The President wanted very much to assist the Mexi­
can people in the task of reconstruction. Moreover, he 
was still responsible for the protection of foreign in­
terests in Mexico. Thus it was of great importance to 
Wilson that the leaders of the faction which ultimately 
gained control of the republic should be men with whom he 
could work amicably. In the summer and fall of 1914, the 
Villistas appeared best able to fulfill that requirement. 
Strengthening the case for Villa was his growing popularity 
among a large segment of the American people, particularly 
among Wilsonian progressives and liberals generally who 
had come to view the erstwhile bandit as a sort of modern 
Robin Hood.11 In the final analysis, however, Wilson's 
decision to back the Villista movement grew out of the 
conviction that Carranza was finished, that the First 
Chief could not long stand before the powerful and spirited 
Division of the North.12
The President responded to Villa's note by dispatch­
ing to Mexico still another executive agent. New York 
attorney Paul Fuller. Fuller was instructed to confer
11Ibid., 241; Clendenen, The U.S. and Villa, 56. 
12Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 241.
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with both factional leaders and to impress upon them the 
urgency of resolving their differences without resort to
bloodshed. Proceeding immediately to northern Mexico,
13Puller found Villa the very model of accommodation.
Moving on to the capital, he reported that Carranza, too, 
appeared willing to cooperate. The First Chief expressed 
his readiness to abide by the Torreon Agreement, thereby 
eliminating the ostensible point of contention between the 
factions.^ Wilson and Bryan were elated. Clearly, 
Villista delegates would dominate the convention. Very 
soon the republic would be reunited under a legitimate 
constitutional regime, one which the President assumed 
would be well-disposed toward the United States and amen­
able to suggestions from the White House.
l3Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 103-105.
^Fuller to Bryan, September 5, 1914, Foreign Rela­
tions , 1914, 594; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era, 130. Despite Carranza's assurances of cooperation. 
Fuller was distressed by the vindictiveness of Constitu­
tionalist authorities towards their erstwhile opponents. 
Equally disturbing to Wilson's agent was Carranza's deter­
mination to execute broad social and economic reform by 
revolutionary decree rather than through normal legislative 
process. In his final report to the President, Fuller 
questioned the ability of the Carrancistas to exert a posi­
tive influence on the reconstruction of the republic. On 
the other hand. Fuller was favorably impressed with Villa 
and his lieutenants, and so informed the President. Teitel- 
baum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 165-168, 173.
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Villa, however, put no stock in Carranza's promises. 
Fearing that the First Chief intended to pack the conven­
tion, as he himself was in the process of doing, Villa 
abruptly called for national elections and the organiza­
tion of a provisional government prior to the convening 
of the revolutionary caucus.^ Again civil war appeared 
imminent. George Carothers, still attached to Villa's 
headquarters, sought to preclude a rupture and to salvage 
the pending convention through a new round of negotiations. 
Accordingly, he arranged a conference between Villa and 
Alvaro Obregon, the latter representing those commanders 
still nominally loyal to Carranza. The talks proved 
fruitless, culminating in the seizure and near-execution 
of Obregon. Only the timely intervention of Carothers* 
aide, Leon J. Canova, and other cooler heads saved Car­
ranza's spokesman from the firing s q u a d . I n  the days 
that followed, nothing more was said of national elections. 
Villa prepared to fight.
By late September, hostilities had commenced.
Having concluded an alliance with Emiliano Zapata, leader
^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 248=249.
16Clendenem The U.S. and Villa, lW-lie.
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of the southern agrarian movement, Villa turned on Carran-
17cista outposts along the northern border. In a bid for 
popular support and doubtless with an eye toward Washing­
ton, he pledged that neither he nor any of his generals
would seek the presidency of the republic or accept it if 
18
offered. Carranza responded to Villa's power play by 
boycotting the revolutionary convention which had opened 
as scheduled on October 1. The First Chief, Silliman la­
mented, had acted in good faith in agreeing to abide by 
the Torreon Agreement. He was bitterly disappointed by
Villa's duplicity and determined to deny him control of
19
the revolutionary movement. In Washington, however, there 
was little remorse. Committed to a Villista victory, 
either at the convention or in the field, Wilson and Bryan 
had reason to be pleased with Carranza's decision. His 
self-imposed withdrawal from the convention seemed to all 
but assure the triumph of their man.
^Silliman to Bryan, September 23, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1914, 605; New York Times, September 26, 1914.
18Carothers to Bryan, September 26, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1914, 605; Letcher to Bryan, September 26, 1914, 
Ibid., 607.
19
Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 25.
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Shortly after Carranza's break with the Convention, 
that body departed the capital to reconvene at the Villista 
stronghold of Aguascalientes. There, controlled by a coa­
lition of Villista and Zapatista delegates, the Convention
proclaimed its sovereignty, repudiated Carranza’s authority,
20
and called upon the First Chief to step down. A delega­
tion led by the as yet uncommitted Obregon then proceeded 
to Mexico City to obtain Carranza's resignation. But the 
First Chief proved difficult. He would resign and leave
the country, he declared, only if Villa would follow him
21into exile. Frustrated, the Convention summarily deposed 
Carranza and appointed General Eulalio Gutierrez provisional 
president of Mexico.22 Gutierrez was to rule by decree 
until national elections could be conducted and a new con­
stitutional government organized. At the same time. Villa 
was confirmed as commander-in-chief of the Conventionist 
armies, an act which assured him control of the new regime. 
Despite the proceedings at Aguascalientes and the
*wCanova to Bryan, October 23 and 30, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914, 612, 615.
21Canova to Bryan, October 29 and November 16, 1914, 
Ibid., 615, 623.
22‘Canova to Bryan, November 2, 1914, Ibid., 617.
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emergence of a "legitimate" Conventionist government,
political stability remained as elusive as ever. Power
still resided in the hands of the generals, and again the
generals were divided. By early November, three of the
most important sub-chiefs had cast their lot with Carranza.
His son-in-law, Candido Aguilar, offered sanctuary in the
State of Veracruz, permitting the First Chief to occupy the
23port shortly after Funston's force withdrew. Also re­
affirming his loyalty was General Pablo Gonzalez, master 
of Tampico and commander of the large Army Corps of the 
Northeast. Last to commit himself, and certainly the most 
important to do so, was Obregon. And with the Sonoran came 
the greater part of the veteran Army Corps of the Northwest.
23From the very first, Wilson had regretted the 
seizure and occupation of Veracruz. Following Huerta's 
flight in July, 1914, the President became increasingly 
anxious to withdraw the expeditionary force and in mid- 
September initiated steps to that end. Garrison to Bryan, 
September 15 and 21, 1914, Ibid., 597, 601-602. However, 
the threat of Carrancista reprisals against persons who 
had cooperated with the occupying authorities stayed his 
hand. American forces remained in possession of the city 
until the First Chief grudgingly agreed to an amnesty. 
Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, November 10, 1914, Ibid., 
618-620. Satisfied, the President gave the order to with­
draw. In order to avoid charges of partiality, formal 
surrender of the city to representatives of either faction 
was prohibited. On November 23, 1914, Dunston's force 
boarded transports in the harbor and sailed for home. 
Breckinridge to Funston, November 20, 1914, Ibid., 625; 
Canada to Bryan, November 23, 1914, Ibid., 626. Shortly 
thereafter, General Candido Aguilar entered the city. Ibid.
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In opposition the Convention boasted Villa's vaunted Divi­
sion of the North, Panfilo Natera's untested Central Divi­
sion, and Zapata's ragged A m y  of the South, But at 
Carranza's disposal was the bulk of the old Constitutional­
ist forces and the superb generalship of Alvaro Obregon.
Thus by the end of November the lines were drawn. The 
Constitutionalist movement was irrevocably split.24
Although Carranza was officially deposed by the 
Convention on November 10 and subsequently forced to with­
draw first to Puebla and then to Veracruz, the odds remained
25
heavily weighted in his favor. However, despite the pro­
cession of executive agents in and out of Mexico and an
accompanying flood of highly informative consular reports,
26
Wilson and Bryan remained oblivious to the fact. The
24Silliman to Bryan, November 13, 1914, Ibid., 620; 
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 123-125; Clendenen, The U.S. 
and Villa, 130.
25Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 266; Quirk, 
The Mexican Revolution, 151.
26Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 131; 
Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 258. This erroneous 
impression was created largely through the efforts of Leon 
J. Canova. Carothers1 aide had arrived in Chihuahua in 
September, 1914, and was later assigned to Aguascalientes 
to observe the proceedings of the Convention. By the time 
of the First Chief's deposition, Canova "was easily Villa's 
strongest supporter among all the American representatives 
in Mexico." Ibid.
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President, in particular, manifested a tendency to believe 
only that which he wanted to believe, evidence to the con­
trary notwithstanding. So it had been from the moment he 
became interested in Mexican affairs and so it would remain. 
Thus neither Wilson nor Bryan was greatly concerned over 
the breakdown of the Torreon Agreement or by news that the 
First Chief was prepared to resist the Convention. They
were convinced that Carranza's defeat was not only desirable
27but inevitable. Accordingly, when the First Chief with­
drew from the capital, Wilson severed de facto relations 
with the Constitutionalists and transferred Silliman to
Aguascalientes. There the President's envoy opened de facto
28relations with the Convention. At the same time, Wilson
publicly expressed his confidence in Villa and Gutierrez
29and extended his "moral support" to the new regime.
Wilson had no intention of again intervening mili­
tarily in Mexico. His preoccupation with the war in Europe 
had increased steadily through the fall of 1914, and with 
it his desire to withdraw as rapidly as possible from Veracruz
27Ibid. 28Ibid., 456.
2 g
Bryan to Canova, November 16, 1914, Foreign Relations,
1914, 622; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,
131.
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and to avoid any further commitment of American troops
below the border. By late November, it appeared that he
would have his way. Carranza was bottled up in Veracruz,
seemingly finished. Great Britain and other European
powers with interests in Mexico were no longer capable of
independent intervention. Even domestic agitation for
30intervention had lessened considerably.
The oilmen, in particular, were subdued. They were 
skeptical of the Administration's professed desire to 
assist them in their struggle with Aguilar. Convinced 
that truly effective assistance was, at least for the 
moment, unobtainable, they sought to make the best of a 
bad situation by negotiating directly with the Governor. 
When, in early November, Bryan, on his own initiative, 
again raised the question of Aguilar's objectionable de­
crees, the oilmen were distressed. They warned the Secre­
tary that it was "unwise1 to press the matter, in effect
31asking him to not interfere. From their vantage point, 
they were able to assess at least as well as Washington
^°Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 259-260. 
•^Bevan to Lansing, November 5, 1914, SDR 812.6363/
144.
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the trend of events in Mexico. Moreover, as eminently 
practical men with large personal stakes in the Mexican 
oil industry, they could ill-afford to indulge in the sort 
of wishful thinking that so distorted the President's 
view of Mexican affairs. Consequently, they shared none 
of the Administration's optimism over the alleged imminent 
collapse of the Carranza regime. On the contrary, they 
ruefully anticipated not only its survival but its ulti­
mate triumph.32
Given Washington's negative attitude toward foreign 
firms operating in Mexico and its refusal to intervene 
effectively (militarily) on their behalf, the oilmen had 
little choice but to seek to come to terms with the Gover­
nor. Understandably, they viewed Bryan's ineffective 
(diplomatic), belated intervention, however well-intentioned, 
as an embarrassing and potentially disastrous liability. If 
the Administration would not provide effective protection 
for the companies, then it was better for all concerned 
that it not become involved at all.
Following the Convention's deposition of Carranza, 
Villa had divided his forces into three columns for
32McNamee to Bryan, February 2, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
163.
simultaneous drives against Guadalajara, Tampico, and
Mexico City. Conventionist armies met little resistance
in the West and still less in their march on the capital.
Zn the Huasteca, however, the Conventionist advance ground 
33to a halt. Failure to take Tampico and the oilfields 
was due as much to the opposition of Pelaez as to the 
presence of Pablo Gonzales' strong Army Corps of the 
Northeast. When Conventionist forces approached the 
petroleum province, Pelaez suddenly proclaimed for Villa 
and assured the invaders that he held the oilfields in the 
name of the new regime. Numerous, well-armed, and allegedly 
backed by foreign oilmen and their respective governments, 
the Pelaecistas presented a formidable front. In the 
negotiations that followed, an accommodation was reached 
between the General and the Convention. The Huasteca cam­
paign was abandoned, and Pelaez* autonomy in the region 
tacitly acknowledged.^
33j3evan to Bryan, December 19, 1914, SDR 812.00/ 
14046; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 213.
^Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, 
376-377. See, for example, Canada to Bryan, February 20, 
1915, U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington,
D. C.; Government Printing Office, 1924), 822 (hereafter 
cited as Foreign Relations, 1915).
Early in December, Villa entered the capital. Shortly 
thereafter Gutierrez and other government officials arrived 
in the city, and, on January 1, 1915, the Convention re­
convened in the Chamber of Deputies to consider long- 
awaited reforms. Although the delegates did indeed have 
plans for reform and sincerely sought to translate them 
into meaningful programs, they were severely handicapped
by their dependence upon Villa. No important decision
35could be made without his approval. Villa, however, was
far more enthused over completing the rout of the Carran-
cistas than over perusing legislation. Consequently, the
Convention faced one deadlock after another. The debates
between the Villista majority and Zapata's agrarian radicals
grew increasingly bitter, threatening to splinter the Con-
3G
ventionist coalition. Villa's baneful influence was 
further manifested in the growing friction between the 
Provisional President and Villista henchmen within the 
administration. On January 7, a frustrated and powerless 
Gutierrez opened secret negotiations with Obregon with a 
view toward eliminating both Villa and Carranza.37 Rebuffed,
35Link, Wilsons Struggle for Neutrality, 265; Quirk,
The Mexican Revolution, 153.
36Ibid. 37Ibid., 155-156.
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he and a small band of followers fled the capital on the 
night of January 15 and made for Gutierrez' home state of 
San Luis Potosi. There in the North they hoped to re­
establish the legitimate government of Mexico.
As Gutierrez fled into oblivion, the Convention 
moved to assume all powers of government itself. General 
Rogue Gonzalez Garza, a Chihuahua political figure and 
protege of Villa, was appointed president of the body. 
Reorganization failed to produce harmony, however, and the 
proceedings of the Convention were marked by increasing 
acrimony.3® By late January, it had become apparent that 
the Convention was neither truly representative nor revo­
lutionary. Nor was it an effective instrument of reform.
For the moment, at least, it was little more than a vehicle 
for Villa's personal pursuit of power.
In Washington, Wilson and Bryan watched developments 
in Mexico with mounting dismay. They had backed the wrong 
horse, and they knew it. The Conventionist Government was 
a patent farce and the alleged invincibility of its armies 
open to serious question.®® On January 5, Obregon's new
38Ibid., 169, 179.
39New York Times, January 6, 1915.
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Army of Operations had driven the Zapatistas from Puebla; 
by the end of the month, it threatened Mexico City. Al­
ready weakened by the disaffection of Gutierrez, the Con­
vention looked to Villa for assistance. But the delegates 
waited in vain. Villa was fully preoccupied with the 
struggle in the North and the West. "Mexico City and the
South . . . played no part" in his immediate plans, "either
military or political."*0 Like Wilson and Bryan, he was
prepared to write off the Convention, and on January 31,
he organized his own "government” in Chihuahua.*-*- Abandoned 
and unable to stand before Obregon, Gonzalez Garza led the 
remnants of the Convention to Cuernavaca, the agrarista 
stronghold in the State of Morelos. There the Villista 
majority rapidly dwindled away, and control of the body 
passed to the Zapatistas. Thereafter, it reflected the 
Southerner's own parochial brand of revolution and 
reform.*2 Within a matter of months it had ceased to be an 
important factor in the struggle for control of the republic.
*°Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 176.
*^The Confidential Agent of the Provisional (Conven­
tionist) Government of Mexico to Bryan, March 8, 1915,
SDR 812.00/14534.
*2Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 179.
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II.
While the Convention was rending itself in the capi­
tal, Carranza's advisers in Veracruz were drafting a com­
prehensive blueprint for reform, a move aimed primarily at 
winning the support of the Mexican m a s s e s . 43 ^ e  so-called 
"Additions to the Plan of Guadalupe" encouraged organized 
labor, restored land to the villages, nullified foreign 
contracts and monopolies, and promised a general restruc­
turing of Mexican society. The first of these reforms was 
announced early in January, the rest following in short 
order. Although the authors of the "Additions" were ap­
parently sincere in seeking genuine reform, the First Chief 
himself was not. "Never thereafter,” Quirk declares, "did 
Carranza make any real effort" to put the program into 
effect.44 The "Additions," then, ultimately served as 
little more than a propaganda device, a measure designed to 
ease the way for Obregon in the forthcoming contest with 
Villa.
They served their purpose well, however, particularly
4 3Arredondo to Bryan, December 16, 1914, Foreign Rela­
tions, 1914, 629-633; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 352.
44Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 152.
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the labor decrees. The latter led to an alliance between 
Obregon and Luis Morones, head of the radical Casa del 
Obrero Mundial, and won the invaluable support of the urban 
worker. As the campaign against Villa progressed, large 
numbers of worker volunteers joined the Army of Operations 
to fill the ranks of the so-called Red Battalions.45
The "Additions" had a profound effect on Constitu­
tionalist relations with Washington as well. They comprised 
the most coherent program for reform yet promulgated. More­
over, by early 1915, it was evident that the Constitutional­
ists alone were capable of effecting the sweeping social 
and economic changes which Wilson and Bryan were gradually 
perceiving as essential for the regeneration of Mexico.
Thus the President could no longer afford to ignore Car­
ranza. Once again, he was forced to deal with the man he 
had snubbed, insulted, and conspired to destroy.
Renewing amicable relations with Carranza was to 
prove a trying and exceedingly difficult task. The Presi­
dent's earlier decision to back Villa and the Convention 
had seriously jeopardized the Constitutionalist cause and 
deeply embittered the First Chief and his followers.
45Cline, The United States and Mexico, 166; Parkes, 
A History of Mexico, 352.
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Silliman's transfer and the withdrawal of de facto recog­
nition had added insult to injury. Then, in early December, 
with relations between Washington and the Veracruz regime 
at an all-time low, developments along the border had 
threatened to provoke still another round of American 
military intervention.^6
In the contest for control of the Mexican Northwest, 
Jose Maytorena, Villista governor of Sonora, sought to 
dislodge Carrancista forces from the border town of Naco. 
During the lengthy seige of Naco, a number of American 
citizens were killed or wounded by stray rounds, and the 
American section of town suffered extensive physical damage. 
On December 10, in stern notes to both Gutierrez and Car­
ranza, Bryan demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities.
The United States, he warned, would take "positive action,"
47
if need be, to stop the fighting.
The Mexican response was discouraging. Maytorena 
ignored orders from the capital to withdraw. Carranza, 
too, refused to succumb to pressure. Instead, the First 
Chief issued a warning of his own: American military
46Clendenen, The U.S. and Villa, 141-143.
47
Silliman to Bryan, December 11, 1914, SDH 812.00/
13944.
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intervention at Naco would be construed as an act of war
48against the Mexican nation. Such a move could have very 
serious consequences. Anxious to avoid a new crisis,
Bryan proceeded with greater caution. Through Carothers 
he arranged a series of Mexican-American conferences aimed 
at defusing the explosive situation on the border. Ulti­
mately his patience was rewarded. By mid-January, the
contending forces had disengaged and the town of Naco had
49been neutralized.
During the course of the negotiations over Naco,
the President had again publicly abjured armed interven-
50
tion as a means of settling disputes with Mexico. None­
theless, because of the development of still new Mexican- 
American tensions, the threat of intervention persisted 
throughout the spring of 1915. Serious differences grew 
out of the Constitutionalist petroleum decree of January 7. 
Determined as ever to obtain control of the domestic oil 
industry, Carranza ordered a halt to all operations in the
^8Canada to Bryan, December 13, 1914, SDR 812.00/
13997.
49Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 163.
50Link, Wilsons Struggle for Neutrality, 464.
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oilfields until such time as the Veracruz regime drafted 
and promulgated a comprehensive petroleum code. Drilling 
and all surface construction, including work on pipelines 
and additional storage facilities, were to cease at once. 
And, according to the original interpretation of the order, 
so, too, was production itself, physically impossible in 
the high-pressure Huasteca fields. Works continued in 
contravention of the decree were to be destroyed by Con­
stitutionalist soldiers at the expense of the delinquent
firms. Crude oil produced subsequent to the decree was
51subject to confiscation.
Strict enforcement of Carranza's order would re­
sult in irreparable damage to the industry and force many 
of the smaller operations to withdraw altogether. For 
all but the largest foreign firms the decree of January 7 
portended ruin. Within a week, word arrived from Tampico 
that the Constitutionalists were indeed enforcing the de­
cree in the districts under their control. In addition, an 
embargo on the export of petroleum products by the Doheny 
and Cowdray companies had been announced by the First Chief,
51Canada to Bryan, January 8, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
146.
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a penalty for alleged failure to pay the production tax
52
to the Veracruz regime. Desperate, the oilmen turned 
again to the State Department for relief. Bryan's response 
to the new assault on the companies was restrained, how­
ever, and in no way deterred Carranza's drive for control
53of the industry.
Fortunately for the oilmen the unreasonableness of 
the decree soon became apparent to Constitutionalist 
officials. Carranza himself ordered its amendment. En­
lightened by his Inspector of Petroleum at Tampico, the
First Chief retreated from his earlier extreme position and
54agreed to permit the resumption of existing production.
On the other hand, drilling and surface works were to re­
main in abeyance until the decree was r e s c i n d e d . Al­
though commanders in the field were informed of the change,
52
Canada to Bryan, January 12, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
147.
53Bryan to Canada, January 13, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
146.
54Daniel Perez, Inspector of Petroleum at Tampico, 
to Pastor Rouaix, Sub-secretary of Fomento, January 13, 
1915, SDR 812.6363/161.
55"'■'Bevan to Bryan, January 16, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
149.
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some chose to ignore it and to adhere to the original inter­
pretation of the decree. Moreover, production restrictions 
against the giants of the industry— the Huasteca, the Aguila, 
and the Royal Dutch-Shell's Corona-remained in force. ^
With the industry thrown into confusion, several 
thousand American and some 20,000 Mexican workers were idle. 
Consular officials at Tampico reported that local Constitu­
tionalist commanders were ignoring the amended decree in 
the belief that unemployed Mexican workers would flock to 
their respective regiments. More than likely, however, the 
majority of workers would join Pelaez or one of the several 
Villista bands in the Northeast, further aggravating the 
unrest in the petroleum province. Of much greater concern 
to the Consulate was the potential for violence represented 
by the hundreds of idle American workers, Hthe element most 
to be feared," currently congregating in Tampico. Recently, 
Bevan revealed, a "secret society for the mutual protection 
of Americans" had been organized in the city. The number 
involved was undetermined, but they were known to have "a 
large amount of arms and ammunition hidden." Moreover, 
they had stated that in case of rioting they intended to
56Bevan to Bryan, January 14, 1915, SDR 812.6363/161.
protect themselves," The Consul did not like it. He urged 
that the Government assist the companies in returning un­
employed American workers to the United States until the 
matter of the controversial decree was resolved.
The hardship borne by the three principal producers 
in the Huasteca was made still more onerous by the selec­
tive embargo on the export of their petroleum products.
Both European firms had paid all taxes required by law, and 
the Doheny company had gone considerably further in seeking 
to accommodate the Constitutionalist r e g i m e . D i r e c t i n g
57Ibid.
58Early in 1914, Candido Aguilar made the first of 
his several forays into the southern Huasteca, seizing the 
port of Tuxpam and threatening to halt oil shipments there­
from unless paid a large sum of money by the exporting 
companies. Harold Walker, Doheny*s representative in Mexico 
City, turned for advice to John Lind, then the President's 
personal agent in the republic. Ultimately, with Lind's 
and, by implication, Washington's approval, Walker complied 
with Aguilar's demand. It was the first time that the 
Doheny interests succumbed to blackmail. Later, during the 
spring, Doheny himself met in New York City with Felicitas 
Villareal, Constitutionalist treasurer, and Rafael Zubaran 
Capmany. He informed Carranza's agents that he had recently 
refused to pay Huerta $100,000 in oil export taxes because 
Washington refused to recognize the General's regime. At 
the same time, he handed Villareal a draft for an equivalent 
amount "for the purpose of helping to finance their needs." 
Shortly thereafter, a Doheny spokesman was sent to Carranza 
with instructions to assure him of "our friendship toward 
the cause of the Constitutionalists and of our refusal to 
pay taxes to Huerta and of our desire to act in accord with 
our own Government's attitude in connection with Mexico . . . 
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 277-278.
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his statement to Bryan through Frederic R. Kellogg, attorney
for the Mexican Petroleum Company, Doheny dolefully re-
59counted his relations with Carrancista officials.
In July, 1914, when Constitutionalist forces had 
first occupied Tampico, representatives of the Huasteca 
Petroleum Company had entered into an agreement with Car­
ranza to deliver fuel oil for the Constitutionalist Rail­
ways at a reduced rate, the deliveries to apply to current 
and future taxes. From July through December, the Huasteca 
had furnished fuel valued at 375,000 gold pesos (c. $167,000). 
Then, late in December, Constitutionalist officials "de­
manded payment of taxes in cash and repudiated the agree­
ment" concluded the previous summer. In addition, the 
National Railways of Mexico, taken over by Carranza in 
the early fall, was indebted to the Huasteca Petroleum 
Company some 400,000 gold pesos for fuel already delivered. 
That obligation, too, had been repudiated by Veracruz.
Prior to concluding its agreement with the Constitution­
alists, Doheny averred, the company had paid its taxes in 
full. He hoped that the Secretary would "see that we are
59Kellogg to Bryan, January 13, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
150.
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dealt justly with" by the government of Carranza.®0 
On January 17, Eliseo Arredondo, Carranza's 
spokesman in Washington, informed Bryan that the First 
Chief had no intention of confiscating foreign oil pro­
perties; rather, he was merely halting "unauthorized" 
drilling and construction. The questionable legal bases 
for that action were ignored. The embargo on oil exports 
by industry leaders, Arredondo assured the Secretary,
would be lifted the moment the firms involved agreed to pay
61their allegedly delinquent taxes. Shortly after the
60Ibid. Although several hundred American firms were 
eventually involved in the Mexican oil play, American oilmen 
as a group were by no means unanimously sympathetic with 
the harried Mexican producers and exporters. In fact, 
purely domestic producers were elated by the misfortunes 
of their international competitors. Cheap Mexican crude 
brought into the United States undercut American produc­
tion and, in the words of a Texas independent, "has almost 
put the little fellows out of business." R. E. Dodson to 
Bryan, January 16, 1915, SDR 812.6363/155. Given the strong 
antimonopolist views of Wilson and Bryan, statements such 
as Dodson's were extremely damaging to the "free compe­
titor" image which the large integrated firms sought to 
project. Almost certainly they affected the Administration's 
response to appeals for assistance from Doheny and other 
oilmen with large stakes in Mexico.
61Arredondo to Bryan, Janury 17, 1915, SDR 812.6363/ 
151. The embargo was indeed lifted late in January, but 
only after both Bryan and Spring-Rice had strongly pro­
tested. Bevan to Bryan, Janury 25, 1915, SDR 812.6363/156.
On the other hand, the matter of delinquent taxes was far
from settled.
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Bryan-Arredondo conference, Carranza sent a special repre­
sentative to Washington expressly to explain his petroleum
62policy to Administration officials.
Meanwhile, with new development work in the Huasteca 
at a standstill, the First Chief issued three additional 
decrees in rapid succession. Each further extended Consti­
tutionalist control over the industry. Thereafter, com­
panies petitioning the government for the "privilege" of 
commencing new works, surface and subsurface alike, would 
be required to sign a document pledging that those works
would be in full accord with the proposed but as yet non-
63existent petroleum code. In conjunction with this announce­
ment, an investigative commission was dispatched to Tampico 
to conduct a thorough study of the industry and to submit 
recommendations upon which to base the projected code.®^
The fact that the decree clearly violated the retroactivity 
clause of the extant Constitution of 1857 was simply
62Canada to Bryan, January 20, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
153.
**2Bevan to Bryan, January 25, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
154.
6*Bevan to Bryan, January 19, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
159.
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disregarded. Once again, Bryan's protest amounted to little
ge
more than a mild rebuke.
A second decree, issued late in January, opened the 
way for confiscation of all buildings and other surface 
structures standing in the Federal Zones unless specific­
ally licensed by Constitutionalist officials. All works 
erected during the Huerta regime were to be automatically 
confiscated, and permits for other structures were subject 
to revision at any time by the Constitutionalist govern­
ment.66 Since most storage and virtually all shipping, 
docking, and loading facilities were located in one of the 
Federal Zones, the decree not only imperiled millions of 
dollars worth of foreign investment but threatened to 
completely disrupt the industry. In addition to striking 
at the scores of crude producers, large and small alike, it 
also jeopardized the position of big refining interests like 
Standard Oil of Hew Jersey and the Pierce Petroleum Corpora­
tion previously untouched by the feud between producing 
companies and the Veracruz regime.
65Bryan to Canada, January 25, 1915, SDR 812.6363/154.
66Bevan to Bryan, February 13, 1915, SDR 812.6363/171. 
The Federal Zone was a strip of land twenty meters in-shore 
from the high-water mark; it extended as far inland as the 
tide.
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A final decree went far towards revealing Carranza's 
underlying motives in restricting the activities of the 
oilmen. In sum, it called for the submission of well logs 
and other highly secret and invaluable subsurface geological 
data to Constitutionalist officials.^ Once in possession 
of such information, Carranza could enter the oil business 
himself. Companies seeking new drilling permits were ex­
pected to comply with the decree.
i
By early February, after little more than a cursory 
study of the petroleum industry* Carranza's investigative 
commission had returned to Veracruz to report to the First 
Chief in person. For the moment, the industry was para­
lyzed, and foreign oilmen feared that worse was yet to come. 
A confidential report from the commander of the cruiser 
Sacramento, standing off Tampico, was far from encouraging. 
The oilmen themselves, he concluded, were in "a state of 
general depression." Most were of the opinion that the pro­
posed new petroleum code would nationalize the Mexican oil 
industry.®8
6^Bevan to Bryan, February 6 , 1915, SDR 812.6363/170.
®®McNamee to Bryan, February 2, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
163.
As if to confirm their fears. Constitutionalist 
officials on February 19 suddenly called for adherence to 
an all-but-forgotten petroleum decree of the previous 
September. According to the long neglected order, all 
property owners were to submit a detailed list of their 
holdings and the value thereof. The announced purpose of 
valuation was to enable the Government to determine the 
exact wealth of the country and to distribute the tax burden 
accordingly. It was understood that the Government was em­
powered, in the event of expropriation, to pay the interested 
parties as an indemnity the value fixed on the tax lists 
subsequent to valuation. Parties failing to submit the 
required data within the time prescribed were subject to
a fine of five per cent of the value of their holdings as
69appraised by a special Assessment Committee. The time 
alloted for filing valuation reports was much too short,
Bevan complained. Moreover, the oilmen had no way of accu­
rately appraising the value of their landed properties.
By far the greater portion of those properties had not 
yet been tested for oil. If the lands in question were 
undervalued the companies risked expropriation by the
69Bevan to Bryan, February 21, 1915, SDR 812.512/556.
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Government; if, on the other hand, they were overvalued 
the companies would be forced to bear an excessive tax 
burden.^® Again Bryan protested.^
While tension mounted over Carranza's campaign 
against the oilmen, a new and potentially far more dan­
gerous controversy grew out of Obregon's occupation of 
Mexico City. Martial law was declared, and the capital 
transferred to Veracruz in hopes of forcing the reloca­
tion of the foreign diplomatic corps and thus tacit recog­
nition of the Constitutionalist regime. In addition, both 
Carranza and Obregon were determined to punish the resi­
dents of Mexico City for their alleged disaffection and 
hostility toward the Constitutionalist cause. By early
February, the General was meting out that punishment with 
72a vengeance. Food trains entering the city were turned 
back by his order, and attempts by the foreign community to 
relieve the hunger of the masses were likewise frustrated. 
Within the city a controlled press repeatedly incited the 
hungry to plunder private property, setting class against
70lbid. ^Bryan to Bevan, March 5, 1915, Ibid.
^Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, February 3, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1915, 649; Quirk, The Mexican Revolu­
tion, 181ff.
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class. Again and again, Obregon himself publicly encouraged 
attacks upon merchants, foreigners and clergymen. His 
words did not go unheeded.
III.
In Washington, the President and Administration of­
ficials followed developments in Mexico City with growing 
revulsion and i n d i g n a t i o n . T h e  callous and vindictive 
behavior of the Constitutionalists was recognized for what 
it was, part of a deliberate scheme to reduce the city to 
anarchy. Domestic demands for armed intervention flared 
anew.^ Outrage mounted when Obregon jailed scores of 
priests and threatened Mexican prelates in a heavy-handed 
attempt to extort large sums of money from the Church. A 
simultaneous drive to wring funds from the foreign business 
community drew angry criticism from abroad, increasing 
pressure upon the Wilson Administration to intercede on be­
half of the victims and to restrain the Constitutionalists
73Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, March 2 and 4, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1915, 654, 656-657.
7 A
Bryan to Cardoso de Oliveira, March 6 , 1915, Ibid., 
659-660; Bryan to Silliman, March 6 , 1915, Ibid., 660-661; 
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 195-196.
75Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 132.
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from further excesses."*® As determined as the President
was to avoid new involvement in the internal affairs of
Mexico, daily reports from below the border rapidly eroded
his resolve. Grudgingly acknowledging the necessity for a
thorough reappraisal of the revolutionary movement, he
dispatched still another personal representative to Mexico
to investigate and assess recent developments in that 
77troubled land.
Wilson's agent was Duval West of San Antonio, a 
former federal attorney and a student of Mexican affairs.
On February 5, West received his instructions from the White 
House: he was to confer with the leaders of the several
revolutionary factions, observe their characters and at­
tempt to discern their respective purposes, and render an 
opinion on the prospects for a lasting resolution of the 
Mexican problem. The President, in his own words, was 
"very anxious to know just what the moral situation" was 
in Mexico, and "what it behooves us to do to check what is
76guirk, The Mexican Revolution, 193.
77Ibid., 209; Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 155;
Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 459.
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futile and promote what promises genuine reform and set­
tled peace."7®
Accordingly, West entered Mexico in mid-February, 
remaining in the republic until the latter half of May.
There he conferred with Villa, Carranza, and Zapata, as 
well as with a number of their respective aides. From 
time to time. West forwarded written reports to Washington. 
Upon his return to the United States, he went directly to 
the White House to summarize his findings for the Presi­
dent. West's evaluation of the political situation in 
Mexico was of profound importance in determining subsequent 
Mexican-American relations. For sometime thereafter, 
Wilson's approach to Mexican affairs was strongly influenced
70
by the West reports.
Meanwhile, through late February and early March, 
conditions in the former capital steadily deteriorated.80 
Communication with the outside world had virtually ceased.
7®Ibid., 460.
7®Ibid.,; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 254.
®°Silliman to Bryan, March 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
14497; Bryan to Silliman, March 12, 1915, Foreign Relations, 
1915, 671; Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, March 20, 1915, 
Ibid., 672-673.
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Some 25,000 foreign nationals, among them approximately
2,500 Americans, were stranded in the city. Pledged to
protect foreign lives and property in the republic, the
Wilson Administration was under increasing pressure from
81both at home and abroad to fulfill its obligation. In 
the weeks following Obregon*s occupation of the city,
Bryan repeatedly called upon Carranza to restrain his 
vengeful subordinate. His entreaties were ignored. Fin­
ally, on March 6 , in identical notes to the First Chief and 
his General, the Secretary delivered a virtual ultimatum. 
Drafted by the Department's counselor, Robert Lansing, it 
was couched in "strong and insulting" language. Constitu­
tionalist leaders were accused of deliberately persecuting 
the inhabitants of Mexico City while inciting them to acts 
of violence against foreigners, the clergy, and the pro­
pertied classes. The Government of the United States, 
Lansing bluntly warned the recipients, would hold them 
personally responsible for any harm that might befall Ameri­
can citizens in Mexico as a result of the policies currently
82being pursued by the Veracruz regime. *
®^Bryan to Silliman, March 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/14477. 
®2Bryan to Silliman, March 6 , 1915, SDR 812.00/14501.
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By early March, the President's patience with Con­
stitutionalist leadership had worn thin indeed. Antipathy 
toward Obregon in particular was very strong in Washington.**3 
Once again, the question of armed intervention arose. Hesi­
tant, Wilson and Bryan turned to Lansing for advice. On 
March 8 , the Counselor recommended the dispatch of an Ameri­
can expeditionary force to Mexico City to restore order and 
to relieve the foreign community. Every effort should be 
made, however, to obtain ABC participation in the venture.8  ^
Despite his grave concern over the situation in Mexico City, 
the President was not prepared at the moment to take such 
drastic action. Lansing's recommendation was rejected in
O C
favor of a naval display off Veracruz. It was hoped that
83Quijrk, The Mexican Revolution, 196.
^^Lansing to Bryan, March 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/14664 1/2.
®^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 462. Wil­
son's position was publicly expressed on March 15, in an 
address by Vice President Thomas R. Marshall: "Wholesale
bloodshed would follow intervention in Mexico, and when we 
conquered we would have another Philippine Islands on our 
hands— something we would have trouble letting loose of. 
Veracruz with its snipers taught us only in a small way what 
armed intervention in Mexico would mean . . . .  It would, be 
years after we captured the cities before we could subdue 
the country . . . .  While we were intervening how would the 
republics to the south of us look upon it? Might they not 
regard us with distrust— as an invader armed with a big 
club who might push on into their provinces if successful?"
New York Times, March 16, 1915.
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a show of force would be sufficient to bring Carranza to 
heel.
With relations between Washington and Veracruz 
already seriously strained by Carranza's petroleum decrees 
and by the developing crisis over Mexico City, still 
another dispute arose over closure of the Yucatecan port 
of Progreso. The city was the exclusive outlet for Mexi­
can heneguin or sisal hemp, the sole source of binding 
twine used in the North American wheat harvest. Thus un­
restricted trade with Progreso was of vital importance not 
only to grain producers in the United States but to the 
general public as well. Some 200,000 bales of hemp, much 
of it already purchased by American firms, rested in dock- 
side warehouses awaiting transportation to the United States. 
The port, however, was in the hands of elements hostile to
the Veracruz regime, and a Constitutionalist blockade had
86been in effect for some time.
®6"Memorandum Re Situation at Progreso," undated memo­
randum in the Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress, Series VI, File 95 (hereafter cited as 
Wilson Papers). The memorandum apparently originated in the 
State Department was was forwarded to the President in the 
latter half of March, 1915. In late February, 1915, Consti­
tutionalist gunboats began seizing American and British ves­
sels calling at Progreso. On Several occasions, ships and 
their officers were detained and, in at least one instance, 
an American vessel was fired upon. Appeals to the Department 
of State by American shippers prompted the dispatch of the 
cruiser Des Moines to Progreso early in March. Ibid.
As the spring wheat harvest approached, American
agricultural and shipping interests pleaded with Carran-
cista officials to allow release of the hemp. Rebuffed by
Veracruz, they turned in desperation to Washington. By
March 12, the President felt that he could no longer stay
his hand. Now determined to use force if necessary to
reopen Progreso, he began preparation of a new ultimatum 
87to Carranza. Before it was completed, however, the First
Q  Q
Chief himself inexplicably lifted the blockade. It was 
well that he did. Armed intervention at Progreso, particu­
larly if resisted, would very likely have prompted Adminis­
tration officials to reconsider the Lansing plan for the 
relief of Mexico City. Given the state of Mexican-American 
relations at the moment, a second round of hostilities 
would doubtless have followed,
Carranza, meanwhile, had responded to Lansing's
87ibid.; Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 462.
8^In announcing the reopening of Progreso, Carranza 
expressed an opinion which doubtless embarrassed and irri­
tated Administration officials: Washington's reaction to
the closure of Progreso, he observed, was comparable to a 
hypothetical British demand during the American civil war 
to lift the Union blockade of New Orleans because British 
manufacturers needed cotton. Silliman to Bryan, March 14, 
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 824.
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sharp note of March 6 with anger and indignation, berating 
Silliman, who delivered the note, and Bryan, who had signed 
it. Refusing to correspond with the Secretary, Carranza 
addressed Wilson personally. Despite his outrage, his note 
to the President was cordial and reassuring. He denied the 
charges made against Obregon and himself, promising effec­
tive protection for Americans and other foreigners residing
89in areas under Constitutionalist jurisdiction. Before 
this communication reached Washington, Obregon had relin­
quished control of Mexico City to municipal officials and 
withdrawn the last of his troops. Ostensibly, at least, 
the principal source of friction between Washington and 
Veracruz had been eliminated, and with it the rationale 
for armed intervention.
Wilson's reply to Carranza, which failed to reach the 
First Chief for several weeks, reflected the President's 
considerable impatience over the closure of Progreso and 
over the continued harassment of foreigners and clergymen. 
Expressing approval of the First Chief's pledge to change 
his ways, Wilson nonetheless closed by bluntly warning Car­
ranza that further abuse of foreigners and ecclesiastics 
threatened the future sovereignty of the republic. World
®9Carranza to Wilson, March 9, 1915, SDR 812.00/14550.
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opinion would not stand for it. And that factor, in turn, 
might well force the United States to intervene once again.
"To warn you concerning such matters is an act of friend­
ship, not of hostility," the President assured Carranza,
"and we cannot make the warning too earnest. To speak less 
plainly or with less earnestness would be to conceal from
you a terrible risk which no lover of Mexico should wish 
90
to run." Wilson meant what he said. Shortly thereafter, 
when Lansing suggested that the Administration prepare
itself for possible full-scale military intervention in the
91 92republic, the President readily concurred.
Despite the unusually frank exchange of views in 
March, tension between Washington and Veracruz persisted. 
Although Obregon had indeed withdrawn from the former 
capital, he continued to interdict communications between 
the city and the surrounding countryside. Supply trains 
bound for the city were stopped and turned back at the out­
skirts. Hunger and hardship spread. Moreover, in areas
90Wilson to Carranza, March 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/14573.
91Lansing to Bryan, March 8, 1915, U. S., Department 
of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, the Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (2 vols.; 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939-1940),
II, 529-531 (hereafter cited as The Lansing Papers).
92Ibid., 532.
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under Constitutionalist control the mistreatment of clergy­
men and foreigners continued, Carranza's pledge notwith­
standing,93 Finally, in the Huasteca, Aguilar and Con­
stitutionalist bureaucrats persisted in their insidious
campaign to wrest control of the Mexican petroleum indus-
94try from foreign interests. The cumulative effect of 
these developments on Administration officials and on an 
ever larger segment of the American public was mounting 
hostility toward the Veracruz regime. In addition to their 
general antipathy toward the Constitutionalists, neither 
Wilson nor Bryan believed that that faction possessed
93J. M. Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, March 20, 
March 22, and May 7, 1915, SDR 812.00/14657, 14669, and 
15087. Cardoso de Oliveira, the Brazilian Minister in 
Mexico City, had assumed responsibility for protecting 
American interests in the republic when Huerta severed re­
lations with the United States in April 1914. For some 
time thereafter he continued to serve as Washington's 
formal representative in Mexico City.
94Early in March, 1915, Carrancista forces occupied 
the Huasteca Petroleum Company's headquarters at Ebano in 
southern Tamaulipas, threatening to burn the wells and 
destroy production and storage facilities in the event of 
their defeat by approaching Villistas. Bevan to Bryan, 
March 5, 1915, SDR 812.6363/174. In early April, during 
skirmishing around Ebano, Carrancistas deliberately fired 
several 40,000-barrel storage tanks. Bryan was angered.
He lodged a strong protest with Carranza, demanding im­
mediate orders to military commanders in the Huasteca to 
prevent further damage to company property. Bryan to 
Silliman, April 3, 1915, SDR 812.6363/179.
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either the strength or the ability to overcome Villa,
95much less to impose a lasting peace in Mexico. That 
conviction was unquestionably enhanced by the reports of 
Duval West.
Early in February, the President's agent had made 
his way to Villa's headquarters in Chihuahua, subsequently 
following Washington's favorite south to Guadalajara. Like 
his predecessors, West was immensely impressed with Villa.
In mid-March, he assured the Secretary that Villa alone was 
capable of settling the Mexican question, apparently con­
firming what Bryan and Wilson alike had long been disposed 
96to believe. Within a matter of weeks, however, Washing­
ton's illusions were rudely shattered. In a sanguinary 
struggle at Celaya, the "turning point of the revolution,"
Obregon administered a crushing defeat to Villa's Division 
97of the North. It never recovered. "From then on,"
Quirk declares, "Villa's fortunes ebbed. Obregon at 
Celaya not only blasted the legend of Villa's invincibility, 
[but] drove a Constitutionalist spearhead into the vitals
95Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 465. 
96.Ibid.
97New York Times, April 9, 1915.
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of Villa's own territory . . . . in addition, it forced 
Villa to withdraw his units from much of northern and cen­
tral Mexico, relieving pressure on Tampico and on other hard- 
pressed Constitutionalist outposts in the Northeast.
Bryan, perhaps sooner than the President, grasped 
the full significance of Celaya and the possible effect 
of Obregon's victory on the Administration's Mexican policy. 
On April 18, three days after the battle, the Secretary 
observed that Villa's reversal had "about convinced" 
officials in Washington "that the men upon whom hopes had 
been pinned for the pacification of Mexico cannot be relied 
upon to save the situation."**9 From that point on, Quirk 
contends, "there was no likelihood that the United States 
would either support Villa or recognize the Convention as 
the de facto government in Mexico." Instead, Washington 
began to work for a peaceful compromise among the various 
factions, a settlement aimed primarily at ending the fighting 
once and for all.^00
In spite of Obregon1s success and the apparent
98Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 221.
**9New York Times, April 20, 1915.
100Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 226.
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eclipse of Villa, Wilson still had little faith in the 
ability of the Veracruz regime to both terminate the war and 
unify the Mexican nation. The President's position was due 
in large part to West's analyses of the several revolutionary 
factions. And almost certainly it was affected by his dis­
like for Obregon and his mounting exasperation with the 
intransigent Carranza. Shortly after Celaya, at a critical 
moment in Mexican-American relations, the President received 
from West a lengthy and extremely important dispatch. In 
it Wilson's agent contrasted the Chihuahua and Veracruz 
regimes. It was a disconcerting report. West believed that 
neither faction possessed the capability to both win the war 
and secure the peace as well.*0*
There were "striking" differences between the two 
groups, West observed. In Chihuahua "the entire business 
of the government seems to be devoted to the prime object 
of military successes . . . ." The civil administration, 
"being temporary in character, had to await the final 
domination of the country." The vital questions of recon­
struction and reform appeared to be of little consequence
10*West to Bryan, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/20721
to the Northerners. In Veracruz, on the other hand, "the 
atmosphere is entirely saturated with the idea of orderly 
and systematic civil administration, the main energy being 
apparently devoted to the study and successful working out 
of the laws and reforms referred to in the Plan of Guada- 
lupe . . . But the campaigns of Obregon in central Mexico 
and of Pablo Gonzalez in the Northeast received little 
attention in Veracruz, a fact which disturbed the agent. 
Although Carranza had "the look of a hard thinker," he 
was not a "man of action," and West doubted his ability to 
lead the Constitutionalists to ultimate military victory.
It was unfortunate, West lamented: The men around the
First Chief were of a "much higher order" than those around 
Villa. If Carranza were somehow able to win the war, West 
believed, his aides "would probably be able to develop the 
ability necessary to carry on a Civil Administration."*'®2
Continuing his pessimistic assessment of the Consti- 
tutionalist movement. West expressed his conviction that 
"under its present leaders” the Veracruz regime could not 
establish peace in Mexico "because of the failure of its 
military leaders to obey the orders and decrees of the
102Ibid
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First Chief." Law and order had first to be established 
by force, but, he reiterated, Carranza, "personally, has 
not the qualifications for military leadership." And even 
if the Constitutionalists were to somehow achieve military 
victory, West warned, "the military leaders themselves 
would, undoubtedly, set General Carranza aside and bring 
about further differences."*0*
Wilson's agent had little regard for the majority 
of Carranza's aides despite their relative attractiveness 
when compared to Villa's lieutenants. Although the Con** 
stitutionalist hierarchy believed itself "actuated by 
patriotic motives," nothing could be further from the 
truth. The "main factor in the revolutionary game is 
pure selfishness," West declared, and the victims were 
the "common people." The Mexican masses "are paying the 
price and their interests are not being advanced by the 
revolution. The leaders thus far met are not capable of 
bringing about the reform indicated in the Plan of Guada­
lupe, even if they were actuated by patriotic motives." It 
seemed, he glumly concluded, that "the outlook for any 




In addition to West's sobering analysis of conditions 
below the border, there were still other factors which pre-• 
eluded a rapprochement between Washington and Veracruz. 
Constitutionalist anticlericalism was among the most im­
portant. Organized Roman Catholic opinion in the United
States had for some time denounced Carranza's aggressive
105campaign against the Mexican Church. Due largely to
Obregon's diligent persecution of clergymen in Mexico City, 
Roman Catholic protest in the United States reached a new 
high in the spring of 1915. Considerable indignant criti­
cism was aimed at the White House in the mistaken belief 
that Wilson favored Carranza and condoned the policies of 
the Veracruz regime. Roman Catholic prelates made it 
abundantly clear to the President that they were adamantly
opposed to recognition of, or support for, the Carranza 
107government. Although the staunchly protestant Wilson
*05I.ink, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 468. See, 
for example. The Reverend R. H. Tierney to Bryan, October
17, 1914, SDR 812.404/22. Tierney was chairman of the 
Committee of the Federation of Catholic Societies. See 
also Father Francis C. Kelley to Wilson, April 17, 1915,
SDR 812.404/85 and 98. Kelley was president of The 
Catholic Church Extension Society of the United States of 
America.
106Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 141.
*07Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 135.
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did indeed sympathize with Constitutionalist efforts to re­
duce the power and prestige of the Mexican Church, he, too, 
was distressed by the methods employed to that end.***8 
Thus humanitarian and domestic political considerations, par­
ticularly the desire to placate aroused American Catholics, 
prompted the President to protest vigorously and repeatedly 
the zealous anticlericalism of the Veracruz regime.
The most important factor, however, in Wilson's de­
cision to withhold recognition from Carranza in the spring
of 1915 was his "deepening conviction" that the First Chief
109was incapable of pacifying the republic. Moreover,
Villa still controlled vast areas of central and northern 
Mexico, including those states in which the bulk of American 
investment was concentrated. Recognition of the Constitu­
tionalist Government might well provoke a disgruntled and 
vengeful Villa to retaliate against American citizens and 
properties in those areas under his d o m i n a t i o n . S h o u l d  
such a situation develop, it would be next to impossible to 
restrain interventionist sentiment in the United States. 
Pressure for a full-scale invasion of northern Mexico would 
become intense and exceedingly difficult to resist.
10 8ciendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 151-152; Link, 
Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 468.
109Ibid., 469. 110Ibid.
Chapter 5
COUNTERREVOLUTION: THE ITURBIDE CANDIDACY
I.
In late April and early May, 1915, conditions in 
Mexico, already deplorable in the eyes of Administration 
officials and the American people alike, took a sharp turn 
for the worse. The plight of Mexico City was particularly 
alarming.1 Reoccupied by Conventionist forces following 
Obregon's withdrawal in March, the city was again subject 
to a Constitutionalist food blockade. Once more the specter 
of anarchy hung over the former capital. Consular reports 
from provincial cities described conditions no less dis­
couraging. By the end of May it appeared to most observers 
of the Mexican scene that the country was on the brink of 
chaos.2
The President's policy of watchful waiting, revived 
the previous summer and doggedly pursued through the trying
Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, May 7, 1915, SRD 
812.00/15087.
2Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 253-254; Cline, The 
United States and Mexico, 172; New York Times, May 31, 1915.
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months that followed, was open to serious question. While 
it had indeed precluded direct American involvement in the 
Mexican civil war, it had singularly failed to terminate that 
struggle and had done little to mitigate its horrors. Increas­
ingly distracted through the spring of 1915 by the intensifi­
cation of German submarine warfare, Wilson and Bryan were 
unable to respond effectively to the rapidly deteriorating 
situation below the border.3 The sinking of the Lusitania on 
May 7 and the crisis that followed further delayed a long over­
due reappraisal of the Administration's Mexican policy. There 
were those, however, who took advantage of the President's 
relative neglect of Mexican affairs to advance their own scheme 
for settlement of the Mexican question, a scheme sharply at 
odds with White House plans for pacification and regeneration 
of the republic.^
Prior to the spring of 1915, Administration officials, 
in their search for a Mexican strong man, had restricted them­
selves to consideration of revolutionaries alone. Certainly 
the President would countenance none but the heirs of Madero.
^Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 470-471.
4lbid., 471; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican 
Revolution, 228-229.
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By March of that year, however, official resolve had begun to 
waver. Disillusion with the Revolution and disgust with its 
feuding chieftains were widespread both in and out of 
Washington. Perhaps nowhere were those sentiments more 
evident than among the personnel of the State Department's 
Latin American Division, that branch of the Government most 
deeply concerned with Mexican affairs. Thus while Wilson and 
Bryan procrastinated, unwilling or unable to commit themselves 
irrevocably to one or the other of the several revolutionary 
factions, a group of influential persons both in and out of 
the Administration introduced still another candidate for 
recognition, the reactionary General Eduardo Iturbide.5
The origins of the Iturbide intrigue are obscure, 
apparently dating from December, 1914, but possibly consider­
ably earlier. Grandson of the ill-fated Mexican Emperor 
Agustin I (1821-1824) , Iturbide had spent his youth in exile 
as the ward of a wealthy American insurance executive J. A. 
Braniff of Oklahoma City. By the time of the Huerta coup, 
however, he had re-established himself in Mexico as a large 
hacendado with extensive holdings south of the capital.
Shortly after the assassination of Madero, Iturbide was
Sibid.j Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 471.
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commissioned a general in the Federal Army and appointed 
Governor of the Federal District.®
In January, 1914, Daniels recalls, Iturbide suddenly 
turned up in Washington; "whether by arrangement or not," 
the Secretary could not determine.7 The general arrived at 
a most opportune moment. Wilson's policy of watchful waiting 
was under determined attack, both at home and abroad, and a 
number of his own advisers were urging decisive action to 
expedite settlement of the Mexican question. At that point 
Franklin K. Lane suggested to the President that he extend 
the full support of the United States Government to a single 
Mexican leader, preferably Iturbide. The Secretary then 
proceeded vigorously to promote the General's candidacy, but 
to no avail.® Seemingly undismayed, Iturbide boldly returned 
to his post in Mexico City.
Following the flight of Huerta in July, 1914, and 
that of his successor, Carbajal, early in August, control of 
the capital fell to Iturbide. For some time prior to those 
developments. State Department Officials had been concerned
®Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 217- 
218. ' “
7Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 184.
8Ibid.
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over the fate of the city in the event of Huerta's defeat.
It was generally though erroneously believed that the 
Zapatistas were savages, and that to permit them to occupy 
Mexico City would be the height of folly. Teitelbaum suggests 
that Washington's fears were conveyed to Iturbide, prompting 
the General to repel an advance column of the Army of the 
South and, subsequently, to open negotiations with Obregon 
for surrender of the city to the Constitutionalists.9 What­
ever the case, the Department of State thereafter exhibited 
an unusual solicitude for Iturbide, going to great lengths 
to assure his personal safety.
The General had need of powerful friends. He was 
charged by the Zapatistas with ruthless exploitation of the 
peons on his estates and with responsibility for the deaths 
of a number of his workers.19 Moreover, his spirited defense 
of the capital against advancing agraristas had further 
marked him for vengeance. Nor despite that service could he 
look to the Constitutionalists for clemency. He had supported 
Huerta, and that alone sufficed to condemn him in the eyes of 
most revolutionaries regardless of faction. That the General
9Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 219
220.
l°Silliman to Bryan, December 14, 1914, SDR 812.00/
14010.
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was able to survive the Constitutionalist occupation suggests 
that he did indeed enjoy Washington's protection. Early in 
September, Paul Fuller, Wilson's personal agent in Mexico, 
sought to obtain Iturbide's release. Carranza himself denied 
the request. He would spare the General's life, but no more.^ 
Iturbide's fortunes plunged in late November when 
Conventionist forces occupied the capital. While the General 
hid in the home of an American resident, Bryan in Washington 
and State Department agents in Mexico City bargained for his 
life and sought to obtain for him a guarantee of safe conduct 
out of the country. On December 13, the Secretary instructed 
Silliman to "do everything in his power to save Iturbide."
It would be "most unfortunate," Bryan declared, if the General 
"were to be dealt with harshly,"12
When Zapata insisted upon trying Iturbide, Silliman 
and Leon Canova secretly approached President Gutierrez on 
the General's behalf. Without consulting the Zapatistas, 
Gutierrez acquiesced in Iturbide's escape by rail to the 
United States. Arrangements were made for Canova to accompany
llFuller to Bryan, September 18, 1914, SDH 812.00/
14236.
12Bryan to Silliman, December 13, 1914, SDR 812.00/
14009a.
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the General to the border in a sealed compartment.13 How­
ever, no sooner had the train departed the city, early on 
December 22, than the secret was out. The leak, due in 
large part to the garrulousness of Canova himself, very 
nearly proved the death of Iturbide.14 Again and again, the 
train was stopped and boarded by Conventionist police.
13Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 221. 
Canova, a Floridian, had little formal education. Prior to 
joining the staff of the Associated Press in 1898, he had 
been variously employed as a carpenter, printer, bank clerk, 
and publicity manager for the Plant railways and hotel chain. 
One of scores of reporters assigned to cover the Cuban cam­
paign, Canova stayed on in Havana after the war. In 1899, he 
became editor of the Havana Herald; from 1906 to 1911, he 
edited La Lucha. In 1909, Canova was appointed chief of the 
Cuban Government's Bureau of Information. Four years later, 
for reasons undisclosed, his service was suddenly terminated. 
When, at a later date, Canova was under consideration for 
head of a proposed Division of Cuban Affairs within the 
Department of State, Cuban officials objected strongly and 
declared him non grata. Unemployed following his dismissal 
from Cuban service, Canova drifted to New York. In June 1914, 
Republican, Roman Catholic, and of questionable integrity, 
Canova inexplicably attracted the favorable attention of the 
Secretary of State. Soon he was on his way to Mexico, com­
missioned as a special agent to assist Carothers. His 
advancement thereafter was phenomenal, due in large part to 
a facile pen and tongue and the naivete of his superiors.
U. S., Department of State, Register of the Department of 
State, 1918 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
l9l9), 9 3  (Herafter cited as Register, 1918); Who's Who in 
America,.1920-1921 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis & Company, 1920),
471; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 163, 179.
14lbid., 222.
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Canova's diplomatic status alone prevented entry into the 
compartment and the forcible removal of his charge. Finally, 
during the night of the 24thf far to the north of the capital, 
Iturbide leaped from the train and made his way to the home 
of a friend. Some days later, using a passport prepared for 
him by Silliman, he entered the United States.15 Almost 
immediately he began to plot his return.18
II.
One can only guess at what passed between Iturbide 
and his escort during their perilous journey. There is 
evidence that Canova was greatly impressed with the General; 
it goes without saying that Iturbide was grateful to Canova.17 
With his eye ever on the main chance, it was characteristic 
of the agent to attempt to capitalize on the relationship.18
iSibid., 223-226.
16Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 471.
17Teitelbaura, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 223- 
224, 270.
18The Iturbide rescue was widely publicized in the 
United States, and Canova made the most of it. Bryan was 
impressed. He shrugged off serious charges against his sub­
ordinate, including the accusation by Conventionist officials 
that Canova had accepted a large bribe from Iturbide. Ibid., 
227-228. In April, 1915, Bryan appointed the agent, by then
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Clearly, Iturbide was favored by Canova's superiors. Given 
the utter confusion in Mexico at the moment, it was not at 
all unreasonable to suppose that an impatient Wilson and 
Bryan might be persuaded to back the General in hopes of 
pacifying the republic once and for all. If Canova were to 
succeed in arranging Administration support for Iturbide, 
the General's debt to the agent would be great indeed. So, 
too, one suspects would be the reward. While acknowledging 
that the connection between the two "cannot be clearly 
defined," Link believes that by the early spring of 1915 it
a self-professed authority on the Mexican Revolution, 
Assistant Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs.
It was a grievous error. Canova was already distrusted by 
the Carrancistas for his earlier advocacy of Villa. The 
subsequent Iturbide rescue had deepened that distrust and 
antagonized other revolutionary factions as well. Then fol­
lowed the notorious association of Canova and the General in 
an avowedly counterrevolutionary scheme. By the time of his 
appointment to the Latin American Division, Canova was 
anathema to all revolutionary leaders. Unfortunately for 
future Mexican-American relations, Bryan's blunder was com­
pounded by his successor. In midsummer, 1915, Lansing 
appointed Canova head of the new Division of Mexican Affairs. 
Personally hostile to Wilson and an outspoken critic of the 
President's Mexican policy, Canova proved a serious liability 
to the resumption of amicable relations between the United 
States and Mexico. Ibid., 300-301. Canova remained at his 
post until December, 1918. Then, as in 1913, he suddenly 
resigned under mysterious circumstances. Ibid., 269. Recog­
nizing his late subordinate as a potential mischief-maker, 
Lansing attempted to keep track of him. When in November, 
1919, Canova embarked for South America on an emerald venture, 
the Secretary had him placed under surveillance. Ibid., 411.
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was "altogether likely that Canova was working behind the 
scenes to open official doors" for his c l i e n t . A n d  so it 
would seem.
Early in January, Canova requested and received 
permission from Bryan to postpone his return to Washington 
in order to confer once again with Iturbide. When Canova 
finally departed for the capital, the General followed. 
Throughout the remainder of the month they maintained close 
contact. On January 30, doubtless through Canova*s efforts, 
Iturbide conferred in secret with Bryan.20 Encouraged, he 
then sought out Chandler P. Anderson, Lansing's assistant in 
the Office of the Counselor, and attempted to procure his 
services. Although Anderson professed to have refused the 
retainer, he, like Canova, became a fervent partisan of the 
General within Administration c i r c l e s .21
On February 6, four days after Iturbide's conversation 
with Anderson, the General's supporters in San Antonio, Texas,
19Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 471.
20Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 228.
21Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, Division of Manu­
scripts, Library of Congress, February 2, 1915 (hereafter 
cited as Anderson Diary)* Anderson was a distinguished 
international lawyer who served on numerous government com­
missions to settle international disputes. He was special 
counsel for the Department of State under Elihu Root from
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sponsored a so-called "pacification conference." There, with 
the appointment of a counterrevolutionary junta, the Iturbide 
movement was formally initiated. Its adherents included 
exiled Mexican bishops, old Maderistas, former Huertista 
commanders, and most of the important Mexican political 
refugees then in the United States.22 in addition, the 
movement enjoyed the support of a number of prominent 
American Roman Catholic leaders. With organizational details 
behind him and the assurance of a favorable hearing in 
Washington, the General proceeded to New York City to estab­
lish his headquarters and to solicit the requisite financial 
support for his venture.
Apparently Iturbide had little difficulty in finding 
interested backers. His progress was checked, however, when 
his anonymous benefactors insisted that he obtain from the 
Administration recognition and approval of his movement.23 
Accordingly, on April 23, Manuel Calero, former Maderista
1905 to 1909 and, again, for Philander Knox from 1909 to 
1910. Who's Who in America, 1920-1921, 84. Anderson was a 
close friend of Robert Lansing, serving as special assistant 
to the Counselor from the fall of 1914 through October, 1915. 
According to Link, Anderson "had some influence upon the
thinking of the President and the formation of foreign 
policies." Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 48.
22ibid., 471 23ibid., 472.
236
ambassador to the United States, contacted Chandler Anderson 
on the General's behalf.^4 shortly thereafter, Anderson 
went to New York to confer directly with Iturbide. Upon his 
return to Washington, Anderson used his influence to arrange 
a meeting between the General and top officials of the 
Department of State. On May 19 Anderson and Iturbide met 
with Bryan and Lansing. The General claimed to have at his 
disposal in Mexico some 20,000 armed men. They would rally 
to his support when he recrossed the border. Moreover, he 
was confident that the great majority of the Mexican people, 
desperate for an end to the ruinous factional strife, would 
do likewise. Success, however, depended upon the acquisition 
of funds; and that, in turn, was contingent upon his obtaining 
the moral support of the Wilson Administration.25
Bryan, like so many others who met the personable 
Iturbide, had been very favorably impressed with the General 
in January. The Secretary was "cordial and jocose" when they 
met again.25 Nonetheless, he could not condone the General's
24Anderson Diary, April 23, 1915.
25Ibid., May 19, 1915.
^6Ibid. iturbide's personality was apparently his 
greatest asset. Even those who opposed his plans and de­
nounced him as a reactionary found him personally charming and 
extremely persuasive. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 255; 
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 185; O'Shaughnessy,
A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, 240.
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plans. Bryan was suspicious. He was well aware of the close 
tie between Iturbide and Mexican and American Roman Catholic 
leaders. If the General did succeed in terminating the 
civil war and imposing his authority upon the republic, his 
ecclesiastical allies would almost certainly demand repeal 
of the old Juarista religious laws.2? Staunch Protestant 
that he was, the Secretary could hardly be expected to rush 
to the defense of Rome.
Furthermore, Bryan had learned that "certain British 
and American investors" were interested in the Iturbide move­
ment and eager to finance it if Washington approved.28 The 
Secretary had not forgotten the Pierce-Cowdray struggle for 
control of the Mexican oil industry. Like the President, he 
remained firmly convinced that European and American firms 
continued to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic. 
And "evidence" to that effect abounded: the clandestine El
Paso negotiations between Villista agents and representatives 
of the Guggenheim and Rockefeller interests; Doheny's 
$100,000 "gift" to Carranza; the ambiguous relationship
2?Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 472.
28Ibid.; Paolo E. Coletta, William Jennings Bryan: 
Progressive Politician and Moral Statesman, 1909-1915 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 177 (Hereafter cited as 
Bryan).
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between the oilmen and Hanuel Pelaez; and perhaps most 
important, the recurring rumors of intense Anglo-American 
competition for control of the great Huasteca oilfields.29 
The alleged alliance of bishop and banker in a thinly dis­
guised counterrevolutionary cabal was more than Bryan could 
bear and was bound to arouse his ire. In no uncertain terms 
he informed the conferees that he opposed the General's scheme 
and that no member of the Wilson Administration would be 
permitted to do otherwise.30
Iturbide was not easily discouraged, however; nor 
were his friends in Washington. Trying a different tack, 
they turned to the General's original sponsor, Secretary of 
the Interior Franklin K. Lane. On or about May 25, Iturbide 
conversed at length with Lane. The Secretary, who thought
29Little more than a month before the Bryan-Iturbide 
meeting. Administration officials were again reminded of the 
fierce, behind-the-scenes struggle for control of Mexico's 
subsurface wealth. On April 12, shortly before spending an 
evening at the White Bouse discussing the Mexican question, 
Cleveland H. Dodge outlined to Joseph Tumulty the gist of his 
advice to the President: "My own opinion is that no group of
men can ever settle up the trouble in Mexico as long as the 
contending oil interests are putting up money for the con­
tending parties. If Lord Cowdray and the other interests who 
are opposing him in trying to secure the Tampico oil fields 
could be brought together, I think peace would be restored in 
Mexico very promptly." Dodge to Joseph P. Tumulty, April 12, 
1915, Wilson Papers, . VI, 95D.
30Anderson Diary, May 19, 1915.
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himself "something of an expert on Mexico," was "completely 
enchanted.1,31 Revealing considerably more to Lane than he 
had to Bryan, Iturbide outlined a plan to organize a new 
constitutional government under Manuel Bonilla, the sur­
viving member of the Madero Cabinet and the sole legitimate 
claimant to the presidential succession.32 No mention was 
made of money, however, and the delicate matter of the 
General's anonymous backers was wisely eschewed. Iturbide 
had learned his lesson well.
The critical factor in the plan presented to Lane was 
food. Already many of his countrymen were starving, Iturbide 
lamented, and supplies grew scarcer by the day. If, however, 
he could somehow obtain a large amount of food to be distri­
buted by his followers in Mexico, many thousands of his people 
would be saved and the masses would rush to support him. At 
that point, presumably, a disinterested Iturbide would pre­
side over the restoration of legitimate constitutional govern­
ment under the respected Manuel Bonilla.32 Good-hearted and 
gullible. Lane dashed off a glowing account of the meeting to 
Wilson. In it he praised Iturbide highly, endorsed his plan
3lLink, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 473
32Ibid., note 55. 33ibid.
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for food relief, and urged the President to give it serious 
consideration.34
Having thus gained the President's ear, Iturbide's 
sponsors renewed their efforts to win over the Secretary of 
State. Canova was aware that Wilson and Bryan alike were 
deeply moved by the suffering of the Mexican people; also 
that they had sought for some time to employ the American 
Bed Cross in mitigating that hardship. Playing upon his 
superiors' compassion, Canova drafted a memorandum proposing 
that the Administration work through the existing Iturbide 
organization to alleviate the misery of the Mexican masses. 
First, however, it would be necessary to embargo arms ship­
ments to all revolutionary factions, at the same time in­
forming their respective leaders that the United States 
meant to save the Mexican people from starvation. Having 
taken those precautions, the Government could turn at once 
to the business of saving lives. Iturbide's followers in 
Mexico, assisted by American consular agents and perhaps 
even by American soldiers, would be mobilized to distribute 
American food and Red Cross supplies to the needy.35
34Ibid., 473
35Ibid., 474; Anderson Diary, June 1, 1915.
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Canova discussed his plan with Anderson on May 28; 
Anderson, in turn, conveyed it to Bryan on June 1.36 The 
Secretary expressed great enthusiasm for a program of 
organized relief for starving Mexicans. However, he firmly 
refused to consider the employment of reactionary elements 
to that end.37 Almost certainly he was by then aware of the 
Iturbide conspiracy, although apparently oblivious to the 
degree of complicity among his own subordinates. Whatever 
the case, Canova*s subterfuge was pathetically transparent.
The Secretary was not prepared to encourage counterrevolution, 
however great his concern for the Mexican people. Bryan's 
rejection of the food relief scheme was a serious setback for 
the Iturbide movement.
III.
By the end of May, the President was again free to 
turn his attention briefly to Mexican affairs. After con­
ferring with Duval West, recently returned to Washington, he 
determined to "take a more personal hand" in terminating the 
struggle in Mexico.38 West, who visited the White House on
36Ibid., May 28, June 1, 1915.
37Ibid., June 1, 1915.
38Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 253.
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May 24, reiterated what he had earlier reported by dispatch:
the republic was in chaos, conditions were growing worse,
and not one of the revolutionary factions was capable of 
* 39restoring order. Several days later, Wilson received a 
letter from the correspondent David Lawrence, "who was on 
intimate terms with the Carrancista representatives in 
Washington and whose judgement Wilson deeply respected.1,40 
Lawrence confirmed the West report and warned that if the 
situation in Mexico continued to deteriorate, massive Ameri­
can intervention would become unavoidable. West had already 
suggested that the President use his influence to promote a 
reconciliation between the various factional leaders; now 
Lawrence made a similar proposal. The newsman urged Wilson 
to open negotiations with Carranza, Villa, and Zapata, as 
well as with the more important of their respective sub­
chiefs. Having done so, the President should insist that the
^ Mew York Times. May 26, 1915. A serious considera­
tion in the President's decision to work for a speedy settle­
ment of the Mexican conflict was the threat of European 
joint intervention at the end of the World War. England, 
France, and Germany as well were known to be contemplating 
such action. Coletta, Bryan, 176; Philip Holt Lowry, "The 
Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University, 1949), 145.
40Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 475.
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principals resolve their differences and organize a pro­
visional government worthy of recognition by the United 
States.4^
Wilson had heard enough. Concurring with West and 
Lawrence, he drafted a message embodying his advisors' 
proposals to be sent to the more important revolutionary 
civil and military leaders. On June lr the same day that 
Bryan received and rejected Canova's food relief plan, he 
presented the draft to the Cabinet. In the "heated dis­
cussion" which followed, Lane again raised the question of
A O
support for Iturbide. He spoke well of the General and 
urged official encouragement of the Iturbidista movement.
As before, however, his efforts on behalf of Iturbide came 
to naught. Again, Bryan proved his undoing. The Secretary 
of State denounced the General as a reactionary. The 
Government, he argued, should recognize none but a true 
revolutionary. His own choice, he concluded, was Carranza.4^
41Ibid.
42David P. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's 
Cabinet, 1913-1920 (2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday,
Page, 1926), I, 133.
4^Ibid. Bryan also considered extending recognition 
to General Felipe Angeles, Villa's artillery chief and one 
of his principal lieutenants. Bryan to Wilson, June 2, 1915,
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Meanwhile, throughout the meeting, Wilson merely 
listened. He refused to take sides. Choosing to proceed 
with his plan, he ordered Bryan to polish the draft and 
send identical copies to the several revolutionary leaders.^ 
The Administration's future course of action would depend 
upon their respective replies.
The Lansing Papers, 11, 533. Angeles, at least for a time, 
was another serious contender for Washington's support 
although there is some question as to whether or not he was 
actually pursuing the presidency for himself or for another 
party. A former Federal army officer, he had backed Madero 
during the Decina Tragica and barely escaped with his life. 
Ross, Francisco 1. Madero, 288ff. He had then joined 
Carranza's cabinet as Sub-secretary of Defense, but his 
aristocratic background and high level of personal integrity 
soon aroused the resentment of the First Chief's inner cir­
cle. Early in 1914, Angeles was attached to Villa's head­
quarters and placed in charge of the artillery of the 
Division of the North, in that capacity, he became Villa's 
most important advisor, putting at his chief's disposal 
"his immense knowledge of the art of war." It was indeed 
"a strange partnership," as Parkes observes, "Don Quixote 
serving as the squire of Sancho Panza." Parkes, A History 
of Mexico, 342, Angeles' ability was generally acknowledged 
by Mexican and American alike. John Lind considered him a 
candidate for the presidency and Villa recommended him to 
Duval West in March, 1915. Teitelbaum, Wilson and the 
Mexican Revolution, 266; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 210. 
Late in June, 1915, Angeles came to Washington to confer 
with Lansing and Wilson. The purpose of his mission has 
never been clearly ascertained. For a brief moment, however, 
in mid-July, the General was very much in the running for the 
provisional presidency of Mexico. Teitelbaum, Wilson and 
the Mexican Revolution, 260-276; Wilson to Lansing, July 8, 
1915, The Lansing Papers, II, 540-541. For a less favorable 
portrayal of Angeles see Womack, Zapata, 192.
4^Link, Wilsons Struggle for Neutrality, 476
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The President's message, dispatched on June 2, 
reviewed recent developments in Mexico and described the 
deplorable conditions existing therein. It disclaimed 
Washington's right to intervene in the internal affairs of 
the republic but declared that the American people and 
government could no longer tolerate the anarchy and human 
suffering which prevailed throughout the greater part of 
the country. Therefore, the statement continued, the Govern­
ment of the United States "must presently do what it has not 
hitherto done or felt at liberty to do: [It must] lend
its active moral support to some man or group of men" who 
could "rally the people of Mexico to their support," abide 
by the constitution, and establish a government which the 
nations of the world could "recognize and deal with." 
Moreover, that government must be one "with whom the program 
of the revolution will be a business and not merely a plat­
form." Virtually an ultimatum, the message closed with a 
call for factional reconcilation and a grim and unmistakable 
warning: If the several leaders failed to resolve their
differences and unite "within a very short time," the 
Government in Washington would be "constrained to decide 
what means should be employed by the United States in order
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to help Mexico save herself and serve her people.1'45 The 
policy of watching and waiting, pursued since the summer 
of the previous year, had suddenly come to an end.
In Mexico, the President's message elicited a mixed 
response. Zapata, concerned primarily with affairs in and 
around the State of Morelos, never replied.4^ The disin­
tegrating Conventionist coalition, no longer a serious 
contender for power, defiantly rejected the proposal.4^
Villa, on the other hand, proved most receptive. On June 1, 
he had again been defeated decisively by Obregon at Leon 
de las Aldamas. With the end near at hand, he had little 
to lose and possibly much to gain by going along with the 
President. Accordingly, he at once called upon his opponents 
to accept the American proposal. Cooperation with the 
United States, he contended, would forestall American mili­
tary intervention and preclude its probable concomitant, 
the resumption of power by former Porfiristas or other
4 Q
reactionary elements. Despite the sensibleness of Villa's
45New York Times, June 3, 1915.
4<*Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 257.
47Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 478.
48Carothers to Lansing, June 11, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 703-704.
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appeal, it failed to sway his rivals. Voluntary reconcilia­
tion was out of the question.
In Veracruz, Carranza equivocated, either failing 
to grasp or choosing to ignore the significance of Wilson's
words. On June 7, Silliman reported that Carranza appeared
49willing to cooperate with Washington. Four days later,
however, the First Chief issued a manifesto to the Mexican
nation proclaiming imminent military victory, urging his
opponents to submit, and pledging national elections and a
rapid return to constitutional government.Following
this confident declaration, Carrancista forces, under General
Pablo Gonzales, launed a determined drive on Mexico City.
Little opposition was expected from either the remnants of
the Conventionist army or from the scattered bands of
Zapata's agraristas still operating in the Valley of Mexico.
Wilson, already having learned of Obregon's triumph in the
51North, was duly impressed. Thus as much as he despised 
Carranza, the President was prepared to extend recognition
4^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 478.
50Venustiano Carranza, "Manifesto to the Nation,"
June 11, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 705-707.
■*^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 478-479.
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to the Veracruz regime if the First Chief would make a
c o
"genuine effort to unite all groups and p a r t i e s . A c ­
cordingly , Silliman was instructed on June 18 to inform 
Carranza of the President's decision. At the same time, 
however, he was to warn the First Chief that failure to 
"go the full length of conciliation and conference with 
all the principal factions" would negate any chance of 
recognition.^3
Carranza would have none of it: "The intimation of
recognition," Silliman reported, "did not in the least 
affect his impassive face."^ And with good reason. The 
Constitutionalists clearly dominated the struggle in Mexico. 
The end was indeed in sight. Moreover, their victory had 
been achieved in spite of the overt hostility of the Wilson 
Administration. For Washington to adopt any course other 
than the "recognition and support of the Constitutionalist 
cause," Carranza declared, "would be a regrettable injustice
52Wilson to Lansing, June 17, 1915, The Lansing 
Papers, XI, 535.
^Lansing to Silliman, June 18, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 715-716.
^Silliman to Lansing, June 22, 1915, Ibid., 718-
719.
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and a great calamity for two friendly nations." He asked 
only that the United States remain neutral and allow his 
armies to complete the pacification of the republic. His­
tory, he reminded the President, offered no example of 
civil war "terminating by the union of the contending
EC
parties." One or the other must ultimately triumph.
Wilson reacted to Carranza's rebuff with "disgust
and a n g e r . "^6 More concerned than ever over the war in
Europe, he was extremely anxious to halt the strife in
Mexico and to disengage as much as possible from Mexican 
57affairs. However, the proposal of June 2, which Wilson 
believed to be eminently reasonable, had backfired. Car­
ranza's refusal to work for factional reconciliation placed 
the President in an awkward and embarrassing position: the
^^Ibid. Carranza justified his position thusly: 
"Villa represents the reactionary tendency which, without 
having achieved the ideals of the Revolution reserves for 
some future time the reformation of the laws. On the other 
hand the Constitutionalists represent the revolutionary 
tendency which proposes to obtain the reforms needed by 
the people prior to the establishment of constitutional 
order. Any combination of the two," he warned, "will pro­
duce only a temporary peace which could only result in new 
conflict." Ibid., 719. It was a sound and irrefutable 
argument.
56Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 481.
57Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 264; Link, Woodrow
Wilson and the Progressive Era, 133.
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United States now stood committed to an imposed settlement 
of the Mexican civil war. Further procrastination was out 
of the question. Wilson had to act.
IV.
Some three months earlier, when conditions in the 
former Mexican capital had very nearly prompted the dis­
patch of an American relief expedition to the city, Lansing 
had drafted and submitted to Wilson a plan for multi­
lateral Pan-American intervention.^® The President had 
expressed interest in the proposal at the time, but had 
dismissed it as too drastic. On June 16 Canova, who com­
prehended the situation in Mexico far better than his 
superiors, resurrected the Lansing plan.^ It is clear 
that he anticipated the President's embarrassment. It 
is equally clear that he had by no means abandoned hope 
for his client. Almost certainly Pan-American interven­
tion would be opposed by all revolutionary factions, par­
ticularly by the Constitutionalists. The sole possible 
exception was Villa; but Villa was very likely finished.
58Lansing to Bryan, March 8 , 1915, The Lansing 
Papers, II, 529-531.
5^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 481.
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Thus, in the event of armed intervention, the odds were 
quite good that the allies would be forced to turn ulti­
mately to one or the other of the exiled conservative 
leaders.®0 With Bryan gone and with proven friends in 
both the Cabinet and the Department of state, Iturbide 
would stand an excellent chance indeed of securing Pan- 
American support.
Reassured by Canova of the feasibility and per­
haps also of the timeliness of the plan, Lansing resub­
mitted it to the President shortly before the arrival of 
Carranza's negative reply to the proposal of June 2. Again 
Wilson expressed interest in the plan. A It appealed to 
him primarily because it would permit the United States to 
escape the onus of unilateral intervention, at the same
GOQuirk contends that Wilson's threat of June 2 
"to look elsewhere" in the event that the rival revolu­
tionary factions failed to reconcile their differences "is 
a clear indication that Wilson was at least toying with the 
idea of going outside the ranks of the revolution to find 
a compromise candidate, a man such as Iturbide or Manuel 
Vazquez Tagle," Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 256. De­
spite the rejection of Iturbide in the cabinet meeting of 
June 1 the General was still highly regarded both within 
the cabinet and within the Administration generally. New 
York Times, June 6 , 1915.
®*Wilson to Lansing, June 22, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 536.
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time bestowing a sort of quasi-legitimacy upon such an 
operation.62 All things considered, it was perhaps the 
least objectionable of the options at the President's 
disposal in the event that factional reconciliation should 
prove unobtainable. Thus on June 22, when Carranza's 
unequivocal rejection came in over the wire from Veracruz, 
a disappointed and exasperated Wilson turned at once to the 
Lansing plan.62 Despite indisputable evidence of the First 
Chief's preeminence, the President could not stomach the 
triumph of the man he had come to detest so utterly. For 
some time thereafter, Wilson and State Department officials
62Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 481.
62Ibid. Armed intervention by United States forces, 
albeit under Pan-American auspices, was by no means out of 
the question. Some time earlier, the War Department had been 
instructed to prepare an estimate of the cost of maintaining 
a 500,000-man army in Mexico for one year. The completed 
report and accompanying editorial comment appeared in the 
June edition of The Army and Navy Register. According to 
the editors: "It begins to look as if there might be an
emergency requiring the military occupation of Mexican ter­
ritory for the benefit of that republic and its citizens."
The cost of such a venture was estimated at $800,000,000 for 
the first year of operations. It would be a difficult task. 
At the time, there were some 100,000 Mexicans under arms, 
all of whom were veterans of the civil war and thus con­
sidered to be capable soldiers. The War Department, in turn, 
had only 30,000 men of the Regular Army in the continental 
United States and 100,000 men in the organized militia. It 
would be necessary, then, to raise an additional 300,000 
volunteers. As no funds for such a project existed, a spe­
cial appropriation would have to be obtained. New York 
Times, June 20, 1915.
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alike were committed to a Mexican settlement which eliminated 
Carranza once and for all.®4
Lansing took the initiative. On July 5, he wrote 
to the President, then vacationing in New Hampshire, out­
lining a course of action by which the Administration might 
eventually realize its objectives in Mexico.65 It was not 
at all what Iturbide's partisans had hoped for, and doubt­
less caused some consternation among them. The Government 
of the United States, Lansing began, should do nothing to 
encourage the various conservative and reactionary exile 
groups then angling for Washington's support. The revolu­
tionary element alone, he believed, was capable of re­
establishing genuine constitutional government in the re­
public. It was "manifest," however, that because of "per­
sonal animosities, jealousies, and ambitions of the factional 
leaders nothing [could] be accomplished through them to 
restore peace and stable government." The United States, 
then, must insist upon the retirement of Carranza, Villa, 
and other principal revolutionary chieftains. Furthermore,
64Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 278-279.
65Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 538-539.
2 5 4
it must withhold recognition and withdraw moral support 
from any government headed or controlled by any one of 
these leaders. Having taken those preliminary steps, the 
Government should then invite subchiefs of the several 
factions to "meet in conference . . .  for the purpose of 
organizing a coalition provisional government," one truly 
representative of the majority of the revolutionary element. 
Once established, the new regime would be accorded the 
recognition of the United States and its Pan-American part­
ners. American authorities would prevent arms and ammuni­
tion from reaching dissidents in Mexico, at the same time 
"employing such other means as it may properly employ to 
insure the stability and permanency" of the provisional 
government until constitutional government was restored.64* 
However disappointing the Secretary's elimination 
of the exiles may have been to Canova and those of like 
mind, Iturbide's chances for intervention were by no means 
diminished. Lansing's proposals were grounded not upon 
fact but upon wishful thinking. The Secretary had failed 
to take into account some hard realities. First and fore­
most, none of the principal factional leaders were disposed
66Ibid
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to step down without a fight. Second, an attempt by the 
United States alone or by a coalition of powers to forcibly 
retire any one of those leaders would almost certainly 
provoke a patriotic uprising against the invader and an 
all-out war with an aroused and temporarily united Mexican 
nation. Mexican leadership in the wake of a Pan-American 
victory would have to come from without. Again, one or the 
other of the several exile leaders would be the logical 
choice. Oddly, despite repeated reminders, most Adminis­
tration officials somehow remained oblivious to the inten­
sity of Mexican patriotism. They still failed to comprehend 
the determination of all revolutionary leaders to resist 
foreign intervention, particularly North American inter­
vention, in what those leaders held to be an exclusively 
Mexican contest. Lansing and Wilson were no exceptions.
The President himself for some time had been con­
sidering the adoption of a plan similar to that outlined 
by the Secretary of State. Accordingly, he endorsed the 
Lansing plan.67 He then instructed the Secretary to sound 
out diplomatic representatives of several Latin American 
nations and bring them together to consider joint
67Wilson to Lansing, July 8, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 539-541.
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Pan-American intervention in Mexico. At the same time, he
suggested that Lansing employ Paul Fuller to serve as
liaison between the Administration and the Washington
representatives of the various Mexican factions.®® Fuller
arrived in the capital soon after he was called, quickly
establishing lines of communication between the Department
of State and the several Mexican agents. Some weeks went
by, however, before the Secretary was able to arrange the
69proposed Pan-American conference on Mexico. During the 
interim, lobbying on behalf of the various candidates for
70Pan-American recognition and support reached a fever pitch. 
The stakes were high. The recipient of Washington's bene­
diction appeared to have a very good chance of ultimately 
controlling the Mexican republic.
6 8Ibid.
6®Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 483.
^°Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 279-281; Teitelbaum, 





Neither Wilson nor Lansing in the summer of 1915 was 
able to devote his undivided attention to a settlement of 
the perplexing Mexican question. Absent from the capital 
from June to September, the President was largely pre­
occupied with the war in Europe. The struggle in Mexico 
paled by comparison and its relative importance to Wilson as 
well as to most other members of his administration steadily 
diminished.1 Because of the European war Lansing, too, had 
less time for Mexican matters. Moreover, having only re­
cently assumed the direction of his department, the new 
Secretary faced the task of familiarizing himself with a 
multitude of pressing problems, only one of which was the
■^ -Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 264j Daniel M. Smith, 
"Robert Lansing, "An Uncertain Tradition: American Secre­
taries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed7, Norman A.
Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 105-106 (hereafter
cited as "Lansing, "An Uncertain Tradition?.
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civil strife in Mexico. Due to these distractions, high- 
level formulation and direction of Mexican policy tended to 
drift throughout the latter part of June and July. During 
this critical period in Mexican-American relations, initi­
ative in the making and execution of Mexican policy reverted 
to lower-echelon officials in the Department of State.2 
Particularly influential in that endeavor was the staff of 
the Division of Latin American Affairs and, after July 28, 
that of the new Division of Mexican Affairs.
Head of the Latin American desk in the summer of 1915 
was Boaz W. Long, one of Bryan's "deserving Democrats."2 His 
Assistant Chief, from April through July of the same year, 
was the ubiquitous Leon J. Canova. During the latter month, 
the new Division of Mexican Affairs was established, and 
Canova was moved up to head it. Prom the beginning, however, 
the two divisions worked in concert, and correspondence of 
mutual interest passed freely between them.
When Bryan assumed office early in 1913, he had dis­
missed not only the First and Second Assistant Secretaries of 
State, but the head of the Latin American Affairs Division
2Cline, The United States and Mexico, 171-172.
2Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 498.
as well. Long, a businessman and proprietor of a large San 
Francisco commission house, was appointed Chief of Division 
in May, 1913. Link concedes that Long was "not without con­
siderable intelligence," but notes that the appointee's 
"reputation as an expert on Latin America rested solely 
upon the fact . . . that his company had a branch office in 
Mexico City." Long had no prior diplomatic experience and 
he "knew no more about Caribbean affairs than his superiors 
did." Nor, since Bryan had also dismissed the professional 
Assistant Chief of Division, could he turn to anyone for 
advice. "In [Latin American] policy," Link concludes, " . . .  
it was a case of the blind leading the blind."4 Nonetheless, 
Long had taken over the Division shortly after the Huerta 
coup, a major turning point in Mexican-American relations. 
Virtually every important official communiccition coming out 
of Mexico since that time had crossed his desk. No one in
4Ibid., 498-499. Long was appointed Minister to El 
Salvador in July, 1914, but apparently remained in Washington 
on special detail to the Department of State until February, 
1916. From the latter date through December, 1917, he served 
in San Salvador. Returning to Washington early in 1918, he 
was again assigned to the Department of State. In June, 1919, 
Long was appointed Minister to Cuba, serving in that capacity 
until his retirement in February, 1922. Register, 1918, 135; 
Who's Who in America, 1920-1921, 1751.
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the Wilson Administration was in a better position to obtain 
a comprehensive grasp of Mexican affairs, and as time went 
by. Long did indeed become something of an expert.
Canova, of course, was fluent in Spanish and had 
considerable knowledge of Cuban politics. But Mexico was not 
Cuba. Conclusions drawn by Canova from his Cuban experience 
seldom applied with regard to M e x i c o . 5 still, Canova had 
been on the scene during that critical stage of the Revolu­
tion when the anti-Huerta coalition had disintegrated. 
Moreover, he had been assigned, albeit briefly, to Carranza's 
Saltillo headquarters, to Villa's stronghold in Chihuahua, 
and to the Convention at Aguascalientes and Mexico City. He 
had met and conversed with Villa, Carranza, and other impor­
tant revolutionary chieftains. In addition, by the time of 
his appointment to Long's staff, he was in frequent contact
5 in early July, 1915, the Division of Latin American 
Affairs prepared a detailed memorandum on the political situ­
ation in Mexico. One of the more important recommendations 
called for the negotiation of a Mexican-American treaty 
similar to the Cuban-American treaty of 1901 embodying the 
notorious Platt Amendment. Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915,
SDR 812.00/20688. Almost certainly that proposal came from 
"the old Cuban hand." Such a scheme was patently inappli­
cable to the Mexican situation. The subsequent failure to 
conclude a much milder pact with the republic made it 
abundantly clear.
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with Iturbide and familiar with the activities of several 
other prominent conservative and counterrevolutionary 
leaders. Equally important, Canova had worked closely with 
the Administration's principal representatives in Mexico, 
Silliman and Carothers, and had made the acquaintance of 
a number of lesser American agents, consular and otherwise. 
He was thus able to assess with some accuracy the credibi­
lity of the Department's primary sources of raw intelligence 
on Mexico. In short, if the Administration had a Mexican 
expert, it was Canova.
Both Long and his assistant, however, had serious 
shortcomings. Neither was particularly knowledgeable with 
regard to Porfirian Mexico or the origins of the Madero 
Revolution. Nor did they have first-hand knowledge of the 
preceding Administration's response to the latter develop­
ment. A critical continuity with the recent past in Mexico 
was lacking. Furthermore, Canova had spent barely a half- 
year in Mexico, and Long scarcely more time than that. 
Possessed of such limited perspective, their view of the 
revolutionary movement was bound to be a distorted one. 
Finally, both men were conservative, if not reactionary, 
politically and strongly biased against the several Mexican
262
revolutionary factions.6 Compounding the problem was Canova's 
relationship with Iturbide. The agent brought to his post a 
serious and unresolved conflict of interest.
Thus while the purely factual data passed on by Long 
and Canova to their superiors was doubtless accurate enough, 
the accompanying analysis or interpretation of that data was 
on occasion highly subjective. Consequently, the ultimate 
authors and executors of Washington's Mexican policy not in­
frequently arrived at important decisions based wholly or 
in part upon false assumptions. Eventually the President 
perceived the situation. Thereafter, he was skeptical of
^Long's position is clearly defined in the following 
memorandums: Long to Lansing, July 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
20688 and Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, U. S., Department 
of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to 
Political Relations Between the United States and Mexico, 
1910-1929 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M-314)
Pile No. 711.12/130 (hereafter cited as SDR 711.12). Ap­
parently Long had opposed the Revolution from its inception: 
"Long was an admirer of Porfirio Diaz,detested Madero, and 
regarded the Mexican people as political 'infants, " 1 Grieb, 
Huerta, 72. Canova's intrigue with the counterrevolutionary 
iturbide leaves no doubt as to his position. Nor did his 
hostility to the Revolution diminish with time. In April, 
1926, as a private citizen, he addressed President Calvin 
Coolidge on the subject of Mexico, sharply criticizing 
Wilson's Mexican policy and urging the conquest and lengthy 
occupation of the republic by American forces. Canova to 
Coolidge, April 9, 1926, SDR 812.00/27752.
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advice on Mexican matters emanating from the Divisions.? in 
time he seems to have ignored it altogether.
By April, 1915, and possibly somewhat earlier, there 
had emerged within the Department of State a small but in­
fluential group of lower-echelon officials mutually suspi­
cious of and antagonistic to the goals, tactics, and princi­
pal leaders of the Mexican revolutionary movement.8 Long, 
Canova, and Anderson formed the nucleus of this antirevolu­
tionary clique. Others of importance who shared their views 
were: Jordan H. Stabler, appointed Assistant Chief of the
Latin American Division in September, 1913, and Chief of 
Division following Long's resignation in October, 1916;9 
Roger C. Tanis, originally a staff assistant in the Latin 
American Division but promoted to Assistant Chief of the
?Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution. 277; 
Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist; A Look at His Major 
Foreign Policies (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1957), 24
(hereafter cited as Wilson the Diplomatist). See also 
Challener, "Bryan," An Uncertain Tradition, 85.
8Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality. 483-484;
Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution. 268, passim; 
Clendenen, The United States and Villa, 206.
®Prior to joining Long's division. Stabler had served 
as secretary of legation in Quito, 1909-1911, and in Guatamala 
City, 1911-1912. Assignments in Stockholm and London pre­
ceded assignment as Long's assistant in 1913. Stabler headed 
the Latin American Division from October, 1916 to August, 1919. 
Register, 1918, 165.
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Mexican Division in July, 1915;1° C. M. Hitch, appointed a 
staff assistant in Long's division in July, 1913;H  and Ira 
H. Patchin, also a staff assistant, assigned to the Office 
of the Counselor as well as to the Mexican and Latin American 
Divisions.
In addition to the aforementioned, who were con­
cerned primarily or exclusively with Mexican affairs, there 
were other officials who frequently cooperated closely with 
the Divisions and appear to have shared to a greater or 
lesser degree the sentiments of the Antirevolutionists:
Herbert C. Hengstler, Chief of the Consular Bureau, and 
Wilbur J. Carr, Director of the Consular Services, who were 
often called upon to advise the Divisions, along with the 
Department Solicitor, Cone Johnson; Assistant Solicitor 
Joseph R. Baker; and staff assistant Leland Harrison of the
^ Register, 1924, 195.
•^Register, 1916, 100.
*2Patchin, formerly an insurance agent and an employee 
of the New York City Administration, was hired in October, 
1915, to assist in important drafting. U. S., Department of 
State, Register of the Department of State, 1916 (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 121 (hereafter 
cited as Register, 1916).
265
Office of the Counselor.Together these officials 
constituted a formidable and effective obstacle to the 
Wilson Administration's acceptance and formal recognition 
of a bona fide revolutionary regime in Mexico.
II.
The Antirevolutionists were far less tolerant of the 
chronic unrest in Mexico than were Wilson and Bryan, especi­
ally when American lives and property were in jeopardy.
They were inclined to deal with it firmly. Although the 
majority of them were Bryan appointees, they shared none of 
their benefactor's pacifism and little of his patience. The 
collapse of the anti-Huerta coalition in the fall of 1914 
served to exacerbate their differences with the Secretary. 
The mounting threat to foreign lives and property in Mexico, 
along with the inexcusable callousness of Constitutionalist 
leaders in encouraging the abuse of foreigners, the clergy.
13Johnson and Baker were regularly consulted by the 
personnel of the Latin American and Mexican Divisions on 
matters involving questions of international law. Their 
initials and marginal comments appear on many important in­
coming messages from State Department representatives in 
Mexico as well as on much inter-departmental correspondence 
pertaining to conditions in the republic. Their views, while 
not so vehemently expressed as those of Canova and Long, were 
in general concurrance with those of the division chiefs. 
Biographical data on Baker, Carr, Harrison, Hengstler, and 
Johnson are in Ibid., 71, 79, 97, 100, and 105.
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and the inhabitants of Mexico City, aroused alarm and indig­
nation among them. By the time of Canova's appointment to 
the Latin American Division, their disillusion with the 
Revolution and its principal leaders was all but complete. 
Thereafter, animosity toward almost all revolutionary 
leaders and particularly toward Carranza and his lieutenants 
was much in evidence 4
Although the Antirevolutionists frequently adopted 
positions coinciding with those of the various domestic 
interventionist groups, there is little evidence that collec­
tively they were inspired by the same motives. Personal 
economic interest, outrage over the persecution of the 
Mexican church, and simple jingoism do not adequately explain 
their opposition to the revolutionary movement. Rather, they 
appear to have been moved by disgust and disappointment with 
the Revolution and by apprehension over its future course.
They were convinced that the contending revolutionary factions, 
if left to their own devices, would continue the struggle 
indefinitely.^ That prospect, in turn, was intolerable to
^4Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688; 
Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47 1/2; Long to
Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
15Ibid
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State Department officials. They had a surpassing pro­
fessional interest in the rapid restoration of peace and 
order in Mexico, a primary objective of Wilsonian foreign 
policy since the Huerta usurpation.
The West reports, which revealed the corruption and 
ineptitude of revolutionary leaders, had a profound effect 
upon the staff of the Latin American Division. West's final 
evaluation of the situation in Mexico confirmed what they 
had already suspected for some time.16 By the early summer 
of 1915, those persons within the Department of State most 
influential in shaping Washington's Mexican policy had lost 
all confidence in the ability of the revolutionary chieftains 
either to terminate the fighting or to organize a viable 
reform government.1  ^ For that reason, if for no other, they 
opposed- recognition of any of the several revolutionary re­
gimes. Even after Carranza had subdued his principal rivals
16West to Bryan, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/20721;
New York Times, May 26, 1915.
17Link, Wilsons Struggle for Neutrality, 480.
Writing to Lansing on June 19, Carothers declared: "I
don't see how existing conditions can last much longer with­
out a collapse. If any agreement can be brought about, . . . 
it will have to be soon, or the country will be confronted 
with an anarchy that only military intervention could stop." 
Quoted in Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 262. See also Long 
to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
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and succeeded in establishing a modicum of authority over 
much of the republic, their hostility toward him did not 
abate. As far as the personnel of the Latin American and 
Mexican Divisions were concerned, the Revolution was a farce 
and its leaders ruthless and cynical opportunists.^8 Both 
the movement and its adherents stood thoroughly discredited.
For the balance of the Wilson Administration, despite 
a near complete turnover in the personnel of the two divi­
sions, strong antirevolutionist sentiment persisted within 
the Department of S t a t e . T h i s  phenomenon was due in 
large part to the generally negative attitude toward Carranza 
and the Constitutionalist regime manifested by the Depart­
ment's correspondents in Mexico: the Embassy staff, consular
officials, secret agents, and a multitude of random 
informers - mostly Americans or Europeans long resident in 
the republic. Their hostility toward the revolutionary 
government was provoked, in turn, by first-hand, day-to-day 
contact with its officials and programs. The unenviable 
record of the Carranza regime speaks for itself. There was 
little about it that immediately benefited anyone, Mexican
18Ibid.f Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR
711.12/47 1/2.
^Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/
229 1/2.
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or non-Mexican, other than members of the Constitutionalist 
hierarchy.
For the most part conservative in outlook. State 
Department officials in Washington and Mexico alike were 
dismayed by Constitutionalist disregard for property rights. 
Given the contemporary context of Dollar Diplomacy and ag­
gressive American economic expansion abroad, the sudden and 
largely unforeseen assault upon foreign investment in Mexico 
understandably alarmed and outraged the legalistic and 
business-oriented individuals who staffed both the Department 
of State and its adjuncts in M e x i c o . F r o m  their point of
20Charles B. Parker, who replaced Cardoso de Oliveira 
as Washington's representative in Mexico City in August, 1915, 
reported some months later that the most serious problem con­
fronting the Carranza regime was graft: "The whole government
he observed, 'rests upon a rotten foundation and, therefore, 
can endure no longer than the force of arms which placed it 
in power.'" Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, the Political 
Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army. 1910-1940 (Albu­
querque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 40 (here­
after cited as Mexican Militarism). Nor did conditions 
improve with the passage of time: "Military rulers and mili­
tary bureaucrats continued to enrich themselves at public 
expense. In many communities," consular agents reported 
early in 1919, "the officers were looked on as 'the worst 
kind of robbers instead of protectors of the peace.1" Ibid.
21With few exceptions, officers of the Department of 
State both in Washington and in Mexico had pursued careers in 
business or the law prior to entering government service. The 
incidence of attorneys among them was markedly high. See 
Register, 1916; Register, 1918; and U. S. Department of State, 
Register of the Department of State (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1922),passim (hereafter cited as 
Register, 1922).
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view, an extremely dangerous precedent was in the making, 
one that jeopardized all American overseas investment.22
To be sure, the Veracruz regime did pave the way 
for future reform by restoring a semblance of order over 
large areas of the republic. However, its contemporary 
critics, lacking unusual foresight, can hardly be faulted 
for failing to appreciate that accomplishment. In fact, 
one of the most effective criticisms of the revolutionary 
government was its alleged unwillingness or inability to 
complete the task of pacification and the restoration of 
law and order in provinces distant from the capital.23 It 
was a damaging indictment and one which served to strengthen 
the conviction within the Department of State that the 
Carranza regime was ephemeral and thus undeserving of 
Washington*s recognition and support.24
Further causes of disenchantment with the revolution­
ary movement were widespread and generally acknowledged 
grafting by Carrancista officials and the excessive harshness
22Long to Lansing, July 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
23Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130; 
Polk to Wilson, March 1, 1919, SDR 711.12/187.
2*Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130; 
Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/229 1/2.
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of Constitutionalist commanders in the field.25 These 
practices were repugnant to State Department representatives 
in Mexico, most of whom had at least some first-hand 
knowledge of them. Accordingly, reports from those repre­
sentatives to their superiors in Washington were frequently 
highly critical of the Carrancistas and, to a somewhat 
lesser degree, of Villistas and other regional revolutionary 
factions as well.26 Without doubt, those reports strongly 
influenced the personnel of the Latin American and Mexican 
Divisions and through them the Secretary of State.
Lansing's attitude toward the revolutionary movement, 
particularly as it was manifested by the Carrancista regime.
2Womack, Zapata, 193; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 
259. "Out of the revolutionary experience," Lieuwen explains, 
"had grown up a new respect for force, and revolutionary 
chieftains were quick to appreciate the Machiavellian dictum 
that a commander should not mind being thought cruel, for the 
reputation for cruelty served the dual purpose of instilling 
fear in one's enemies and terror, mingled with respect, 
amongst one's troops." Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 38. 
Carranza's principal general, Alvaro Obregon, regularly 
executed captured officers; so, too, did Villa. "Such battle­
field practices by military men soon extended to civilian 
opponents” as well. Ibid.
26See West to Bryan, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/
20721; Miller to Lansing, June 16, 1915, SDR 812.6363/189; 
Garrett to Lansing, December 3, 1916, SDR 812.00/20035; Cobb 
to Lansing, April 24, 1917, SDR 812.00/20874; Hanna to 
Lansing, December 26, 1918, SDR 812.00/22440; Chamberlain 
to Lansing, January 31, 1919, SDR 812.00/22509.
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was of extreme importance. Had he been favorably disposed 
toward it, the Antirevolutionist clique within the Depart­
ment of State would not long have survived his promotion to 
Secretary. The dispersal of that group, in turn, would have 
seriously inhibited the activities of Mexican counter­
revolutionaries residing in the United States and certainly 
discouraged domestic interventionists. The Secretary, how­
ever# was no friend of the R e v o l u t i o n . 2 ?
27Despite his suspicion of and antagonism towards 
certain aspects of the revolutionary movement, Lansing 
differed significantly from the Antirevolutionists in that 
he early recognized and accepted, albeit grudgingly, the 
President's irrevocable committment to the Mexican Revolution. 
Accordingly, on July 5, 1915, while the Antirevolutionists 
were determinedly if deviously pursuing counterrevolution, 
the Secretary acknowledged to Wilson that "the old aristo­
cratic party must not be recognized in a settlement of the 
present situation (in Mexico) and . . . the restoration of 
responsible government must come through the revolutionary 
element now composed of hostile factions. The problem is, 
therefore, the harmonizing of factions representing the 
Revolution." Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing 
Papers, II, 538. Implicit in that statement was the under­
standing that Carranza and his principal aides must go. 
Lansing's antipathy toward the Carrancistas was in no way 
diminished, and in his distrust of and dislike for the 
Carranza regime he differed little if at all from the Anti­
revolutionists. The salient point is that from the fall of 
1915 through the spring of 1920, the Revolution was mani­
fested through the actions of the Carranza Government, the 
one revolutionary faction which the Secretary could not 
abide. Consequently, Lansing found it ever more difficult 
to support the President's position on Mexico. By December, 
1919, he could no longer do so. Shortly thereafter he 
resigned.
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Lansing was appointed Counselor to the Department 
of State in April, 1914.2® in that capacity, as Bryan's 
principal assistant, he handled "the bulk of the technical 
work," questions involving international law and u s a g e .29 
He worked closely with the chiefs of the respective area
2 8 As a young New York attorney, Lansing married the 
daughter of John W. Foster, Secretary of State in the 
Harrison Administration from 1892 to 1893. Through the 
influence of his father-in-law, Lansing turned to the prac­
tice of international law. In 1892, he served as associate 
counsel for the United States in the arbitration of the 
pelagic seal dispute with Canada. From that year to 1914, 
he "represented the United States in more international 
arbitrations than any other American lawyer." During the 
same period, he represented private interests in a number of 
international cases and served as counsel for the Chinese 
and Mexican legations in Washington. Julius W. Pratt,
"Robert Lansing, Secretary of State," American Secretaries 
of State, ed. S. F. Bemis (New York: Pageant Book Company, 
1958), X, 47-48.
29ibid. Lansing's promotion to Secretary was due in 
large part to the fact that he had made himself indispensible. 
Bryan's purge of the professional staff in 1913 and the sub­
sequent resignation of the veteran John Bassett Moore had 
left the State Department without a competent advisor on 
international law. Lansing - "thoroughly trained in inter­
national law and practice, keenly intelligent, and completely 
loyal to the President" - was ideally suited for the job. 
Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 26. Yet Lansing's ten­
ure as Secretary was an unhappy one, indeed. His political 
philosophy was "distinctively conservative." Upon his 
appointment as secretary, Beers notes, "his conservative 
record caused some to suspect that he did not sympathize with 
the 'New Freedom' programs of his chief." Burton F. Beers, 
Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-
Japanese Rivalry (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962), 13 
(hereafter cited as Vain Endeavor). His political views and
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desks and relied upon them for regional intelligence and 
specific policy recommendations. Like Long and the staff 
of the Latin American Division, he too, in time, became 
disgusted with the struggle in Mexico, questioning both 
the viability of the revolutionary movement and the inte­
grity of its leaders.30
As a prominent international jurist, Lansing had 
little patience with the shoddy legal briefs introduced by 
Carrancista officials in their attempt to rationalize the 
dispossession of foreign investors.3^ Perhaps more clearly
the fact that he had replaced Bryan aroused the distrust and 
antagonism of his progressive colleagues, "if all Democrats 
were of his type,” Josephus Daniels remarked, "Taft instead 
of Wilson would be President." Daniels, The Wilson Era:
Years of Peace, 436. Nor were Lansing's relations with the 
President much better: "He was too independent in his think­
ing to follow Wilson slavishly and too reserved in his manner 
to fight for what he believed. As a result the President 
consistently underestimated his talents. . . . ” Richard W. 
Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 244. Time has vindi­
cated Lansing. Smith observes that he "was one of the 
ablest and most experienced American Secretaries of State 
of this century. . . . "  It is now "generally agreed" that 
his role in the years 1914 to 1920 "was one of great impor­
tance." Smith, "Lansing,” An Uncertain Tradition, 101.
30Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing Papers, 
II, 538-539.
3^Lansing to Wilson, June 27, 1918, SDR 711.12/104; 
Lansing to Fletcher, June 29, 1918, SDR 711.12/109a; New York 
Times, May 28, 1918 and August 16, 1918.
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than anyone in the Wilson Administration, he grasped the 
full significance of surrendering to the Constitutionalist 
Government in the matter of expropriation. The precedent 
established by the successful confiscation of foreign- 
owned properties in Mexico could conceivably initiate a 
chain reaction disastrous to foreign investment everywhere. 
For American investors alone, billions of dollars worth of 
property was at stake. Personally, however, Lansing seems 
to have had little sympathy for the plight of Guggenheims, 
Rockefellers, Dohenys, and the like.32 His persistent
32In 1917 and early 1918 when the Carranza regime 
began to extend its control over the operations of foreign
oil companies, American oilmen sought intervention. Lansing 
"took a generally cold view” of their appeal. Only when 
actual nationalization of the industry was threatened did he 
contemplate occupation of the Huasteca. Cline, The United 
States and Mexico, 186-187. Like Wilson, Lansing believed 
that there were "interested persons" who desired American 
intervention in Mexico as a guarantee for jeopardized in­
vestments. Link, Wilsoni Confusions and Crises, 219-220. 
Unlike the President, however, Lansing was not entirely in­
different to the hardships of American investors in Mexico.
He readily accepted legitimate complaints and urged, often 
in vain, action on behalf of the aggrieved parties. In 1922, 
some two years after his resignation, Lansing drafted a memo­
randum in which he expressed his concern over the failure of 
the State Department to stand behind American investors 
abroad: It was time, he declared, that the Department
"looked at business from the point of view of the American 
businessman, seeking practical ways to help and volunteering 
such help whenever possible, rather than spending its time in 
formulating reasons why it should refuse assistance of any 
sort, and making those who appeal to the State Department feel 
that their chief difficulty is in persuading their own Govern­
ment that they are honest and acting in good faith." Quoted 
in Beers, Vain Endeavor, 152n.
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efforts to forestall expropriation of American and European 
investments in Mexico was hardly the work of a Wall Street 
lackey.33 Rather, it appears that Lansing was obsessed with 
the preservation of something which to him was of far 
greater significance than oilfields, copper mines, or the 
momentary prestige of the United States - the principle of 
the sanctity of private property. The Secretary well under­
stood the relationship between expropriation of foreign 
investments and retaliatory foreign intervention. A basic 
tenet of his general policy was the assurance of hemispheric
33Some of Lansing's progressive contemporaries were 
not so sure. It was Daniels' opinion that the Secretary was 
"not in sympathy with Wilson's policies but rather held to 
the old diplomacy that encouraged exploitation of small 
countries by American industrial captains.1' Lansing "shared 
the Root-Poster Big Stick and Dollar Diplomacy policy." 
Daniels believed that Lansing's "mind ran along in harmony 
with that of J. Pierpont Morgan and others in Big Business." 
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 438. It is an 
unduly harsh judgment. Daniels seems to have misunderstood 
Lansing's motives completely. See Lansing to Wilson, 
November 24, 1915, and Lansing, "Present Nature and Extent 
of the Monroe Doctrine," memorandum dated November 24, 1915, 
both in The Lansing Papers, II, 466-470; Smith, "Lansing,"
An Uncertain Tradition, 102, 113. However, in the same 
assessment, Daniels did make an astute observation. Lansing, 
he acknowledged was not at the beck and call of Big Business, 
"He was above that. He just naturally believed that the 
strong ought to rule. He was a disciple of Root." Daniels, 
The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 438. And so he was. Smith, 
"Lansing," An uncertain Tradition, 102.
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security through the total preclusion of European inter­
vention.34
During the five-and-a-half years of the Wilson 
Administration subsequent to Bryan's resignation, the Anti­
revolutionists drafted and submitted for presidential perusal 
a succession of plans for the pacification and reconstruction 
of Mexico.3^ Several of those proposals called for direct
34In June, 1914, Lansing had expressed his concern 
over the necessity to restate the Monroe Doctrine in terms 
"more in accord with modern ideals and conditions." Lansing 
to Bryan, June 11, 1914, The Lansing Papers. II, 459. Accord­
ingly, in late 1915, he submitted to the President a memo­
randum dealing with the Monroe Doctrine and the "possible 
extension of the principle in a way to constitute a policy 
which may be termed a 'Caribbean Policy'. . . . "  It was, 
in effect, a vigorous reassertion of the Roosevelt Corollary. 
Recently, Lansing stated, "the financing of revolutions and 
corruption of governments of the smaller republics by 
European capitalists have frequently thrown the control of 
these governments into the hands of a European power." The 
situation constituted a "menace to the national safety" of 
the United States. In addition, "possession of the Panama 
Canal and its defenses" gave to the Caribbean states "a new 
importance from the standpoint of our national safety." It 
was "vital to the interests of the United States that European 
political domination should in no way be extended over these 
regions. Considerations of national security required that 
the United States "should intervene and aid in the establish­
ment and maintenance" of stable and honest governments "if 
no other way seems possible to attain that end." Lansing to 
Wilson, November 24, 1915, Ibid., 466-467. Wilson was favor­
ably impressed with Lansing's argument and "approved the 
memorandum as a guide to future national action." Smith, 
"Lansing,” An Uncertain Tradition, 113.
35Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/
47 1/2; Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130;
Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/229 1/2.
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American military intervention and virtually all of them 
involved a greater or lesser degree of coercion. The 
President, chastened by the Veracruz episode and haunted by 
fears that "the interests" might somehow capitalize on a 
new intervention to seize large portions of northern Mexico, 
repeatedly rejected those plans.3® Despite the gravest pro­
vocation, he steadfastly refused to impose a settlement of 
the Mexican question. His reluctance to use force in resol­
ving Mexican-American differences understandably increased 
as the United States drifted ever closer to participation in 
the World War. Once engaged in that contest, Wilson dis­
missed altogether the option of armed intervention in 
Mexico.
As the war in Europe drew to a close, a fresh outburst 
of anti-foreign incidents below the border again drew the 
attention of the American people to the interminable unrest
3®Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crises, 219-221; Baker, 
Woodrow Wilson, VI, 72-74.
■^Wilson was so preoccupied with the war in Europe, 
Cline contends, "that almost never did he personally notice 
what was going on in the neighboring southern republic. His 
general attitudes toward Mexico, good for the duration of 
European hostilities, were known by his subordinates: no use
of force under any circumstances or provocation. Threats, 
yes; force, no." Cline, The United States and Mexico, 185.
in Mexico. State Department officials urged anew the 
adoption of a hard line in dealing with the Carranza govern­
ment. The radical Constitution of 1917, the strong pro- 
German bias so recently displayed by a number of prominent 
Constitutionalists, and the alleged Bolshevist leanings of 
high-ranking Carrancista officials all served to intensify 
Antirevolutionist antagonism toward the Carranza r e g i m e . 38 
As before, however, the President forbade intervention.
Almost completely engrossed in the Peace Conference and 
thereafter in the bitter and taxing ratification struggle, 
he had neither the time nor the disposition to pursue a new 
quarrel with Carranza. Again he withstood strong inter­
ventionist pressure from both within and without the 
Administration. The upshot was the resignation early in 1920 
of both Lansing and the United States Ambassador to Mexico, 
Henry Prather Fletcher.33 Thereafter, it was abundantly 
clear that for the remainder of the Wilson Administration 
American armed intervention in Mexico was out of the question.
38Ibid., 186; J. Lloyd Meecham, A Survey of United 
States-Latin American Relations (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965], 361; Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 
711.12/229 1/2.
39Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of War, 
1917-1923 (Chapel Hill: University of1 North Carolina Press, 
1946), 529 (hereafter cited as The Wilson Era; Years of War).
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III.
Unfortunately for Mexican-American relations, dis­
sension within the Wilson Administration over official 
response to the disturbances in Mexico was an open secret.
From the summer of 1914 through the aforementioned resigna­
tions, the President's determination to adhere to a policy 
of minimal interference in Mexican affairs drew criticism 
from the Department of State and the Cabinet alike. In 
addition to Lansing and his subordinates, both Lane4** and 
Garrison4 -^ were hostile to the Constitutionalist movement 
and repeatedly urged forcible suppression of the civil strife 
in Mexico. As long as discord over Mexican policy persisted 
within the Administration, there remained an outside chance 
that the President might one day succumb to interventionist 
pressure and reverse his position. That possibility, in turn, 
served to sustain the hopes of exiled Mexican reactionaries 
and various domestic interventionists as well. Consequently, 
those groups persevered in their counterrevolutionary acti­
vities both north and south of the border, thereby prolonging
40Ibid., 522; Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace,
184; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VI, 72n; Lane -bo Lansing, November 
28, 1919, SDR 711.12/229 3/4.
4^Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 184, 445;
Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 104. 123.
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the disorder in Mexico and further exacerbating the already 
strained relations between Washington and the Carranza 
regime.42
Within the United States, Mexican reactionaries for 
a time enjoyed considerable success in obtaining the support 
of sympathetic Administration officials. Through such men 
as Canova, Anderson, and Lane, they sought to reach the 
President and win him to their cause. Simultaneously, 
private American investors in Mexico and the representatives 
of large American corporations with holdings in the republic 
tirelessly pressed Administration officials to take a firmer 
stand on behalf of property rights.42 They, too, sought to 
influence the President: through formal appeals to the
Department of State, through personal entreaties to congress­
men and highly-placed members of the Administration, and 
finally, through an informed and aroused public opinion. 
Meanwhile, an obtuse and stubborn Carranza proved an
42Cline, The United States and Mexico, 190.
42Ibid., 185-186; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 355; 
Bernstein, Mexican Mining Industry, 106-114. See, for example, 
Doheny to Lansing, February 17, 1918, SDR 812.6363/342; 
Williams to Lansing, July 11, 1917, SDR 812.6363/291; Associ­
ation of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico to Senator Knute 
Nelson, December 8 , 1919, SDR 812.6363/599; Smith to Bryan, 
April 15, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 899-900; The Mining 
and Smelter Operators* Association to Bryan, August 6 , 1915, 
Ibid., 933.
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invaluable assist, seemingly determined to play into the 
hands of those who wished to destroy him. For five years, 
from the reoccupation of Mexico City early in 1915 through 
the collapse of his regime in the spring of 1920, hardly a 
month passed during which the First Chief failed to provide 
his enemies abroad with additional excuses for intervention.
Had all Administration officials, particularly those 
of the Department of State, concurred with the President’s 
position on Mexico or had they turned a deaf ear to the 
pleas of interventionists and counterrevolutionaries, the 
supplicants would soon have resigned themselves to the tri­
umph of the Revolution and ceased agitating for its overturn. 
On the other hand, had the President surrendered to inter­
ventionist pressure, the United States might well have suc­
ceeded in forcing a negotiated settlement of the Mexican 
civil war. In keeping with earlier proposals, American 
authorities might then have conducted free elections, with­
drawn American forces, and thrown the moral and financial 
support of the United States Government behind whichever 
party emerged victorious at the polls, in either case, there 
was at least a fair chance that the struggle in Mexico might 
have been shortened appreciably.
But neither condition prevailed. Instead, because 
of widely varying assessments of the revolutionary movement
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within Government circles, a consistent response to develop- 
ments in Mexico failed to evolve until the last year of the 
Wilson Administration. For some seven years, the United 
States policy with regard to Mexico was characterized by 
vacillation, indecision, and uncertainty.44 with few excep­
tions, the Administration failed to take the initiative in 
attempting to resolve the many Mexican-American differences 
arising from revolutionary unrest. Instead of acting, it 
reacted. The options as well as the audacity to exercise 
them belonged not to the government in Washington, but to 
Carranza and Villa and bold regional caudillos like Manuel 
Pelaez.
44Link notes that in areas that Wilson considered 
"vitally important" (Mexico), he "took absolute personal 
control. He wrote most of the important notes on his own 
typewriter, bypassed the Secretary of State by using his own 
private agents, ignored his secretaries of state by con­
ducting important negotiations behind their backs, and 
acted like a divine-right monarch in the general conduct of 
affairs." Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 23-24. The 
President's personal diplomacy frequently produced pro­
found embarrassment, i.e. the Tampico and Veracruz incidents. 
"Time and again," Link concludes, "Wilson used the same 
methods and almost always with the same results: the for­
mation of faulty policy through sheer ignorance, men working 
at cross-purposes, confusion in the State Department and in 
the embassies and legations, and the like." Ibid., 24. See 
also Challener, "Bryan," An Uncertain Tradition, 92; John 
Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 85-89.
284
Fundamental to the Wilson Administration's failure 
to cope satisfactorily with recurring Mexican crises was a 
lack of consensus with regard to the nature and meaning of 
the Revolution. Wilson, Bryan, Daniels, and those of like 
mind, conscious of the desperate need for sweeping social 
and economic reform in Mexico but far removed from the scene, 
sympathized strongly with the announced goals of the move­
ment, Essentially idealistic progressives, they were 
inclined to rationalize or overlook revolutionary excesses. 
Lansing, Lane, Garrison, and State Department officials both 
in Washington and in Mexico were certainly no less conscious 
of the need for reform. However, they, and particularly the 
personnel of the Latin American and Mexican Divisions and 
the Department's representatives in the republic, were far 
more familiar with the true state of affairs in Mexico. 
Whatever illusions they once may have had as to the nobility 
of the revolutionary movement and the selflessness of its 
leaders were clearly dispelled by the summer of 1915. They 
did not like the trend of events in Mexico. And, as time
^5Cronon, Josephus Daniels, 10-11; Coletta, Bryan, 
160; Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with
President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 4, 71.
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went by, their opposition to that trend hardened percep­
tibly.46
IV.
On July 8 , while Lansing awaited Wilson's response 
to his and Canova's proposal for Pan-American intervention 
in Mexico, the Secretary received from Long a lengthy, de­
tailed memorandum on the contemporary Mexican political 
situation. The greater part of the Long Memorandum was 
devoted to a discussion of the various Mexican factions, 
revolutionary and reactionary alike, and to a consideration 
of the several options open to the Wilson Administration 
in pursuing its objectives of peace and order in Mexico. 
Included was a blunt and highly critical analysis of the 
underlying dynamics of the Mexican Revolution.4^ To what 
extent the Long Memorandum influenced the Secretary and 
through him the future course of the Wilson Administration's 
Mexican policy is difficult to determine. But influence him 
it did. Throughout the balance of Lansing's tenure of office 
his response to new Mexican-American differences arising from
46Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47
1/2; Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/ 229 1/2; 
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 188-191.
4?Long to Lansing, July 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688
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unrest in the republic reflected a constant reaffirmation 
of the views espoused by Long in the July Memorandum.4 8
Long opened by recalling that the United States had 
extended moral support to Madero in 1911, thereby enabling 
the "original" Constitutionalists to oust Diaz and assume 
control of the republic themselves. Regrettably, the 
Maderista "party" had been unable to establish peace and 
order. In view of that disappointing episode. Long queried, 
what assurance did Washington have that any other faction 
of the Constitutionalist "party" could "do any better?" On 
the other hand, the Cientificos, while including some of the 
"best men of Mexico," did not occupy any territory within
48In regard to Latin American affairs generally, Long 
and Lansing differed little. On June 11, 1914, Lansing 
drafted a memorandum calling for a "restatement" of the 
Monroe Doctrine. Lansing to Bryan, June 11, 1914, The Lansing 
Papers, II, 460-465. The following day, Long submitted to 
Bryan a memorandum on political conditions in northern Latin 
America. Like the Lansing memorandum it expressed concern 
over the relationship between the fiscal irresponsibility 
of Latin American republics and European intervention. Long 
recommended American assumption of fiscal control in 
"revolution-ridden" Latin American states. Link, Wilson: 
Struggle for Neutrality, 521-522. Long's memorandum on 
Mexico was essentially a restatement of the views set forth 
in regard to northern Latin America. Those views were 
embodied in Lansing's "Present Nature and Extent of the 
Monroe Doctrine," drafted and submitted to the President on 
November 24, 1915. Lansing to Wilson, November 24, 1915,
The Lansing Papers, II, 466-470.
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the r e p u b l i c . 49 To extend support to one or the other of 
the old Porfiristas would "merely mean a new revolution with 
no guarantee of what would e m e r g e . "5°
Given the aforementioned circumstances, Long sug­
gested, the United States should extend support to whichever 
group offered "the most guarantees of being able to establish 
needed reforms and give reasonable effect thereto." The 
previous year( there had existed a "reasonable hope" that 
Carranza and Villa would establish the opinions they professed. 
At the moment, however, those who were "intimately informed"
49in the 1890's, there emerged within the Diaz 
Administration a small but influential elite composed of 
attorneys and intellectuals who rejected the revolutionary 
liberalism of the Juarez Reform and attempted to apply to the 
governing of their country the principles of French Positivism. 
The Cientificos were "always a clique," never a political 
party with a popular following. Some became bankers, indus­
trialists, and corporation lawyers; others became cabinet mem­
bers or state governors. Eventually they dominated Diaz and 
became in effect the real rulers of Mexico. Almost wholly 
creole, they regarded the Mexicans as a "backward and bar­
barous race who needed to be coerced along the path to civili­
zation . . . ." They placed greatest stress upon material 
development and vigorously solicited foreign capital to that 
end. "As their wealth and power increased, they abandoned 
their early idealism and aspired toward complete political 
and economic control of the country." Under the Cientificos 
the government of Mexico did indeed become more honest and 
efficient. But the price was high. By 1910, the wealth of 
the republic was largely in the hands of foreign investors.
As for the Cientificos; "If they preached honesty, it was 
partly because they were clever enough to make fortunes with­
out violating the law." Parkes, A History of Mexico,299-301.
5(>Long to Lansing, July 8,1915, SDR 812.00/20688. All 
information in the next eight pages comes from this citation 
unless otherwise noted.
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and who judged all Constitutionalist factions "by deeds and 
not by words" were confident that neither leader could 
restore order in Mexico.
An improvement of the Mexican situation might be 
hastened. Long believed, if the President would remind 
Congress of the "long-suffering endurance and patience" of 
the American people and request of that body authorization 
to use the armed forces to establish "peace and order" below 
the border. If that permission were granted, the contending 
Mexican factions would realize "at last that we mean to 
intervene, if that be necessary." They would be forced to 
"get together and jointly, on their own account, do . . . 
what they have to date refused to do— that is to carry out 
their promises to establish a good government in Mexico."
If, indeed, the United States did owe a "duty" to 
Mexico or to American and other foreign investors in Mexico, 
then it must work for the establishment of an "acceptable 
government" in the republic. If no such "duty" existed, it 
should remain neutral "and leave Mexico to her fate." How­
ever, Long reminded, "we gave the world powers the impression 
that the United States would care for the Mexican situation 
without their aid . . . ." In the light of recent developments 
in Mexico, it seemed to him that the United States did have
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an obligation to act decisively in that country. American 
financial control within the Mexican Government would sat­
isfy both foreign powers and their respective nationals 
resident in Mexico, he believed. Moreover, it would also 
assure "just treatment” of American citizens and "remove 
prizes from the reach of future revolutionists.11
The Mexicans, he continued, had shown themselves 
"unable to solve their own problems.” Because of that fact 
there were many statesmen "of all nationalties," who knew 
Mexico well, who had reached the conclusion that "the United 
States alone" could give to that country a "new and regener­
ated government." They believed, he declared, that armed 
intervention was the only solution.
There was an alternative, however. In accord with 
the Presidents declaration of June 2, 1915, Washington 
might extend to a single leader or faction "the support . . . 
necessary to bring success. . . . "  But timing was critical: 
"We do not wish to delay in taking effective action until 
some other world power should feel called upon to solve 
Mexico's problems." Moreover, "careful regard" must be shown 
for "amply safeguarding the interests of those . . . nations 
that leave this matter in our hands."
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Long was more than a little apprehensive lest the 
President decide to recognize Villa or Carranza. Apparently 
the Latin American Division had been called upon to con­
sider the feasibility of simultaneously recognizing Villa's 
Chihuahua regime in the North and Carranza's Veracruz regime 
in the South. Aside from an obvious distaste for both revo­
lutionary leaders. Long feared that execution of such a plan 
would lead inevitably to new fighting. Felix Diaz or some 
other prominent reactionary with influence among the sub­
stantial remnants of the old Federal army would almost 
certainly launch a new revolution. Owing to the "very strong 
sentiment in Mexico against a division of the country," he 
warned, separate recognition of a faction in the North and 
another in the South "would produce great and active 
hostility." Still worse, such would probably be interpreted 
by most Mexicans "as indicative of our intention to endeavor 
to take over the northern portion." It might well "destroy 
all belief in the good intentions of the United States."
Turning to the men around Villa and Carranza as 
possible candidates for Washington's support, Long summarily 
dismissed the lot of them. None was capable of "giving good 
administration" to the republic. Most were holdovers from 
the inept Madero Administration and were, in Long's opinion,
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largely to blame for the disaster which had befallen it.
Madero had failed principally because he had "entrusted the 
details of the administration . . .  to those incompetent, 
inexperienced and avaricious revolutionists who fought or 
connived to put him in power." If, Long predicted, either 
the Carrancista or the Villista wing of the old Madero coa­
lition were ever to assume full control of the republic,
"their necessities" would compel a repetition of Madero's 
distribution of patronage. Unfortunately, there was no reason 
to believe that as lieutenents of Carranza or Villa the old 
Maderistas "would do better" than before. Quite the contrary, 
he implied.
It appeared to Long that the pitfalls accompanying 
the recognition of Villa or Carranza might be avoided for the 
most part by installing a coalition government composed of 
several factions. But Long would go considerably further 
than either Lansing or the President. The "right men" must 
be installed. And that, in turn, would require the "active 
insistence of the United States." As a bare minimum. Long 
contended, Washington must be empowered to approve prospec­
tive cabinet officers.
Reviewing recent developments in Mexico, the division 
chief turned to Wilson's declaration of June 2. The message
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was clear to him, he observed, yet "some very important 
Mexicans" were in doubt as to its meaning. Prior to dis­
patch of the President's note most Mexican leaders, re­
gardless of faction, "believed implicitly that the United 
States would not intervene." They had "predicated their 
whole course on that belief and campaigned accordingly."
Villa had responded favorably to the President's 
proposal, but Carranza had bluntly rejected it. Meanwhile, 
General Huerta, who had entered the United States some weeks 
earlier, had moved at once to crystalize an intrigue that had 
"been in formation for mo n t h s . " 5 1  The General evidently 
interpreted Wilson's declaration to mean that someone must 
set Mexico aright. Clearly he intended to be the one to do 
so. Long understood that Huerta had succeeded in subverting 
the Carrancista garrison at Nuevo Laredo and the critically 
important Villista garrison at Ciudad Juarez as well. Both 
were to rally to his standard when he crossed the border. 
Still another important counterrevolutionary chieftain known 
to be plotting a comeback was Felix Diaz.52 Like Huerta,
S^Grieb, Huerta, 180-186; Meyer, Orozco, 120-124.
52During the half-decade after the splintering of the 
Constitutionalist movement, Diaz was a major contender for 
the leadership of the counterrevolutionary movement. He was
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Diaz had stepped up his activities following the President's 
June 2 statement. At the moment, he was known to be pur­
chasing large quantities of arms and ammunition. Backing him 
were a number of "military men [even] more powerful than 
himself."
especially favored by American interventionist groups and was 
held in high esteem by the Antirevolutionists. Nephew of the 
dictator, Diaz served successively as Chief of Staff of the 
Federal Array, diplomatic representative to Chile, and General 
Inspector of Police. According to his principal agent in the 
United States, former New York Congressman William S. Bennett, 
Diaz was neither close to his uncle nor in sympathy with his 
policies. Bennett to Long, July 13, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
In 1910, Diaz resigned from the Administration and was 
elected Governor of the State of Oaxaca. Shortly thereafter, 
he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. In 1912, as the 
Madero Administration grew increasingly unpopular, Diaz re­
signed from both Congress and the army. Later in the year, 
he seized Veracruz and proclaimed against Madero. Captured 
and sentenced to death, he was transferred to the peniten­
tiary in Mexico City. There in February, 1913, in accordance 
with a prearranged plan, he was freed by opponents of Madero 
and joined Bernardo Reyes and Huerta in overthrowing the 
President. Bennett insisted that Diaz was not involved in 
Madero1s murder and that he had refused to form a government 
in the absence of a popular mandate. Ibid. Consequently, 
Huerta emerged as interim chief-of-state. In the subsequent 
elections, Bennett alleged, Diaz drew the largest number of 
votes but lost to Huerta due to the latter's control of the 
election machinery. Ibid. Huerta turned immediately on his 
erstwhile allies, sending Diaz on a "mission" to Japan and 
similarly exiling or jailing his followers. Despite harass­
ment by Huerta and later by Carranza, the Oaxaca-based 
Felicista movement spread to adjoining states. By 1915, Diaz 
professed to control some 3000 Felicista political clubs 
throughout the republic. He was, he contended, the only 
Mexican leader backed by a "true political party." Moreover, 
the election of 1913, stolen by Huerta, had confirmed him as 
the sole legitimate contender for the presidency. Ibid. In 
March, 1916, Diaz returned to southern Mexico and proclaimed 
against Carranza.
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In order to Impress upon Lansing the dearth of 
responsible revolutionary leaders with whom Washington 
might cooperate. Long drew a highly unflattering comparison 
between the Constitutionalists and the displaced Porfirian 
Cientificos. Under the dictatorship a mere handful of the 
more powerful Cientificos had raked off the lion's share 
of the graft. Only the crumbs were left for the "lesser 
lights." Disappointed and embittered, many of the frustrated 
spoils-seekers had eventually made common cause with the 
idealistic Madero. But they had never intended to keep 
Madero's promises to the Mexican people: "Their platform was
designed to get in on, not to travel on."
Much the same element, "thrown out by Huerta," 
presently constituted the backbone of the revolutionary 
movement. "While proclaiming their own ambitions to be clear 
and worthy,1' Long charged, "they have applied the term 
'Cientifico' to every Mexican of means who does not support 
them." To that group the term was synonymous with "political 
grafter." In truth, the Constitutionalists were motivated 
to a far greater extent than their predecessors by the pro­
spects of political graft. And their acts had proven it.
The aims of both groups were essentially the same: personal
gain and power. The principal difference between them lay
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in the fact that the Cientificos were not guilty of the 
“outrages against property justly chargeable to the 
Constitutionalists." The former had done much for the mate­
rial welfare of Mexico; the latter had accomplished "nothing 
but ruin." Although the leaders of both groups had enriched 
themselves, the Cientificos had done so while building up 
the country; the Constitutionalists, while destroying it.
It was obvious, Long declared, that the significance of the 
term "Cientifico" depended entirely upon "the one who uses 
it."
Returning to a consideration of the contemporary 
situation in Mexico, Long revealed a deep pessimism: "If
it is desired to entrust the destiny of Mexico to a man of 
purity and force, who can surround himself with a cabinet 
and administrative officers of his own kind, we are doomed 
to disappointment." Fulfillment of that hope could "never 
be realized." However, if a solution to the Mexican problem 
was to be left solely to Mexicans, "we must take them as we 
find them." To Long it meant supporting "the least objec­
tionable and the most experienced in the science of 
government."
At the time, Long's division had under consideration 
several possible conservative coalitions which appeared to
296
meet the aforementioned requirements. The first, tenta­
tively headed by Madero's Minister of Justice, Manuel 
Vazquez Tagle, was the only one with a trace of legitimacy 
about i t . V a z q u e z  Tagle, residing quietly in Mexico City, 
allegedly had refused to resign when Huerta usurped the 
presidency in 1913. Long, however, personally preferred 
another of the former Maderistas, Angel Garcia Pena.^ 
"Stubborn but virile," Garcia Pena, was capable of commanding 
the respect and support of former Federal army officers, a 
factor which Long apparently believed to be indispensible 
for success in restoring order in Mexico. A decision by the 
Administration to back either of these men would mean a 
return of the Madero wing of the original revolutionary co­
alition and an extension of the Madero Cabinet.
A second group under consideration by Long's division 
was that headed by Canova's favorite, General Eduardo Iturbide. 
Some of the "leading men" among the old Porfirian Cientificos, 
Long contended, "would rally to sustain" the General. So,
53Manuel Vazquez Tagle was among the more conser­
vative of Madero's ministers. Ross, Madero, 221.
54Angel Garcia Pena was Minister of War in the Madero 
Cabinet. He had remained loyal to his chief during the 
Ciudadela, Ibid.
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too, would most of the great hacendados. Support of that 
faction, he acknowledged, would mean returning control of 
the republic to "those who in the past were known to have 
clearly defined Cientifico tendencies," Nonetheless,
Iturbide and his adherents had recently expressed "a 
willingness to enforce Constitutionalist ideas,"
The third possible conservative coalition consisted 
of a potentially powerful alliance of former Federal officers 
under Felix Diaz. An important factor in considering the 
Felicista movement was the participation of General Manuel 
Mondragon, the old dictator's chief of artillery and one of 
the principal conspirators in the Huerta coup. Long noted 
that Mondragon had done "many constructive and creditable 
things' during the Porfirian period and that he commanded a 
considerable following among the remnants of the disbanded 
Federal a r m y . 55 The Diaz-Mondragon group claimed the support
S^Long's praise notwithstanding, there was a dark side 
to the career of Mondragon. The General had initiated the 
coup against Madero, leading the Tacubaya garrison into the 
capital, freeing Felix Diaz, and placing his force at the 
latter*s disposal according to a prearranged scheme. Grieb, 
Huerta, 12. There is evidence that Mondragon personally 
ordered the executions of Madero and his brother Gustavo* 
Ibid., 29. Long acknowledged that Mondragon had "grafted 
shamefully" while serving as Huerta's Minister of War and 
Marine and believed that to be the reason for the General's
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of the Catholic Party and might well obtain it if it appeared 
that they stood a fair chance of triumphing over the revolu­
tionaries. Long believed that this faction could quickly 
revive and reorganize the old Federal army and "draw to their 
standard . . . many excellent men of the younger generation." 
The Felicistas would not begin a new revolution, however, 
unless assured of American support. Such assurances would 
entail "ignoring the preparations, to be made on American 
soil, necessary to put the group managers back into Mexico 
with sufficient force to overcome those now in the 
field . . . .”
Long was convinced that a movement embodying all of 
the aforementioned conservative elements would "offer strong 
possibilities of success . . . ." Although the United States 
was indeed committed at the moment to the establishment of 
a revolutionary government in Mexico, it had been clearly 
demonstrated that the several revolutionary factions "could
break with Huerta and subsequent exile to France. Long to 
Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688. Actually, Mondragon, 
a protege of Diaz, was sent to France on a "mission" as part 
of Huerta's move to isolate Diaz politically. Grieb, Huerta,
57. Long's apparent ignorance of this episode some two years 
after its occurrence raises some question as to the accuracy 
of the information received by his division from its sources 
in the republic. In June, 1915, Mondragon arrived in New 
York, apparently with the intention of joining Diaz or 
Huerta in a counterrevolutionary venture. Ibid., 188.
not be united by any Mexican influence or pressure.” Still, 
it was obvious that "no man or group of men" would be able 
to ignore those factions and restore order in Mexico without 
strong support from the United States.
Returning anew to the revolutionaries, Long again 
rejected the Carrancistas. "Little could be expected" of 
the First Chief or his aides, he contended. On the other 
hand, an alliance between Villa and Vazquez Tagle or, perhaps 
between Villa and Francisco Vasquez Gomez, one-time Maderista 
vice presidential candidate, would "make a good initial start 
in solving the Mexican problem. The principal drawback lay 
in the fact that such an alliance would soon be "subverted" 
by various opposition groups unless it was "strongly backed" 
by Washington.
Zt was rumored, for instance, that Diaz, Mondragon, 
General Aureliano Blanquet, and a "great number of Federal 
army men" who were well known in Europe, might seek to 
"enlist the support of the victor in the present European 
war."^6 That group would "gladly support" any of twenty or
56General Aureliano Blanquet, like Mondragon, was one 
of the principal conspirators in the overthrow of Madero. 
Blanquet personally arrested Madero and was a party to the 
decision to execute him. Ibid., 19, 29. Loyal to Huerta, he 
succeeded Mondragon as Minister of War in Huerta's provi­
sional cabinet. Blanquet was instrumental in assuring the
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thirty "high class Mexican gentlemen" such as Pedro 
Lascurian, Madero*s Minister of Foreign Affairs.57 or it 
might just as well rally around Diaz, Mondragon, or 
Blanquet. Whatever the case, it was a formidable alliance, 
based upon a "very powerful following" among the officer 
corps of the former Federal army. Moreover, it was probable 
that such a coalition could count upon the support of 
Guillermo Meixueiro, able governor of the autonomous Oaxaca 
regime, and that of Higinio Aguilar, a powerful, independent 
caudillo operating southeast of the capital.5*3
success of the Huerta coup of October, 1913. When Huerta 
resigned in July, 1914, Blanquet followed him into exile. In 
June, 1915, he arrived in New York with Mondragon. Ibid., 
107, 179, 188.
5?Lascurian, a prominent wealthy moderate, replaced 
the conservative Manuel Calero as Minister of Foreign Rela­
tions in the Madero Cabinet in April, 1912. The following 
December, he was appointed Ambassador to the United States.
By early 1913, however, he had returned to his former post 
in the Mexican capital. Upon the resignation of Madero and 
Pino Suarez, Lascurian succeeded to the Interim Presidency.
He served for 56 minutes. Acting under pressure, he ap­
pointed Huerta Minister of Government and then submitted his 
own resignation. Huerta "automatically assumed the executive 
power." Ross, Madero, 317-318, passim. At the Niagara Con­
ference in June, 1914, Lascurian was under consideration for 
provisional president of the republic. At that time, he was 
acceptable to the Wilson Administration. Grieb, Huerta, 171- 
172.
58Meixueiro retained firm control of the important 
southern state of Oaxaca throughout the greater part of the
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A final group from which Washington might select a 
candidate for provisional president of the republic was 
composed of younger revolutionary subchiefs such as Felipe 
Angeles. Although aligned with one faction or another, 
those men were "essentially neutral." They were patriots, 
known to be concerned primarily with terminating the fighting 
and regenerating their country.
Assuming that the Administration would ultimately 
choose to back one or the other of the several aforemen­
tioned groups. Long warned that mere passive "moral support" 
would be insufficient to assure its survival. He urged in­
stead an extension of the "active moral support" pledged by 
the President in the declaration of June 2. It was a "very 
useful phrase," Long observed, since its ambiguity and 
"threatening overtones impressed Mexican leaders." It was 
hoped that the Administration would send "a really good man"
civil war. Nominally a Felicista, he was in reality an inde­
pendent conservative. Diaz and his followers were nonetheless 
granted sanctuary in Oaxaca, and that state remained the 
domestic stronghold of the Felicista movement. Aguilar had 
been a brigadier general in the old Federal Army, had served 
Huerta, and eventually cooperated with Zapata against the 
Carrancistas. Like a number of other regional caudillos, 
he was first and foremost an opportunist. Shifting his 
"allegiance" from Zapata to Diaz to Manuel Pelaez, he finally 
settled in the border area between the states of Puebla, 
Oaxaca, and Veracruz where he engaged in desultory raids on 
Constitutionalist towns and railroads. Womack, Zapata, 40- 
41, passim.
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to Mexico City as ambassador, "a man understanding the 
Latin mind." Such an official would be able to "apply with 
subtle force the influence of this government." It was 
assumed, of course, that the new ambassador would exercise 
more discretion than did his controversial predecessor,
Henry Lane Wilson.
Real success in dealing with Mexico, Long stressed, 
depended not so much upon the personnel of the new regime as 
upon their "accord" with the United States and their willing­
ness to follow Washington's recommendations. What Long 
appears to have had in mind was the negotiation of a Platt 
Amendment treaty with the Mexican Government. The conditions 
which he sought, he explained, could best be obtained "through 
a treaty or convention: which clearly spelled out the "rights 
and obligations of both countries."
Having dealt with the political aspects of an induced 
Mexican settlement. Long turned to the matter which seems to 
have been uppermost in his mind: American fiscal control
within the proposed provisional government. There existed 
throughout much of Latin America, he declared, a direct and 
fateful relationship between treasury receipts and revolu-
i
tion. Condemning the Constitutionalists for fighting for 
plunder while pretending to fight for principle. Long
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unabashedly called for American direction of Mexican finances. 
Following the collapse of the Huerta government, the 
Constitutionalists had had every opportunity to put their 
alleged principles to practice. They had failed to do so, 
however, "because there remained something of profit for 
which to fight." Nor would they ever put those principles 
to practice, he contended, unless "forced to do so or until 
the profits were consumed, a condition which meant the 
country laid waste and utterly ruined.”
It was generally acknowledged, Long declared, that 
nearly all factional leaders had "stolen in proportion to 
their opportunities." Villa was believed to have more than 
two million dollars in gold, and Carranza a little more. 
Huerta was said to have twenty millions in gold. The pecula­
tions of other lesser caudillos "were known to have been 
limited only by the opportunities which came to them." The 
sums involved, however, were of little consequence to Long; 
what concerned him was the fact that dishonesty in the hand­
ling of public funds had been "general” and promised to 
continue so unless the United States took steps to halt the 
p r a c t i c e . T h e  greater part of the "stolen wealth” had come
^Eventually even Carranza himself was suspect. In 
19 20, the Spanish author and journalist Vincente Blasco Ibanez 
noted that in Mexico "They call him the 'First Chief . . .  of
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from plundering foreign investors in the republic, but much 
of it had come from native Mexicans as well. It appeared. 
Long lamented, that patriotism in Mexico was rapidly be­
coming little more than the desire to hold the country 
"enriched by foreign capital, for personal exploitation."
Long was adamant in his insistence upon American 
fiscal control as a prerequisite for Mexican political sta­
bility. If an accord were eventually reached between 
Washington and a new coalition government in Mexico, he 
predicted, the United States would pump millions of dollars 
into the republic to hasten economic recovery. It would 
also demand a number of reforms which would enable Mexico to 
meet its considerable financial obligations. However, 
similar programs implemented first in Cuba and more recently 
in the Dominican Republic had proved less than satisfactory. 
Long was far from optimistic. Mexico's fiscal problems, were 
formidable, indeed.
those who come in the night. 1 Long ago," he recounted, "the 
wags of the capital began to use a new verb, 'to carranza,' 
the exact humor of which may not appear in English. 'To 
carranza, 1 in the cafes and vaudeville theaters of Mexico 
City, means 'to steal, 1 and you can hear people conjugating 
it on every hand: 'I carranza, thou carranzest, he carranzas-
they all carranza.'" Vincente Blasco Ibanez, Mexico in 
Revolution, trans, Arthur Livingston and Jose Padin (Mew 
York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1920), 84.
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Fundamental to the Chief's position was the con­
viction that "most Latin American revolutions [were] 
conducted for gain." If, he believed, revenues were placed 
in American hands there would be "little left to fight for 
except principles." With the withdrawal of "cash prizes," 
legitimate reforms would eventually be realized through 
normal legislative procedure. Recalling that Washington had 
allowed full fiscal control to "slip by" in the Dominican 
treaty, he strongly urged that any similar agreement subse­
quently concluded with Mexico."provide an absolute economic 
domination of that.country1s finances."60 In an enlight­
ening display of candor. Long vowed that were he a Mexican 
"and had opportunity, through revolution, to amass, within 
a comparatively short time, millions of money," he would 
find it most "distasteful . . .  to see any foreigner
60Long believed that the United States had erred 
gravely in failing to obtain firm control of Cuban and 
Dominican finances. That failure, in turn, had led to re­
current unrest in both republics. In Cuba it had produced 
"very corrupt administrations," and revolutions would have 
occurred "but for the Platt Amendment.” In the Dominican 
Republic that failure had led to revolutions and chronic 
unrest. Long was distressed because both countries, "at 
the time of making treaties with us," would have accepted 
"any financial arrangement suggested by the United States." 
Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688. Clearly 
Long hoped to avoid the "mistakes" of his predecessors and 
to obtain full control of Mexican finances through the pro­
posed Mexican-American treaty.
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frustrate so brilliant a possibility." Nonetheless, he 
believed that his recommendations could be executed without 
unduly ruffling Mexican pride. It was essential, however, 
that the concurrence of the other Latin American republics 
be obtained.
In sum. Long argued, regardless of which group the 
United States ultimately chose to support, that group would 
"have its hands very full" measuring up to all that was 
expected of it. "If we handle the cash box," he assured the 
Secretary, "there will be but little leakage, little op­
portunity for graft, and consequently little thought of new 
principles and new revolutions." Entrusting fiscal control 
to American officials. Long concluded, appeared to offer the 




THE RECOGNITION OF CARRANZA 
I.
It is clear from the Long Memorandum that the Anti­
revolutionists, while deferring to Lansing's insistence upon 
the selection of a revolutionary chieftain as head of the 
proposed Mexican coalition government, still preferred one 
of the several exiled conservative leaders. It is equally 
clear that the Secretary's subordinates had by no means 
abandoned hope for a reversal of the Administration's 
Mexican policy. The forceful arguments advanced by Long on 
behalf of the various conservative coalitions were intended 
to produce just such a shift. Moreover, Long's advocacy of 
a Mexican-American treaty similar to existing interventionist 
agreements between the United States and several of its 
Caribbean and Central American neighbors was a further in­
dication of his division's hostility to the revolutionary 
movement and the Antirevolutionists' determination to gain 
and maintain control over the future course of events in 
Mexico.^
^Long to Lansing, July B, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
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The proposed treaty was a means to that end. In the 
event that the Antirevolutionists failed in their attempt 
to place a conservative in the National Palace, they still 
would retain through the treaty authority to monitor the 
policies of whatever government did eventually emerge as a 
result of Pan-American mediation and to frustrate those pro­
grams they opposed. As acknowledged authorities on Mexico 
and primary interpreters of developments therein, the per­
sonnel of the Mexican and Latin American Divisions would be 
in a position to exert immense influence over the internal 
affairs of the republic.
Canova took the lead. On July 17, he advised Lansing 
that he was in "close communication" with Iturbide and other 
important conservative leaders. "All of them," he averred 
"had promised to 'unite under the standard of any man or 
group of men who would be countenanced by President Wilson.'" 
He then offered to suggest the "names of leaders who could 
unite all factions except the inner group around Carranza."
The proposed conservative coalition, he assured the Secretary, 
would control the greater part of northern Mexico from the 
moment it took the field. Moreover, as its forces moved 
southward, they would be joined by "most of the Carrancistas."
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The exile leaders, Canova declared, were ready to cooperate 
fully with the President. 2
Lansing, who shared both his subordinate's distaste 
for the Veracruz regime and his apprehension lest the First 
Chief emerge at the head of a unified Mexican nation, needed 
no prompting from Canova to work for Carranza's demise.3 
Accordingly, during the latter half of July, the Secretary 
worked closely with Paul Fuller and the Antirevolutionists 
in drafting a "comprehensive plan for intervention," a scheme 
which they intended to submit to the pending Pan-American 
conference on Mexico.4 Although there did exist a funda­
mental contradiction in their respective objectives - Lansing 
having committed himself to a revolutionary settlement of the 
Mexican question and his aides to counterrevolution - the 
planners were in wholehearted agreement on both the necessity 
and the desirability of eliminating Carranza.5 The draft plan, 
completed on July 30, so provided. Neither the First Chief
2Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 483-484.
3Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing Papers, 
II, 538-539; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 285.
4Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 484.
5Ibid.; New York Times, August 4 and 5, 1915.
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nor any of his principal lieutenants would be permitted to 
participate in the proposed provisional government. And, in 
a move designed to further minimize resistance to an imposed 
settlement of the Mexican question, the planners explicitly 
extended that prohibition to Villa and Zapata as well-6 
Ostensibly, the way would be clear for maximum cooperation 
between the Pan-American mediators and those lesser Mexican 
chieftains whom they ultimately chose to support.
The unanimity manifested in the planners' decision 
to exclude Carranza was lacking in their deliberation upon a 
suitable candidate for the provisional presidency. Puller 
preferred one of the lesser chieftains in Villa's retinue: 
Manuel Vazquez Tagle, Felipe Angeles, or Manuel Bonilla, the 
latter a prominent Maderista and close associate of the 
former president.? Canova, too, was willing to consider 
Bonilla, but both he and Anderson were concerned primarily 
with advancing the interests of their protege, Agustin 
Iturbide.8
6Ibid., August 3 and 5, 1915.
?Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 484.
Q
Anderson to Lansing, July 22, 1915 and Anderson memo­
randum, July 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/23140; Canova memorandum, 
July 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/23141.
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In mid-July the General was still a formidable 
contender.9 Reports from the border indicated that large 
numbers of soldiers would desert the belligerents then in 
the field and join Iturbide if and when he crossed the border 
into Mexico. The participation of Braniff, the General's 
wealthy patron, assured adequate financial backing.*'9 All 
that was lacking was the moral support of the United States 
and the several Latin American republics. Apparently still 
unaware of the strength of Lansing's committment to a revo­
lutionary settlement, the Antirevolutionists were confident 
of attaining that end as well. Thus with the matter of 
leadership seemingly resolved the planners turned to the more 
immediate problem of reconciling the other American republics 
to an imposed multilateral settlement of the Mexican civil 
war.11
II.
While State Department representatives worked with 
Latin American diplomats in Washington to organize a conference
^Lane to Lansing, July 31, 1915, SDR 812.00/17538; New 
York Times, August 3, 1915; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican 
Revolution, 288.
10Ibid.
11Lansing to Wilson, July 31, 1915, The Lansing Papers, 
II, 541-542. See also Paul Fuller, "Conference of South 
American Republics," August 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/17561.
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on Mexico, a new series of incidents below the border engen­
dered still another serious Mexican-American crisis. Suddenly 
the Lansing-Canova plan was in jeopardy. By mid-summer, 
American armed intervention had become a distinct possibi­
lity. Obviously such a course would fatally undermine any 
attempt at peaceful Pan-American mediation. Nonetheless, in 
early August, Lansing called for a naval demonstration off 
Veracruz.*2 Although the President had already approved the 
Lansing-Canova plan and strongly opposed further armed inter­
vention in Mexico, relations between Washington and the 
Carrancistas had so deteriorated that he readily acquiesced 
in the Secretary's request. Once again United States war­
ships were ordered to V e r a c r u z . 1 *^
Some months earlier, upon Lansing's recommendation, 
Wilson had briefly considered dispatching an expedition to 
Mexico City to protect the foreign community. Fortunately, 
diplomatic pressure had produced the desired results, and the 
Secretary's plan was set aside. By early summer, however, 
the Valley of Mexico had again become the focal point of
*2New York Times, August 3 and 5, 1915.
^Ibid., August 11, 1915; Lansing to Wilson, August 10, 
1915, SDR 812.00/15736a; Wilson to Lansing, August 10, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17558.
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fighting. Mexico City, torn by looting and rioting, changed 
hands repeatedly. Threats against Americans and other for­
eign residents multiplied. And the crisis was aggravated 
by reestablishment of the Constitutionalist food blockade.
By late July, a state of anarchy existed within the city.*4
Outraged, Lansing demanded an immediate restoration 
of communications between the city and the surrounding 
countryside.*5 Doubtless influenced by contemporaneous 
developments in Washington, Carranza moved at once to relieve 
the former capital. On August 3, General Pablo Gonzalez 
reoccupied the city, restored order, and reestablished rail 
communications with Veracruz.*® Again, armed intervention 
had been narrowly averted by diplomacy.
A second confrontation, potentially more explosive 
than the first, stemmed from the xenophobia of Carranza's son- 
in-law, Candido Aguilar. Early in June, 1915, the Governor 
of the State of Veracruz had resumed his harassment of
*4New York Times, July 1, 6 , 20, 24, and 27, 1915; 
Cardoso de Oliveira to Lansing, July 11, 18, 22, 29, and 30, 
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 721-727.
*5New York Times, July 31, 1915.
*®Cardoso de Oliveira to Lansing, August 3, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1915, 732.
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foreign oilmen operating in the Huasteca. By mid-summer the 
British-owned Aguila Oil Company had become his principal 
target.17 The Cowdray firm, upon which the embattled Royal 
Navy still relied for a significant proportion of its fuel 
oil requirements, was a poor choice. Nor was it a propi­
tious time to twist the lion's tail. Aguilar's game was a 
dangerous one, indeed, and might well have ended in disaster 
for the Constitutionalist regime. Nonetheless, the Governor 
persisted. He publicly denounced foreign oil interest in 
Mexico, particularly the Aguila, holding them responsible 
for all of the republic's international "difficulties;" The 
oilmen, he charged, were solely responsible for the failure 
of the Constitutionalist regime to obtain recognition abroad. 
Anticipating an attempt by foreign governments to seize the 
oilfields, he solemnly warned that the moment "foreign 
marines" set foot on Mexican soil he would "set fire to all 
the wells." The "cause of Mexico's troubles," would thereby 
be eliminated.1® From all accounts, the Governor meant what 
he said.1® Officials in Washington and London alike were 
shaken.
17Spring-Rice to Lansing, June 12, 1915,SDR 812.6363/
196.
18Ibid.
19Silliman to Lansing, June 24, 1915, SDR 812.6363/197.
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Deeply alarmed by Aguilar's threat, Sir Cecil Spring- 
Rice appealed to the Department of State for assistance. 
Aguilar, the Ambassador urged, should be informed in no un­
certain terms that he would be held "personally responsible" 
for destruction of the oil f i e l d s . 20 The British Government 
would not tolerate interdiction of its fuel oil supply.
Shortly after the Department's receipt of Spring-Rice's 
ominous note, a consular report from Tampico confirmed 
Lansing's fears: Aguilar's troops were indeed in control of
the greater portion of the oilfields and in sufficient force 
to carry out the Governor's threat.21 "The Gentleman (Aguilar] 
mentioned," Silliman cabled from Veracruz, was "fully equal 
to such conduct in the event of i n v a s i o n . "22 The Huasteca 
situation had become very grave.
The Governor1s antipathy toward foreigners was by no 
means restricted to the oilmen alone. Late in June, Consul 
Canada at Veracruz reported to Lansing that Aguilar was per­
sonally inciting the natives to attack Americans and other
20spring-Rice to Lansing, June 12, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
196.
23,Miller to Lansing, June 1.6, 1915, SDR 812.6363/189.
22silliman to Lansing, June 24, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
197.
foreigners in and around the c i t y . 22 The Secretary re­
sponded with a sharp note to Carranza in which he demanded, 
among other things, Aguilar's resignation as governor. The 
First Chief refused even to acknowledge Lansing’s highly 
irregular communication. A second note, dispatched on 
July 3, again called for Aguilar's dismissal and threatened 
dire consequences in the event that the demand was not met. 
Silliman was "appalled at the severity of the ultimatum.1,24 
He requested and eventually received permission to soften 
its tone. Having done so, he then submitted it to Carranza. 
Perhaps as a result of the agent's editing, the First Chief 
misjudged Lansing's mood and again refused to reply.25 Out 
of patience, Lansing reacted by calling upon the Secretary 
of the Navy to dispatch two battleships and supporting naval 
units to the waters off Veracruz.2®
The following day, August 11, Silliman reported that 
threats against foreigners in Veracruz had ceased. Further­
more, Aguilar had publicly expressed his regret that such
23Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 486.
24Ibid. 25lbid.
2®Lansing to Wilson, Agust 10, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
15736a; New York Times, August 11, 1915.
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threats had ever been made.2  ^ Almost certainly the Governor's 
apology was prompted by pressure from Carranza himself. It 
was a humiliating reversal for Aguilar and doubtless increased 
his enmity towards the United States. To be sure, his sub­
sequent behavior suggested as much. Although friction be­
tween Washington and the Veracruz regime momentarily declined, 
the threat to foreign control of the oilfields persisted. In 
the months and years that followed, Aguilar pressed unremit­
tingly for confiscation of foreign holdings in the Huasteca. 
Throughout the balance of the Carranza regime, he remained 
strongly anti-American and the implacable foe of the oilmen.
While officials of the Department of State fenced 
with the Carrancistas through the summer of 1915, new and 
unexpected difficulties with Villa further complicated rela­
tions with Mexico. Again, Pan-American mediation was 
jeopardized. Villa, retiring before the rapidly advancing 
Obregon, was hard pressed for money and supplies.28 Late in
2^Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 486. Barely
two weeks earlier, Wilson had ordered the seizure of Port-au- 
Prince, the Haitian capital, ostensibly for the purposes of 
protecting foreign lives and property and to forestall pos­
sible European intervention. New York Times, July 28, 1915. 
The similarity between the Haitian situation and the crisis 
developing at Veracruz was unmistakable. Doubtless the oc­
cupation of Port-au-Prince served as an object lesson for the 
Carrancistas.
28Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 283-284.
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July, he seized the property of foreign merchants in Chihua­
hua and announced his intention to impose a confiscatory tax
29on foreign mining operations in northern Mexico. Lansing 
was apprehensive. He fully appreciated the seriousness of 
a confrontation with Villa. Yet failure to curb Villista 
plundering of foreign interests might well lead to armed 
intervention by the United States. In addition to under­
mining the Lansing-Canova plan, intervention would almost 
certainly spell Villa's defeat. The last effective obstacle 
to a complete Carrancista victory would thereby be removed,
a prospect distressing to Lansing and the Antirevolutionists 
30alike. Consequently, the Secretary moved at once to miti­
gate Villa's hardship.
Turning to the President and to Secretary of Agri­
culture David F. Houston, Lansing persuaded them to permit
O l
the inspection and importation of Mexican beef at El Paso.
2^Ibid., 284; Carothers to Lansing, July 26, 1915, 
Letcher to Lansing, July 31, 1915, and The Mine and Smelter 
Operators' Association to Lansing, August 6 , 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 926-933; New York Times, August 5, 1915.
30Lansing to Wilson, August 9, 1915, The Lansing 
Papers, II, 547-548; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 285.
^Lansing to Wilson, August 6 and 9, 1915, The Lansing 
Papers, II, 545-548. The Secretary's measures to assist 
and thereby restrain Villa were first suggested by Carothers. 
Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 185. Wilson was "puzzled"
Villa was thus able to obtain desperately needed funds 
through the sale of stolen cattle to American buyers.
Next, Lansing sent to the border General Hugh Scott, 
Chief of Staff and Villa's principal advocate within Adminis­
tration circles.32 Scott was to personally inform his 
Mexican friend of Washington's concession and prevail upon 
him to abandon his plan for a confiscatory mining t a x . 33 in  
addition, the General was to assure Villa that the United 
States had no intention of extending recognition to Carranza. 
Scott, however, "had a lucid interval" during his meeting
by Lansing's suggestion that the United States act to relieve 
Villa: "Do you think it is wise," he queried, "to put Villa
in the way of getting money just at the moment when he is 
apparently weakest and on the verge of collapse? What will 
be gained by that, if, should he be left alone, he may be 
eliminated by the force of events?" Wilson to Lansing, Au­
gust 7, 1915, The Lansing Papers, XI, 546. Lansing explained 
"We do not wish the Carranza faction to be the only one to 
deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an 
appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us an 
opportunity to invite a compromise of factions.” The Sec­
retary thought it "politic, for the time, to allow Villa to 
obtain sufficient financial resources to allow his faction 
to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected."
Lansing to Wilson, August 9, 1915, Ibid., 547-548. Quirk 
concludes that Lansing "wanted the elimination of Carranza 
more than he wanted peace" in Mexico. Quirk, The Mexican 
Revolution, 285.
* ) 0
Ibid. Again, the suggestion to use Scott to 
control Villa came from Carothers. Clendenen, The U. S. 
and Villa, 185.
33Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 487.
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with Villa and chose to withhold from him the Secretary's
guarantee. It was the General's conviction that "matters
of that kind should be held back when dealing with primitive 
34people." It was a fortunate decision. Both Lansing and
the Wilson Administration generally were spared considerable
embarrassment when the President a short time later chose
to extend recognition to the Veracruz regime. Meanwhile,
Scott's initiative in no way interfered with the success of 
35his mission. Villista depredations in northern Mexico 
fell off sharply after the border conference, and tension 
between the Chihuahua caudillo and the Government of the 
United States diminished accordingly.
III.
While Lansing, through a combination of threats on 
one hand and concessions on the other, sought to forestall 
serious trouble with Carranza and Villa, representatives of
six Latin American nations met with the Secretary in Washing-
36ton to consider joint action on the Mexican problem.
34Ibid.
35Carothers to Lansing, undated. Foreign Relations, 
1915, 935; New York Times, August 11, 1915.
36The participating nations were Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala.
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Opening the talks on August 5, Lansing expressed the opinion 
that not one of the incumbant factional leaders was capable 
of forging a lasting peace. He then suggested that the 
conferees recognize and actively support one of the several 
secondary chieftains around whom all revolutionary elements 
might rally. Doubtless astonishing his subordinates, the 
Secretary closed by insisting that the Pan-American designee 
be a revolutionary. The true will and sovereignty of the 
Mexican people, he explained, were vested in the Revolution. 
For that reason, if for no other, consideration of a con­
servative or counterrevolutionary leader was out of the 
question.^
The Latin American response to Lansing's proposal
38was unexpectedly encouraging. Although the assembled
diplomats represented conservative governments hostile in
varying degree to the Mexican Revolution, they feared the
effects of unilateral American intervention. Seemingly the
only acceptable alternative to that course was a scheme such
as the one suggested by the Secretary of State. In addition,
Lansing was calling for elimination of the troublesome 
39Carranza. It was an important feature of the American




plan and certainly one of the principal reasons for Latin 
American acquiescence in it. Among the conferees there was 
from the start "unanimous agreement" that the First Chief 
was "impossible, that even if he triumphed it would mean 
continued disorder."40 Thus by the close of the first 
session, consensus had been reached on three points: First,
none of the incumbent factional heads would be eligible for 
Pan-American recognition; second, representatives of all 
revolutionary factions were to be invited to an "immediate 
conference" at Washington to consider a compromise settlement 
of the Mexican civil war; and, third, the conferees them­
selves were to draft a plan for installing a Mexican pro­
visional government of their own choosing in the event that 
voluntary compromise could not be reached.^
At a second session, held the following day, it was 
decided that invitations to attend a conference in Washing­
ton would shortly be dispatched to prominent revolutionary 
leaders. It was further agreed to reconvene in New York to 
consider the composition of the proposed provisional govern­
ment.42
All the while, Lansing both anticipated and desired
40Ibid 42Ibid
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Mexican opposition to Pan-American mediation.43 Manifesting 
his concurrence with the convictions expressed in the Long 
Memorandum, he preferred to impose upon the republic a regime 
of his own making.44 From its inception, the Lansing- 
Canova plan had been predicated on the assumption that 
the composition of the new provisional government would be 
determined by officials of the Department of State. Latin 
American participation was merely an artifice intended to 
allay the fears and cultivate the confidence and good will 
of the several Latin American republics, an attempt to cloak 
an essentially unilateral American intervention in the 
sanctity of responsible Pan-Americanism. It was the 
Niagara maneuver all over again.
At that critical juncture in Mexican-American rela­
tions, it suddenly became evident that the President was by 
no means irrevocably committed to execution of the Lansing- 
Canova plan. The situation in Mexico remained fluid, and 
rapidly unfolding events below the border forced Wilson, 
however, grudgingly, to reassess his position on Pan-American 
mediation. The President was deeply impressed by the growing
43Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 488.
44Ibid,
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military might of the Constitutionalist armies and by the 
ease with which Carrancista commanders rolled back the 
opposition through the latter half of the summer. By early 
August, it was clear to Wilson that Villa's days were 
numbered.45 Zapata and the remnants of the Convention, of 
course, had long since been dismissed as serious contenders 
for Washington's recognition and support. Furthermore, the 
President had no intention whatsoever of encouraging any of 
the exiled leaders.45 Gradually, then, Wilson was moving 
toward acceptance of the Veracruz regime.
Link believes that, in addition to Constitutionalist 
success in the field, a partial explanation for the re­
markable reversal of presidential policy lies in an inex­
plicable strengthening of Wilson's "faith" in the Revolution. 
Despite his disgust with its leaders, by midsummer the 
President was convinced that the movement was "a bright 
chapter in the history of mankind's struggle for freedom and 
democracy."47 Under no circumstances, then, would he will­
ingly become a party to its frustration. Nor, by late summer,
45Wilson to Lansing, August 7, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 546.
4®Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 489.
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was he prepared to stand in the way of the leader, whoever
he might be, who seemed best able to bring the movement to
fruition. Clearly, by early August, Carranza appeared to
be that leader.
There were, in addition to the aforementioned, still
other factors which stiffened Wilson's resolve. First,
several politically significant groups within American
society strongly favored the Constitutionalist cause. The
revolutionary decrees of January, 1915, and conclusion of
the alliance between Carranza and the radical Casa del
Obrero Mundial had duly impressed American labor leaders.
Samuel Gompers, influential president of the American
Federation of Labor, was particularly partial to the First
Chief and had repeatedly petitioned the White House to
48extend recognition to the Veracruz regime. Many influential 
Protestant clergymen and laymen were equally enthusiastic in 
their support of the Constitutionalist movement. They wel­
comed the humbling of the reactionary Mexican Church and 
anticipated the opening of a fertile new field for Protestant 
missions. Finally, large numbers of progressive and liberal
48Ibid., 642; Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 205; 
Gompers to Wilson, September 22, 1915, Wilson Papers, VI, 
95A.
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reformers were taken in by the very effective Carrancista 
propaganda which began to make its appearance in the United 
States in the fall of 1 9 1 4 . They, too, were vigorous advo­
cates of recognition. Roman Catholic opposition notwith­
standing, the political dividends which might be expected to 
accrue to the Wilson Administration through recognition of 
the First Chief were considerable.
A second factor of great importance in reconciling 
both the President and large numbers of the American people 
to Constitutionalist hegemony in Mexico was the aforemen­
tioned Carrancista propaganda. It was instrumental in 
bringing about American recognition of the Veracruz regime, 
and was to remain that government's most effective defense 
against the activities of counterrevolutionaries and foreign 
interventionists throughout the balance of the Carranza era. 
Constitutionalist propaganda, Clendenen observes, "was 
voluminous and was conducted with a skill and attention to 
the current prejudices of the American people that indicated
49Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 199-200. The acti­
vities of Carrancista propagandists are well documented in 
the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's inves­
tigation of Mexican affairs conducted in the autumn of 1919 
and the spring of 1920. See Testimony of Dr. Samuel G.
Inman, September 8 and 9, 1919, and Testimony of L. J. de 
Bekker, September 15, 1919, IMA, 4-141 and 331-370.
327
that the managers knew exactly what they were doing." It 
bore evidence "of having been actually written by highly 
skilled Americans, rather than Mexicans." Funding was never 
an obstacle.5®
In the autumn of 1914, shortly after the rupture 
between Villa and the First Chief, Carrancista agents had 
established the Mexican Bureau of Information in New York 
City. Thereafter, "a stream of pamphlets, press releases, 
and interviews" — all designed to discredit Villa or extol 
Carranza and the Constitutionalist cause — issued from that 
office. Initially, Villa was portrayed as simple, naive, 
and badly misled. Upon the eruption of hostilities, however, 
the campaign of vinification took a nastier turn.
Carrancista propagandists were quick to exploit Villa's out­
law past. At the same time, they shrewdly catered to the 
ideological prejudices of the Wilson Administration. Relying 
upon unsubstantiated newspaper accounts as evidence, they 
charged that Villa had sold out to Wall Street, that in ex­
change for arms and money he had pledged fabulous concessions 
to Rockefeller and other giants of American industry. In­
creasingly, Villa was cast in the role of arch-reactionary.
5®Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 195-197.
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Again and again, it was alleged that he was working hand- 
in-glove with Huertistas and the old Cientifico faction.
"No opportunity was ever lost," Clendenen declares, "to 
couple Villa*s name and party with the rich who stood to lose 
by the Revolution and with the predatory capitalists who were 
vaguely, but genuinely, feared in both the United states and 
Mexico.
While Carranza's opponent was being thus maligned, 
the First Chief himself was "being depicted by liberal 
writers," both Mexican and American, as "the very incarnation 
of the ideals and aspirations of true liberalism." The muck­
raking journalist, Lincoln Steffans, "in whom . . . Wilson 
placed great confidence," was perhaps the most effective of 
Carranza's eulogists. Following a visit to Constitutionalist 
headquarters early in 1915, Steffans returned to New York to 
become "one of the most enthusiastic of the pro-Carranza and 
anti-Villa propagandists. To all intents and purposes," 
Clendenen concludes, "he became a Carrancista public relations 
o f f i c e r . "52 Equally close to Wilson and to his principal 
advisor. Colonel Edward M. House, Steffans discussed Mexican 
matters with both men during the critical summer and early 
fall of 1915. Unquestionably, his efforts and those of other
51ibid., 197-199. 52Ibid., 200-201.
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propagandists on behalf of the Constitutionalist cause 
played a major role in tempering the President's antipathy 
toward Carranza and in winning White House support for the 
Veracruz regime.
Indication of a marked shift in the President’s atti­
tude toward the political situation in Mexico first came to 
light on August 8.^3 jn a telegram to Lansing, Wilson 
approved both the draft invitation to revolutionary leaders 
and the decision to prepare an alternate plan for an imposed 
Pan-American settlement of the Mexican conflict. He ques­
tioned, however, the conferees' emphasis on elections and a 
rapid return to constitutional government. It was his opinion, 
he informed Lansing, that "the first and most essential step 
in settling [the] affairs of Mexico" was "not to call general 
elections." Rather it was "necessary that a provisional 
government essentially revolutionary in character should take 
action to institute reforms by decree before the full forms 
of the constitution [were] resumed." Such, he contended, was 
the "original program of the revolution" and "probably an 
essential part of it."S4 The President had come a long way, 
indeed.





Once resigned to a revolutionary rather than consti­
tutional solution of the Mexican problem, Wilson naturally 
began to question the expedience of the Lansing-Canova plan. 
On August 11, he revealed just how far he had moved from his 
original position: "I think," he cabled Lansing, "it would
be unwise for the conference to take for granted or insist 
upon the elimination of Carranza." To do so would be "to 
ignore some very big facts." It was "very important" that 
the plan then under consideration by the Pan-American con­
ferees "should leave the way of action open in any direction 
and not assume a beginning over again with a clean sheet of 
paper to write on." Doubtless with some anxiety, the 
President finally acknowledged Carranza's ascendency: the
First Chief, he declared would "somehow have to be digested 
into the scheme." At the same time, he stressed, it was 
essential that "the object of the revolution . . .  be 
conserved.1,55
Lansing received Wilson's message in Mew York, 
shortly before he was to open the third round of talks with 
the Latin American diplomats. Unquestionably deeply
S^Wilson to Lansing, August 11, 1915., Ibid., 549.
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disappointed, he nonetheless accepted the change with 
equanimity.56 Going before the conferees, he bluntly an­
nounced that the Constitutionalists were obviously the do­
minant faction in the republic and that, for the moment at 
least, it was impractical to consider the establishment of 
an imposed coalition government. In the face of determined 
Carrancista opposition, he warned, there would be little or 
nothing that the conferees could do to force mediation. The 
only course open to them was to extend the invitations as 
planned and hope for a favorable response from all
factions.57
Fuller, who had not been informed of the President's 
sudden reversal, was incredulous. What, he inquired, was to 
become of the many Mexicans who had opposed or failed to 
support the revolution? Certainly they too were to be 
accorded representation in the new government. Not so, 
Lansing countered. The proposed provisional government 
would be "founded on the revolution." Those Mexicans who 
had resisted the Madero movement, supported the Huerta revolt, 
or opposed "the principle of reform of the revolution" were
56x,ink, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 492.
5?Ibid., 492-493.
"not entitled to participate in the initial reestablishment 
of government in Mexico." The fate of the dissidents was to 
be determined solely by the provisional government. The 
conferees, Lansing insisted, had no right to interfere with 
that government on behalf of the exiles. Nor did the Wilson 
Administration. The United States would not encourage 
counterrevolution. The Conference, he contended, would ac­
complish nothing unless the conferees accepted the fact that 
the revolution was "triumphant" and that "the Mexican people 
were the "ones who for the present possess the right of 
sovereignty and the right to establish a provisional 
government."5®
Lansing's defense of Mexican self-determination 
struck a responsive chord among the Latin American diplomats 
Fuller objected, but to no avail.^9 Accordingly, the deci­
sion was made to proceed with the dispatch of invitations to 
revolutionary leaders. The matter of recognition was post­
poned, to be taken up again only after all the recipients 
replied. Thus, on August 13, invitations to attend a 
conference at Washington under the auspices of the Pan- 
American conferees were sent to dozens of prominent civil
58ibid 5®Ibid., 492
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and military officials. The announced purpose of the 
conference was “to exchange ideas and to determine the fate" 
of the Mexican Republic. It was hoped that frank discussion 
at a neutral site would lead to voluntary organization of a 
new provisional regime preparatory to the restoration of 
peace and constitutional government. The Pan-American con­
ferees stood ready upon request to make the necessary arrange­
ments for the meeting. Replies were expected within ten 
days.60
Within or shortly after the alloted time, Villa, 
Zapata, and Rafael Borrego, spokesman for the disintegrating 
Convention, each expressed his willingness to consider a 
mediated settlement.6^ Similar assurances came from their 
respective lieutenants.6  ^ Constitutionalist leaders, however, 
reacted almost exactly as Lansing had feared they might. To 
a man they referred their invitations to the First Chief, 
pledging themselves to abide by his decision.6  ^ It was a 
discouraging response. Effective mediation was obviously
60l»ansing to Parker, August 13, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 735-736.
6^Llorente to Lansing, August 19, 1915, and Parker to 
Lansing, August 29, 1915, Ibid., 737-738, 739-742.
62Note, Ibid., 753-754. 63Ibid.
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out of the question. Equally disheartening was the pro­
longed silence of Carranza himself. Chagrined, the President 
sent David Lawrence to confer with Eliseo Arredondo,
Carranza's principal spokesman in Washington.®4
Lawrence, on August 15, assured Arredondo that the 
conferees had no intention of intervening militarily in 
Mexico. Nor, he declared less candidly, were they hostile 
to the First Chief. In fact, he implied, Constitutionalist 
participation in the proposed Mexican conference would defi­
nitely enhance Carranza's chance of winning Pan-American 
recognition. On the other hand, if the First Chief persisted 
in pursuing total military victory, it was highly unlikely 
that he would ever be recognized by the United States. 
Washington, Lawrence stressed, was committed to a compromise 
settlement of the Mexican civil war. The President would 
countenance nothing else.®5
Encouraged by Arredondo's response, Wilson and Lansing 
decided to send Lawrence on to Veracruz to discuss the matter 
of a mediated settlement with the First Chief himself. Despite 
the fact that the newsman did not officially represent the 
Administration, his assignment remained a closely guarded
®4Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 631.
65Ibid., 630-631.
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66secret. It would have been difficult, indeed, to reconcile 
his mission with Washington's professed commitment to Pan- 
Americanism.
Lawrence arrived at the Constitutionalist capital on 
August 28, and the same day spoke with Carranza. Despite a 
virtual guarantee of American recognition in exchange for 
cooperation with the Pan-American conference, the First Chief 
again expressed his opposition to foreign interference in 
Mexican affairs. He unequivocally rejected the American 
proposal.®7 A realist, Lawrence then advised Wilson to accept 
the preeminence of the Constitutionalists and to extend recog­
nition to that faction regardless of whether or not Carranza 
chose to go along with the conferees. It was a bold and 
practical recommendation. It was not, however, what the 
President wanted to hear.68
Nor was Lansing pleased. The Secretary was concerned, 
and rightly so, over the reaction of the Latin American diplo­
mats to Lawrence's recommendation. They would be "strongly 
opposed" he warned the President.69 Moreover, unilateral 
American recognition of Carranza would constitute a serious
66Ibid., 631n. 67Ibid., 632.
68Ibid. 69Ibid.
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breach of faith with the Latin American conferees and nullify 
whatever benefits had accrued as a result of Pan-American 
cooperation. Indeed, the Lawrence mission itself violated 
the spirit of Pan-Americanism, and doubtless the Secretary 
was apprehensive lest it be discovered. Wilson, on the other 
hand, appears to have been annoyed by Lawrence's initiative 
and piqued by the First Chief's obstinance. It was "clear,” 
he fumed, "that nothing can be done either with or through 
Carranza."70 And so it seemed. That same day the First 
Chief informed reporters at Veracruz that "under no con­
sideration" would he "permit interference in the internal 
affairs of Mexico. . . . "  Any nation attempting to meddle, 
he warned, would "meet resistance.
On September 1, the date of his departure from 
Veracruz, Lawrence engaged in a final, brief conversation 
with Carranza. General Obregon, the First Chief revealed, was 
about to launch a major offensive against demoralized Villista 
forces in northern Mexico. The Constitutionalists were con­
fident of victory. When he had crushed his opponent,
Carranza assured Wilson's envoy, he would open communications
70Ibid., 633.
7^New York Times, September 1, 1915.
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with the Pan-American conferees. At that point, there would 
no longer be any doubt as to who was the master of Mexico.^
Forthwith the campaign in the North began. On or 
about September 4, Saltillo, capital of the State of 
Coahuila, fell to General Carlos Trevino. Shortly there­
after, General Francisco Murguia seized Torreon, the communi­
cations hub of northern Mexico and longtime Villista strong­
hold. Meanwhile, other Constitutionalist columns occupied 
the city of Durango and Piedras Negras, an important border 
port opposite Eagle Pass, Texas. Villa's army rapidly 
melted away. His soldiers deserted en masse, and a number 
of his generals opened negotiations with Obregon. By mid- 
September, Villista forces held only the State of Chihuahua 
and Ciudad Juarez opposite El Paso. Villa's power was 
b r o k e n . A l t h o u g h  he continued to dominate large areas of 
north-central Mexico for four more years, he no longer repre­
sented a serious threat to Constitutionalist control of the 
republic.
On September 10, having swept his opponent from the 
field, Carranza finally chose to reply to the Pan-American
72Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 633.
^^New York Times, September 5, 10, 19, 1915; Quirk,
The Mexican Revolution, 287.
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conferees. He would not discuss the internal affairs of the 
republic, he explained, because to do so would be to violate 
Mexican sovereignty and "set a precedent for foreign inter­
vention” in the settlement of future internal disorders. 
Constitutionalist forces, he observed, now controlled all of 
Mexico except the State of Chihuahua, a small part of Sonora, 
and the Zapatista stronghold in the State of Morelos.
Clearly the opposition was finished. The need for mediation 
had passed. Instead, Carranza proposed, the conferees might 
join him at some point along the northern border for the 
purpose of discussing de facto recognition of the Veracruz 
regime.74
V.
Some two weeks earlier, while recommending the exten­
sion of American recognition to Carranza, Lawrence had urged 
the President to "accept the facts of Mexican life."7  ^ By 
mid-September, Wilson had no choice. While he and Lansing 
pondered their next move, reports from two of the Adminis­
tration's "most trusted agents" on the border forced them 
to reconsider Lawrence's recommendation. George C. Carothers,
74Silliman to Lansing, September 10, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 746-748.
^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 632.
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formerly attached to Villa's headquarters, and Zachary Cobb, 
Collector of Customs at El Paso, both noted the rapid dis­
integration of the Villista movement and predicted its 
imminent collapse. On September 10 and 11 respectively, 
they too urged recognition of the Veracruz regime.
Lansing was converted. On September 12, he forwarded 
to Wilson a copy of Carranza's firm but conciliatory rejection 
of Pan-American mediation. With it he enclosed his own anal­
ysis of the drastically altered political situation below the 
border.77 The First Chief's position, Lansing opened, was 
"not unreasonable." In fact, his proposal to meet with the 
conferees to discuss recognition was most encouraging.
Although the Secretary was concerned primarily with the con­
sideration of Mexican internal affairs, he was nonetheless 
pleased with Carranza's apparent willingness to cooperate at 
all with the conferees. The First Chief's proposal, he 
remarked, reflected a "better disposition" than any previously 
manifested by the Veracruz regime.
The Carrancistas, Lansing informed the President, 
were "undoubtedly stronger and more cohesive" than ever before.
76Ibid., 636.
77Lansing to Wilson, September 12, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 550-552.
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"In fact," he admitted, "I have almost reached the conclusion 
that they are so dominant that they are entitled to recog­
nition." The Secretary "could not see what [would] be gained 
by recognizing any other government." The war would simply 
"continue and be prolonged" by any attempt to strengthen 
Villa. The First Chief, he believed, was certain to "win in 
the end."
The situation in Mexico had "changed materially” 
since the conferees had first addressed the several factional 
leaders. As long as Villa had been able to offer "stubborn 
resistance" to Carranza, the "desirable thing” had been "to 
stay the strife by harmonizing factional differences." That, 
of course, had been the original purpose of the proposed 
conference of revolutionary leaders. But Villa's power had 
"rapidly waned." He was clearly finished. "Now," the 
Secretary declared, "the problem is whether or not peace in 
Mexico will not be more quickly restored by giving moral 
support" to the triumphant Carrancistas*
Certainly the course suggested by Lansing was the 
most practical of the several options open to the President. 
However, consideration of that recommendation automatically
^®Ibid
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raised some embarrassing questions. Leaders of those fac­
tions opposed to Carranza had by then agreed to attend the 
proposed conference. "Can we," Lansing mused, "consistently 
or honorably refuse to call such a conference?" And if it 
were called, "what would be the value of its deliberations?" 
Given the "utter demoralization" of Carranza's opponents it 
seemed to him "absurd to assert" that any government which 
they might organize would truly represent the "sovereignty 
of the Mexican people."79
Still another "difficulty" raised by Lansing's pro­
posal was the attitude of the Latin American conferees. They 
remained strongly opposed to the Mexican Revolution and were 
especially antagonistic toward the Constitutionalists. At 
the meeting of August 6, they had unanimously expressed both 
their antipathy toward Carranza and their determination to 
eliminate him from Mexican politics. Lansing, at the time, 
had wholeheartedly agreed, and the President himself had only 
belatedly questioned the decision. Now, however, the 
Secretary proposed to go far beyond Wilson's subsequent sug­
gestion that Carranza somehow be included in a mediated 
settlement. In fact, Lansing was calling for a complete
79Ibid.
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reversal of the course so enthusiastically adopted by the 
conferees barely a month past. It was an awkward situation, 
indeed, and one which threatened to efface entirely the 
spirit of Pan-American trust and cooperation so painstakingly 
pursued by the Wilson Administration.
Nonetheless, Lansing was determined to proceed. It 
was "necessary," he believed, to call the Latin American con­
ferees together, "lay before them the replies of the Mexican 
chiefs," and reveal to them "the present state of affairs in 
Mexico." At the same time, he would impress upon them the 
"continuing successes of the Carrancista arms." Before doing 
so, however, the Administration should have a definite course 
of action to present to the conferees.8** It was essential 
that Washington retain the initiative.
The following day, Wilson called Lansing to the White 
House to discuss the Secretary's proposal. It was decided 
that Lansing would meet again with the Latin American confer­
ees and "suggest" to them a conference with Constitutionalist 
repesentatives in Washington to consider the recognition of 
Carranza. It was to be made very clear to the conferees that 
the Wilson Administration held "acceptance of the Revolution
8°ibid
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absolutely necessary." In addition, the conferees were to 
"keep faith" with the other factions by later meeting with 
their respective representatives at some point in Mexico. 
There, the First Chief's opponents were to be informed that 
"the best and most helpful thing for them to do" was to dis­
close "confidentially" to the conferees "the terms upon which 
they [would] submit to Carranza." It was then to be explained 
to them that because of the recent "utter alteration of 
conditions" in Mexico the conferees could do no other than 
recognize the Veracruz regime.
VI.
Although the preeminence of Carranza stood as the 
obvious rationale for extending de facto recognition to his 
government, there was another factor of equal if not greater 
importance in determining the Administration's course. Some 
two months earlier, quite by accident, Lansing had stumbled 
upon the clandestine activities of the German Intelligence 
apparatus in North America.82 Justice Department officials 
took over the investigation and, on or about July 21,
8^Wilson to Lansing, September 13, 1915, Ibid., 552.
82Anderson Diary, July 9, 1915; Barbara Tuchman, The 
Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Dell Publishing Company,
1963), 66ff.
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rendered a preliminary report to the Secretary. According 
to Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren, an extensive 
network of agents directed by Captain Franz Rintelen von 
Kleist, a member of the General Staff of the German 
Admiralty, was engaged in interdicting the export of war 
material to the Allies.83 In addition to fomenting strikes 
and otherwise interfering with the traffic in arms, Rintelen 
was believed to be involved in a plot to embroil the United 
States in a war with Mexico. The object of the latter scheme 
was to force Washington "to commandeer for its own use" 
against Mexico the great quantities of arms and ammunition 
being exported to the Allies.®-* Subsequent investigation by 
Justice Department agents and the cooperation of British 
Counterintelligence, into whose hands Rintelen ultimately 
fell, revealed much more*
In February, 1915, the Captain had gone to Spain, 
sought out the exiled Huerta, and promised German support for
83Anderson Diary, July 22, 1915.
®^New York Times, December 5, 1915. In May, 1915, 
Gottlieb von Jagow,secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 
explicitly approved a plan to provoke American armed inter­
vention in Mexico. It was "very much to be desired," von 
Jagow declared, "that America should get involved in a mili­
tary action, and distracted from Europe, where it is friendly 
to England." Quoted in James A. Sandos, "German Involvement 
in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus 
Raid," HAHR, L (February, 1970), 85 (hereafter cited as
"German Involvement in Northern Mexico").
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a Huertista counterrevolution. The General had accepted. 
Traveling separately, both men arrived in New York early 
in April. Rintelen immediately contacted Huerta and soon 
opened negotiations with the representatives of other pro­
minent Mexican reactionaries.88 Alarmed by the General’s 
presence in the United States, Villista and Carrancista 
agents alike protested to State Department officials.86 
Apparently unaware of the German intrigue, Bryan took no 
action; and, indeed, as long as the General remained away 
from the Mexican border it would have been difficult to do 
so.8? Meanwhile, throughout the month of May, Rintelen and 
two members of the German Embassy staff. Military Attache 
Franz von Papen and Naval Attache Karl Boy-Ed, conferred 
almost daily with Huerta. By the end of the month an agree­
ment had been reached.88 Having made the necessary prepara­
tions, both in the United States and Mexico, Huerta was to 
cross the border, rally conservative elements and disaffected
86New York Times, June 30 and August 4, 1915; George
J. Rausch, Jr., "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta," 
HAHR, XLII (May, 1962), 134-135.
88I>lorente to Bryan, April 10, 1915, Foreign Relations, 
1915, 827; Note, Ibid., 828.
8^Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 182-183.
op
Rausch, "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta," 
HAHR, 136-137.
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revolutionaries, and move against the Constitutionalist 
regime at Veracruz. At the same time, Felix Diaz was to rise 
against Carranza in the South.89
In return, the exiles demanded arms and money; they 
received both in abundance. Rintelen had at his disposal an 
estimated $30,000,000 to invest in the Mexican venture and 
appears to have expended some $12,000,000 before the scheme 
aborted.90 Large numbers of Mauser and Winchester rifles 
were purchased and successfully delivered to Huerta's follow­
ers along the border. Another large shipment, destined for 
Felix Diaz, was discovered and seized by Justice Department 
agents at New Orleans. Rintelen also purchased huge quanti­
ties of ammunition in St. Louis and placed orders for still 
more in New York. Responding to Huerta's demand for funds, 
German agents deposited $800,000 to the General's account in 
the Deutsche Bank in Havana and another $95,000 in a Mexican 
account.9 *■
Shortly before the counterrevolution was to begin, 
the attaches made trips to Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio,
89New York Times, December 5, 1915.
90Ibid., December 8, 1915.
9^Ibid., December 5, 1915.
and several other Southwestern cities, distributing funds, 
recruiting fighting men, and completing plans for the 
i n v a s i o n . Then, late in June, Huerta proceeded to the 
border. There he was arrested by American authorities, 
allowed to post bond, and kept under close surveillance. 
Early in July, he was again arrested and confined at Fort 
Bliss, Texas. In time, he turned to the bottle, his chronic 
weakness, and subsequently fell seriously ill. When he was 
eventually released in January, 1916, his moment was long 
passed. Shortly thereafter he d i e d . 9 ^
The terms of Rintelen's agreement with Huerta were 
vague. Apparently, however, there was some discussion of a 
formal military alliance aimed at the United States. Huerta 
Rintelen later recalled, ascribed his earlier downfall to 
Washington's meddling in the internal affairs of Mexico. He 
hungered for vengeance.94 Again according to Rintelen, the 
General expressed his willingness to wage war against the
92n>id.
93Rausch, "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta, 
HAHR, 139-151; Grieb, Huerta, 187-192.
94Franz Rintelen von Kleist, The Dark Invader; War­
time Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), 175 (hereafter
cited as Dark Invader).
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United States if Germany would continue to provide him 
military and financial assistance and guarantee his personal 
safety in the event of failure.95 Execution of the alleged 
alliance was, of course, contingent upon successful counter­
revolution in Mexico.
By late July, the Huertista movement was obviously 
dead. Discouraged, but by no means defeated, the Kaiser's 
agents abandoned the unfortunate Huerta and began anew, 
first with Felix Diaz and then with Pancho Villa.96 Fol­
lowing Huerta's confinement, control of the Mexican project 
passed from Rintelen to von Papen and Boy-Ed. They, in turn, 
received their orders from the German Ambassador in 
Washington, Count Johann von Bernstorff.97
Early in August, British Counterintelligence had 
succeeded through a clever ruse in luring Rintelen abroad.
He was subsequently captured and interrogated,99 Much of the 
information extracted from him was immediately passed on to 
American authorities. On September 15, shortly before Lansing
"ibid.; Grieb, Huerta, 184-185.
9^Mew York Times., August 4 and December 5, 1915; 
Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, 92-97; Sandos, "German 
Involvement in Northern Mexico;" HAHR, 83-88.
97Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 563-564.
98Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, 83-84.
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was to meet again with the Latin American conferees, Warren 
forwarded to him the latest developments in the Rintelen 
case. Included was the British report on the Captain's 
activities in America.^®
Lansing was alarmed. Although the Huertista movement 
had indeed been frustrated and the General himself effec­
tively neutralized, Diaz, Blanquet, Mondragon, and a number 
of other prominent Mexican reactionaries were still at large. 
Thus a serious counterrevolutionary uprising, inspired by 
German agents and supported by German arms and money, re­
mained a distinct possibility. Should such occur, all hope 
of a speedy settlement of the Mexican question would be lost. 
At best, Administration officials could expect another dismal 
round of bitter civil strife below the border; at worst, the 
emergence of a new pro-German reactionary regime hostile to 
both the United States and the European Allies. In either 
case, Washington's diligent efforts to stabilize the repub­
lic and withdraw from the Mexican morass would be all for 
naught.
Strongly biased in favor of the Allies, Lansing was 
deeply concerned over the prospect of a new revolution in
^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 650-651.
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Mexico."^00 The great Huasteca oilfields, vital to the 
Allied war effort, and the mines of Northern Mexico, upon 
whose production American munitions-makers heavily depended, 
would become prime targets for expropriation by a pro- 
German regime. Still more sobering was the prospect of 
extensive sabotage or even outright destruction of the 
Mexican mining and petroleum industries by the losing faction. 
Given the recent deterioration of German-American relations, 
Washington could ill-afford either development. Almost 
certainly, then, execution of the German plan would provoke 
American armed intervention in Mexico - precisely what 
Berlin desired. That act, in turn, would have a profoundly 
negative effect upon the Allied war effort, to say nothing 
of the incipient Pan-American movement. Lansing, then, was 
determined to prevent intervention. The most immediate 
effective deterrent, he believed, was de facto recognition 
of Carranza and subsequent American support of the 
Constitutionalist Government. ^
Already all but committed to such a course, the 
Secretary was moved to haste by Warren's report. Accordingly,
lGOsmith, "Lansing,” An Uncertain Tradition, 105; 
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134n.
101Ibid.
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on September 18, anxious to obtain rapid Pan-American 
recognition of the Veracruz regime, he met again with the 
Latin American diplomats. The session did not go well for 
Lansing. Inexplicably, he.had earlier informed reporters 
that the conferees welcomed Carranza's invitation to discuss 
recognition of the Constitutionalist Government,^02 uis 
statement, of course, was untrue. Equally indiscreet was 
his admission that State Department officers in Mexico were 
already warning American citizens to evacuate at once those 
areas still under the control of Carranza's opponents.
There could be no mistaking Washington's intent: the
Wilson Administration meant to recognize Carranza.
The Latin Americans, particularly the Brazilian 
Ambassador, Domicio da Gama, were understandably indignant 
and in no mood to cooperate with Lansing. The American pro­
posal to recognize Carranza and placate his opponents was 
rejected. Failure, Lansing believed, was due largely to 
the Brazilian. De Gama, he complained to Wilson, was 
"apparently opposed to all the revolutionary factions in 
Mexico" and "unwilling to be in any way responsible for the
■^ ■Q^ New York Times, September 16, 1915.
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recognition of any of them*" In the end, Lansing was able 
to obtain no more than the other conferees' assurance that 
at a later date they would make some recommendation to their 
respective governments regarding recognition of the 
Veracruz regime. During the interim the Secretary was to 
meet once again with the Washington representatives of Villa 
and Carranza. He was then to resubmit his recommendations 
at a final session of the Pan-American conference.^4
Expressing his disappointment to the President,
Lansing nonetheless urged Wilson to accept the conferees' 
decision and to "follow out" the scheme proposed by them.
It was obvious that Carranza had won the civil war, he 
explained, and he was confident that the Latin Americans, 
however distressed they might be by that fact, would sooner 
or later accept it.^05 By October 9, the date of the final 
meeting, all had done so. Following a lengthy session in 
his Washington office, Lansing announced to reporters that 
the conferees had found the Carrancistas the "only party 
possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto 
government of Mexico."*0® Accord with Veracruz was imminent.
*04Lansing to Wilson, September 18, 1915, The Lansing 
Papers, II, 552-554.
*05Ibid. J-O^New York Times, October 10,1915..
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VII.
Discovery of Germany's Mexican intrigue was the 
decisive factor in convincing Administration officials that 
the United States must come to terms with the First Chief.
To be sure, both Wilson and Lansing were already of the 
opinion that the revolutionary aspirations of the Mexican 
people were best represented by the Constitutionalist party. 
Moreover, Obregon's victories in the North left no doubt as 
to which of the contending factions was dominant. Nonethe­
less, while President and Secretary alike acknowledged both 
the preeminence of the Constitutionalists and the prudence 
of recognizing the Veracruz regime, they balked at accepting 
Carranza as chief of state. Only after receipt of the 
Justice Department report of September 15 did they begin to 
relent. Full disclosure of Rintelen's Mexican venture left 
them little choice. Thereafter, the Wilson Administration 
was committed to recognition of the Constitutionalist Govern­
ment with Carranza as its head.
On October 10, the day after the Pan-American deci­
sion to recognize the First Chief, Lansing set forth in his 
diary both a statement of the Administration's current 
position vis ja vis Mexico and guidelines for its relations 
with that country for the duration of the war in Europe.
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"Looking at the general situation," he wrote, he had come to 
the "following conclusions:
Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico 
until the United States is forced to intervene; 
therefore we must not intervene.
Germany does not wish to have any one faction 
dominant in Mexico; therefore, we must recognize one 
faction as dominant in Mexico.
When we recognize a faction as the government, 
Germany will undoubtedly seek to cause a quarrel 
between that government and ours; therefore, we must 
avoid a quarrel regardless of criticism and complaint 
in Congress and the press.
It comes down to this," he closed: "Our possible relations
with Germany must be our first consideration; and all our
intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. "-*-0 7
Lansing's position on future Mexican-American 
relations was unquestionably well taken. To have pursued 
the aggressive interventionist scheme of the Antirevolu­
tionists would have been to run the risk of a major Mexican- 
American conflict and the attendant deterioration of rela­
tions between Washington and the other Latin American 
republics. Moreover, to have succumbed to the passions and 
pressures engendered by the civil strife in Mexico would 
have been to play the German game to perfection. Clearly, 
then, it was in the best interest of the American Government
lO^Quoted in Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive
Era, 134n.
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to adopt the Secretary's position. And so it did, albeit 
not without grave misgivings and ill-concealed disappoint­
ment in some quarters.-^88 Accordingly, on October 19, 1915, 
the United States joined eight other American republics in 
extending de facto recognition to the Constitutionalist 
Government of Mexico.
108villa's friend and sponsor,. General Hugh Scott, 
was particularly upset. Clendenen, The U. s. and Villa, 
193-194. So, too, for different reasons, were Canova and 
the Antirevolutionists. Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican 
Revolution, 300-301. Prom its inception, the new policy 
was subject to great stress and on more than one occasion 
was very nearly abandoned. In time, Lansing himself was 
prepared to repudiate it. Cline, The United States and 
Mexico, 187. Thereafter, its retention was due almost 
entirely to the President. Despite Lansing's eventual 
return to an interventionist position, his initial analysis 
of the objectives and possible consequences of the German 
intrigue in America proved irrefutable. Ibid., 184-185. 
That fact plus Wilson's unswerving committment to the 
Revolution more or less assured Washington's adherence to 
the new Mexican policy through the end of the war in Europe. 
Ibid., 185.
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I.
Relieved if not jubilant over the Mexican settle­
ment, Wilson and Lansing anticipated speedy disengagement 
from the internal affairs of Mexico and an extended respite 
from further serious differences with the revolutionary 
government. Their optimism was premature. Indeed, rela­
tions with Carranza, as well as with Villa and with the 
Mexican people generally, shortly took a sharp turn for the 
worse. Villa, of course, was embittered by recognition of 
the Veracruz regime. His violent response to that and to 
subsequent American acts injurious to his cause in turn 
provoked the Wilson Administration to pursue a course which 
ultimately brought both nations to the brink of war. Conse­
quently, from early 1916 through the spring of the following 
year, Mexican-American relations remained at a nadir.
Although neither Wilson nor Carranza wanted war, 
there were forces at work on both sides of the border which
356
357
rendered it highly unlikely that peace would prevail.1 
Moreover, throughout the greater part of that critical 
period, neither leader was in a position to altogether 
neutralize those elements working for war. Election-year
^■Cline, The United States and Mexico, 177. Formi­
dable domestic opposition to the unexpected shift in the 
Administration's Mexican policy had arisen some time prior 
to its official adoption. Press releases following the Pan- 
American conference of September 18 had hinted strongly at 
approaching recognition of the Veracruz regime. New York 
Times, September 19, 1915. Roman Catholic reaction was 
vehemently negative. Both in the press and in private com­
munications to top Administrative officials spokesmen for 
American Roman Catholicism expressed dismay and indignation. 
The first wave of protest, however, was "all merely a prelude 
to the violent denunciation" that followed the Pan-American 
conference of October 9. Lansing's statement to newsmen at 
the close of that decisive meeting set off a "storm of almost 
unprecedented magnitude . . .  a violent last-ditch campaign" 
by American Roman Catholics "to thwart the final act of 
recognition of the Constitutionalist regime." Link, Wilson: 
Struggle for Neutrality, 640-641. See, for example, Edward 
P. Allen, Bishop of Mobile, to Wilson, October 4, 1915, and 
J. H. Carey, Auxiliary Bishop to Ogdensburg, to Wilson, 
October 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/16415. Wilson and Lansing were 
taken aback. Although neither sympathized with the Mexican 
Church, foreign and domestic political pressures had prompted 
them to press Carranza for a cessation of religious perse­
cution. The First Chief had responded with "broad guarantees 
of religious freedom" for the Mexican people. Administration 
officials, therefore, were satisfied with the religious set­
tlement and not a little annoyed at the impassioned protest 
of the Roman Catholic community. In fact, Link concludes, 
the overall effect of that protest was "to harden their de­
termination to proceed to the final stages of the policy 
already announced." Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality,
641-642. Roman Catholic resistance to that policy persisted, 
however. See, for example, the statement of James Cardinal 
Gibbons in New York Times, October 30, 1915.
358
political considerations unquestionably embarrassed Wilson 
and limited the options at his disposal.2 Nonetheless, he 
possessed far greater domestic political power and consider­
ably more freedom of action in the conduct of foreign affairs 
than did his Mexican counterpart. At no time did Carranza 
match the President of the United States in the degree of 
influence each enjoyed over his respective government and 
people.
The crux of the Mexican problem, as the Antirevolu­
tionists had repeatedly advised their superiors, was the 
moral and political weakness of the Constitutionalist regime. 
It lacked the resources, the cohesiveness, and the unity of 
purpose to complete the all-important task of pacification. 
Although that government had indeed experienced notable 
success in the field, it singularly failed to exploit its 
momentary military ascendancy. Instead of eliminating Villa 
and systematically reducing the remaining regional caudillos, 
it allowed the former to escape and recover and the latter 
to thrive as never before. Nor was that government
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 175.
^Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 34-35; Long to Lansing 
August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130; Long to Lansing, December 12, 
1919, SDR 711.12/229 1/2. For specific examples see Bevan 
to Lansing, October 12, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 767 and
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successful in winning and retaining the allegiance of the 
Mexican people as a whole. Consequently, large areas of 
the republic remained disaffected throughout the Carranza 
era.4
Still more important, the First Chief exercised little 
more than nominal control over his commanders in the field. 
Away from the capital each Constitutionalist general operated 
as a law unto himself. It was only with the greatest diffi­
culty that Carranza was able to impose his will upon them.5 
Thus if Villa and the several regional caudillos were no 
longer serious contenders for mastery of Mexico, the First 
Chief himself was by no means in control of the entire repub­
lic. It was, then, patently impossible for the Constitu­
tionalist Government to restore order throughout Mexico.
That fact, in turn, precluded the establishment of lasting 
amicable relations with the United States.
Bevan to Lansing, November 18, SDR 812.00/16857 (Pelaez in 
the Huasteca Veracruzana); Guyant to Lansing, October 25, 
1915, SDR 812.00/16668 (Cantu in Baja California); Roosevelt 
to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 812.00/16889 (Meixueiro 
and Santibanez in Oaxaca)•
4Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130; 




On October 19, 1915, the Wilson Administration for­
mally extended de facto recognition to the Constitutionalist 
Government, agreed to exchange ambassadors with Veracruz, 
and halted the shipment of arms to all other Mexican 
factions.® In return for those important concessions, 
Carranza was expected to deal "promptly and effectively" 
with eighteen outstanding issues between the two countries.7 
Although as Louis Kahle observes, Washington's demands "were 
not in any sense unreasonable, some of them placed Carranza 
in a difficult position . . . . And so they did. Fore­
most among them were a guarantee of American and other 
foreign property rights in Mexico and the immediate cessation 
of Mexican "bandit" raids north of the Rio Grande. In the 
first instance, the American demand clashed with one of the
®Lansing to Arredondo, October 19, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 771; Wilson to Secretary of the Treasury, 
October 19, 1915, Ibid., 781.
7Lansing to Arredondo, October 19, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16548 1/2.
®Louis G. Kahle, "Robert Lansing and the Recognition 
of Venustiano Carranza," HAHR, XXXVIII (August, 1958), 368. 
The aforementioned demands were originally drafted by Canova 
and subsequently approved by his superiors. Canova memo­
randum, October 13, 1915, SDR 812.00/16546 1/2.
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primary objectives of the Revolution; in the second, the 
matter was not altogether within Carranza's power to control. 
In neither case, then, did the Wilson Administration obtain 
satisfaction.
In the months that followed, abuse of foreign prop­
erty rights in Mexico intensified. At the same time, unrest 
along the border, although somewhat diminished, continued to 
poison relations between the neighboring republics. Moreover, 
there was mounting evidence to the effect that prominent 
Carrancista officials, perhaps even the First Chief himself, 
were deeply involved in both a determined assault on foreign 
property rights and in a well-organized campaign of terror 
against the Southwestern border states. Although Carranza 
repeatedly denied Constitutionalist collusion in either 
endeavor, he appears to have been as unwilling as he was 
unable to curb the excesses of his more zealous anti- 
American subordinates.^ By the end of 1915, then, relations 
between the First Chief and the Wilson Administration had
9Carothers to Canova, March 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/20668; 
Funston to Newton D. Baker, June 7, 1916, Foreign Relations, 
1916, 568-569; Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids on the 
Lower Rio Grande Valley - 1915," Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly, LVI (1954) , 298, 308-309 (hereafter cited as 
"Border Raids," SHQ).
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already begun to sour. Early the following year, a vengeful 
Villa administered the coup de grace to the short-lived 
reconciliation between Washington and the government of 
Venustiano Carranza.
III.
The causes of friction between the United States and 
Mexico during the immediate post-recognition period were 
manifold. One, however, was paramount - the failure, for 
whatever reason, of the Constitutionalist Government to 
restore order in northern Mexico. The weakness or culpa­
bility of that government, in turn, seriously exacerbated 
three highly volatile Mexican-American disputes: the first
stemming from the bizarre Plan of San Diego; the second, 
from the sanguinary Yagui Indian uprising in the states of 
Sonora and Sinaloa; and the third, from the depredations of 
Pancho Villa on both sides of the Rio Grande. By the spring 
of 1916, none of the aforementioned disputes, each in its 
own way a potential casus belli, had been settled. A new 
Mexican-American crisis of major proportions was in the 
making.
The movement engendered by the Plan of San Diego was 
perhaps the most dangerous and potentially explosive of all 
Mexican-American disputes during the Carranza era. Cutting
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across regional and factional lines, the movement apparently 
enjoyed widespread popular support throughout much of the 
Mexican nation.^ For large numbers of Mexican patriots on 
both sides of the Rio Grande it was a veritable crusade, the 
long-awaited opportunity to settle a lengthy list of griev­
ances against the Colossus of the North. Although initially 
favored by the First Chief and enthusiastically endorsed by 
many of his subordinates, the plan was not of Constitu­
tionalist origin. ^  Certainly it was never acknowledged 
as official policy of the Constitutionalist Government, 
quite the contrary,.-^ Nonetheless, the movement could not
^ Conq. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4847; 
Funston to the Adjutant General, October 28, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16667; Carothers to Canova, March 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
20668; Testimony of L. C. Hill, January 22, 1920, IMA, 1263; 
Testimony of S. C. Kile, January 22, 1920, Ibid., 1247.
Kile, a captain in the United States Army, was a military 
intelligence officer assigned to Southern Department Head­
quarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, He was called upon to 
verify a published account of the 1915-1916 border distur­
bances as presented in Frank Cushman Pierce's A Brief 
History of the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
■^Funston to Baker, June 7, 1916, Foreign Relations, 
1916. 568-569; Randolph Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, 
Ibid., 570. Robertson, a Texan was appointed Vice-Consul 
at Monterrey in December, 1915. From August to December, 
1916, he was on special assignment in Washington with the 
Division of Mexican Affairs. In September, 1918, he was 
appointed Vice-Consul at Nuevo Laredo. Register, 1918, 156.
^Arredondo to Wilson, September 6, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 807-808; Arredondo to Lansing, October 6, 
1915, Ibid., 814; New York Times, September 8 and 14, 1915.
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have survived without the sympathy and assistance of 
Carrancista officials in northern Mexico. In time, however, 
the First Chief was embarrassed by the San Diego revolution 
and sought to suppress it. He was not immediately successful. 
The demise of the movement was due ultimately to its obvious 
futility and to the vigorous countermeasures adopted by both 
American and Constitutionalist authorities on both sides of 
the international boundary.
The circumstances surrounding the promulgation of 
the Plan of San Diego, a fifteen-point blueprint for revo­
lution, were not at all auspicious. The document itself 
was drafted and signed on January 6, 1915. The signatories 
were nine obscure Huertista veterans, all imprisoned in 
Monterrey for a variety of political offenses against the 
Constitutionalist Government. The name of the plan, in 
turn, derived from the prospective headquarters of the move­
ment, a tiny rural community located some one hundred miles 
north of the border in Duval County, Texas.
In accord with the Monterrey statement, on February 
20, 1915, partisans of the plan were to "rise in arms against 
the Government and country of the United States . . . ."
^Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 570.
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They were to proclaim both "the liberty of the black race1' 
from "Yankee tyranny" and the "independence and segregation" 
of the following states: Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
Colorado, and Upper California —  all of which had been stolen 
from the Mexican Nation by "North American imperialism." 
Revolutionary chiefs, waging a "war without quarter," were 
to seize "by whatever means possible" the arms and funds of 
certain predesignated Southwestern cities. Prisoners, mili­
tary and civilian alike, were to be "shot without pretext." 
So, too, were all North American males over sixteen years 
of age. Upon seizure of the aforementioned states, the con­
quered territory was to be reorganized as an independent 
republic. Union with Mexico, "if thought expedient," might 
then be considered.^
Having completed the initial stage of the plan, the 
revolutionists were to proceed to their secondary objective—  
independence for American Negroes and the establishment of 
a black republic. The Negro state was to be contiguous with 
the San Diego republic and was to consist of six western 
states wrested from the North American Union. Common cause 
was also to be made with the Apaches of Arizona and with
14Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIU. 4848.
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other Southwestern tribes, and their ancestral lands returned 
to them. Japanese, too, were to receive special considera­
tion. Under no circumstances, the statement concluded, was 
the revolutionary party to accept aid, "either moral or 
pecuniary," from the incumbent government of Mexico. Nor 
was that government to consider itself under any obligation 
to intervene on behalf of the movement.^-5
Almost immediately the Plan of San Diego became 
known to American authorities. In mid-January, 1915, Basilio 
Ramos, secretary of the movement and one of the original 
signatories, was arrested as an illegal entrant at McAllen, 
Texas.-1-6 In his possession were a copy of the plan, a code, 
and a pass through the Constitutionalist lines signed by the 
Carrancista commander at Matamoros, General Emiliano 
Nafarrate,^ Taken before the United States Commissioner at 
Brownsville, Ramos was bound over to await the action of the 
Federal grand jury. On May 13, that body returned seditious
15Ibid.
16Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign 
Relations, 1916, 570.
17Testim©ny of Tom Mayfield, January 22, 1920, IMA, 
1295. Mayfield, a Special Ranger and Hidalgo County, Texas, 
deputy sheriff, was one of the arresting officers in the 
Ramos case.
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conspiracy indictments against Ramos and the other signa­
tories of the Plan of San Diego.1® Inexplicably, the case 
against Ramos was shortly dismissed.^ Although ostensibly 
an exile from Mexico at the time of his arrest, Ramos re­
crossed the border and was subsequently amnestied by 
Constitutionalist authorities. He was then "banqueted and 
feted by Carrancista officials at Nuevo Leon, Monterrey, and 
Tampico and proclaimed a great h e r o . "2°
Upon his return to Mexico, Ramos was joined by 
Augustin Garza, another of the original conspirators and 
commander of the incipient revolutionary army.21 Together 
they moved at once to execute the Plan of San Diego. Accord­
ingly, late in May, a large band of armed Mexicans was dis­
patched across the Rio Grande on what appears to have been
^ Conq. Rec.. 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4848; 
Testimony of John A. Vails, January 22, 1920, IMA, 1210. 
Vails, district attorney of the 49th judicial district of 
Texas since 1902, prosecuted a number of San Diego revolu­
tionaries captured during the Texas raids of June, 1916. 
Ibid., 1203.
^Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign 
Relations, 1916, 570.
20lbid.; Testimony of Vails, IMA, 1205.
21Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign Rela­
tions , 1916, 570. Prior to his involvement in the Plan of 
San Diego, Garza, a Texas Mexican and an American citizen, 
had been a schoolteacher at San Diego, Texas. Upon sup­
pression of the irredentist movement, he became an agent of 
the Carrancista secret service. Testimony of Vails, IMA, 
1210.
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primarily a reconnaissance and recruiting mission.22 Texas 
authorities expressed little concern over the incursion and 
apparently failed to relate it to the intrigues of Basilio 
Ramos.23 In American Southwest the Plan of San Diego 
had been dismissed as preposterous and rapidly forgotten.
In the words of New Mexico Senator Albert B. Fall: "It was
so fantastic and struck every American as being so childish 
and ridiculous that no one with ordinary intelligence be­
lieved at the time that any responsible Mexican could be 
cognizant of it, or at least could propose to assist in 
carrying out the plan."24
But Fall and others like him failed to comprehend 
the intensity of anti-American sentiment among border 
Mexicans, particularly among those residing in the Lower 
Rio Grande Valley.23 in that district grievances against 
the Anglo-American population generally and against state
22Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1243.
23Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4847; 
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 291.
24Fall to Wilson, December 5, 1919, IMA, 843F.
^Frederick c. Turner, "Anti-Americanism in Mexico, 
1910-1913," HAHR, XLVII (November, 1967), 502-505; Cumber­
land, "Border Raids," SHQ, 286-287; Testimony of Hill, IMA, 
1262-1263; New York Times, June 3 and August 31, 1915.
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law-enforcement agents in particular were long-standing and 
for the most part legitimate. Moreover, the passions aroused 
by revolutionary propaganda, intensified by the seizure and 
occupation of Veracruz and sustained by an interminable suc­
cession of minor incidents along the border, could not be 
contained indefinitely. It was inevitable that sooner or 
later the pent-up bitterness of the border-dwellers would 
explode in violence north of the Rio Grande. What is truly 
remarkable about the San Diego uprising is not that it 
actually occurred but that it was so long in coming.
Early in the summer of 1915, another irredentist 
movement was started by two Texas Mexicans, Luis de la Rosa
2g
and Aniceto Pisano. Both were former residents of Cameron 
County, Texas, where the former had been a deputy sheriff at 
Rio Hondo and the latter a highly respected and "well fixed" 
rancher "related to a number of the leading Mexican residents 
of southwest Texas."2^ In its immediate objective, "libera­
tion" of the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande
2®Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign 
Relations, 1916, 570.
2^Ibid.; Testimony of Hill, IMA, 1263. Hill, who 
had leased his Los Tulitos ranch to Pisano for some fifteen 
years prior to the border uprising, described the latter as 
"honorable . . . high-class and as straight a Mexican citizen 
as there was in that country." Ibid.
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rivers, the new movement differed significantly from the 
more ambitious Plan of San Diego.2 8 its long-range ob­
jectives, however, appear to have been identical with those 
of the Monterrey conspirators. By mid-summer, the two 
groups were closely allied and, for all practical purposes, 
had become one and the same. Their respective leaders, in 
turn, were in general agreement that the main effort of 
their combined forces should be directed against the Lower 
Rio Grande Valley.29 Thus was launched the so-called Texas 
rebellion.
It was the logical move. A large segment of the 
preponderantly Mexican-American population of that district 
was either totally disaffected or deeply dissatisfied with 
Anglo-American political and economic ascendancy. Several 
of the more prominent leaders of the irredentist movement 
and perhaps the majority of their following were themselves
2®Ibid., 1264; Funston to the Adjutant General, 
October 22 and 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/16567 and /16667. The 
raiders referred to themselves as the Army of Liberation 
for Mexicans in Texas. New York Times, August 12, 1915.
29Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign 
Relations, 1916. 570-571; Cumberland, "Border Raids,"
SHQ, 291.
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Texas Mexicans.30 Thus they would be operating on familiar 
ground and could anticipate the active collaboration or at 
least the sympathetic neutrality of the majority of the in­
habitants. In that respect they do not appear to have been 
disappointed.31 The critical factor, however, in the deci­
sion to initiate the revolution in the south Texas counties 
was the attitude of Carrancista officials in the adjacent 
Mexican states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon.
Apparently aware of the Plan of San Diego from the 
very beginning, Constitutionalist authorities at Monterrey,
Matamoras, and Nuevo Laredo not only refused to suppress the 
movement but gave it their wholehearted support.32 Evidence
30New York Times. August 12, 1915; Testimony of W. E. 
Vann, January 23, 1920, IMA. 1296. Vann was Sheriff of 
Cameron County, Texas during the border disturbances of 1915- 
1916; Testimony of Kile, Ibid., 1247.
^Testimony of Hill, Ibid., 1254, 1263.
32Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916. Foreign Rela­
tions, 1916. 570-572; Testimony of R. L. Barnes, January 22, 
1920, IMA, 1232-1234. Barnes, a major in the United States 
Army, was chief intelligence officer for the Southern Depart­
ment and had served in that capacity since receiving his 
commission in the fall of 1917. Prior to that time, from 
December, 1913 to October, 1917, he was head of the San 
Antonio Division of the Justice Department's Bureau of 
Investigation. His jurisdiction included the States of 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Ibid., 1231-1232. Obvi­
ously, Barnes was in a position to know a great deal both 
about developments along the border and within Mexico itself. 
No one in the Wilson Administration was more advantageously
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indicates that during the late summer and early fall of 1915 
and again in the spring and summer of 1916 those officials 
provided not only sanctuary but invaluable material assist- 
ance to the San Diego revolutionaries. Weapons, ammunition, 
and horses were supplied by Carrancista commanders, and both 
the Constitutionalist railways and telegraph service were 
placed at their disposal.33 on more than one occasion 
Carrancista officers and enlisted men escorted the revolu­
tionaries across the border into the United States, partici­
pated in their raids, and provided protective cover during 
their withdrawals south of the Rio G r a n d e .3  ^ Almost all of 
the strikes against the lower Texas counties in the summer 
and fall of 1915 were organized and launched from territory 
under the control of the aforementioned General Nafarrate.
placed to observe the course of the Revolution; nor did 
anyone, excepting perhaps the staff of the Division of 
Mexican Affairs, have access to such a wealth of information 
on the internal affairs of Mexico.
^Testimonies of Barnes and Vails, Ibid., 1232-1234 
and 1203, 1212-1214; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, 
Foreign Relations, 1916, 570-571.
34New York Times. August 12 and September 5, 25, and 
30, 1915; Alonzo B. Garrett to Lansing, June 11, 1916, 
Foreign Relations, 1916, 573; Lansing to Rodgers, June 13, 
1916, Ibid. 575; Garrett to Lansing, June 17, 1916, Ibid., 
576. Garrett had been United States Consul at Nuevo Laredo 
since 1901. Register, 1918, 112.
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A close friend of both Pisano and de la Rosa, Nafarrate was 
intensely anti-American and deeply involved in the Texas 
rebellion.35 At the height of the disturbances along the 
border, he is alleged to have publicly boasted that he would 
personally "plant the Mexican flag on top of the Brownsville 
Post Office."35
In addition to Nafarrate, there were other prominent 
Constitutionalist officials, both in the Northeast and at 
Carrancista headquarters itself, who actively supported the 
Plan of San Diego. Niceforo Zambrano, former Treasurer 
General of the Constitutionalist Government and Governor of 
the State of Nuevo Leon during the Texas rebellion, raised 
both men and money for the movement.37 So, too, did General 
Portunato Zuazua38 and General Mario Mendez, chief of the 
government telegraphic s e r v i c e . 39 Generals Candido Aguilar 
and Pablo Gonzalez were also alleged to have provided arms
35Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign Rela­
tions, 1916, 571; Punston to Baker, June 7, 1916, Ibid., 568.
35New York Times, August 12, 1915.
^ T e s t i m o n i e s  Qf Barnes and Vails, IMA, 1232 and 1203.
38Testimony of Barnes, Ibid., 1232-1234.
35Testimony of Vails, Ibid., 1213.
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and money to the revolutionaries, the latter officer some 
10,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition.4° in 
addition, a number of colonels and junior officers assigned 
to Constitutionalist garrisons along the international 
boundary provided logistical and in some instances tactical 
support for the raiders.41 When in late summer, 1916, the 
San Diego revolutionary forces were finally disbanded, 
several of the leaders —  some of whom were American citizens—  
were given Constitutionalist commissions and "incorporated 
into the Mexican army."42 Unquestionably, then, the Texas 
rebellion enjoyed something more than the limited clandes­
tine support of a handful of anti-American zealots.
Carranza himself was fully cognizant of the Plan of
San Diego and took advantage of the movement to advance the
interests of the Veracruz regime.42 The First Chief,
Cumberland contends, was determined to win American recogni­
tion for his government and was prepared to resort to "any
40Ibid.; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign 
Relations, 1916, **572.
41Lansing to Rodgers, June 13, 1916, Ibid., 575; 
Garrett to Lansing, June 17, 1916, Ibid., 576; New York Times, 
September 25 and 30, 1915.
42TestiAony of Barnes, IMA, 1233. De la Rosa and 
Pisano, both American citizens, were cases in point. Ibid.; 
Bundy to the Adjutant General, November 26, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16890.
42Carothers to Canova, March 7,1916,SDR 812.00/20668.
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means at his disposal" to obtain that end.44 The distur­
bances along the border "fitted in well" with his plans. 
Carranza viewed the unrest as a "means of applying pressure" 
on the Wilson Administration.45 On the other hand, Cumberland 
questions whether or not the First Chief actually encouraged 
Nafarrate.46 It is a moot point. Simply by failing to 
restrain the General and other supporters of the Texas rebel­
lion, Carranza implicitly approved their activities; explicit 
encouragement was unnecessary.
Carranza's tolerance of the Lower Valley raids was a 
shrewd calculated risk. He was well aware both of the 
President's strong aversion to further intervention in Mexico 
and of the intense pressure to intervene which the raids 
would ultimately bring to bear upon the White House. Gam­
bling on Wilson's forebearance, the First Chief convincingly
44Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 298.
45Ibid. In the Lower Rio Grande Valley that fact was 
recognized by Mexicans and Americans alike. According to one 
irate American border-dweller: "The belief is universal
among the Mexicans that they have bluffed the United States 
into recognizing Carranza, that the wholesale murder of 
Americans and destruction of American property has forced 
the United States to accept the so-called Carranza Government," 
H. L. Yates to Lansing, October 19, 1915, SDR 812.00/16523.
46Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 298.
376
protested his innocence and insisted "that he could not 
cope properly with the raiders as long as there was no 
legally recognized government in Mexico."47 His implica­
tion was clear: recognition of the Veracruz regime would
be attended by dispersal of the raider bands and the re­
storation of order along the border.
Actually, Carranza could have halted the raids at 
any time "had he made the effort in cooperation with 
American officials."4® Indeed, shortly after Pan-American 
recognition of the Constitutionalist Government, the raids 
all but ceased. That fact, Cumberland concludes, "indicates 
quite clearly" that the First Chief had deliberately con­
doned the Plan of San Diego and had used that movement as 
an "instrument of policy" in hastening recognition of the 
Veracruz regime.4®
IV.
The initial Mexican reconnaissance of May, 1915, was 
followed by further probes in July. At least twice those
47Ibid. See, for example, Arredondo to Lansing, 
September 6 , 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 808.
4 ^Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 308.
4®Ibid.- Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 572.
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forays culminated in sharp clashes between the intruders 
and local Anglo-American p o s s e s , 5° Then, early in August, 
there was a virtual "invasion of Texas,"51 on the sixth 
of that month, a large band of raiders, many of them former 
residents of the Brownsville area, struck Sebastian, Texas, 
looting the settlement and kidnapping and executing the 
president of the local Law and Order League.52 The fol­
lowing day, far to the west, a large party of Mexicans 
crossed the border near Duguesne, Arizona, and made off with 
hundreds of head of cattle and horses.53 Meanwhile, in the 
scrub country around Brownsville, civilian posses, Texas 
Rangers, and elements of the Twelfth Cavalry repeatedly made 
contact with parties of armed Mexicans. Casualties on both 
sides mounted. On August 8, another band of thirty to fifty 
raiders fell upon the Las Norias Ranch, some sixty miles 
north of Brownsville, and a day-long battle ensued.54 Two
5®Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1243; New York Times, July 6 , 
7, and 9, 1915.
5iCong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4847.
52New York Times, August 7, 1915.
^3Ibid., August 8 , 1915.
54Ibid., August 9, 1915; Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1244.
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days later, in pursuit of the Norias raiders, the first 
American soldier was killed.
On August 11, Texas Governor James E. Ferguson ap­
pealed to the President for reenforcements. Conditions 
along the border were "perilous and grave," he declared: 
"Every twelve hours a loss of life or wounding of American 
citizens occurs. Texas citizens have been murdered. Post 
Offices have been robbed, and rangers and soldiers have 
been killed within the last week." The offenders were 
"mostly Mexicans from across the border," the Governor 
charged, although some were undoubtedly American citizens. 
Ferguson feared that he could not long control the situation. 
"I do not overdraw the picture," he closed, "when I say that 
a reign of terror exists on the Mexican border and that any 
unusual occurrence now would cause a disastrous invasion of 
Texas from Mexico."5^
Reports from the border tended to corroborate the 
Governor's statement. General Frederick Funston, commander
5% e w  York Times. August 11, 1915.
5®Ibid., August 12, 1915. Conditions in the Lower 
Valley in August, 1915, were "veryi.bad indeed," according to 
a contemporary witness, Cameron County Deputy Sheriff Mike 
Monohan: "People felt unsafe- except in our . . . biggest
towns, all the little towns were being crowded by soldiers 
and by civilian posses, . . . people were moving, and dis­
satisfied and it was about as fierce as you could expect." 
Testimony of Mike Monohan, January 22, 1920, IMA, 1266.
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of the Southern District, confirmed the existence of the Plan 
of San Diego and reported that for some time Texas Mexicans 
had been spreading the plan on both sides of the Rio Grande. 
His intelligence indicated that the rash of raids in Cameron, 
Hidalgo, Starr, and Willacy counties was being directed by 
partisans of the plan with headquarters located in Browns­
ville itself.5?
Unconfirmed reports from other official sources 
revealed that since the first of the month numerous bands 
of thirty to forty armed Mexicans had crossed into Texas. 
Furthermore, many of the men were believed to be Constitu­
tionalist soldiers from the Matamoros garrison of General 
Nafarrate. There no longer appeared to be any doubt as to 
their objective: preposterous as it seemed, it was indeed
the conquest of south Texas and possibly the entire South­
western United States.5®
Meanwhile, in Laredo, "loyal" Mexican-Americans were 
warning officials there that "a dangerous sentiment had been 
fomented among Mexicans across the border." It was due, they 
explained, to the "alleged harm done to Mexico by the failure
57wew York Times, August 12, 1915.
58ibid.
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of the United States to recognize Carranza." It was their 
opinion that "it needed only a good opportunity for this 
sentiment to break into violence against the American border." 
Taking no chances, Federal and State authorities maintained 
a close watch along the Rio Grande for a considerable dis­
tance above and below Brownsville.59
For the most part their efforts were fruitless.
Strong parties of raiders continued to cross and recross the 
Lower Rio Grande almost at will. They struck repeatedly at 
rural settlements, isolated ranches, and railroad and tele­
graph facilities. Running fights between the intruders and 
cavalrymen or civilian posses were almost daily occurrences 
throughout the months of August and September. Consequently, 
many ranches and outlying settlements in the southermost 
Texas counties were virtually abandoned by the Anglo-American 
population, the men joining posses and their families going 
to Corpus Christi or other havens to the north for the dura­
tion of the disturbances.50 The rural Mexican-American 
community did not fare so well. Caught between the demands
59Ibid.
60Ibid., August 24, 1915; Testimony of W. B. Hinkly, 
January 21, 1920, IMA, 1183? Cumberland, "Border Raids,"
SHQ, 301-302.
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of the raiders on one hand and the indiscriminate vengeance 
of their Anglo-American neighbors on the other, large numbers 
fled to Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo, thereby exacerbating the 
already virulent anti-American sentiment on the south bank 
of the Rio Grande. ^
Tension soon gripped west Texas as well. On August 
11, some 300 men in Carrancista uniforms crossed the river 
above Del Rio and burned a strategic railroad bridge near 
Langtry, Texas.62 days later, another party struck the
settlement of Polvo, just east of El Paso, calling the 
Postmaster to his door and shooting him down before his 
family.63 Thus, by mid-August, Governor Ferguson's con­
tention that a "reign of terror" existed along the border 
was by no means an exaggeration.
Despite knowledge of the Plan of San Diego, Federal 
officials in Washington and on the border were at a loss to
6^Ibid., 300-302; New York Times, September 3 and 7, 
1915; Testimony of J. I. Kleiber, January 23, 1920, IMA, 
1278-1279. Kleiber, a resident of Brownsville, Texas, had 
been district attorney of the 28th judicial district of Texas 
since 1894. He was one of several Americans killed or criti­
cally wounded by members of De la Rosa's band in the hold-up 
of a passenger train near Brownsville on October 18, 1915. 
Ibid., 1269-1274.
62New York Times, August 12, 1915.
63Ibid., August 15, 1915.
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explain the disturbances.64 For Wilson and Lansing, then 
engaged in highly sensitive negotiations for a compromise 
settlement of the Mexican civil war, the matter was ex­
tremely unsettling. By early August, it had become apparent 
that the Constitutionalists, if not Carranza himself, would 
soon dominate the greater part of the republic. It was 
equally clear that the Veracruz regime was the only faction 
qualifying for recognition, and that sooner or later 
Washington would have to acknowledge that fact. Yet from 
the very beginning of the Texas rebellion it had been per­
sistently rumored that prominent Carrancista officials and 
perhaps even the First Chief himself stood behind the move­
ment. por the Wilson Administration it was indeed a 
perturbing situation.
On August 14, it became still more so. On that date, 
General Funston, theretofore convinced that the disturbances 
were almost wholly the work of Texas Mexicans, met with a 
committee headed by Congressman John Nance Garner of Texas 
to examine new evidence shedding light on the causes of the
®^Ibid., August 12, September 26, and October 23, 
1915; Cumberland "Border Raids," SHQ, 292-293.
65New York Times, August 12 and 15, 1915.
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rebellion. Funston emerged from the meeting convinced that 
the uprising "had been fostered by Mexican authorities." 
Affidavits submitted to the War Department indicated that 
General Nafarrate was both encouraging and actively as­
sisting the raiders and that "a date had actually been set 
by the Mexicans for the sacking of B r o w n s v i l l e . "66 The same 
day, a War Department press release revealed "that a consi­
derable portion" of the party that struck Las Norias Ranch 
on August 8 had been "officers and soldiers of Carranza's
forces." It was assumed, however, that they had acted with-
67out the "authority of their chiefs." In Washington, an 
indignant Arredondo hotly denied the charge.**8
By mid-August, the situation on the border had be­
come very ugly. On the night of the 14th, a serious riot 
erupted in the streets of Nogales, Arizona, when a group of 
Mexicans attempted to disarm American soldiers. One soldier 
was killed in the melee, and an aroused mob of Anglo-Americans 
forced some 200 Mexicans to flee across the boundary. Spokes­
man for the crowd demanded that "all Mexicans" be driven out 
of the country.**9
6*Ibid., August 15, 1915.
67Ibid. 6®Ibid. 69Ibid.
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South of the border feelings were equally high, and 
with good cause. For days, cavalry patrols, Texas Rangers' 
and other law enforcement officers had been systematically 
disarming Mexican-American residents in the embattled 
southern counties. The Rangers, in particular, seem to have 
gone about their task with excessive zeal; so much so, in 
fact, that scores of Mexican-American families fled the 
State of Texas.Furthermore, following the Las Norias 
raid, certain Rangers were photographed dragging the bodies 
of Mexicans behind their horses. Almost immediately the 
photographs reappeared in the form of postcards and were 
widely circulated throughout northern Mexico. As a result, 
American citizens in the interior of the republic were 
threatened repeatedly by Carrancista soldiers outraged over 
the alleged lynching and abuse of their countrymen north of 
the border.^
70Ibid., August 17 and September 7, 1915; Cumberland, 
"Border Raids," SHQ. 301. One contemporary observer noted 
that "the killing of Mexicans through the borderland in these 
last four years is almost incredible. Some Rangers have 
degenerated into common man-killers. There is no penalty for 
killing, for no jury along the border would ever convict a 
white man for shooting a Mexican." Ronald Atkin, Revolution; 
Mexico 1910-20 - {New York: The John Day Company, 1969) , 272.
^ Hew York Times, August 17 and September 7, 1915.
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V.
On August 16, perhaps because o£ the aforementioned 
incidents, the raiders changed their tactics. Near Mercedes, 
Texas, a band of some 100 Mexicans pursued and surrounded 
a cavalry detachment, killing one soldier and wounding 
several others.73 Thereafter, looting and the destruction 
of property largely gave way to aggressive strikes against 
Texas lawmen and the United States Army. Although their 
casualties rose sharply, the raiders persisted in those 
attacks. At the same time, overriding foreign policy con­
siderations prompted officials in Washington to urge the 
utmost restraint in suppressing the Texas rebellion. The 
Administration, Funston was advised, was /'making an earnest 
effort" to compose the Mexican situation by "diplomatic 
means." The President, his superior informed him, "wishes 
to impress upon you the necessity of exercising the greatest 
moderation and caution . . . lest his plans of peaceful 
solution be nullified by . . .  an armed conflict on the 
border."73
The third week in August was marked by relative calm 
in the south Texas counties. Near Lochiel, Arizona, however.
7 2lbid., August 17, 1915.
73Breckenridge to Funston, August 17, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 803-804.
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cavalry units were fired upon by raiders who fell back into 
territory controlled by Carrancista General P. E. Calles#74 
Although unlike Nafarrate, Calles does not appear to have 
actively supported the irredentist movement, he nonetheless 
did nothing to discourage it. Consequently raiding into 
Arizona continued.76 It did not, however, approach the 
intensity of the campaign in the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
The following week, violence again erupted along the 
Texas border. Evidence of Carrancista participation was now 
conclusive.76 Every day American soldiers patrolling the 
Rio Grande drew fire from the opposite bank. Men were killed 
and wounded. Mexican-American negotiations notwithstanding, 
Washington could no longer afford to ignore the Texas rebel­
lion. On August 28, Lansing ordered the United States consul 
at Matamoros to impress upon General Nafarrate the gravity
7^New York Times, August 21, 1915.
^Frederick simpich to Lansing, September 15, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1915, 811. Simpich, a journalist with 
experience in both Europe and Asia, joined the consular ser­
vice in 1909. He served thereafter.as consul or vice-consul 
in a succession.of Mexican posts. He was at Nogales from 
November, 1912 through July, 1917. In the latter month, he 
was assigned to Guaymas, Sonora. Register, 1918, 162.
76According to General Funston: Nafarrate "has taken
pains to leave (the) impression that these bands are deserters 
from his forces. It is noticed, however, that when pursued, 
they cross the river and rejoin their commends.w Lansing to 
Silliman, August 28, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 805.
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of the situation and to warn him that the matter "might 
easily lead to most serious consequences."77 It is doubtful, 
however, whether at that moment Nafarrate or any other 
Carrancista official on the border could have immediately 
extinguished the rebellion. By the end of August, the 
movement had developed a powerful momentum of its own. Its 
supporters on both sides of the border were legion.78
Pressure upon Washington to take more effective 
action to suppress the uprising steadily mounted. Governor 
Ferguson was particularly insistent. He continued to call 
for further Federal assistance and, upon the discovery of 
a plot to seize El Paso, threatened to call out the Texas 
National Guard.7^ Funston, too, expected more serious dis­
turbances along the border.80 As if to confirm his fears, 
the very day that he appealed to the War Department for 
additional troops rioting broke, out in San Antonio. Federal
77Lansing to Jesse H. Johnson, August 28, 1915,
Ibid., 802.
^8Funston to the Adjutant General, November 17, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16842; Testimonies of Kile and Hill, IMA, 1247 
and 1263; New York Times, August 12 and 31, 1915.
78Ibid., August 25, 27, and 29, 1915. The Army was
already in a strong position on the border with some 17,000
men under Funston's command. Ibid., August 12, 1915.
80punston to Garrison, August 30, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 806.
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and state authorities there subsequently announced the 
frustration of a revolutionary uprising and the arrest of 
twenty-six partisans of the Plan of San Diego.
The General was explicit: "Owing to the great
preponderance of the Mexican over the American population
all along the border, to the excitable character of the
£
Mexicans and to the vengeful feeling that exists among 
Americans due to the recent outrages committed by . . . 
bands . . . composed partly of Mexican soldiers, the situ­
ation . . .  is now likely to give rise to such serious 
consequences that further delay is dangerous." If a wide­
spread uprising should occur without sufficient troops to 
put it down, he warned, "it will mean the murder of hundreds 
of defenseless people, the destruction of millions of prop­
erty and a loss of prestige." A single "act of indiscretion 
by a subordinate commander on either side [could] start a 
conflagration that [would] extend along the entire border 
and result in an international crisis." He had been hesitant 
to call for additional troops, the General explained, because 
he hoped to avoid unnecessary expense." The "time for 
economy," however, had passed. "More troops should be
8% e w  York Times, August 31, 1915.
supplied regardless of expense. Whatever action it may be 
proposed to take,” he concluded, "should be taken at once."82 
For the moment, at least, the Wilson Administration could 
do little more than it had already done to suppress the 
rebellion. Determined as ever to avoid intervention and 
increasingly anxious since the discovery of Germany's Mexican 
intrigue to regularize relations with the neighboring repub­
lic, the President dared not risk a serious rupture with the 
Veracruz regime. Thus the Administration's response to con­
tinuing unrest on the border was limited to strengthening 
the forces under Funston's command and to requesting anew 
the cooperation of Carrancista authorities in quelling the 
Texas rebellion. Those measures, however, proved largely 
ineffective. Although the former did result in higher 
Mexican casualties, the latter brought nothing but empty 
promises. Neither appears to have had the slightest effect 
in deterring the San Diego revolutionaries.
The month of September opened with an apparent 
attempt to isolate Brownsville and other border communities. 
On September 2, raiders led by Aniceto Pisano destroyed a 
bridge and track on the St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico
82punston to Garrison, August 30, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 806.
Railroad. Two Anglo-American prisoners taken during the raid 
were executed; a third, pretending to be a German citizen, 
was released u n h a r m e d . T h e  following day another bridge 
was burned between Harlingen and the border, further iso­
lating Brownsville and appearing to confirm American fears 
that a large-scale invasion of south Texas was in the offing.®^ 
While bands of raiders renewed attempts to recruit Texas 
Mexicans as far north as Duval County, Carrancista soldiers 
in Matamoros repeatedly fired on American airplanes flying 
over Brownsville and exchanged shots with troops guarding the 
city's power p l a n t . T e n s i o n  on the American side of the 
border mounted daily.
On September 4, near Hidalgo, Texas, cavalrymen and 
Rangers fought a major engagement with raiders and
8®New York Times, September 3, 1915; Testimony of 
S. S. Dodds, January 22, 1920, IMA. 1250-1253. Dodds was 
the surviving prisoner. Again, the question arises as to 
the degree of German involvement in Mexican-American dif­
ferences from early 1915 through the end of the First World 
War. Cumberland notes that "there was a suggestion of pro- 
German motivation" in several of the border raids. Cumber­
land, "Border Raids," SHOf 311n. His contention would appear 
to be verified by Dodds' testimony and by that of Marcus Hines, 
a mounted customs inspector and a participant in several 
skirmishes with the raiders. Testimony of Marcus Hines, 
January 23, 1920, XMA, 1311-1312.
®^New York Times, September 3, 1915.
85Ibid., September 3 and 4, 1915; Lansing to Arredondo 
September 10, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 809-810.
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Carrancista soldiers along a two-mile stretch of the Rio 
Grande. Fearing that the anticipated invasion was at hand. 
Colonel A. P. Blocksam, commander of the Brownsville garrison, 
called out all troops at Fort Brown and sent them to the 
river.86 That same night, armed civilians in dozens of south 
Texas settlements braced themselves for the shock. It never 
came. Instead, Nafarrate recalled his men from the south 
bank of the river and promised American authorities that they 
would not again assist the raiders.8^ At the same time, he 
lodged a bitter protest against the harsh treatment of Mexican- 
Americans by Rangers and other state law enforcement offi­
cers.88 In the future, he pledged, his men would not inter­
fere with American soldiers patrolling the river. Rangers 
and civilian posse-men, however, were another matter; they 
would be shot on sight.88
Despite Nafarrate*s admission that his men had been 
involved in the clash of September 4, both Arredondo in 
Washington and the First Chief himself continued to vigorously 
deny Constitutionalist collusion in the Plan of San Diego.
86New York Tiroes, September 5, 1915.
8^Ibid., September 6 , 1915.
88Ibid., September 7, 1915.
89Ibid., September 14, 1915.
Texas Mexicans alone, they insisted, were responsible for 
the border disturbances.99 Meanwhile, taking Nafarrate at 
his word, American authorities temporarily withdrew all 
civilian lawmen from the Rio Grande. At the same time, they 
called upon the General to arrest and submit to them Pisano 
and De las Rosa, both of whem resided in Matamoros and moved 
freely about the city.91 Nafarrate, however, refused to 
comply. Shortly thereafter the raids began anew.
On September 13, a cavalry patrol was attacked by 
Mexican-Americans near Santa Maria, Texas. A house-to-house 
search subsequently conducted in and around the settlement 
produced an alarming number of weapons.92 Soon it was 
rumored and widely accepted by Anglo-Americans in the South­
west that Mexican-Americans from Texas to California would 
rise in revolt on September 16, the anniversary of Mexican 
independence.93 Near panic swept the border.94 On the 14th, 
in response to a mass meeting of the Anglo-American citizenry
"ibid., September 8 , 1915; Arredondo to Wilson, 
September 6 , 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 807-808.
91Garrison to Lansing, September 13, 1915, Ibid., 810 
New York Times, September 14, 1915.
92Ibid. "ibid., September 15, 1915.
9 4Xbid., Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 302.
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of Tucson, troops from Fort Huachuca occupied that city for 
the duration of the traditional independence celebration.95 
The following day, Frederick Simpich, United States Consul 
at Nogales, reported that "raids into Arizona" and the theft 
of livestock by Villista and Carrancista troops alike had 
sharply increased. General Calles, he protested, refused 
even to discuss the matter. At the moment, civil authorities 
alone were attempting to police the countryside and meeting 
with little success. Simpich urged that troops from the 
Nogales garrison be used to supplement civilian patrols.
Unless "immediate action" was taken, he warned, "a situation 
similar to that existing on the Texas border might soon 
develop.
It was a grim prospect. Throughout the Lower Rio 
Grande Valley, Anglo-Americans were again organizing in armed 
bands to put down the anticipated uprising. Still more dis­
turbing, abusive treatment of Mexican-Americans by state law- 
enforcement officers and local vigilantes had reached alarming 
proportions. For the first time, it was revealed in the 
national press that a number of suspected raiders had been
95New York Times, September 15, 1915.
96Simpich to Lansing, September 15, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 811.
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summarily executed or shot "while attempting to escape."^
Nor, Cumberland observes, were the "lynchings and executions 
the only indications of fear and vengeance." Homes in which 
raiders "purportedly held meetings" were burned by posses; 
families of Latin extraction were forcibly disarmed; and 
"self-appointed law-enforcers" coerced "Latin families in 
outlying regions to move into populated centers where they 
could be more effectively watched." The result was a "mass 
exodus" from south Texas. Hundreds of Mexican-American 
families crossed the border into Mexico, many never to return. 
By the time that order was finally restored in the Lower 
Valley, more than half of the region's population had fled 
and the economy of the south Texas counties was "practically 
ruined."®®
Meanwhile, as the fateful day approached, large 
parties of Mexicans displaying the red banner of the San
®?New York Times, September 15, 1915; Testimony of 
Kile, IMA, 1248*1249. According to Pierce, between August, 
1915 and June, 1916, some 100 suspected raiders were executed 
by Rangers and deputy sheriffs "without process of law."
Other authorities estimated the- number of summary executions, 
to be as.high as 300. Ibid. Funston believed that more than 
150 such killings had occurred by late October, 1915. 
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 303n.
^®Ibid., 300-302; Testimonies of Kile and Kleiber,
IMA, 1247 and 1279; Funston to the Adjutant General, November 
4, 1915, SDR 812.00/16752.
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Diego Revolution were sighted along the south bank of the 
Rio Grande. Ominously, they were in the company of Carran* 
cista soldiers." Perhaps at no other time during the entire 
period of unrest was tension on the border as high as it was 
on the night of September 15. Whether or not a general up­
rising had indeed been planned to coincide with the celebra­
tion of Mexican independence has never been determined. 
Whatever the case, September 16 passed without incident.
The raids, however, continued. So, too, did serious 
confrontations between American soldiers and the men of 
Nafarrate's command, on September 17, cavalrymen and 
Carrancista soldiers in Matamoros itself engaged in a two- 
hour exchange of gunfire across the Rio G r a n d e . A  week 
later, a large party of raiders, including many in Carran­
cista uniforms, struck Progreso, Texas, killing and wounding 
a number of American soldiers. Pursuing cavalrymen were 
turned back from the riverfront by intense fire from several 
hundred Mexicans entrenched on the south b a n k . 3- Funston
" New York Times, September 15, 1915.
100Funston to Garrison, September 17, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 812.
^Funston to the Adjutant General, September 24, 1915 
SDR 812.00/16302; Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1245; New York Times, 
September 25, 1915.
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and Garrison alike considered the Progreso raid and the 
ensuing engagement to be the most serious provocation since 
the disturbances along the border began. The following day, 
September 25, the Secretary of War announced his intention 
to lay the matter before the Cabinet.
Following the Progreso strike, violence along the 
border came to a "momentary halt; for the first time since 
July a full week passed without a single raid or exchange 
of shots."103 Nonetheless, rumors of an invasion from 
Mexico again began to circulate throughout the south Texas 
counties. Funston responded by reinforcing Brownsville and 
the other border posts. For the first time, too, high- 
ranking army officers on the border openly discussed the 
possibility of pursuing raiders across the river into 
Mexico.1®^ The President, however, would not countenance 
such a move. Instead, the Administration continued to 
adhere to its original position: The raiders were mostly
Texas Mexicans, the Veracruz regime was not involved in the 
disturbances, and Washington would continue to rely upon
102Ibid. ■ 1
*®2Cumberland, "Border JRaids,” SHQ, 299.
104New York Times, September 29, 1915.
397
that government for assistance in restoring order on the 
Lower Rio G r a n d e . W i l s o n  still hesitated to force the 
issue.
There were sound reasons for the President's fore- 
bearance. On September 13, four days before the Progreso 
raid, Wilson and Lansing had finally agreed to extend recog­
nition to the Veracruz regime and to accept Carranza as its 
head. Two days later that decision was reaffirmed when the 
British Government revealed to officials in Washington full 
details of the Huerta-Rintelen scheme. There existed, how­
ever, both within and without the Wilson Administration, 
a strong and determined opposition to recognition. Public 
acknowledgement of a serious dispute with Veracruz, to say 
nothing of a clash of arms with Constitutionalist forces, 
would embolden that opposition and almost certainly enable 
it to frustrate or delay the reestablishment of normal rela­
tions with Mexico. Furthermore, the Administration's new 
policy would remain in jeopardy until its adoption and 
execution by the governments of the other Pan-American 
conferees. Until such time, then, it was expedient for 
Washington to minimize the gravity of the situation on the
105Ibid.
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border. Unquestionably, high Administration officials 
sought to do just that. It proved, however, to be a most 
difficult task. The initiative belonged to the raiders.
VI.
On September 29, equivocation in Washington suddenly 
ceased. On that date, the War Department received a shock­
ing report from the border. According to the affidavit of 
a captured raider, on the night of September 23 a Carrancista 
officer and a detachment of troops from Matamoros had at- 
tacked an American patrol at Los Peladoes crossing. One 
American soldier had been killed and another seized and 
taken to the south bank of the Rio Grande. There the captive 
was executed, his ears and head cut off, and his body thrown 
into the river.10® Unconfirmed reports indicated that the 
head of the deceased was subsequently placed on a pole and 
paraded through the rural settlements between Reynosa and 
M a t a m o r o s . I t  was precisely the sort of inflammatory
incident that Wilson and Lansing dreaded.
Indignant and angry, Acting Secretary of State Frank
L. Polk immediately protested the atrocity. Special Agent
106Testimony of Mayfield, IMA, 1288-1289; Polk to 
Belt, October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 812-813.
^•^New York Times, September 30, 1915
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J. W. Belt, then assigned to Carranza's headquarters, was 
instructed to deliver Polk's rebuke and to impress upon 
Carrancista officials the seriousness of the incident.
The Veracruz regime, Polk declared, had repeatedly professed 
to control the Northeast. Because of that fact the Govern­
ment of the United States could not view such "outrages” as 
other than acts in which the soldiers had participated 
voluntarily or "because of instructions from headquarters."
In either case, he charged, the responsibility rested upon 
the First Chief.108
Expanding his indictment of Carrancista involvement 
in the border disturbances, Polk cited the recent heavy flow 
of ammunition from Monterrey to the small garrison at 
Matamoros. That traffic was inexplicable "when the movement 
of supplies had invariably been" in the opposite direction, 
and was a circumstance which had "serious bearing on the 
case." In closing, Polk demanded that Carrancista authorities
10®Polk to Belt, October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 813. Belt, trained as* an attorney, entered government
service in 1907 as a deputy collector of customs in the Canal
Zone. From July, 1914 through October, 1916, he was employed
by the Department of State as a special agent in Mexico. From
the latter month through January, 1917, he was assigned to
the Department of State in Washington, presumably to the
Division of Mexican Affairs. Thereafter, he held a succession
of minor diplomatic posts in Central and South America.
Register, 1918, 86.
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order an immediate halt to such "reprehensible acts" as the 
Los Pelados incident. Failure to do so# he declared, would 
"imply total lack of authority in a section long claimed to 
be under the complete control of the Carrancistas."109 
There was no mistaking his meaning: if the First Chief
could not maintain order on the south bank of the Rio Grande, 
the United States would be obliged to do so.
Significantly, following the strong American protest 
of October 1, incidents along the border ceased as suddenly 
as they had begun. By that date, it was an open secret that 
American recognition of the Veracru2 regime was imminent.
For Carranza, at least, the raids had served their purpose 
and now became a definite liability. Accordingly, on or 
about October 3, the First Chief replaced Nafarrate and his 
entire c o m m a n d . T h e  new commander at Matamoros, General 
Eugenio Lopez, "had no strong feelings against the United 
States and was apparently willing" to cooperate fully with 
American authorities in halting the raids. Moreover, Lopez*
lO^Polk to Belt, October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations, 
1915, 813.
I*-0 Cumber land, "Border Raids," SHQ, 302. According 
to Philip C. Hanna, the American Consul-General at Monterrey, 
Carranza himself had sent General Jacinto B. Trevino to 
Matamoros to "set Nafarrate right." Hanna to Lansing,
October 6, 1915, SDR 812.00/16469.
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command "consisted primarily of enlisted men from southern 
Mexico (in contrast to Nafarrate's men, who were native to 
the border)." Within days of the change, it was learned 
that Lopez1 men had forced the raiders to withdraw from the 
river and to retreat into the interior. American autho­
rities on the border were elated.
On October 9, Lansing announced the decision £>f the 
Pan-American conferees to extend recognition to the Veracruz 
regime. For the more enthusiastic partisans of the Plan of 
San Diego, particularly for those among them who were citi­
zens of the United States, the announcement came as a bitter 
disappointment. The reestablishment of formally amicable 
relations between the United States and Mexico meant the 
loss of sanctuary, the imminent withdrawal of all Constitu­
tionalist support, and an effective end to the Texas rebel­
lion. Their dream of an independent Mexican-American 
republic shattered and the very existence of their organi­
zation in jeopardy, the San Diego revolutionaries pursued 
the one course left open to them. Unquestionably acting 
alone and in defiance of higher Carrancista authorities, 
they renewed their raids into Texas in hope of undoing the
lllCumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 303
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recently concluded Mexican-American rapproobeaent.
On the night of October 18, Luis de la Rosa and a 
band composed largely of Texas Mexicans derailed and looted 
a passenger train between San Benito and Brownsville, Indi­
cating to the passengers that they were Carrancistas, the 
raiders shot down three unarmed American soldiers and 
several Anglo-American civilians. Persons of Latin ex­
traction were not h a r m e d . S h o r t l y  after the band's 
departure, a posse under Cameron County Sheriff J. E. Vann 
arrived at the site of the wreck. As soon as Vann himself 
had left in pursuit of De la Rosa, remaining possemen exe­
cuted a young Mexican-American passenger on suspicion of 
having assisted the raiders. His death was followed by 
that of another Mexican-American reputed to be a friend of 
the f i r s t . o t h e r  retaliatory acts occurred during the 
night, some of them far from the site of the raid. Four 
Mexican-Americans were hanged to trees along the river and 
four others were shot to death in the same vicinity. 
According to the New York Times, Anglo-American posses were 
responsible for the lynchings, and possemen "made no secret"
H 2Testimony of Kleiber, IMA, 1269-1274; New York 
Times, October 19, 1915.
^ 2Ibid., October 20, 1915.
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of the fact that an identical fate awaited all other 
"suspected bandits." Only in the Brownsville jail were sus­
pects secure from the wrath of the aroused Anglo-American 
community. It was the reporter's opinion that few if any 
Mexican prisoners taken in the Lower Valley would ever reach 
that haven alive.**4
On October 21, raiders struck again, attacking a 
cavalry patrol near Ojo de Agua. Three American soldiers 
were killed and several others wounded. **5, Funston "was 
beside himself with anger and frustration."-*-*6 The following 
day, he reported to Garrison that De la Rosa had been seen 
on the streets of Reynosa on the 20th and that Carrancista 
authorities had made no attempt to arrest him.1*7 The 
initial enthusiasm for Nafarrate-1 s replacement at Matamoros 
had turned to "gloomy pessimism."**6 It was "increasingly
**4Ibid.
115
Ibid., October 22, 1915; Testimony of Kile, IMA, 
1246; Funston to the Adjutant General, October 22, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16567.
116Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 304.
**7Garrison to Lansing, October 22, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 815-816.
**®Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 304.
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evident," Funston concluded, that his commanders on the 
border could "expect no help" from General Lopez.
Accordingly, Funston was prepared to adopt drastic 
measures to halt the raids. He would completely close the 
Lower Valley to "all intercourse with Mexico." Bloodhounds 
would be employed to track down raiders, thereby making it 
"almost certain death" to participate in such forays. The 
General also sought authorization to pursue raiders across 
the river into Mexico and "to order 'no quarter' for the 
enemy." Funston's superiors, Cumberland observes, were "not 
only startled?" they were "aghast." Garrison unequivocally 
refused the General's requests. Instead, he dispatched 
additional reinforcements to the border. By late October, 
"practically all the armed forces available for duty" had 
been ordered to the Rio Grande.
Lansing, meanwhile, had responded to Funston"s dis­
tress by demanding that Carranza immediately issue "positive 
orders to his commander at Matamoros to disperse the raiders 
and apprehend Luis de la Rosa.l^l At the same time, the
119Garrison to Lansing, October 22, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 816.
120Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 304-305.
121Lansing to Belt, October 23, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 816.
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President authorized Attorney-General Thomas Gregory to send 
a large squad of Justice Department agents to the border to 
determine "the real cause and origin of the disturbances. "■*•2 2 
Publicly, however, Administration spokesmen continued to 
disclaim Carrancista complicity in the raids* Officials in 
Washington, the New York Times reported on October 23, "are 
convinced that the Carranza authorities have no connection 
with the disturbances and are anxious to step them." Indeed, 
it was believed "that influences on the American side of the 
line . . . had much to do with a conspiracy to cause 
trouble."123 yjho or what those "influences" were, the 
journal did not reveal.
Having finally obtained formal Pan-American recogni­
tion for his government on October 19, Carranza was'indeed 
anxious to terminate the Texas rebellion.12^ Accordingly, 
he assured Lansing that he would "personally investigate" 
the situation on the border. Troops that were "inclined to 
make trouble" would be replaced with "reliable soldiers."
122New York Times. October 23, 19.15; See also Testi­
mony of Barnes, IMA, 1234.
*23New York Times, October 23, 1915.
124Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916. Foreign
Relations, 1916, 572.
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In addition, he revealed, secret service agents had been 
ordered to cooperate with military authorities in arresting 
and punishing Luis de la Rosa and other known raider-..125
Lansing, in turn, sought to reduce the sources of 
friction on the American side of the line. He acted just 
in time. Anglo-American response to the latest raid;; in the 
Lower Valley had been "prompt and vehement. 125 A worried 
Colonel Blocksam reported from Erownsville that the citizens 
of that city were "seriously considering pursuing thn raiders 
into Mexico." An organization of south Texes ranchers ap­
pealed to both state and federal officials -iirst for author­
ization to cross the border and second for the imposition 
of martial law in the beleaguered counties. Still more 
alarming, Texas Senator Morris Sheppard, "after a personal 
investigation of conditions on the border, found evidence 
of an impending 'race' war."12^
125eelt to Lansing, November 1, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 818.
125Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 305.
1^^Ibid.; Sheppard to Lansing, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16700. Funston, too, was concerned: "The wide
use of arms by white citizens and the extreme difficulty of 
the civil authorities supervising their use* leading to 
personal aggression, revenge and terrorism by white upon 
Mexican citizens, are certainly complicating the situation 
. . . There is unquestionably a growing separation and
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Lansing did not mince words. Governor Ferguson was 
urged to use his influence with state and county officials 
to allay "race prejudice" and restrain "indiscreet conduct.1' 
The officials and residents of the Lower Valley, Lansing 
charged, had seriously embarrassed the Wilson Administration 
through their irresponsible behavior. They should be made 
to "realize the responsibility” which they had "unconsciously 
imposed upon the National Government by tthoirl failure" to 
appreciate the "seriousness of the situation."*28 In short, 
lynchings, vigilantism, and the indiscriminate abuse of the 
Mexican-American population must cease at once.
Although Carranza did not fully adhere to his pledge 
to Lansing, he did temporarily suppress the activities of 
the San Diego revolutionaries. The last serious strikes 
for many months against the south Texas counties occurred 
on October 25 and 29.*28 On the latter date, troops from
distrust between white and Mexican races. Some intelligent 
citizens of Mexican blood are beginning to realize that 
existing conditions in this district cannot probably last 
a great deal longer without resulting in a race war . . . 
Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16752.
128Lansing to Ferguson, October 30, 1915, Foreign
Relations. 1915, 817.
129New York Times, October 26 and 30, 1915
408
General Lopez* command fought a pitched battle with raiders 
near Matamoros, killing fifteen and driving the remainder 
from the field.130 Early in November, municipal officials 
in Reynosa "organized a force of rurales . . . and within 
three days their activities had driven many bandits from 
the border."13* Deprived of vital Carrancista logistical 
support and confronted with the aggressive opposition of 
new field commanders unsympathetic to their cause, the San 
Diego partisans dispersed.
Late in November, Carranza himself came to the 
border. Conferring with both Governor Ferguson and Colonel 
Blocksam, he assured them that no further disturbances in 
the Lower Valley would emanate from the Mexican side of the 
line.132 Shortly thereafter. General Alfredo Ricaut.t "who 
had a reputation for friendliness to the United States," 
replaced Lopez as commandant of the Northeastern military 
district. "During the succeeding months," Cumberland notes, 
"Ricaut lived up to his reputation by dispersing several 
potential raider bands . . . ,"123
l30Ibid., October 30, 1915.
13Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ,307;Funston to the 
Adjutant General,. November 17, 1915,SDR 812.00/16842.
132New York Times, November 21 and December 1, 1915.
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 307-308.
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Nafarrate, meanwhile, was transferred to Tampico, 
there to vent his xenophobia on American and other foreign 
oilmen.-1-34 Accompanying him were Pisano, Oe la Rosa, and 
an undetermined number of erstwhile raiders.I35 His pledges 
to Lansing and Ferguson notwithstanding, Carranza had no in­
tention of delivering those capable and experienced guerrilla 
leaders to American authorities.136 Given the uncertainty 
of future Mexican-American relations, such men might again 
prove useful. And indeed they did. Although for some time, 
relative calm prevailed along the Lower Rio Grande, the 
movement engendered by the Plan of San Diego did not expire. 
Dormant throughout the winter months, it flared anew in the 
spring and summer of 1916.137
3,34Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 833-835.
•^35Funston to Baker, June 7, 1916.Foreign Relations# 
1916, 568; Testimony of Barnes, IMA, 1233.
-1-3® Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916,Foreign Rela­
tions, 1916. By late 1915, both Pisano and De la Rosa were 
under indictment for murder in Texas. Carranza had personally 
promised Governor Ferguson that both men upon their appre­
hension would be summarily shot or turned over to Texas 
authorities. Shortly thereafter, Pisano, was arrested and held 
in Matamoros by General Ricaut. New York Times, March 24,1916. 
He was not delivered to Texas authorities; instead, by order 
of Carranza himself, the prisoner was sent to Carrancista 
headquarters at Queretaro and subsequently released. He then 
returned to the State of Tamaulipas, joined De la Roaa, and 
under the protection of General Nafarrate resumed hit- acti­
vities on behalf of the Plan of San Diego. Funston to Baker, 
June 7, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916, 568-569. De 1& Rosa, 
too, received favored treatment from Constitutionalist offi­
cials, later obtaining a general's commission in the Consti­
tutionalist Army and a staff assignment in Mexico City. Testi­
monies of Fall and Kleiber, IMA, 1227-1228 and 1275.





American recognition of the Carranze* regime and the 
subsequent temporary suppression of the San Diego revolu­
tionary movement did much to improve theretofore strained 
relations between Washington and the Constitutionalists. 
Nonetheless, serious Mexican-American differences remained. 
Unresolved, they posed a grave threat to maintenance of the 
new accord. Although Carranza was indeed successful in 
momentarily halting Mexican raids in the Lover Rio Grande 
Valley, he proved somewhat less effective in quelling the 
serious Yaqui and Mayo Indiem uprisings in the northwestern 
states of Sonora and Sinaloa. While primarily a Mexican 
domestic affair, Indian unrest in those states eventually 
threatened the lives and property of hundreds of American 
citizens and jeopardized the considerable investment of a 
number of American and foreign corporations.. From its in­
ception, it was a source of serious friction between the 
Wilson Administration and successive revolutionary regimes.
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On more than one occasion local crises arising from Indian 
unrest very nearly precipitated the landing of United States 
naval forces on the west coast of Mexico. Evidence indicates 
that local military commanders, Villista and Carrancista 
alike, would have vigorously resisted any such incursion. 
Under the circumstances, American intervention in the Yaqui 
and Mayo Indian uprisings might well have culminated in a 
much more serious Mexican-American conflict. Fortunately 
Villista and later Carrancista authorites as well were them­
selves able to contain if not entirely to suppress the rebel­
lion. As a result, the threat to American end foreign lives 
and property was considerably diminished. So, in turn, was 
the primary rationale for American armed intervention along 
the Gulf of California.
The underlying causes of the Yaqui rebellion lay 
some thirty years or more in the past. During the 1880's, 
Ramon Corral, Porfirista governor of the State of Sonora, 
had seized from the Indians the fertile Yaqui River Valley 
and much of the adjacent territory. The Yaquis, it was 
argued, were not making profitable use of the land. Mexican 
and foreign colonists, on the other hand, would establish 
great cotton and rice plantations which would enrich the 
entire state. In the ensuing struggle for control of the
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Indian lands the Yaquis were defeated and sold by the 
thousand to the planters of the Yucatan. Corral and his 
successor, Luis Torres, then disposed of the lands to 
wealthy Mexican and foreign investors interested in 3arge- 
scale development of the region's agricultural potential.
At the same time, they continued to pursue Indian slaving 
until the advent of the Revolution in 1910.^
Fierce fighters, the Yaguis took advantage o£ the 
turmoil to free themselves from the oppression of Mexican 
rule. They allied themselves with first one faction and 
then another in hope of recovering their ancestral lands. 
They were sorely disappointed. By the end of 1914, despite 
repeated Mexican promises to the contrary, those lands re­
mained in other hands. Out of patience, the greater part 
of the Yagui Nation, the so-called wild or ftroncho Yaquis, 
rose in revolt.2 Well-armed and capably led, they were 
determined to drive Mexicans and foreigners alike from the 
Yaqui Valley and from all other tribal lands. Initially, 
they very nearly succeeded.4 Intermittent hostilities
■1-Parkes, A History of Mexico, 296.
2New York Times, May 15, 16 and June 22, 1915.
^Xbid., May 16 and June 19, 1915; Testimony of 
Frederic N. Watriss, IMA, 467.
4Ibid., 482-483.
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continued for more than a decade. Final pacification of the 
Yagui Nation was not completed until the spring of 19 27.5
The largest of the aforementioned foreign concerns 
operating in the Yaqui country and the focal point of 
Washington's interest in the Indian uprising was the American 
owned Richardson Construction Company. A Mexican corpora­
tion/ the firm was controlled by the Yaqui Delta Land, and 
Water Company/ an American holding company capitalized at 
twelve million dollars.® Principal bond-holders of the 
latter concern were New York financiers John Hays Haivtmond 
and Harry Payne Whitney.^ The operating company owned in 
fee 750,000 acres in the Yaqui River Valley of southern 
Sonora. Almost all of its holdings had been acquired by
5Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 312.
®Testimony of Watriss, IMA, 426-429.
^New York Times, June 23, 1915. Hammond, a prominent 
Republican and a mining engineer of world renown, was "asso­
ciated with some of the most important financial "groups" in 
the United States. In addition, he had a significant stake 
in the Mexican petroleum industry and owned and promoted some 
of the most valuable mining properties in Mexico and the 
United States. Whitney was an influential New York Democrat 
and capitalist with interests in investment banking, mining, 
real estate, and public utilities. A protege of the Guggen- 
heiras, he was a director of the Guggenheim Exploration Com­
pany, another firm with large interests in Mexico. Who's 
Who in America, 1916-1917 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis u Company,
1916), 1055,.2658. Obviously, then, powerful and politi­
cally influential interests stood behind the Yaqui Valley 
venture.
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direct purchase from local Mexican landowners. Very little 
of its property was held under concession from the Mexican 
Government.®
In accord with its original contract with the govern­
ment of Porfirio Diaz, the company was to have limited use 
of the waters of the Yaqui River. In return, it was to 
construct and operate certain irrigation facilities in the 
valley and to irrigate all lands, regardless of ownership, 
bordering its canals. Following the ouster of Diaz, the 
company renegotiated its contract with the revolutionary
Q
government of Francisco I. Madero. Its claims, then, were 
unquestionably legitimate. Moreover, until revolutionary 
factional strife and the Yaqui uprising halted all construc­
tion in the Valley, the company earnestly endeavored to 
fulfill its contractual obligations. In addition to 
erecting a "complete plant for the construction of an irri­
gation system of very large dimensions," it had expended 
more than a million dollars on roads, dams, canals, and an
testimony of Watriss, IMA, 429.
^The original contract was negotiated in 1803. Ibid.,
430. A copy of the renegotiated contract, executed in
August, 1911, is included in Ibid., 469-472.
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agricultural experiment station, and had converted some
45.000 acres from grazing to cultivable land.^-0
Although the company subdivided and sold more than
30.000 acres of irrigated land to Mexican, German, and 
American settlers, it failed to realize a profit. As of 
the end of 1919, neither dividends nor interest on the 
company's six million dollar bonded debt had been paid.**'*- 
According to Frederic N. Watriss, president of the parent 
organization, the Yaquis had struck especially hard at the 
Richardson Construction Company,^2
However, if the stockholders of the Yaqui Delta Land 
and Water Company stood to lose their considerable invest­
ment, the several hundred independent colonists in the Valley 
stood to lose much more. Established on irrigated farms and 
ranches around Esperanza, a small settlement some ninety 
miles southeast of Guaymas, they had come to the Valley to 
stay. It was their home, and, if necessary, they would 
fight to protect it. However, foolhardy that decision may
10Ibid., 429-430. 11Ibid., 430.
■^The Yaquis, Watriss declared, "are savages and they 
think they have been robbed and they are taking it out on us. 
They think that it (the land) belongs to them. X don't know 
the history of that." Ibid., 435.
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have been, they nonetheless adhered to it.13 Moreover, 
they both expected and demanded the assistance of the United 
States Government in that endeavor. Consequently, the 
Yaqui Valley colony was to prove a source of considerable 
concern and embarrassment to officials in Washington through­
out the remainder of the Wilson Administration.
II.
Yaqui discontent exploded in January, 1915, in 
widespread attacks on Mexican and foreign settlements alike. 
By the end of the month, most of the mines of central Sonora 
were shut down and its ranches and farms deserted. Aural 
residents fled to Hermosillo, the state capital, or to other
*3According to John M. Bishop, president of an 
American mining company with interests in southern Sonora, 
the problem in that area was not the Yaqui Indians, but the 
attitude of the American colonists. There was no need to 
send American forces to the Yaqui Valley, Bishop informed a 
New York Times reporter. The Americans at Esperanza could 
"get out" if they wanted to do so. "The trouble with them,1 
he concluded, "is that they bought their farms and don't 
want to leave them. The trouble is not in the getting out, 
but in the staying . . . ." New York Times, June 20, 1915.
^Protection was sought first against Yaqui raids 
and later against both Yaquis and attempts by Constitution­
alist authorities to confiscate foreign holdings in the 
Yaqui Valley. See, for example, Ibid., June 11, 22, and 23, 
1915; McPherson to Lansing, November, 1915, and Winslow to 
Daniels, November 13 and December 11, 1915, Foreign Rela- 
tions, 1915, 839 and 857; W. E. Richardson to Lansirig^ 
November 13, 1916 and Watriss to Lansing, February 17, 1919, 
Testimony of Watriss, IMA, 491-493.
417
fortified towns, abandoning the countryside to the Indians. 
Villista governor Jose Maytorena, dependent upon a local 
garrison composed in large part of "tame1 Indians, was 
unable to quell the uprising. Indeed, on January 29r Yaqui 
soldiers mutinied at Guaymas, turning on their Mexican 
counterparts.15 Thereafter, Yaqui soldiers refused to serve 
against their rebellious kinsmen.15 Thus, by the spring of 
1915, when raiding spread southward into the Yaqui River 
Valley, Villista authorities at Hermosillo were virtually 
powerless to stop it. The colonists were on their own.
On May 11, an estimated 500 Indians struck for the 
first time at the foreign settlements in southern Sonora. 
Based in the Batamete Mountains, some forty miles north of 
Esperanza, they suddenly fell upon the colonists in the 
Yaqui Valley. Three Americans and a large number of Mexicans 
were killed. At the same time, American consular officials 
at Nogales, Guaymas, and Hermosillo reported that several 
thousand Yaquis, as well as other "lawless elements," were 
pillaging and murdering at will in the interior of the state. 
Many small towns had been raided and scores of persons killed
15New York Times, February 5 and 6, 1915.
15Ibid., May 16, 1915.
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or abducted. Throughout the greater part of the state all 
livestock had been driven off and the property of Americans 
and other foreign residents looted or destroyed. Only 
Cananea and a few of the larger mining communities had es­
caped unscathed.^ Villista authorities, meanwhile, could 
offer little effective resistance. Maytorena's Indian 
troops, at best useless, might at any time have chanced 
sides. The burden of defense, then, rested entirely upon 
the Governor's undermanned Mexican units. Those troops, in 
turn, were barely able to hold their own against the Yaquis. 
Thus by mid-May, 1915, conditions in central and southern 
Sonora were "little short of appalling."I8
Alarmed by the consular reports from Sonora, offi­
cials in Washington acted at once to relieve and, if neces­
sary, to evacuate the foreign colony in the Yaqui Valley.
On May 14, Secretary Daniels dispatched the cruisers Raleigh 
and New Orleans to the vicinity of Guaymas to investigate 
and report on the Indian uprising and to “look after American
IQ
interests" in the area. 3 Two days, later, both vessels 
17ibid.. May 14 and 16, 1915.
l8Ibid., May 14, 1915. Maytorena repeatedly warned
Simpich that he could not afford protection to Americans in
that region. Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915r SDR 
812.00/16843.
l^New York Times, May 15, 1915.
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arrived at Tobari Bay, midway between the mouths of the 
Yaqui and Mayo Rivers and the closest point on the coast 
to the settlement of Esperanza.2®
The same day, word arrived in Washington that 
Maytorena's troops had entered the Yaqui Valley. The Indians 
had subsequently withdrawn to the mountains, and, according 
to the Governor, the situation was "well in hand." Further 
reassurance came from the superintendent of the Richardson 
Construction Company. The colonists, the latter informant 
disclosed, had at all times had access to a branch line of 
the Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico. Escape to the 
coast had been possible all along. The colonists, however, 
had no intention of abandoning the Valley. Instead, they 
had concentrated their forces in a strong defensive position 
at Yaqui Pueblo.2*- For the moment, at least, evacuation was 
out of the question.
On May 18, it was learned that the Yaqui Nation had 
formally declared war against Germany, the United States, 
and all Mexican factions.22 For. several weeks, however, 
relative calm prevailed throughout the state. Taking advan­
tage of the lull, colonists in uhe Yaqui Valley returned to
20Ibid., May 16, 1915
22Ibid., May 19, 1915
21Ibid., May 17, 1915.
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their ranches. But peace was shortlived. Early in June,
600 Indians again moved into the Valley, and the raids began 
anew, in desperation the colonists appealed for assistance 
to both Maytorena and the Government of the United States.23
Although the Governor again sent a force to the 
Valley, it was too small to be effective. Consequently, the 
Wilson Administration itself adopted a "vigorous policy" for 
the protection of American citizens in southern Sonora. In 
communications to both Maytorena and his chi.ef, Lansing 
insisted that the Governor dispatch additional troops to the - 
Yaqui Valley and take whatever measures were necessary to 
secure the foreign colony from further attack. Failure to 
comply, the Secretary warned, would force the United States 
to land a relief expedition at Tobari Bay.24
Lansing was not bluffing. On or about June 16, 
Admiral Thomas B. Howard, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, 
was ordered to proceed at once from San Diego to Guaymas. 
Accompanying him aboard the cruiser Colorado was a special 
force composed of 600 marines and bluejackets. The flagship 
was to be joined at Guaymas by the cruisers Raleigh, New 
Orleans, and Chattanooga, with a combined complement of
23Ibid., June 11, 1915 24Ibid., June 17, 1915.
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1100 men. The crucial decision to disembark and march in­
land to relieve Esperanza was left to Howard's discretion.
It was understood, however, that the Admiral was not to 
land his force unless conditions in the Yaqui Valley ren­
dered such drastic action "absolutely necessary*"2  ^
Washington wanted no new Veracruz.
Villa, meanwhile, had ordered Maytorena to dispatch 
every available soldier to the Yaqui Valley. His fortunes 
on the wane since the disaster at Celaya, Carranza's rival 
was more anxious than ever to accommodate the Wilson Admin­
istration. He was prepared, he informed Carothers, to "do 
everything possible" to quell the Yaqui uprising.2** Villa, 
however, was in no position to make good his pledge. At 
that very moment, he was manuevering desperately to escape 
still another confrontation with the pursuing Obregon. 
Moreover, Villa had little influence over his subordinate 
at Hermosillo. Far away across the sierra, Maytorena was 
very much his own man.27 And with 6000 Yaquis roaming at 
will over the greater part of his state, he could ill afford 
to spare a large body of troops for garrison duty at
25ibid., June 17 and 18, 1915. 26Ibid.
27Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 160.
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28Esperanza. Nonetheless, doubtless because of Lansing's
ultimatum, the Governor grudgingly agreed to send reinforce-
29ments to the south.
On June 18, General Sosa and 150 men. entrained at 
Guaymas for Esperanza. They never reached their destination. 
Yaquis attacked the train just north of the American strong­
hold, killing and wounding most of its occupants and forcing 
Sosa to withdraw, tinder the circumstances, the New York 
Times solemnly intoned, the "only hope" for the Yaqui Valley 
settlers was Howard's marines.3*1
Officials in Washington evidently concurred. The 
commander of the Raleigh. whose vessel rode at anchor in 
Tobari Bay, was instructed to send a heliograph team twelve 
miles inland to Esperanza. The moment the colonists were 
threatened, word was to be flashed to the Raleigh. A 
landing party would move immediately to the rescue.
Similar instructions were given to Howard at Guaymas. The
2**New York Times, June 22, 1915.
29
Ibid., June 19, 1915. On June 19, Maytorena an­
nounced that 850 soldiers would be sent to the Yaqui Valley 
to protect the settlers and their crops from the Indians.
At the same time, however, he warned that those troops would 
also resist any attempt to land United States naval forces 
in Mexican soil. Ibid., June 20, 1915.
30Ibid., June 22, 1915 31Ibid
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Admiral was to proceed at once to Tobari Bay. In the event 
of an attack upon Esperanza, he was to relieve the colonists 
and escort them safely to the coast. Under no circumstances, 
however, was he to linger in the Yaqui Valley? nor was he to 
remain on Mexican soil any longer than was absolutely neces­
sary.^2 Although the colonists had repeatedly requested 
that an expeditionary force be stationed in the Valley to 
protect them, officials in Washington unequivocally rejected 
their appeal. Occupancy of Mexican territory, they feared, 
might well give rise to "complications that would result in 
armed intervention."23
They had some cause for concern. On June 21, the 
day after the Colorado arrived at Guaymas, Howard conferred 
at length with General Leyva, commander of the Villista 
garrison. State authorities, the General conceded, sym­
pathized with the American dilemma and would "understand" 
the dispatch of a relief expedition to Esperanza. The 
Mexican people, however, would unquestionably "misunderstand" 
such action and deeply "resent" it. Moreover, Leyva declared 
even minimal intervention in the Yaqui Valley was certain to 
provoke even more Indians to take up arms against the
32Ibid 33Ibid
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foreign colony* There would be "trouble" for Americana "all 
along the coast," he warned.3^
The following day, Howard went ashore to confer once 
again with the General. There he learned that communications 
with Esperanza had been restored and that General Sosa and 
a large body of Villista troops had again moved into the 
southern part of the state. For the moment, the Valley was 
quiet. Leyva, however, was apprehensive. He expressed 
impatience and anxiety at the settlers1 adamant refusal to 
abandon their holdings. Their very presence on Mexican soil, 
he contended, had become a major source of unrest in Sonora. 
Ultimately, he feared, it would lead to a serious Mexican- 
American confrontation. Sosa's command, composed largely of 
"tame” Yaquis, was unreliable and could not be depended upon 
to defend Esperanza. Sooner or later, then, Howard would be 
forced to intervene. The General believed that Sosa'1* 
troops would resist.35
There was little that Howard could do to alter the 
situation. He had his orders and, on June 23, he proceeded 
to Tobari Bay. The settlers, meanwhile, continued to spurn 
Washington's offer of evacuation. Instead, they persisted
34lbid., June 23, 1915. 35Ibid
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in their demand that the Wilson Administration send troops 
to protect t h e m . B y  the time that Howard arrived at 
Guaymas, they had already sent their families out of the 
country. Of the original 300 American settlers in the Valley, 
only some seventy-five remained. They were well-armed, how­
ever, and in a strong defensive position. They would not 
leave voluntarily. Doubtless their doggednsss was as 
exasperating to Lansing as it was to Leyva. By the summer 
of 1915, then, the Yaqui Valley colony had become a serious 
liability to Washington and Hermosillo alike.
Just how serious soon became evident. Early in July, 
Yaqui chieftains presented a sobering ultimatum to Maytorena. 
Villista authorities, they declared, must return all tribal 
lands to the Yaqui Nation and immediately expel all foreigners 
from the Yaqui Valley. Failure to meet their demands, they 
warned, would result in a new round of hostilities, an all- 
out, no-quarter campaign of extermination against foreigners 
and Mexicans alike.38 Maytorena, of course, was powerless 
to comply. Consequently, late in the month, raiding recom­
menced. Fortunately for the colonists at Esperanza heavy 
rains and subsequent flooding of the Yaqui delta acted as an
36ibid.
3®lbid., July 8, 1915
37Ibid.
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effective deterrent to invasion of the Valley for the 
remainder of the summer.39
III.
Early in August, 1915, in the face of the Constitu­
tionalist advance, Maytorena withdrew his troops from 
southern Sonora.^® Weeks passed, however, without serious 
incident. Then, in early October, unable to come to terms 
with either revolutionary faction, the Yaquis returned to the 
offensive.'*1 Shortlyjthereafter, they concluded an alliance 
with the powerful Mayo Indians of the Sonora-Sinaloa border 
district:. By the end of the month, then, the rebels had ex­
tended their zone of operations from central Sonora to 
northern Sinaloa. Raiding parties were active as far south 
as the valley of the Rio del Fuerte, some 300 miles down the 
coast from Guaymas.42
39lbid., July 26, 1915.
40Ibid., August 5, 1915. 
'*1Ibid., October 2, 1915,
42ibid., October 23, 1915. The Mayos had been restive 
for some months, having already attacked the foreign colony 
at Los Mochis, Sinaloa, on June 21. Ibid., June 23, 1915.
Not until the fall, however, did really serious trouble recur 
in the Fuerte Valley. Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16843.
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On October 22, Yaquis and Mayos decisively defeated 
a Constitutionalist force near San Bias, Sinaloa, and began 
a slow advance down the Fuerte Valley to the coast.4  ^ por 
the next two months, bands of Indians, frequently cooperating 
with Villista guerrillas, terrorized the west coast of Mexico 
from Guaymas to Topolobampo. Once again, as along the north­
eastern border, local Carrancista authorities manifested an 
unwillingness or inability to bring the disturbances to a 
halt. Nor would they cooperate with United States naval 
forces dispatched to the area to protect American and other 
foreign interests. Consequently, late in 1915, the possibi­
lity of American armed intervention in Mexico arose once again.
During the first week in November, in a series of 
separate incidents, Indians killed two American settlers in 
northern Sinaloa and struck again at American-owned ranches 
in the valley of the Rio del Fuerte.44 Shortly thereafter, 
Consular Agent John McPherson reported from Guaymas that 
hostile Indians had re-entered the Yaqui Valley as well. 
According to a spokesman for the Richardson Construction Com­
pany, a number of Mexicans there had already been murdered by
43New York Times, October 23, 1915.
44Alger to Lansing, November 19, 1915, Foreign Rela-
tions, 1915. 842-843.
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Yaqui raiders. The latter source considered the situation 
in the Valley "very grave," and warned that additional 
protection was "absolutely necessary" in order to prevent a 
recurrence of the crisis of the previous spring.^5
Admiral Cameron M. Winslow, Howard's successor as 
Commander of the Pacific Fleet, strongly concurred. On 
November 13, the Admiral conveyed his fears to the Secretary 
of the Navy.4** The danger to the Yaqui Valley colony, he 
contended, was greater than ever before. Recent disbandment 
of Maytorena's Indian units and a scarcity of food in the 
Northwest had swelled the ranks of the insurgents and in­
creased the likelihood that they would renew their raids into 
the Yaqui delta. In other respects, however, the situation 
remained essentially unchanged. Because of the distance 
inland, Winslow's forces could do nothing to protect the 
colony at Esperanza. At the moment, the Admiral could do no 
more than "afford refuge at the coast line." But the settlers 
still refused to countenance withdrawal.4^
45McPherson to Lansing, November, 1915, Ibid.., 839. 
John A. McPherson, Consular Agent at Guaymas, had been en­
gaged in business in Mexico for twenty-five years. In 1915, 
he was proprietor of the Guaymas Bottling Works, a candy and 
soda factory. Register, 1918, 138.




Under the circumstances, the Admiral saw but two 
solutions to the problem; First, Washington might compel
the Constitutionalists to permanently garrison the Yaqui
II
Valley; or, as an alternative, he himself might be given 
"discretionary orders" to land an expeditionary force if the 
occasion demanded. Whatever the case, Win3low advised, prompt 
action was essential. Matters were complicated, however, by 
the fact that General Manuel Dieguez, Carrancista commander 
in Sonora, was at the moment fully preoccupied with operations 
against the Villistas in the northern portion of the state.
The General, then, would be most reluctant to send a detach­
ment south to the Yaqui Valley. For that reason, Winslow 
explained, Washington would have to exert "extreme pressure" 
upon the.Constitutionalist Government in order to obtain ade­
quate protection for the colonists at Esperanza^ 8 Time was to 
prove him correct.
IV.
By mid-November, unrest on the west coast of Mexico 
had assumed serious proportions. On the 17th, the Secretary 
of the Navy received an alarming dispatch from the port of
48lbid
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Topolobampo. Commander Kavanaugh of the gunboat Annapolis 
reported that on the previous day Mayo Indians and Villista 
guerrillas had attacked Los Mochis, Sinoloa, sacking the 
town and killing a number of its inhabitants.49 Located 
some twenty miles from the coast, Los Mochis had a sizable 
foreign population. Several hundred American citizens resided 
in or near the town, and much of the surrounding land was 
owned and worked by the big American-owned United Sugar 
Companies.
At first, Kavanaugh had considered sending an armed 
expedition to relieve the colony. Ultimately, however, he 
had decided against such a move, but only because of the rela­
tive weakness of the forces at his disposal. Instead, working 
through the representative of the United Sugar Companies, he 
had arranged for the evacuation of all American citizens to 
Topolobampo. There a number of the refugees had been taken 
aboard the Annapolis. Those Americans remaining ashore 
established armed outposts around the town and organized 
patrols to maintain internal security. Under the circum­
stances, friction with the Mexican population was inevitable. 
Although Kavanaugh himself sent no armed men ashore, a landing
49Winslow to Daniels, November 17, 1915, Ibid., 840-
841.
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party was kept in readiness to counter any threat to the 
town from either within or without.5®
On November 18, news of the raid reached Consul 
William E. Alger at Mazatlan. Alger immediately wired 
General Mateo Munoz, military commander of Sinaloa, re­
questing that he rush assistance to the survivors,51 
Munoz, then at San Bias, no more than twenty miles distant 
from the colony, might easily have complied. Instead, he
CO
did nothing. Clearly unsympathetic, he had by his actions 
prior to the raid actually encouraged the attack on Los 
Mochis.55 Moreover his subsequent behavior unquestionably
54invited new strikes at foreign holdings in the Fuerte Valley.
5®Ibid.; Alger to Lansing, November 26, 1915, Ibid., 
851; Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 863.
51Alger to Lansing, November 19, 1915, Ibid., 842. 
Alger entered the consular service in 1891, serving at 
various posts in Honduras until his appointment as consul 
at Mazatlan in December, 1909. He remained at the latter 
post until June 1916. Register, 1916, 69.
52Winslow to Daniels, November 21 and December 11,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 845 and 863.
55Alger to Lansing., November 23, 1915, Ibid., 849; 
Winslow to Daniels, November 18 and December 11,-1915, Ibid., 
841-842 and 863.
5^Winslow to Daniels, November 18 and 21, 1915,
Ibid., 841-842, 845.
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Replying to Alger on the 19th, Munoz accused the 
colonists of collaborating with the enemies of the Consti­
tutionalist regime. They had armed the Indians, he declared, 
and so had no one to blame but themselves for the disaster 
which had befallen them.55 ^he following day, in a second 
message to Alger, the General charged that Kavanaugh had 
landed marines at Topolobampo. The Commander, it was al­
leged, had already sent an expeditionary force inland to Los 
Mochis and had grievously insulted Constitutionalist author­
ities at Topolobampo. His subordinates, Munoz warned the 
Consul, had been ordered to repel the invader. There must 
be no recurrence of the outrage.55
Alger was frankly puzzled. He knew of no landing at 
Topolobampo or anywhere else along the coast.57 Yet in the 
days that followed Munoz reiterated the charge.5® How, then, 
to explain the General's behavior? It soon became apparent: 
Because of the alleged American presence in the Fuerte Valley, 
Munoz was relieved of responsibility both for the raid on 
Los Mochis and for the future defense of foreign interests
55Alger to Lansing, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 849.
56Ibid. 57Ibid., 850.
5®Alger to Lansing, November 26, 1915, Ibid., 851.
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therein.55 For more than a week, then, during a critical 
period for the colony, the General deliberately withheld 
protection. At the same time, he continued to vociferously 
protest the alleged violation of Mexican sovereignty and to 
warn both Alger and Kavanaugh that further violations would 
be met by armed resistence.
In the interim, the Mayos struck again. Returning 
to the undefended settlement, the Indians destroyed private 
residences, burned the warehouses of the United Sugar Com­
panies, and killed or abducted a number of the Mexican 
inhabitants. American and other foreign residents fled for 
their lives. Behind them, Los Mochis lay in ruins. "A 
reign of terror” existed in the Fuerte Valley, Kavanaugh 
reported to Alger, and Munoz was directly to blame.55
Winslow, meanwhile, had learned that General Dieguez 
had ordered Munoz to relieve Los Mochis. The Admiral, how­
ever, suspected that Munoz would not obey. Accordingly, he 
again urged Daniels to press the Carranza Government for a 
"strong guaranty" that it would permanently garrison the Yaqui 
and Fuerte Valleys. A "general massacre of all foreigners
55Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 863.
50Alger to Lansing, November 26, 1915, Ibid., 851.
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may occur at any time," Winslow warned. Prevention could 
be assured only by the presence of large bodies of Mexican 
troops or by the assignment of American expeditionary forces 
to the respective colonies. The Admiral anticipated further 
disturbances, particularly in.the Fuerte Valley. Conse­
quently, he informed the Secretary, he had already ordered 
the cruiser Raleigh to reenforce the Annapolis at Topolo­
bampo.
On November 18, Daniels received further discouraging 
news from Kavanaugh. Despite Dieguez1 pledge of assistance 
for Los Mochis, the Commander reported, none had been forth­
coming. Munoz remained at San Bias. It was his opinion, 
Kavanaugh declared, that the General's campaign against the 
Mayos "was a farce from beginning to end." Its sole ob­
jective appeared to have been the seizure of "loot already 
collected by the Indians." Having accomplished that end, 
Munoz' men had withdrawn, "as it appeared always to have 
been their intention to do." The Americans in the Valley 
were left at the mercy of the Indians. Carrancista author­
ities, the Commander charged, "must have known" that the 
withdrawal of their forces "would result in great Indian
61Winslow to Daniels, November 17, 1915, Ibid. 840-
841.
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raids on the Americans." The consequences of that irres­
ponsible action were a "shameful loss of property” and the 
terrorizing of a large number of American citizens. It was 
essential, Kavanaugh closed, that Munoz be forced to garrison 
Los Mochis and to wage a "real" campaign against the Indians^ 
The following day, Lansing instructed Silliman to 
take up the matter of the American colonies with Carranza 
himself and to impress upon the First Chief the importance 
of providing adequate protection for American lives and prop­
erty at Esperanza and Los Mochis.63 Again, however, nothing 
but promises resulted.64 indeed, on November 20, as noted 
earlier, the Mayos returned to Los Mochis. Far from driving 
them off, Munoz1 command actually joined the Indians in 
looting surrounding American properties. "It is hard to say 
which are the worst," Kavanaugh complained, the Indians or 
the Carrancistas.66
Conditions were little better in the north. On 
November 22, McPherson reported that hostile Indians had
62uinslow to Daniels, November 18, 1915, Ibid., 841-
842.
6 3
Lansing to Silliman, November 19, 1915., Ibid., 843. 
6^Belt to Lansing, November 20, 1915, Ibod., 844.
6^Winslow to Daniels, November 21, 1915, Ibid., 845.
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again entered the Yaqui Valley, and that despite repeated 
assurances to the contrary Dieguez had failed to drive them 
out.6® Despairing of cooperation from either the General 
or his chief, Lansing turned to Alvaro Obregon, the one other 
Constitutionalist commander then in a position to render 
effective assistance.6? However, like Dieguez, Obregon was 
wholly committed to the campaign against Villa. The final 
defeat of Carranza's rival remained the primary objective of 
the Constitutionalist Government. For the moment, at least, 
all other considerations were of secondary importance. There 
was nothing, then, that Obregon could do either for the Yaqui 
Valley colony or for the settlers at Los Mochis.68
Lansing had come full circle. Out of patience and 
heartily disgusted with the procrastination and apparent 
duplicity of Constitutionalist authorities, the Secretary 
grew belligerent. Following Obregon's rebuff, he assumed 
the hard line so vigorously espoused by Winslow and other
66McPherson to Lansing, November 22, 1915, Ibid.
^Lansing to Simpich, November 22, 1915, Ibid., 845-
846.
68Obregon replied that orders had already been given 
to subordinate commanders to "crush the rebels" at Los Mochis. 
He had done what he could. Ultimate execution of the order, 
of course, fell to the uncooperative General Munoz. Simpich 
to Lansing, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 847.
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naval commanders in Mexican waters. Addressing the First 
Chief on November 23, Lansing bluntly informed him that if 
the Mexican Government could not protect American interests 
at Los Mochis then American marines would do so. Only 
recently, he reminded Carranza, the Wilson Administration 
had permitted the passage of Constitutionalist troops across 
American territory. The First Chief, then, should have "no 
objection" to the employment of United States naval forces 
in restoring order in the Fuerte Valley. Emphasizing his 
determination to act unilaterally if necessary, the Sec­
retary concluded with the information that still another 
American warship had been ordered to Topolobampo "to meet 
any emergency" that might arise.69 Carranza had been warned.
Lansing moved at once to make good his threat. On 
the same day that he admonished the First Chief, he re­
quested the Department of the Navy to prepare the battleship 
Maryland for dispatch to Topolobampo. A force of no less 
than 300 marines was to be embarked "for the purpose of 
affording protection” to the Americans at Los Mochis. Upon 
arriving on station, the marines were to be "kept in readi­
ness" to go ashore. There would be no landing, however.
69Lansing to Garrett, November 23, 1915, Ibid
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unless specific orders to that effect came directly from
Washington.70
Having thus initiated the organization and dispatch 
of an expeditionary force, Lansing then sought Congressional 
approval of his actions. On November 24, he conferred at 
length with Congressman James R. Mann of Illinois, Repub­
lican minority leader in the House of Representatives.
Mann, too, was disturbed by recent developments in Mexico 
and, like the Secretary of State, was prepared to adopt
extraordinary measures to protect the colonists at Espe-
71ranza and Los Mochis. Thus assured of bipartisan support, 
Lansing went ahead with his plans. On the same day, Daniels 
transmitted to San Francisco Lansing's and his own supple­
mentary instructions to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet. 
Winslow, accompanied by a force of 275 marines, was to 
proceed at once to the troubled area aboard the cruiser San 
Diego. The Maryland and supporting units were to follow as 
soon as possible.72 on November 25, Winslow sailed. Taking
70Lansing to Daniels, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 847-
848.
7lNew York Times, November 25, 1915.
72Daniels to Winslow, November 24, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 850.
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aboard an additional two companies of marines at San Diego, 
he arrived off Topolobampo on the last day of the month.
Carranza, meanwhile, had received the ominous Ameri­
can note within hours of its dispatch. Perceiving the ur­
gency of the situation, he acted at once to mollify the 
aroused Secretary of State. Adopting an unusually concili­
atory tone, the First Chief expressed appreciation for the 
"offer" of American assistance in quelling the Mayo revolt.
He could not, however, consider such a proposal. Instead, 
he suggested, until the rebellion was suppressed, the 
colonists at Los Mochis might move to territory already 
controlled by Constitutionalist forces or remain aboard one 
of the American warships off Topolobampo. Meanwhile, he 
assured the Secretary, he had already written to Obregon, 
urging the General to hasten occupation of the Fuerte Valley. 
When that operation was completed, he declared, the lives 
and property of Americans residing therein would be fully 
guaranteed.^
Carranza earnestly endeavored to make good his pledge. 
On November 27, four days after his exchange with Lansing,
?3New York Times, November 27, 1915; Winslow to
Daniels, December 11, 1^15, Foreign Relations, 1915, 862.
74Garrett to Lansing, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 848.
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some 1200 Constitutionalist troops entered the Fuerte 
Valley.75 The Indians, in turn, withdrew to the mountains. 
Although the lives of the colonists were no longer in jeo­
pardy, their property was by no means secure. Upon en­
tering Los Mochis, Munoz* soldiers again ransacked the 
settlement, looting private homes and committing many acts 
of vandalism.7® Responding immediately to Lansing's sharp 
protest, Carranza ordered the return of all American and
other foreign property then in the hands of Constitutionalist 
77forces. His subordinates, however, refused to obey. 
Kavanaugh and spokesmen for the foreign community protested 
in vain to Munoz.7® Tension mounted. By the end of the 
month, relations between the colonists and the Carran- 
cistas in the Fuerte Valley were very poor indeed.75
On November 30, Winslow arrived off Topolobampo.
The following day, the Admiral made an inspection tour of
75Alger to Lansing, November 29, 1915, Ibid., 854.
7®winslow to Daniels, November 28, 1915, Ibid., 853.
77Lansing to Daniels, December 2, 1915, and Arre­
dondo to Lansing, December 3, 1915, Ibid., 855 and 855-856.
78Winslow to Daniels, November 28 and December 11, 
1915, Ibid., 853 and 862-864.
79Ibid.
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the American colony and the lower Fuerte Valley.80 He was 
duly alarmed by what he saw. Inviting Munoz and other local 
Carrancista authorities aboard the San Diego, he carefully 
explained to them the American position vis-a-vis the colony 
at Los Mochis and tactfully but firmly insisted upon their 
cooperation. Concentrating on Munoz, Winslow informed the 
General that in the future he would be expected to prevent 
the recurrence of situations which strained relations be­
tween their respective governments. Failure to do so, the 
Admiral implied, would almost certainly precipitate the 
landing of an American expeditionary f o r c e .8^ Overawed, 
Munoz buckled. Immediately thereafter, he ordered all 
Constitutionalist commanders in the state "to assist in the 
recovery of stolen property" and the return of same to the 
rightful owners.82 The crisis in the Fuerte Valley had 
passed.
V.
Winslow was by no means sanguine. He had witnessed 
firsthand the deep antagonism manifested by Carrancista 
officials toward the Americans at Los Mochis. The position
80Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 862-
863.
81Ibid., 863-864. 82Ibid., 864.
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of the Fuerte Valley colony was precarious indeed, and the 
Admiral knew it. Something more substantive than promises 
would be required to assure its safety. The moment Munoz1 
command was needed elsewhere or threatened by a large force 
of Indians, he wrote Daniels, it would be "promptly with­
drawn with little or no warning to I the] settlers . . . ."
For that reason, then, he urged, permission should be ob­
tained from the Mexican Government to land American marines 
on Mexican territory "in cases of great emergency." Unless 
some such provision were made, and soon, he warned, a 
massacre of Americans on the west coast of Mexico was inevi­
table. The Indians acted far too quickly, he explained, "to 
admit of the delay necessary to obtain permission . . .  to 
land."83
Despite the validity of the Admiral's argument, there 
was little chance that he would obtain the authorization 
that he sought. Both the President and the Secretary of 
the Navy, to say nothing of Constitutionalist authorities, 
were adamantly opposed to further armed intervention in 
Mexico. Daniels would not again grant the discretionary 
powers bestowed upon Winslow's predecessor. Only under the
83Ibid
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direst circumstances would intervention again be permitted, 
and then the decision would be made in Washington. To have 
again extended to a subordinate commander carte blanche to 
intervene would have been to assure that sooner or later 
intervention would indeed recur. Accordingly, Winslow's 
proposal was rejected.®^
It was just as well. No sooner had the Fuerte 
Valley disorder subsided than a new and even graver crisis
ft Rarose in the Yagui delta. On December 9, an estimated 
500 Yaguis fought a three-hour battle with Constitutionalist 
troops along the railroad between Esperanza and Cocorit.
The following day, another sharp clash occurred at Corral.
At the same time, several hundted Yaguis struck at foreign- 
owned farms and ranches, burning the harvests and threaten­
ing the Richardson Construction Company's experimental 
station at San Pedro. Sporadic skirmishing between Yaguis 
and armed bands of colonists spread throughout the settled 
portions of the Valley. Calling upon Consul McPherson for 
assistance, a Company representative reported that Americans 
in the vicinity of Esperanza had been left "entirely without
®4Daniels to Winslow, December 21, 1915, Ibid., 860. 
®®Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 856-
857.
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military protection." It was "imperative," he insisted, 
that American armed forces be sent to the Yaqui Valley 
at once.®®
Admiral Winslow concurred. Constitutionalist troops 
at Corral, he informed Daniels, had withdrawn "without 
warning," just as they had at Los Mochis. If the soldiers 
at Esperanza behaved in like manner, a raid on that settle­
ment was bound to follow. The Yaquis, he believed, would 
"not only destroy property, but murder settlers" as well. 
Still at Topolobampo, Winslow was deeply concerned. The 
expeditionary force under his command, he reminded the 
Secretary, was "none too strong." Moreover, the reenforce­
ments that he had earlier requested would not reach Tobari 
Bay in time "to take part in early operations" ashore. 
Clearly, the Admiral believed that the worst was in store. 
Describing the situation in the Yaqui Valley as very serious, 
he urged his superiors "to bring pressure to bear" upon 
Dieguez and other Constitutionalist authorities to "compel" 
them to garrison Esperanza.®7
Again, however, the Admiral revealed his predelic- 
tion for armed intervention, it was "possible," he
86ibid 87Ibid., 857
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declared, "that under certain conditions Mexican authorities 
might grant permission for us, or even request us, to land 
and protect our own people.” General Munoz, he stressed, 
had "freely admitted" that "in the event of sudden attack 
by Indians on unprotected American settlers we would be 
justified" in intervening. As a precaution, then, he had 
already ordered the cruisers Raleigh and Denver to Tobari 
Bay. In closing, Winslow again urged the Secretary to 
obtain from Carranza "authority" to employ American forces 
in the defense of the Yaqui Valley colony.®® The Admiral 
was spoiling for a fight.
Although Lansing himself apparently was not averse 
to landing an expeditionary force in the event of a genuine 
emergency, he refused to consider Winslow's audacious pro­
posal. He preferred, instead, to pursue the cooperation of 
the Constitutionalist Government. Accordingly, on December 
12, in communications to both Carranza and Obregon, he 
requested that additional troops be sent to the Yaqui 
Valley to relieve the American colony.®® The following day
8®Ibid.
®®Lansing to Parker and Simpich, December 12, 1915, 
Ibid., 858.
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Simpich reported from the border that reinforcements from 
Guaymas were even then on their way to Esperanza.90
Within a week, the crisis in the Yaqui Valley 
appeared to have passed. On December 20, General Dieguez 
and Obregon .himself arrived in Guaymas for conferences with 
the Yaqui chieftains.9*- Then all went awry. On the very 
day that negotiations were to begin, some 1500 Indians again 
invaded the Valley. The American settlements at Ontogata 
and Cajeme and the Richardson Construction Company's station 
at San Pedro all came under attack. Constitutionalist 
troops at those locations first refused to fight the Yaquis 
and then deserted. Shortly thereafter the settlements 
fell.92 Although no Americans were killed, damage to 
foreign-owned property was extensive.93 Those Americans 
that failed to escape down the valley barricaded themselves 
at isolated ranches in country already overrun by the Indians. 
"When we left Ontogata," retreating colonists wired McPherson,
90Simpich to Lansing, December 13, 1915, Ibid.
3*~New York Times, December 20, 1915.
92Winslow to Daniels, December 21, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 859-860.
"simpich to Lansing, December 22, 1915, Ibid., 861.
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"block 33 and 36 were fighting to hold out for help and 
help is needed quick."9  ^ Events were unfolding much as 
Winslow had predicted.
The Admiral, having recently arrived at Guaymas, 
was ready to intervene. Although Obregon had already ordered 
General Estrada to the Yaqui Valley and had assured American 
consular officials that an even larger force would follow, 
Winslow placed little stock in the promises of Constitution­
alist authorities.95 On December 21, he advised Daniels 
that despite the rapidly deteriorating situation in the 
Yaqui Valley the Americans there were not being evacuated.
He feared for their lives. "Am I," he queried, "to land 
troops if General lObregonj is willing?" An "immediate 
answer" was requested.9*’ Daniels needed no prompting.
There would be no landing, he tersely replied. The decision 
to intervene would be made in Washington and nowhere else.97
It was fortunate that Winslow was restrained. Hun­
dreds of Constitutionalist soldiers and a large number of 
deserters no less hostile to Americans and other foreigners
9^Winslow to Daniels, December 21, 1915, Ibid., 860
95lbid. 96Ibid., 859.
^7Daniels to Winslow, December 21, 1915, Ibid., 860
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on Mexican soil remained in the Yaqui Valley.9** Given 
the existing tension, the sudden appearance of an American 
expeditionary force at Esperanza might well have had dis­
astrous consequences. Moreover, at the very moment that 
the Admiral was prepared to intervene, the Constitutionalists 
themselves were in the process of launching a major offen­
sive against the Yaquis. Some 10,000 soldiers under five 
Constitutionalist generals were already converging on the 
Valley from both north and south. Dual headquarters for the 
campaign were to be established at Guaymas and Esperanza."
Under the circumstances, there was no justification 
for the landing of American marines at Tobari Bay. Quite 
the contrary. Such a move would have greatly intensified 
the already widespread anti-American sentiment in northern 
Mexico. In addition, it would have seriously exacerbated the 
existing complex and volatile international dispute arising 
from foreign control of some of the most highly productive 
agricultural lands in the republic. In the midst of a 
xenophobic, nationalistic agrarian revolution, few acts by 
the United States could have proved more dangerously provo­
cative .
"winslow to Daniels, December 21, 1915, Ibid.
"simpich to Lansing, December 22, 1915, Ibid., 861.
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Chastened, Winslow did not again suggest inter­
vention. And, indeed, for some time thereafter, there was 
no reason to do so. On December 22, the Admiral reported 
an encouraging conference with Obregon. The General, he 
informed Daniels, "stated that it would take two or three 
days for his plans to develop, but that he would then proceed 
seriously against the Indians." Winslow seemed satisfied. 
"Apparently," he observed, the General was "making good on 
what he said he would do." Rather soon, the Admiral closed, 
"I look for an improvement in the Yaqui Valley situation. 
Corroborative reports came from both Simpich at Nogales and 
Consul Louis Hostetter at Hermosillo. Obregon "assures me," 
the latter wrote Lansing, "that within a very short time the 
State will have no Yaqui question."-^1 The General, however, 
was overly optimistic.
VI.
In the weeks that followed, Obregon's subordinate 
commanders inexplicably failed to press home the offensive. 
Although the Indians were indeed put to flight and the
lOOwinsiow to Daniels, December 22, 1915, Ibid.
^^Simpich to Lansing and Hots tetter to Lansing, 
December 22, 1915, Ibid., 861-862.
security of the Yaqui Valley colony apparently assured, the 
"Yaqui question" was by no means eliminated. Even under 
optimum conditions - given the nature of the terrain, the 
hardiness of the Indians, and the limited resources at 
Obregon's disposal - it would have proved a most difficult 
task to complete. Then, early in 1916, there emerged a 
succession of serious new challenges to the preeminence of 
the revolutionary regime. Each took priority over suppres­
sion of the Yaqui rebellion. Of primary importance was the 
resurgence of Villista activity in north-central Mexico.
That development, in turn, led directly to armed intervention 
by the United States in March, 1916. Thereafter, for the 
better part of a year, Constitutionalist forces in northern 
Mexico were held in readiness to meet whatever new crisis 
might arise from the presence of American troops deep in 
Mexican territory. Under the circumstances, the campaign
against the Indians was all but abandoned. Consequently, by
102the spring of 1916, the "Yaqui question" had emerged anew. 
Again it became a source of friction between Washington and 
the revolutionary government of Mexico.
102geef jor example, New York Times, March 27,
April 13.and 21, and May 18, 1916.
Chapter 10
THE DEFEAT OF FRANCISCO VILLA
I.
Although border raids and Indian uprisings seriously 
strained Mexican-American relations during the immediate post­
recognition period, the principal threat to the incipient 
reconciliation of October 1915 was a disillusioned and em­
bittered Pancho Villa. Deeply disappointed by Washington's 
recognition of the Constitutionalist Government, he became 
enraged at subsequent American cooperation with Carrancista 
field commanders» Believing himself basely betrayed, he and 
his lieutenants turned upon Americans and other foreigners 
with a vengeance. Villista bands struck repeatedly at 
American-owned mines and ranches throughout north-central 
Mexico. At the same time, there was a marked increase in the 
number of ugly incidents along the border between the United 
States and territory under Villista control. Carranza, as 
anxious now to reduce Mexican-American friction as he was to 
complete the ruin of his rival, countered by dispatching 
Obregon to the border. The General, in turn, quickly broke
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organized Villista resistance in the North and hounded Villa 
himself deep into the western sierra. By the end of the year, 
then, at least to casual observers of the Mexican scene, it 
appeared that the First Chief might at last be master in 
his own house.
II.
The decision to recognize the Constitutionalist 
Government, taken at the White House conference of September 
13, was a calculated risk. That trouble with Villa would 
follow was a foregone conclusion. Anticipating retaliatory 
strikes against American residents in Villista or Conven- 
tionist territory, the Wilson Administration took the one 
step it could to preclude violent reprisals.* As early as 
September 11, Lansing, apparently on his own initiative, 
began to lay the ground for a general evacuation of American 
citizens from the affected areas. "In view of [the] particu­
larly dangerous condition arising from revolutionary crisis," 
he explained to pertinent consular officials, Mit is of the 
utmost importance that you induce all Americans and inci­
dentally other foreigners in your district to leave Mexico 
without any delay whatsoever." Dissemination of that advice
•*-New York Times, September 20 and November 28, 1915.
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was to be effected "as thoroughly and quietly as possible,
requesting discretion of parties informed." Should the
consuls themselves feel endangered, they too were to pro-
ceed to the border.
For the rest, the Administration looked to Carranza.
So impressive was the September offensive in the North that
higher officials in Washington fairly assumed that Villa,
Zapata, and lesser Conventionist chieftains would soon be
swept from the field. The momentary danger of reprisals
against Americans and other foreign nationals in Mexico
would thereby be minimized if not altogether removed. Dire
predictions to the contrary and a sobering survey of existing
conditions in the republic, both emanating from the Division
3
of Mexican Affairs, were cavalierly dismissed. Officially, 
at least, the mood of the moment was optimism.
Following the Pan-American conference of October 9, 
at which time the Latin American conferees endorsed Washing­
ton' s decision to recognize Carranza, a second, more urgent
2
Lansing to certain American Consuls, September 11, 
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 837.
3See, for example, Canova "Brief Statement of Present 
Political Situation in Mexico Based on Official Reports,” 
October 6 , 1915, SDR 812.00/16962.
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note was sent to the aforementioned consular officials 
ordering them to confidentially advise all Americans and 
foreigners in their respective districts to "withdraw 
immediately" to the border.^ The gradual retirement of 
Americans from northwestern and north-central Mexico, 
prompted by Lansing's initial warning, turned into a rush 
in early October. By then, however, no official warning 
was necessary. Imminent American recognition of the Car­
ranza regime was an open secret, and foreigners and Mexicans 
alike prepared as best they could for the tempest that was 
sure to follow.
In the State of Sonora, in which American and other 
foreign mining and agricultural interests were heavily rep­
resented, Villista civil government suddenly collapsed. On 
September 30, Maytorena crossed into the United States, 
leaving a deputy, Carlos Randall at Nogales in nominal con­
trol of the state.® In western Sonora, isolated from the 
rest of the republic by the massive Sierra Madre Occidental,
^Lansing to certain American Consuls, October 9, 
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 838.
^New York Times, October 16, 1915.
^Funston to the Adjutant General, October 7, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16457.
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near anarchy prevailed. "Here at Hermosillo," Hostetter 
reported from the state capital, "there is absolutely no law 
or order and everything is in the hands of the Yaquis." 
Maytorena, he charged, had made the Indians "immune to all 
laws," so that no one dared to interfere with them. Condi­
tions there were rapidly deteriorating, and the population 
of the western portion of the state was completely "demora­
lized." Even more than they feared the Yaquis, however, the 
people there dreaded the reported approach of Villa. It 
was widely rumored that Carranza's rival planned to cross 
the mountains to punish the Maytorenistas for their insub­
ordination and to establish himself at Hermosillo for a last 
stand against Obregon.^
Some days later, Simpich reported from Nogales that 
the new Randall regime was "encountering grave difficulties." 
In addition to bankruptcy, it had been seriously weakened by 
the resignation and flight of large numbers of civil and 
military officials.** Then, as anarchy spread to eastern
^Hostetter to Lansing, October 6 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
16468.
8Simpich to Lansing, October 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16470.
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Sonora as well, rioting erupted at Cananea, headquarters of 
the big American-owned Cananea Consolidated Copper Company 
(CCCC) and site of the largest concentration of foreigners 
in the state. Inhabited by some 700 Americans and perhaps 
12,000 Mexicans, most of the latter sympathetic with Villa 
and strongly influenced by the radical Industrial Workers 
of the World (I. w. W.), Cananea was a powder keg.*® The 
consular agent there, Simpich informed Lansing, "daily 
reports . . . the continuation of street brawls, murder, and 
fighting." Nothing, however, was being done to restore 
order* The few remaining constituted authorities in the 
state were simply standing by, awaiting "some new develop­
ment,"^*
Conditions in the neighboring State of Chihuahua were 
for the moment, at least, somewhat better. Villista Governor 
Fidel Avila was in firm control* And, by early October,
Villa himself had arrived in Chihuahua City. There, at the
q
^Consular Agent Montague to Lansing, undated, re­
ceived October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 1095.
*°Lansing to Belt, October 12, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16485.
**Siropich to Lansing, October 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16470.
headquarters of the Villista movement, the General was busily 
engaged in "reorganizing and regrouping his forces." Despite 
heavy losses and "large-scale desertions," he "still com­
manded a formidable army." His "complete control over the
troops under his direct command and observation" was indis-
12putable. Consequently, the civil disorder that wracked 
Sonora had not yet spread to Chihuahua. Moreover, for some 
time, foreign lives and property in the latter state had 
been reasonably secure. Although in the past Villa himself 
had extorted forced loans from foreign merchants and corpo­
rations, he had foregone the practice since his conference 
with General Hugh Scott the previous August. Thus in early 
October, the State of Chihuahua was relatively stable. None­
theless, foreigners generally and Americans in particular 
were apprehensive. Since mid-September, it had been in­
creasingly evident that the Wilson Administration was moving 
toward recognition of the Carranza regime. And few Americans 
in Mexico doubted that Villista reaction would be ugly.
Unquestionably, Villa himself was cognizant of 
developments in Washington. In addition to his own sources 
of information in the capital, the disclosures of the American
12Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 207.
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13press left little to the imagination. Lansing's secrecy 
in advising the withdrawal of foreigners from northern 
Mexico was all for naught. Almost immediately, then. Villa 
learned the results of the final Pan-American conference of 
October 9. "First reports," Clendenen notes, "indicated 
that he took the news quietly." The struggle had only 
begun, Villa declared stoically, adding that "a dozen nations 
could not keep Carranza from f a i l u r e . M o r e o v e r ,  the 
United States still had not recognized the Constitutionalist 
regime. The full impact of Washington's decision had yet to 
be felt.
Unwilling, for whatever reason, to precipitate the
now inevitable break with the United States, Villa behaved
initially with considerable self-restraint. Although by
the second week in October, it was learned that Villista
bands were "making a clean sweep of American property" in
some parts of Chihuahua, the lives of Americans resident in
15the state did not appear to be in serious jeopardy. For
13-“ Villa's principal spokesman in Washington was 
Enrique C. Llorente, the Confidential Agent of the Provisional 
Government of Mexico.
^Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 207.
15
Edward L. Hamilton to Lansing, October 14, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16479. Hamilton, a Republican congressman from 
Michigan, wrote to the Secretary of State on behalf of con­
stituents with holdings in Mexico.
the moment, at least, Villa's aim appears to have been to 
strengthen his own hand while denying supplies to the ad­
vancing Constitutionalists.16 Most distressing to State 
Department officials, however, were an alleged order pro­
viding for the confiscation of certain large American mining 
properties in Chihuahua, including the ASARCO smelting plant 
in Chihuahua City, and Villa's threat to "leave nothing" in 
the state that could "be of service to Constitutionalist 
forces." American investors, Lansing complained to Carranza 
on October 14, feared that "millions of dollars worth of 
property will be destroyed.” It was essential, then, the 
Secretary declared, not only that the Constitutionalist 
Government protect American holdings in Chihuahua, but that
Carranza send troops to eastern Sonora as well to protect
17the "vast mining interests” at Cananea.
Under the circumstances, Lansing's demands were 
excessive. In the first place, the United States had not 
yet extended de facto recognition to the Constitutionalist 
Government. And, until it did so, Carranza was in no way
16Lansing to Belt, October 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16509a.
17Ibid.; Lansing to Belt, October 12, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16485.
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responsible for the lives and property of Americans and other
foreigners in territory not under his immediate control.
Secondly, there was no powerful Constitutionalist force near
enough to the districts in question to provide the requisite
protection. Finally, Villa, with a disciplined army of some
13,000 men, was, for the moment, the unchallenged master of
the Mexican North. It was patently impossible, then, for
the First Chief to provide the degree of protection for
foreign lives and property insisted upon by Washington.
Furthermore, to have attempted to comply with the
American demands would have been to drastically reduce the
forces at Obregon's disposal, thereby delaying indefinitely
or frustrating completely attainment of the Government's
primary objective - the defeat and destruction of Villa's
army. Consequently, as long as organized resistance to the
Constitutionalist Government remained, Carranza could offer
no more than token compliance with Lansing's insistence upon
18protection of foreign interests in the republic. With the 
very survival of the Constitutionalist regime itself at 
stake, he could ill afford to do otherwise. Yet Lansing 
persisted in his demands. With the sole exception of the
^Hew York Times, October 24, 1915.
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President, officials in Washington manifested little under­
standing of the Constitutionalist dilemma and even less 
sympathy for the harried Carranza. Thus even before the 
United States formally extended de facto recognition to the 
Constitutionalist Government, new seeds of mutual discord 
and misunderstanding were sown.
III.
By mid-October, Villa was ready to resume operations. 
Cut off from the sea, his only openings to the outside world 
were the border ports of Nogales and Ciudad Juarez, neither 
of which were really secure. His immediate objective, then, 
was Agua Prieta, a small border settlement opposite the 
American city of Douglas, Arizona. The only remaining Con­
stitutionalist outpost in the Northwest, it was na standing 
threat to Villa's rear." Seizure of Agua Prieta, Clendenen 
observes, "would simultaneously eliminate that danger, make 
an additional port of entry available, and destroy the only 
vestige of Carranza's authority in northern Sonora. An
extended base, from which new operations could be launched,
19would thus be consolidated." Villa, then, could not afford
19Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 208.
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to fail at Agua Prieta. The survival of the Villista move­
ment hung in the balance.
Yet fail he did, largely because of the benevolent 
interference of the United States Government on behalf of 
the Constitutionalists. As far as Washington was concerned, 
following the decisive Pan-American conference of October 9, 
Villa was just another rebel in arms against the legitimate 
government of Mexico. Administration officials had no in­
tention of permitting Villa to prolong his resistence by 
establishing himself in strength at still another of the 
strategic border ports. Although unwilling to extend mili­
tary or financial assistance to the de facto Government, they 
were by no means averse to helping it in other ways. Conse­
quently, they responded positively to Carranza's appeal for 
cooperation in the defense of Agua Prieta. Late in October,
the President himself authorized the passage of Constitution-
20alist troop trains across the southwestern United States.
Completely cut off from other Constitutionalist 
forces. General P. E. Calles1 command at Agua Prieta con­
sisted of no more than a few hundred ill-equipped recruits, 
hardly a match for Villa's seasoned veterans. During the
20
Ibid., 209? New York Times. October 27, 1915.
last week in October, however, thousands of troops, artillery,
and large quantities of war materiel rolled into Agua Prieta
from Constitutionalist bases at Piedras Negras and Nuevo
Laredo.2^ Soon extensive defensive works, bristling with
cannon and machine guns, ringed Calles position to within a
22
few feet of the international boundary. Meanwhile, in
response to urgent appeals from Senator Henry F. Ashurst and
other Arizona public officials, the Secretary of War had
instructed General Funston to reinforce the garrison at
Douglas and to take whatever steps he deemed necessary to
93
protect American lives and property in that city. In 
short, Funston was authorized to intervene in the ensuing 
contest for Agua P r i e t a . B y  October 30, then, when Villa 
reached the border, the Constitutionalist outpost had become 
a near-impregnable fortress. What but two weeks earlier had 
promised to be a quick and easy victory, the critical first 
step in the anticipated resurgence of the Villista movement, 
now loomed as a potential debacle.
21Ibid., October 27 and 29, 1915.
22Ibid., October 27, 1915. 23Ibid.
2*Ibid., November 2, 1915.
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The Villista response to American accommodation of
Carranza was understandably heated. On October 29, Governor
Randall, then at Nogales, Sonora, vehemently protested the
passage of Constitutionalist troops through United States
territory. Because of that unfriendly act, he informed
Consul Simpich, he could no longer guarantee the safety of
25American lives and property in Sonora. It was an alarming
statement and one which caused as great a stir in New York
26and Washington as it did along the southwestern frontier.
Meanwhile, during the latter half of October, as 
Villa himself led the march on Agua Prieta, his subordinates 
in the interior of Sonora intensified their harassment of 
American and other foreign business interests. By the third 
week of the month, Villista bands had occupied most of the 
American mining communities in the northern portion of the
27
state and stripped them of arms, horses, and provisions.
As a result, virtually all activity in the mining districts
25Ibid., October 30, 1915; Funston to the Adjutant 
General, November 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/16752.
26Ibid.; L. W. Mix to Ashurst, October 28, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16643. Mix was mayor of Nogales, Arizona.
27New York Times, October 24# 1915.
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came to a sudden halt. Only the great copper mines at
Cananea maintained production and they too were soon shut
, 28 down.
Destruction of the Southern Pacific Railroad of 
Mexico (SPM) spur line between Cananea and the border and the 
refusal of company officials to repair it so long as the 
campaign in the North continued, ultimately forced the clo­
sure of the mines at Cananea. As of October 23, then, 
operations cleased and thousands of workers were idle and 
unpaid. At Nogales, Governor Randall was furious. The 
Yaqui general, Urbalejo, was promptly dispatched from Naco 
to Cananea with orders to detain officials of the CCCC and 
to compel regular payment of wages despite the shut-down.
Upon occupying the town, Urbalejo demanded from CCCC and 
SPM officials gold levies of $25,000 and $150,000 respec­
tively. Failure to pay, the General indicated, would be 
punished by the destruction of all railroad property at Naco 
and Cananea and the mining properties at the latter site as
28Ibid., October 29, 1915.
^Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
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Shortly thereafter, word arrived in Washington that 
still other foreign firms with operations in northern Sonora
were being subjected to similar pressure by Villista authori-
30ties. "It is the belief here," the American commander at
Nogales reported, "that all these unreasonable demands are 
the last frantic efforts of the factional chiefs in Sonora." 
Nonetheless, they were not to be taken lightly. "There is 
grave personal danger," he warned, "to any American in 
Sonora, and threats are being openly made at Naco and in
Nogales at acts of retaliation" against United States citi-
31zens. By the last week in October, then, some twenty
million dollars worth of American property in northern Sonora
32was at the mercy of Villista commanders. At the same time, 
hundreds of American residents of the mining districts, par­
ticularly those at Cananea, had begun to fear for their
, . 33lives.
30
New York Times, November 5, 1915.
31Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16752.
33Mix to Ashurst, October 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16643.
33
Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
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On October 29, Lansing moved to forestall further 
Villista depredations. On the same day that Randall's 
ominous protest was received in Washington, the Secretary 
warned the Governor in no uncertain terms that both he and 
his chief would be held strictly accountable for the abuse 
of American citizens in northern Sonora as well as for the 
confiscation or destruction of their p r o p e r t y . I t  was a 
stern rebuke and an effective one. Soon after, Urbalejo 
himself vouched for the safety of Americans at Cananea.35 
For the moment, at least, the danger there had passed.
Not so, however, at Agua Prieta. There a storm was 
brewing. On or about October 30, during an interview with 
newsmen, Villa obtained absolute confirmation of the formal 
recognition of the Carranza regime. Although obviously 
disappointed, he appeared resigned to the fact and accepted 
it with considerable aplomb. He did not, however, receive 
with equanimity the disclosure of American cooperation with 
the defenders of Agua Prieta. Quite the c o n t r a r y . " I n d i g ­
nant and defiant," he burst into a "tirade" against the
3^Ibid.; New York Times, October 30, 1915.
35Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16752.
35Carothers to Lansing, October 31, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16653.
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United States Government: "This is the way the United States
repays me," he raged, "for the . , . protection I have given
foreigners in Mexico. Hereafter, I don't give a  what
happens to foreigners in Mexico . . . .  I am through with
37the United States." He would take Ague Prieta, he vowed,
"if he had to fight the whole Carran2a army and the United
38States" as well. Meanwhile, as Villa fumed, four more
trainloads of Constitutionalist troops crossed into Agua
Prieta. At the same time, some 6000 American soldiers from
the hastily reinforced garrison at Douglas took up defensive
39positions just north of the international boundary. "The
situation here," Carothers reported late on the 31st, is
40
"rather tense."
During the following afternoon, Villa began his 
advance on Agua Prieta. Shortly after midnight, following 
an extended artillery duel, he launched a series of four 
successive assaults against the Constitutionalist defenses.
37Ibid.; New York Times, November 1, 1915; Funston 
to the Adjutant General, November 1, 1915, SDR 812.00/16679.
38Ibid.
39New York Times, November 1 and 2, 1915.
40Carothers to Lansing, October 31, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16653.
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Exposed by powerful searchlights, allegedly operated by 
American adventurers, and subjected to intense cannon and 
machine gun fire, the attackers were driven back with heavy 
losses.^ In the morning. Villa withdrew his forces some 
distance from the town, apparently to regroup preparatory to 
a fresh assault.
Meanwhile, during the course of the battle, stray 
rounds had killed and wounded a number of spectators on the
a  e
American side of the line. Funston, having recently ar­
rived in Douglas, responded by notifying both belligerents 
that deliberate firing into the city would not be tolerated.
Should it occur, he warned, American troops would cross the
43border and forcibly suppress it. The Villistas, of course,
Ibid., November 3, 1915; Clendenen, The U. S. and 
Villa, 211. "Villa's previous successes in night attacks," 
Clendenen notes, "caused him to have great faith in them, but 
at Agua Prieta the night was turned into day by powerful 
searchlights, the beams of which not only revealed the on­
coming attack but blinded the attackers. These searchlights 
caused much bitterness among the Villistas and were quickly 
added to the grudge which they were building up against the 
United States." Villa believed that the searchlights were 
furnished by the United States Armyr manned by American sol­
diers, and located on the American side of the line. What­
ever the case, Clendenen concludes, power for the searchlights 
"undoubtedly came from the United States." Villa had cause 
for complaint. Ibid.
43New York Times, November 2, 1915.
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because of their position opposite Douglas, were most likely 
to give offense. Consequently, on the morning of November 3, 
Villa sought and obtained an interview with the General.
His aim, apparently, was to determine whether or not Funston 
indeed intended to intervene on behalf of the Constitu­
tionalists. At the meeting Villa expressed his aversion to 
opening hostilities against the United States. Beyond that
the details are unclear. Funston reported only that Villa's
44"attitude was quite satisfactory." Whatever, the case, 
Villa chose not to renew the attack. Instead, later in the 
day, he broke camp, swung south of Agua Prieta, and took a 
position twenty-five miles to the west at the tiny border 
town of Naco. There Villa hoped to establish another port 
of entry and a new base of operations in the North. Once 
firmly established on the border, he planned on the one hand 
to renew the campaign against Calles and on the other to ex­
tend his influence into western Sonora and down the Gulf of
45California to Sinaloa.
The meeting with Funston, Clendenen notes, "was 
probably the last occasion on which an American official saw
^Funston to the Adjutant General, November 3, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16727; New York Times, November 4 and 5, 1915.
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and talked [with. Villa] face to face*" The latter*s "resent­
ment against the United States and his bitterness at American
ingratitude must have been increasing hourly, as the magni-
46tude of his disaster sank deeper into his consciousness." 
Certainly, within a very short time. Villa's hatred of the 
United States had become intense. In the weeks and months 
that followed, it was manifested repeatedly in an increasingly 
violent assault upon American lives and property on both 
sides of the international boundary.
For several days, Villa rested at Naco. In the in­
terim, Lansing's warning notwithstanding, he and his lieu­
tenants persisted in their campaign against foreign interests 
in northern Mexico. On November 4, the American-owned 
Nichols ranch, several miles from Naco, was swept clean of 
livestock, and threats were subsequently made to confiscate 
the huge herd of the Cananea Cattle Company, a subsidiary 
of the CCCC in eastern Sonora.47 Also on November 4, it was 
learned in Washington that officials of the latter firm had 
finally succumbed to Villista pressure, paying $25,000 in gold 
for an "immunity" of dubious validity. Other large mining
4<*Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 215.
47New York Times, November 4 and 7, 1915.
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concerns in eastern Sonora promptly followed suit.^® And
doubtless it was well that they did. Some three weeks earlier,
just before leaving for Agua Prieta, Villa himself confirmed
the order confiscating the ASARCO smelting plant at Chihuahua
49City and all other company property in the state.
Although as yet no Americans had lost their lives in
the northern campaign, it was clear that those who remained
in Villista territory did so at great risk. On November 6 ,
Villistas at Cananea arrested all Turkish merchants in the
50vicinity and held them for ransom. Moreover, on the same 
day, two American physicians, employees of the CCCC who had 
gone to Agua Prieta to care for the wounded, crossed the 
border at that site with a shocking account of physical
51abuse and near execution at the hands of Villista soldiers.
Thus while Lansing's admonition of October 29 succeeded in 
intimidating Governor Randall and Villista civil authorities, 
it by no means curbed the excesses of Villa himself or those
^®Ibid.f November 5, 1915.
^ Bernstein, Mexican Mining Industry, 108; Clendenen, 
The 0. s. and Villa, 213.
5QNew York Times, November 7, 1915.
51xIbid.; Funston to the Adjutant General, November 10,
1915, SDR 812.00/16803.
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of his military commanders. In fact# Carothers reported on
November 8 , Villa was now "absolutely irresponsible and
subject to violent bursts of temper." He was "fully capable
of any extreme." Neither "promises nor assurances of good
intentions" could be accepted at face value. Villa's "brutal
treatment" of the American doctors, Carothers contended, was
52a "fair example of his present state of mind." It was 
clear, then: sooner or later, Americans would die in
northern Mexico.
IV.
Early in November, the First Chief moved to drive 
his surviving opponents from the field. In the North,
Obregon on the border was to cooperate with General Manuel
c o
Dieguez, then at Guaymas, in bringing Villa to bay. Thus, 
on November 6, Obregon established his headquarters at Agua 
Prieta and began preparations for what was confidently ex­
pected to be the final campaign in the North. The following 
day, Dieguez* army of 7000 men occupied Hermosillo with 
little difficulty, tightening the vise on Villa and blocking
^2Carothers to Lansing, November 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
16739.
53New York Times, November 8 and 9, 1915.
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54his escape route south down the main line of the SPM. 
Constitutionalist strategy now presupposed a final Villista 
stand at Naco and the subsequent flight of Villa himself 
across the international boundary to internment in the 
United States.55
Apparently, the full cooperation of United States 
authorities was taken for granted. Although there is no 
evidence of a formal agreement to that effect, American 
officials on the border were unquestionably well-disposed 
toward Obregon and hostile in varying degree to Villa. 
Funston, for instance, conferred at length with Obregon upon 
the latter's arrival at Agua Prieta. What passed between 
them is unknown; the meeting, however, was most cordial.5® 
More explicit indications of official American sentiment were
manifested in the respective attitudes of Customs Collector
Zach Cobb at El Paso and Special Agent Carothers at Douglas, 
Arizona.
In the first instance, Cobb recommended that per­
mission be denied to Villa to send several hundred severely
54Ibid., November 7 and 8 , 1915.
55Ibid., November 9, 1915.
56Ibid., November 7, 1915.
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wounded soldiers across the Southwest to Ciudad Juarez.57
Accordingly, Lansing rejected Villa's appeal, thereby
5 8deepening the latter's hatred of the United States. In 
the second, Cobb, strongly supported by Carothers, repeatedly 
urged the appropriate authorities in Washington to halt the 
export of coal to Mexico on the grounds that it would ulti­
mately fall into Villa's hands and be used to fuel his 
59trains. Without coal, of course. Villa would lose much 
of his mobility, and the bases at Naco and Nogales, isolated 
from the interior of Mexico, would become virtually useless. 
And, in addition to attempting to deny Villa fuel, Cobb also 
took steps to deprive him of his principal source of revenue. 
On his own initiative, the Collector halted the sale of 
Villista cattle at El Paso and urged his superiors to endorse 
his action. Such measures, he argued, were essential to the 
destruction of Villista power in northern Mexico.59 Carothers 
concurred. If Villa were "permitted to gain a footing" at 
either Naco or Nogales, the agent warned, he would become a
57Cobb to Lansing, November 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16705.
5®Lansing to Cobb, November 6 , 1915, Ibid.
59Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 215-216.
60Ibid.
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"dangerous menace." Not only coal, Carothers advised, but
all other supplies of potential use to the Villistas should 
61be embargoed.
Villa, meanwhile, with some 12,000 men scattered 
throughout northern Sonora, realized that his position at 
Naco was rapidly becoming untenable.Flanked on the east 
by Calles and Obregon, he was cut off from Ciudad Juarez, 
and his communications with Chihuahua were in serious jeo­
pardy. He had to act, and quickly. A new assault on Agua 
Prieta, far stronger since the arrival of Obregon, was 
obviously out of the question. So, too, was withdrawal to 
the interior of Chihuahua. The only acceptable alternative, 
then, was a sudden thrust into western Sonora in hopes of 
defeating Dieguez. Indeed, if villa succeeded in destroying 
Dieguez' army and establishing himself at Hermosillo, he
would have "a new lease on life . . . and a base from which
63he might yet conquer all of Mexico." If nothing else, he
6^Carothers to Lansing, November 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
16739.
62New York Times, November 8, 1915; Simpich to 
Lansing, November 10, 1915, SDR 812.00/16785; Funston to 
the Adjutant General, November 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/16842.
63Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 214.
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might still succeed in brushing by Dieguez and escaping
southward to join Zapatista and other nominally Villista
forces operating in the States of Durango, Sinaloa, and 
64Jalisco. Accordingly, on November 14, as Obregon began 
his advance on Naco, Villa withdrew from the border and 
proceeded rapidly southward toward Hermosillo.6^
Four days later, skirmishing commenced around Alamito, 
a dozen miles north of Villa's objective.66 Then, on the 
20th, Villa himself led a disastrous assault on the Consti­
tutionalist outpost. Caught in a lethal triangle of cannon
and machine gun fire, his veterans were utterly routed. By
67the morning of the 21st, it was all over for Villa. In
the "most decisive defeat" since Celaya and Leon, Villista
68morale was shattered: "The hard Villa army began to
®4Davis to Lansing, October 30, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16793. Villista forces in Jalisco were particularly strong 
at that time, very nearly seizing the important city of 
Guadalajara on October 31. Davis to Lansing, October 31,
1915, SDR 812.00/16794.
65New York Times, November 15, 1915.
66
Ibid., November 20, 1915.
67Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16951; Carothers to Lansing, November 20, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16831; Literary Digest, LI (December 11, 1915), 
1395.
68New York Times, November 22, 1915.
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69disintegrate." Leaving behind them more than 800 dead,
many seriously wounded, and great quantities of ordnance and
other materiel, the survivors began a long forced march to 
70the border. There, at Nogales, Randall and a small 
Villista garrison held the last remaining refuge in the 
entire Northwest. With Dieguez in determined pursuit, dis­
cipline dissolved, desertions soared, and villa reverted to 
type. He and his people, Hostetter reported from Hermosillo, 
behaved "shamefully" during the retreat from Alamito. Villa
himself set the example. "He acted like a wild beast in
71this section," the Consul concluded in disgust.
While Dieguez was dealing the death blow to Villa's 
main force in western Sonora, Obregon, at least in part be­
cause of urgent State Department representations, moved
^Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 214.
70New York Times, November 22, 1915.
7 ^"Hos tetter to Lansing, December 27, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
17053. At La Colorado, for instance. Villa's men "sacked 
every store in the town and murdered sixteen Chinamen, some 
were hung, others shot and a few were killed by being pulled 
to pieces by horse.*r Then, at San Pedro de las Cuevas, they 
"shot seventy-eight men, every man in the town, and outraged 
every girl and woman in the place . . . .  This he [Villa] 
did after collecting forty thousand pesos in silver and 
promising not to injure anyone . . . ." Ibid.
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swiftly against the smaller Villista concentration in the
eastern portion of the state. There# General Jose Rodriguez
occupied Cananea and detachments from General Francisco
Acosta's command held the smaller towns and camps in the
72adjacent mining districts. By late November# the situation
73at Cananea was "desperate. Despite the "immunity" recently 
purchased by the CCCC, Rodriguez had sacked the town and 
threatened to execute every American citizen therein. Upon 
Obregon's approach# he took up positions around the great 
smelting works of the American>-owned Cole-Ryan Corporation 
and announced his determination to stand fast. Obregon# in 
turn# was equally determined to dislodge him, threatening to 
bombard the town# if necessary, to drive Rodriguez into the 
open. The lives of hundreds of Americans and investments 
valued in the millions of dollars were at stake. "Serious 
complications {were] feared there," the New York Times con­
cluded.74
Soon after# however# Rodriguez force of 5500 broke
72New York Times# November 20, 1915.
^Ibid., November 22, 1915.
74Ibid., November 24 and 29# 1915; Funston to the 
Adjutant General# November 10# 1915, SDR 812.00/16803; 
Carothers to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/16840.
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through the Constitutionalist encirclement, eluded pursuit,
75and disappeared into the mountains. Sorely disappointed, 
Obregon turned on Acosta's scattered bands, driving them be­
fore him toward the border. Funston, closely following the 
campaign, was apprehensive. If Rodriguez and Acosta were to 
join Villa, then falling back on Nogales, their combined 
forces would considerably outnumber O b r e g o n . U n l e s s  
Dieguez came up fast from Hermosillo, the entire Constitu­
tionalist position in the North would be in jeopardy.
Along the Arizona-Sonora border, meanwhile, Villista 
animosity toward the United States had risen sharply following 
the formal recognition of the Carranza regime. Nowhere along 
the border was anti-American sentiment stronger than it was 
at Nogales, Sonora. There, since October 30, when the SPM 
had ceased to operate in Villista territory, repeated "declara­
tions and • • . demonstrations" against the Government of the 
United States had occurred. Feeling on both sides of the 
border, the American commander reported, particularly on the 
Mexican side, was "at high tension."77 The circumstances
7^Funston to the Adjutant General, November 25, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16855.
76Ibid.
77Funston to the Adjutant General, November 10,
1915, SDR 812.00/16803.
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surrounding Villa's defeat at Agua Prieta, of course, had
seriously aggravated the situation. Soon after that setback,
rumors of an imminent Villista attack on the American town
began to drift across the border. Then, on November 4,
American authorities "unearthed" positive evidence of such
a scheme. An attack was indeed scheduled for the night of
the 6th when a small band was to cross the border and "loot
the various banks and stores." Those involved included
Villista non-commissioned officers and soldiers, Mexican
civilians, and some fifty to sixty of "the Mexican rabble
on the American side." Some of the latter group were "pledged
to join in the attack on the American Boundary guard." That
the projected raid did not occur was due almost certainly to
its premature exposure and to the obvious readiness of the
78strong American garrison. Nonetheless, in the days that
79followed, both towns remained in ferment. Excitement rose 
to a fever pitch on November 24 when the remnants of Villa's 
shattered army entered the Mexican town.®**
79On or about November 19, for instance, Governor 
Randall seized from the CCCC a consignment of copper bullion 
worth in excess of a half-million dollars. New York Times, 
November 20, 1915.
®°Ibid., November 25, 1915.
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By late November, Clendenen contends, the Villistas 
were convinced that they would have taken Agua Prieta if 
Calles "had not been reinforced through the United States 
and that the crushing blow at Hermosillo would not have 
occurred." Consequently, when they reached the border, 
their hatred burst forth "in open violence."81. That very 
day, a concerned Governor Randall informed American authori­
ties that a number of Villista officers on the Mexican side
p O
of the line were "intoxicated and beyond his control."
Soon after, a number of mounted Villistas rode to the edge
of the international boundary and "hurled insults across the
line at the American border guards, daring them to fight."
Brigadier General George Bell, commanding American forces at
Nogales, responded by rushing troops to prepared positions
83along the border. And it was well that he did. That night
a serious riot erupted in the Mexican town when the rumor
spread that even then Obregon was advancing on Nogales through
84United States territory. Only the presence of Bell's troops 
on the border prevented a march on the American town.
81Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 219.
82
New York Times, November 25, 1915.
83Ibid. 84Ibid., November 27, 1915.
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The following day, customs officials closed the Port 
of Nogales and permitted no food or other supplies to cross 
to the Mexican side. "This added materially to the tense­
ness of the situation."®® It also provoked a very serious 
incident. Later in the day, two Villista colonels, one of 
whom was garrison commander at Nogales, and some thirty 
soldiers approached the international boundary near the 
Nogales Customs House. Seeing Simpich and the collector of 
customs, they charged in their direction, brandishing their 
weapons and "calling them vile names." Although no shots 
were fired, several soldiers rode across the border with 
drawn guns, threatening people on the streets of the American 
town and driving them back in confusion.®® Why the border 
guard did not open fire, Funston queried, "I do not know.'1®^
The General was unquestionably alarmed over the 
state of affairs at Nogales. Within the previous 24 hours, 
he reported on November 25, there had occurred five separate 
incidents in which Villistas had fired across the border at
85Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16951.
86Ibid., Simpich to Lansing, November 25, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16854; Funston to the Adjutant General, November 
25, 1915, SDR 812.00/16855.
87-,. .Ibid.
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American soldiers. Several of the latter had been wounded,
and a number of Mexicans hit and probably killed by the 
8 8
return fire. The situation at Nogales, he advised the 
War Department, was "one of the gravest we have faced on 
the border." General Acosta, he continued, would shortly 
join Villa thereby raising the number of troops opposite the 
American town to more than 3000. And General Rodrigues; was 
expected to follow. Given the breakdown of discipline in 
the Villista ranks and the vengeful mood of the recent 
arrivals, a potentially explosive situation was rapidly 
developing. Accordingly, the General closed, he had already 
ordered reinforcements to Nogales and was leaving at once 
for that place himself.®^
It is clear that Funston anticipated a serious clash 
with Villista forces at Nogales. And very likely something 
of the sort would have occurred had not the sudden convergence 
of Dieguez and Obregon on the town forced its precipitate 
evacuation. Thus on the night of the 25th, Villista soldiers 
looted foreign properties in the Mexican town and began a
®®Funston to the Adjutant General, November 25, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16858; New York Times, November 27, 1915.
89
Funston to the Adjutant General, November 25, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16855.
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disorderly withdrawal down the main line of the SPM. At the
same time, a large number of deserters, including Governor
Randall and General Acosta, crossed to the American side and
90sought political asylum. The following morning, shortly
before Constitutionalist Colonel Lazaro Cardenas entered
Nogales, drunken Yaqui soldiers abandoned at the railroad
station began a deliberate fire across the border, in the
ensuing skirmish, one American soldier and fifty to sixty
91Yaguis were killed. Later in the day, a second clash
occurred when Cardenas' command, then approaching Nogales,
mistook elements of the Tenth Cavalry for fleeing Villistas.
Although two of Cardenas' men were killed and several others
wounded, the Constitutionalists readily acknowledged their
92error and the matter was amicably resolved. By nightfall 
of the 26th, Obregon and the main body of the Constitution­
alist army had occupied the Mexican town. The crisis at 
Nogales had passed.
90Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16951; New York Times, November 28, 1915.
91Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16951; Carothers to Lansing, November 26, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16869.
92
Ibid.; Funston to the Adjutant General, November
27, 1915, SDR 812.00/16886; New York Times, November 28, 1915.
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V.
Initial American reaction to Villista reverses in 
northern Mexico was one of guarded optimism. On November 
28, for instance, the New York Times opined editorially that 
Carranza's rival probably was f i n i s h e d . A n d  indeed it 
seemed so. During the week immediately following the evacua­
tion of Nogales, large numbers of Villista troops, including 
Orbalejo's entire command of 1400 Yaguis, surrendered to 
Dieguez or Obregon.9  ^ Scores of Villista officers, the 
backbone of the Division of the North, were summarily exe­
cuted. Other units simply disbanded, leaving behind them 
great quantities of ammunition, as well as cannon, machine
guns, and other war materiel all but impossible for Villa 
95to replace. Although Villa himself, as well as Rodriguez 
and several less prominent commanders, retained sizable 
personal followings, they no longer constituted an army.9^
And upon withdrawing from Nogales they went their separate 
ways.
If, however, the conventional war was over, the 
guerrilla had just begun. For the moment, though, that fact
9*Ibid., December 2, 1915. 95Ibid.
93_, . , Ibid.
96Ibid.
487
was largely overlooked. The situation in Mexico, the New 
York Tiroes declared, was "much more promising than we had 
reason to believe it would be so soon after the recognition 
of Carranza.1' But appearances, particularly in revolutionary 
Mexico, were apt to be misleading. Thus the possibility re­
mained, the writer cautioned, that still new "international
complications" might arise from "misapprehensions on one
97side or the other." And indeed they did.
On November 25, on the eve of the evacuation of
Nogales, Villa summoned his officers before him, informed
them that the United States Government "was to blame for his
present predicament," and called upon them to join him in a
guerrilla campaign against the northern border. Those who
wished to leave him, he declared, were free to go. As there
was "little enthusiasm" for the scheme, the great majority
98of Villa's officers chose the latter option. Some, at
least, believed their chief insane. The rapid succession of
defeats in the North, they explained, had left him seriously
99and perhaps dangerously deranged. Inexplicably, in view
"ibid., November 28, 1915.
"Garrison to Lansing, December 1, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16893.
99New York Times, December 2, 1915.
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of Villa's notorious vindictiveness and penchant for violence,
American military authorities on the border failed to take
the threat seriously. Funston, for example, could "scarcely
believe" that Villa meant what he said.***0 And yet however
absurd the scheme might have appeared in some quarters, it
was obviously feasible. De la Rosa, Pisano, and the Texas
revolutionaries had established that fact beyond equivocation
on the Lower Rio Grande. And Villa, in deadly earnest, would
do so again along the Chihuahua-New Mexico border.
Immediately, however, Washington and Queretaro had
to contend with a new series of attacks upon American and
other foreign properties in northern M e x i c o . O n  November
28, Rodriguez' band struck the headquarters of the Moctezuma
Copper Company at Nacozari, Sonora. . Although the raiders
were eventually driven off by the Constitutionalist garrison,
102extensive property damage resulted. On December 1, the 
approach of another Villista band prompted the evacuation of
^00Garrison to Lansing, December 1, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16893; New York Times, December 2, 1915.
10*Ibid., November 27 and December 2, 14, 1915; 
Funston to Adjutant General, December 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
17030; Simpich to Lansing, December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
17031.
102
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El Tigre, Sonora, the site of American-owned gold and silver 
mines. Again, Constitutionalist soldiers drove off the 
attackers.*03 qU£ the appearance of Rodriguez and other 
Villista marauders in the mining districts of eastern 
Sonora effectively shut down most of the smaller camps and 
prompted a new exodus of Americans to the border.
Meanwhile, in the southwestern United states, anxiety 
mounted over the fate of American citizens in the interior 
of Sonora. It was generally believed that if Rodriguez 
succeeded in taking either Nacozari or Cananea, his avowed 
objectives, he would execute all Americans therein.
In Washington, too, then, concern was manifested over 
conditions in northern Mexico, not only in Sonora but in the 
Villista-controlled states of Chihuahua and Durango as well. 
Those Americans who had failed to heed Lansing's warning 
to come to the border would be in grave danger if, as 
expected. Villa recrossed the Sierra Madre. Moreover, in 
addition to hundreds of American lives, millions of 
dollars worth of American property was threatened. There
l°3ibid.
lO^Punston to the Adjutant General, November 30,
1915, SDR 812.00/16893.
490
would be no buying "immunity" after Nogales. Consequently, 
early in December, Lansing began to receive urgent appeals 
for protection from American firms with interests in northern 
Mexico.10^
Responding sympathetically, the Secretary requested 
on December 7 that Obregon strengthen the Constitutionalist 
garrison at Cananea so that production there might be resumed 
in s a f e t y . Some days later, the General complied.
Then, on December 11, in response to a particularly urgent 
appeal from ASARCO representatives, Lansing explicitly called 
for the protection of that company's plant in Chihuahua City 
and its other properties in the state as well.^08 Impossible, 
at the time, to fulfill, the Secretary's request doubtless 
sorely vexed Constitutionalist officials. They had more 
important priorities.
l°5see, for example, L. C. Neal to Lansing, December 
11, 1915, SDR 812.00/16944„and Frank L. Peckham to Lansing, 
December 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/16953. Neal was an attorney 
for American ranching and agricultural interests in the 
States of Chihuahua and Durango.
^®6Lansing to Simpich, December 7, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16927a.
^O^Simpich to Lansing, December 9, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16928.
^°^Lansing to Parker, December 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16944.
491
While Rodriguez and other roving Villistas swept
through the mining districts of Sonora, Villa himself and
several thousand followers made straight for Chihuahua.
Crossing the Sierra Madre on horseback, they emerged in the
109western portion of the state on December 11. Advancing 
on the town of Madera, site of the American-owned Madera 
Lumber Company, they "looted and destroyed" all of the 
American homes and stores in the community and demanded a 
large sum of money from the company.**° Thirty of its em­
ployees, all American citizens, were seized and taken along 
to Chihuahua City as hostages against payment of the levy.1** 
Only the hasty departure of the majority of American residents 
"averted a wholesale killing, as Villa pursued them for miles 
with his cavalry."*'*'2
Entraining at Madera, Villa soon arrived at Chihuahua 
City, then held by Governor Avila and a garrison of 500 men. 
There, he demanded food and money from all foreign-owned
109«rhomas D. Edwards to Lansing, December 12, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16942. Edwards, a former South Dakota editor and 
civil servant, was consul at Ciudad Juarez from June, 1905 
to September, 1917. Register, 1918, 107.
110^ew York Times, December 14 and 15, 1915.
***Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 224.
112New York Times, December 14, 1915
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businesses, permitting his soldiers to loot those establish-
11 o
ments that r e s i s t e d . T h e n ,  on the 13th, he learned that 
Washington again had granted permission for Obregon to move 
troops through the United States, on that occasion from Agua 
Prieta to Las Paloroas preparatory to an attack on Ciudad 
Juarez. Villa was furious. He would "destroy American 
property wherever it was found," he vowed; "no American life 
would be safe in his territory." It was feared, the New York 
Times lamented, "that a massacre of Americans may occur at 
any time in Chihuahua State or city."*1,1*
Already on December 12, however, Carothers had re­
ported the existence of "serious dissension . . . between 
Villa and several of his prominent generals." Moreover,
rumors of disaffection within the Villista party, particularly
115among its adherents at Ciudad Juarez, were rife. Then,
on or about December 16, at a council of war in Chihuahua
116City, Villa was abruptly deposed. There, his assembled 
subordinates sought to impress upon him "the hopelessness of
113Ibid. 114Ibid.
115Carothers to Lansing, December 12, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16938.
116
Edwards to Lansing, December 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16964; New York Times, December 19, 1915.
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his struggle and insisted that it should end immediately." 
Ultimately, Villa gave in, but as manifest in a rambling, 
highly emotional farewell address, not without great bit­
terness and indignation and a profound sense of personal 
117betrayal. in stepping down, he was more dangerous than 
ever before.
At the close of the aforementioned address, Villa
indicated his desire to join his family in the United States,
declaring that he would abide by that country's laws and
refrain from any further political activity. Should the
Americans deny him asylum, he declared, he would go on to
118Spain or to some other neutral country. Shortly there­
after, Governor Avila arrived in Ciudad Juarez, sought out
117Ibid. "For five years I have fought the enemies 
of our great republic, and I have lost," Villa declared.
". . . I have done everything which my love of country has 
directed me to do. That men surrounding me were self-seeking 
and traitors to the cause of Mexican liberty, I cannot help. 
They will fight no longer, for they see no more money in 
sight. I have been in the field for five years. I have 
fought three dictators and have vanquished two - Diaz and 
Huerta. Had it not been for the traitorous alliance with 
the United States I would have vanquished Carranza, but the 
great country to the north, which professed friendship to me 
is all powerful now that Europe is at war, and I can do 
nothing but bow my head to superior force . . . .  I have 
no plans. I have planned so much for my people and they 
have turned against me just as they turned against the 
great and good Madero . . . ." Ibid.
118Ibid.
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Consul Thomas D. Edwards, and handed him a telegram from 
Conventionist authorities at Chihuahua City. Intended 
for President Wilson, it reviewed recent developments in 
Chihuahua, including Villa's dismissal as commander-in- 
chief of the Conventionist Army, and called upon the Presi­
dent to offer the General asylum in the United States.
Villa, Avila assured the Consul, was now in complete ac­
cord with the new regime at Chihuahua City and had himself 
approved the Governor's mission.
The following day, on December 18, Avila received a 
reply. The United States Government, Lansing declared, would 
accept Villa as a political refugee and would guarantee his 
safety and immunity from prosecution. Such terms, however, 
were contingent, first upon the immediate release of all 
American hostages in Villista hands and, second, upon re­
ceipt of a reciprocal guarantee of American lives and pro­
perty from Villa and those of his commanders still in the 
120field. It is doubtful whether Villa ever received 
Lansing's message. Nor, apparently, would it have mattered
**9Edwards to Lansing, December 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16964.
120Lansing to Edwards, December 18, 1915, Ibid.
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if he had. Later in the same day, Villa and several hundred
followers entrained at Chihuahua City, ostensibly bound
for Ciudad Juarez and exile in the United States. Accordingly,
General Pershing at El Paso sent troops to the international
121bridges in anticipation of the party*s arrival. They 
waited in vain. Villa never appeared.
VI.
From the first, there had been considerable skepti­
cism in some quarters over the authenticity of Villa's 
retirement. And not without cause. On December 17, soon 
after the General's dismissal, the entire Villista treasury - 
some 2,000,000 pesos - had been transferred from Juarez to 
banks in El Paso. Moreover, on the same day. Villa's wife 
had guilelessly informed American reporters that her hus­
band's retirement was only temporary: "'Should his party
not succeed within a reasonable time,' she said, 'he would
122seek to return to Mexico and again assume command.*"
Villa, the New York Times deduced, had no intention of per­
manently retiring from Mexican politics. Nor, it observed, 
would Carranza soon succeed in restoring order in all parts
121
New York TimeB, December 20, 1915.
199
Ibid., December 19, 1915.
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of the republic. Consequently, the journal concluded with 
eerie prescience. Villa, "no longer either Constitutionalist 
or Conventionist [might] yet appear armed and on horseback 
as the militant leader of some other variety of Mexican 
patriotism."*22
And indeed the General himself had implied as much. 
Taking leave of his former comrades-in-arms at Chihuahua 
City, he had urged them not only to make their peace with 
Carranza but also to retain their weapons as well. "You 
will need them soon," he promised, "and it will be the 
American invader against whom you will fire them, and not 
against your brothers." Intervention, he predicted, was 
"coming sooner" than they knew. And when it did, he con­
cluded, "fight for your country and you will find General
124Francisco Villa beside you."
Villa's dismissal and subsequent disappearance into 
the vastness of western Chihuahua was followed soon after 
by the capitulation of the Conventionist regime in that state 
and by the surrender of its remaining outposts in the North. 
On December 19, Governor Avila concluded a protocol with Con­
stitutionalist representatives in Chihuahua City, formally
1 2 3
Ibid., December 20, 1915. 124Ibid.
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ending hostilities, transferring the capital to Carrancista 
forces, and providing for the inclusion of former Conven­
tionist officers in the Constitutionalist Army.3,25 In 
addition, it was agreed that Conventionist civil servants
would continue at their posts through nation-wide general
1 26elections tentatively scheduled for March, 1917. Some
days later, the city was occupied by Constitutionalist
troops under General Jacinto B. Trevino.
Meanwhile, in Ciudad Juarez, Carrancista Consul-
General Andres Garcia and Villista generals Banda and Limon
quickly negotiated the surrender of the last Conventionist
127stronghold in the North. The transfer, however, did not
go smoothly. It was rumored that Villa himself was advancing
on the city with a large force, determined to undo the capitu-
128lation and to start a new revolution. Although there was 
no substance to the rumor, rioting swept the city on the
125Ibid.; Funston to the Adjutant General, December 
31, 1915, SDR 812.00/17048.
126New York Times, December 20, 1915.
127
Cobb to Lansing, December 20, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16976; Funston to the Adjutant General, December 31, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17048.
128Ibid.; Carothers to Lansing, December 21, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16984.
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morning of the 21st, and force was required to suppress 
129it. Then, later in the day, disgruntled Villista soldiers
vented their wrath against the United States by deliberately
130firing across the river into El Paso. Upon the death of
an American railway inspector, Pershing rushed troops to the
river front, "giving them orders to return vigorously any
Mexican fire directed toward the United States."131 By
nightfall the firing had ceased and order had again been
restored in Ciudad Juarez. The following day, Obregon
arrived at the border. The remaining Villista troops were
disarmed and mustered out, and a Constitutionalist force
132under General Gavira occupied the city.
Upon the collapse of the Villista movement and the 
conclusion of peace at Chihuahua City, at least some students 
of Mexican affairs were willing to express a guarded optimism 
in viewing the immediate future of the neighboring republic. 
The de facto Government, it was noted, was now in control of
129Ibid.; Funston to the Adjutant General, December 
31, 1915, SDR 812.00/17048.
13t*Ibid.; Barnum to the Adjutant General, December 21, 
1915, SDR 812.00/17022.
13^Funston to the Adjutant General, December 31,
1915, SDR 812.00/17048.
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the "entire border territory except one or two unimportant
133sub-porta." And Villa* indisputably Carranza's most 
dangerous rival, was clearly in eclipse. Believed to be 
in hiding somewhere in the mountains of western Chihuahua, 
he was again little more than an outlaw with a price on his 
head. For the moment, at least, his days appeared numbered. 
Thus, with no other serious opposition still in the field, 
there was no apparent reason why the de facto Government 
could not get on with the urgent business of completing 
pacification and beginning the monumental task of recon­
struction.
Certainly, then, there was cause for optimism. And
yet, among close observers of the Mexican scene, a nagging
uneasiness persisted. As Zach Cobb put it early in the new
year, there was "an unpleasant drift" in the conduct of the
Carranza regime. It was "very difficult," he admitted, "to
134fora a balanced judgement on Mexican affairs."
133
Parker to Lansing, December 30, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17028.
^^Cobb to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
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Chapter 11
THE FAILURE OF PACIFICATION 
I.
Collector Cobb's concern over the state of affairs 
in Mexico was by no means restricted to those individuals 
whose job it was to observe and report on developments in 
the southern republic. By the end of 1915, congressmen, 
Administration officials, and newsmen alike shared a dis­
comfiting suspicion that serious trouble in Mexico, far from 
being over, might have just begun.
On December 20, the New York Times reported that a 
discussion of the "Mexican situation" and a general review 
of the Administration's Mexican policy could be expected on 
the floor of Congress shortly after the holiday recess. And 
in the Senate, it was revealed, a resolution was to be pre­
sented "calling upon the State Department to furnish the 
Foreign Relations Committee with all the documents, letters, 
and other data bearing on the negotiations with Mexico.
•^New York Times, December 20, 1915.
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Partisan as its origins admittedly were, the pending con­
gressional investigation of Mexican affairs unquestionably 
reflected a genuine and growing apprehension over the 
seemingly interminable disorder in Mexico and a widespread 
lack of confidence in the ability of the de facto Government 
to put things aright.
within the Department of State, of course, the Anti­
revolutionists had never had the slightest faith in the 
ability of the Constitutionalist party, either to complete 
the pacification of the republic or to preside over its re­
generation. Indeed, both immediately before and shortly 
after the extension of recognition to the Carranza regime, 
Canova and his staff implicitly questioned the wisdom of
that decision in formal memorandums to the Secretary of 
2
State. Without doubt, they anticipated further, even 
greater disorder in Mexico in the not so distant future.3 
Lansing, too, despite his seminal role in shaping the Ad­
ministration's new Mexican policy, was far from sanguine.
2
Canova, "Brief Statement of Present Political 
Situation in Mexico Based on Official Reports," October 6 , 
1915, SDR 812.00/16962; Anderson, "Memorandum on the Mexi­
can Situation," May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47%.
3Ibid.
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When, early in January, 1916, the Secretary of War suggested 
that "in view of . . . improved conditions in Mexico" cer­
tain units might be recalled from the border, Lansing
4
strenuously objected. Precisely because of continuing 
turmoil in the republic, he argued, not one man should be 
withdrawn from the border.^
Among the more important journals, even those 
friendly to the Wilson Administration and well-disposed 
toward the de facto Government, there were manifestations 
of concern over the situation in Mexico and of grave doubts 
as to the future course of events in that country. On 
December 20, 1915, a New York Times editorial writer neatly 
caught the prevailing mood: "The Mexican question," he
contended, "would not be a political issue" during the 
coming election year unless "something" were to happen to 
"check" the progress of Mexico toward "the restoration of 
peace and prosperity." However, he pointedly warned, that 
"something" might well happen. And if it did, the writer 
believed, it would occur "through the machinations of
^Garrison to Lansing, January 6 , 1916, SDR 812.00/
17070.
5
Lansing to Garrison, January 12, 1916, Ibid.
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Mexican exiles in the United States" acting in “connivance" 
with certain Americans "who may have reasons of their own 
for desiring the failure" of the Carranza regime.
The following day, despite the pessimistic tone of 
the above editorial, the same journal sympathetically re­
viewed the Government's recent relations with Mexico and 
endeavored to conclude its summary of current Administra­
tion Mexican policy on an optimistic note. Washington, it 
explained, had gone to great lengths to facilitate negotia­
tions between the Constitutionalists and Villa's Conven- 
tionist regime in the belief that with Villa "out of Mexico 
the way would be cleared for the restoration of order" in 
that country. In offering asylum to the General, the Ad­
ministration had "taken the step with [the] realization that 
it [might] provoke criticism in some quarters and very 
probably [would] be made the occasion for an attack from 
Colonel [Theodore] Roosevelt." Indeed, there was "keen 
realization in official circles that the whole progress of 
the negotiations with Mexico [would] be raked over" in the 
approaching presidential campaign. It was, however, the 
"hope" of the Administration that the months ahead would be
^New York Times, December 20, 1915.
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marked by such progress in "restoring something like normal 
conditions in Mexico that the course of the Administration 
will be vindicated thereby nullifying the effect of the 
expected attacks." Whatever the case, the President would 
"stand pat on the belief that nothing [had] happened in
•J
Mexico which would have justified armed intervention." 
Carranza, then, would continue to receive the benefit of 
the doubt. He would be given every opportunity to prove 
himself.
By the end of 1915, the First Chief was desperately 
in need of all the help he could get. It was far simpler, 
he and his generals were learning, to cope with an army in 
the field than it was to deal with the dozens of small, 
highly mobile guerrilla bands that had arisen in the wake 
of successive Constitutionalist victories. By the beginning 
of the new year, the de facto Government was faced with a 
frustrating impasse: although Carrancista forces were in
nominal control of all but one of the states and indeed 
occupied the cities and most of the larger towns, a bewilder­
ing melange of bandits, local autonomists, and self-styled 
revolutionaries completely dominated the countryside. Hordes
^Ibid., December 21, 1915.
505
of outlaws infested every state, cutting rail communications, 
seizing and looting the smaller towns, and consistently 
eluding the infrequent, uninspired punitive expeditions 
sent against them by Constitutionalist authorities. Out­
side of the principal towns, then, virtual anarchy prevailed 
over the greater part of the republic. It was precisely 
that condition which the Wilson Administration, through 
recognition of the Carranza regime, had so fervently hoped 
to preclude.
Then, too, older problems persisted. Despite an 
apparently sincere initial attempt by the First Chief to 
suppress the Texas revolutionaries and to prevent a recur­
rence of the disturbances along the Lower Rio Grande, ad­
herents of the irredentist movement had by no means aban-
Q
doned their plans. In fact, during the winter of 1915- 
1916, they intensified their recruiting and organizational 
activities south of the border in expectation of resuming 
their offensive in the spring of the latter year. In the 
State of Sonora, meanwhile, inability to solve the so-called
^Breckinridge to Lansing, December 22, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16999; Lansing to Silliman, January 18, 1916, SDR 
812.00/17042; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
20165.
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Yaqui problem continued to embarrass the de facto Government.
There, the much-heralded "campaign of extermination1 against
9
the Indians bogged down almost immediately. Within a 
matter of months it was virtually abandoned. Finally, in 
improving its image and in bettering its relations with both 
the government and the people of the United States, matters 
of utmost importance to its very survival, the Carranza 
regime failed abysmally. Despite repeated assurances to 
the contrary, harassment of the Mexican Church and persecu­
tion of the clergy persisted.^ So, too, in contravention 
of prior pledges, did encroachment upon the property rights 
of American and other foreign citizens and corporations in 
Mexico.^ In conjunction with the obvious inability of the
9Funston to the Adjutant General, January 8, 27 and 
February 3, 1916, SDR 812.00/17112, 17194, and 17239; Baker 
to Lansing, February 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/17278.
^ New York Times, November 30 and December 14, 20, 
1915; Funston to the Adjutant General, January 6, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17078.
•*-*See, for example, Funston to the Adjutant General, 
November 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/16842; Davis to Lansing, 
December 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/17528; Simpich to Lansing, 
December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/17031; Williams to Lansing, 
January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17107; Vincent to Lansing, 
January 19, 1916, SDR 812.6363/202a; Parker to Lansing, 
November 16, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 951-952; Lansing 
to Silliman, December 28, 1915, Ibid., 962-963.
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de facto Government to complete pacification of the republic, 
those abuses, in turn, gave rise to new and increasingly 
insistent demands for American armed intervention.
Carranza, then, by the beginning of the new year, 
was in a most difficult position. He could not afford to 
further antagonize those interests in the United States 
already hostile to his regime, much less the Wilson Adminis­
tration. Nor, on the other hand, could he continue to 
frustrate the largely unfulfilled revolutionary aspirations 
of his more zealous lieutenants, to say nothing of those of
i 2
the great mass of the Mexican people. And therein lay his 
dilemma. He could not serve two masters.
XI.
Immediately upon obtaining coveted Pan-American 
recognition, the First Chief moved to mend his political
12In November, 1915, for instance. Constitutionalist 
General Cabanillas advised the United States Consul at 
Mazatlan that he and his comrades-in-arms had not yet 
"carried out our ideals and secured the laws that we have 
been fighting for . . . Their objectives were, for the 
most part, contrary to the existing constitution of Mexico. 
They would have to be realized through sweeping decrees 
issued in a pre-constitutional period. Thus, the General 
warned, any attempt to stage an election or to place the 
country on a constitutional basis "before a lapse of at 
least two years" was bound to provoke a new revolution.
Alger to Lansing, November 10, 1915, SDR 812.00/16833.
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fences both foreign and domestic. In late October, 1915, 
Carranza himself, accompanied by Obregon and a sizable 
retinue of civil and military officials, began a triumphal 
if leisurely progress through the restless Northeast to 
the Texas border. In addition to reasserting his tenuous 
authority over wayward subordinates in that near-autonomous 
region, the First Chief was anxious to conciliate the 
aroused Anglo-American populace of the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley and to impress upon the government in Washington his 
determination to personally investigate and suppress the now 
embarrassing Texas rebellion. He enjoyed notable success in 
the former endeavor, but failed singularly in the latter.
Special Agent John Belt, attached to the Carranza 
party, reported on October 22 that the First Chief's tour 
was "fast resulting in a most clever political move." The 
presence of General Obregon, "in apparent perfect accord" 
with Carranza, was "having a telling effect on every military 
man throughout the entire section traversed." As supreme 
head of the Constitutionalist forces, Obregon was treated by 
other officers, "including Generals, with notable deference." 
And there was "no doubting," Belt assured his superiors, 
"General Obregon*s complete loyalty to Carranza." The agent 
himself was deeply impressed with Obregon. It was certain.
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he declared, that in the future the General would "figure
prominently in the affairs" of Mexico: "He is at the present
moment the dominating character among all military men in
13this Republic." Clearly, then, so long as Obregon stood 
by Carranza, the latter*s position was secure.
Unquestionably, Carranza's presence - and that of 
Obregon - in the Northeastern border states had a dampening 
effect upon the Texas rebellion and, to a somewhat lesser 
degree, upon the broader Plan of San Diego as well.14 The 
removal of Nafarrate as commander at Matamoras and his re­
placement, first by General Eugenio Lopez and then by the 
able and conscientious General Alfredo Ricaut, effectively 
curtailed the offensive operations to the raiders. The last 
serious strike across the Rio Grande was executed on October 
29. Although rumors of new raids in the offing recurred 
through the balance of the year, none of the threatened 
strikes occurred. Nonetheless, the expectation that, at any 
moment, the raids might recommence kept tension high along
^Belt to Lansing, October 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16568.
14Hanna to Lansing, December 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16946. Philip C. Hanna was United States Consul-General at 
Monterrey. Prior to his appointment to that post, he had 
served as a consular officer in Venezuela, Trinidad, and 
Puerto Rico. Register, 1918, 117.
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the south Texas border. The result was to prolong and in­
tensify ethnic polarization in the Lower Valley and to sus­
tain the virulent anti-Mexican sentiment manifested by the 
majority of Anglo-American residents of the region. Under 
the circumstances, there was little that Carranza or anyone 
else could have done to dispel that deeply-rooted antagonism.
By late October, the temper of the Anglo-American
15community of south Texas had reached the flash point.  ^
Following de la Rosa's attack on the St. Louis, Brownsville 
and Mexican Railway train, the leaders of that community in 
Cameron County (Brownsville), Texas, complained bitterly to 
the Secretary of State, sharply criticizing the Administra­
tion's response to the raids and demanding armed intervention 
to suppress them. There was no doubt in their minds where 
the blame lay: "Carrancista soldiers or bandits, whichever
you prefer to call them."
j
Undoubtedly representing the Anglo-American consensus 
in the Lower Valley, they presented their case as follows:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the so-called 
authorities across the Rio Grande have for months been 
actively supporting this campaign of murder and plunder. 
The belief is universal among the Mexicans that they
15Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
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have bluffed the United States into recognizing Carranza, 
that the wholesale murder of Americans and destruction 
of American property has forced the United states to 
accept the so-called Carranza Government. To the 
hatred which the Mexicans have always felt for 
Americans, is now added utter contempt, induced by 
the weak and vacillating policy of our Government in 
dealing with the Mexican situation generally and the 
border trouble in particular* The bandits who mur­
dered and raided last night are safe in Mexico today 
and will be banqueted as heros in Matamoras tonight.
These raids will continue as long as American soldiers 
are confined to the north bank of the Rio Grande. We 
who confine our activities to peaceful pursuits, who 
have been sniped at from the bush, boldly shot at from 
across the river, and seen our murdered friends lying 
dead, feel that we are entitled to at least as much 
consideration as the oil interests. Nothing but 
vigorous action will relieve the situation - action 
not limited to the American side of the river.16
Although Constitutionalist authorities themselves
shortly brought the raids to a halt, Mexican-American tension
on the Lower Rio Grande persisted. On October 28, Funston
reported that "all the people" in Matamoras "sympathized very
deeply with Pizano and de la Rosa in what they called their
'revolution.'" And it was the "general opinion that this
revolution would continue to grow and grow until Texas be-
17came an independent Mexican republic."
16
H. L. Yates to Lansing, October 19, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16523.
17Funston to the Adjutant General, October 28, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16667.
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Some days later, Texas Senator Morris Sheppard re­
turned to Washington from a week in the south Texas counties 
to report that "the situation there continues to be full of
danger, possessing many of the terrors of impending race 
18war." Meanwhile, despite Lansing's stern admonishment
of Governor Ferguson concerning persecution of Mexican-
Americans by Texas lawmen, Funston reported on November 4
that the abuse continued. Large numbers of those people
continued to abandon their homes in south Texas and to cross
over to Matamoros. The exodus, he explained, was "due both
to harassment of Rangers and Peace Officers and to threats
19by unidentified Mexicans." Time did nothing to improve 
the situation.20
Carranza, meanwhile, earnestly endeavored to allay
t
mutual Mexican-American animosity and to promote a degree 
of reconciliation along the lower border. On November 3, 
the First Chief's party arrived at Piedras Negras, opposite 
Eagle Pass, Texas. There, in a "most cordial" meeting,
^Sheppard to Lansing, November 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16700.
19Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16752.
20New York Times, November 22, 1915.
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Carranza conferred with Belt, Silliman, and his representative 
in Washington, Eliseo Arredondo, on the troubles in the Lower 
Valley. He assured the State Department agents that he was 
doing all that he could to suppress the raids. He then 
suggested the negotiation of an international agreement 
providing for the reciprocal right to cross the border in 
hot pursuit of bandits.2 *^ Such suggestions, however prac­
tical, were not then well-received in Washington, and nothing 
came of the First Chief's proposal. Lansing dared not risk 
the presence of Mexican soldiers in the south Texas counties.22 
Later in the day, "many Americans called at the custom house 
to pay their respects" to Carranza and General Obregon. The 
latter, accompanied by General Candido Aguilar, then crossed
the border and "lurched with newspaper representatives and
23prominent American businessmen of Eagle Pass." It was an 
encouraging start.
2*Silliman to Lansing, November 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16686.
22"I think you will agree with me," the Secretary 
wrote New Mexico Senator Henry Ashurst, "that the United 
States could not allow Mexicans to exercise rights so pregnant 
with possibilities of serious complications on the border." 
Lansing to Ashurst, November 9, 1915, SDR 812.00/16823.
23Blocker to Lansing, November 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16687.
514
Eagle Pass, though, was some 200 miles up the river 
from the center of raider activity and had barely been 
touched by the Texas rebellion. Mexican-American friction 
there was relatively slight. Along the Lower Rio Grande, 
however, where feeling ran the highest, there was no sur­
cease. A minor incident on November 8 added to the ani­
mosity and anxiety already rife in the south Texas counties. 
Near La Feria, ten miles north of the river, an American 
patrol was fired upon by unknown assailants and one soldier
0  A
was wounded. Consequently, Senator Shepard requested 
that American troops be stationed at nearby Ojo de Agua and 
that the Constitutionalists garrison Reynosa Viejo on the 
opposite bank. The inhabitants of both settlements, the 
Senator explained, were "personally related" to the raiders, 
and the Mexican town was "a recruiting place" for those 
"lawless spirits." Moreover, the headquarters of at least
7 5one of the bands was believed to be "in the brush" nearby. 
Lansing complied with the Senator's request, and a few days 
later Reynosa Viejo was occupied by Constitutionalist troops.
24New York Times, November 10, 1915.
25Sheppard to Lansing, November 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16778.
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Soon after, Funston reported that the Pizano and de la Rosa
bands, known to have been camped in the vicinity, had with-
26drawn upriver and "seemingly disappeared.1
Although by mid-November, raider activity along the
river front had all but ceased, the persecution of Mexican-
Americans on the north bank continued apace. On November
21, General Luis Caballero, Military Governor of the State
of Tamaulipas, revealed that many Mexicans living in Texas
27had written him requesting land and asylum in Mexico.
Those letters, he explained to reporters, were "from my
people who cannot live any longer in the State of Texas."
There, he charged, they were denied protection, and many
had been murdered by "irresponsible armed posses who have
killed innocent people without reason." The refugees were
afraid to live there and many were being forced to leave
small farms "which they purchased with the savings of a
lifetime." Some 300 such families were in Nuevo Laredo
alone and many more in Matamoras. Some, he declared angrily,
had arrived with "just the clothes they [had] on, compelled
28to flee at night to escape.
2 6Funston to the Adjutant General, November 10, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16803.
27New York Times, November 22, 1915. 28Ibid.
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The results o£ those excesses were as deplorable as 
they were predictable. Relations between Texas authorities 
and those initially friendly Mexican officials sent to the 
border to replace the anti-American Nafarrate and his staff 
were strained from the very beginning. Moreover, the already 
deep hatred of many border Mexicans for the United States 
was intensified, thereby swelling the ranks of the raider 
bands then organizing and training in the interior of Tamau- 
lipas and Nuevo Leon. The would-be peacemakers in the Lower 
Valley had a difficult task indeed.
On November 24, they tried again. On that day, at 
Nuevo Laredo, Carranza met and conferred with Governor Fer­
guson. Consul Garrett, reporting the meeting the following 
day, noted that Mexican-American feeling appeared "to be 
better for it." By that time, too. General Alfredo Ricaut 
had assumed command at Matamoras and General Reynaldo Garza 
at Nuevo Laredo. Garrett was optimistic. It was his opinion
that the new commanders would make every effort to halt the
29
"bandit raids" and that ultimately they would succeed.
Two days later, however, the Secretary of War received 
a discouraging and disconcerting report from Colonel A. P.
2 Garrett to Lansing, November 25, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16852.
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Blocksam at Brownsville. It puzzled Administration officials 
and forced them to re-evaluate the First Chief’s protesta­
tions of innocence with regard to his alleged complicity in 
the Texas rebellion. Both Pizano and de la Rosa, it was 
revealed, were then at Nafarrate's headquarters at Victoria, 
Tamaulipas. And, despite Carranza's assurances that the 
raider captains had been outlawed and were to be shot on
sight, both men were in Constitutionalist uniform and as-
30signed to Nafarrate's staff. Something was obviously 
amiss and seriously so. Either the First Chief was lying 
deliberately to Washington or he had so little control over 
his generals that Nafarrate could flout his orders with im­
punity. Whatever the case, it looked bad for Carranza - and 
for the Administration's new Mexican policy as well.
Spokesmen for the irredentist movement, meanwhile, 
had indicated that its partisans would remain out of sight 
and refrain from conducting new offensive operations until 
the First Chief's departure from the northeastern border 
states. Immediately thereafter, however, they planned to 
renew their activities north of the Rio Grande. The focal 
point of the projected campaign was the area around San
Bundy to the Adjutant General, November 26, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16890.
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Antonio, Texas, where the movement already had many sympa­
thizers. There, the raiders would operate under the broader 
Plan of San Diego, indicating the existence of a close 
working relationship between the adherents of that plan and 
those of the so-called Army for the Liberation of Texas.
They would receive their orders, it was stated, from a junta
31already established in San Antonio.
On November 30, four days after dispatching the afore­
mentioned report to his superiors, Colonel Blocksam met and 
conferred with the First Chief and his party on the inter­
national bridge at Brownsville. Accompanying Carranza and 
General Ricaut on their goodwill visit were the strongly 
anti-American Governor Caballero and General Nafarrate. In 
a "cordial" if ludicrous exchange, the First Chief again 
deplored the Lower Valley raids and repeated his specious 
promise to do "all in his power to suppress the bandits." 
Blocksam, who had only recently strengthened his patrols in 
response to renewed suspicious activity on the south bank, 
somehow managed to bite his tongue.32 One can but wonder at 
their respective thoughts. Later in the day, in still another
31Ibid.
32Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16951.
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exercise in dissimulation, the leading citizens of Browns­
ville called upon the First Chief and his party to express
33their gratitude for suppression of the Texas rebellion.
On December 8 , the camaraderie on the border not­
withstanding, a second alarming report concerning resurgence 
of the irredentist movement reached officials of the Depart­
ment of S t a t e . P h i l i p  C. Hanna, United States Consul- 
General and long-time resident of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, 
advised Lansing that for the past four months he had been 
receiving word of "plots to cause international trouble by 
the invasion of the State of Texas.'1 And such reports con­
tinued to reach him. Pizano, de la Rosa, and Agustin Garza, 
one of the original San Diego conspirators, had been "quite 
recently in Monterrey in connection with their plans of 
’Setting Texas Free.'" One of Hanna’s informants, a Carran- 
cista colonel whose support had been solicited by the raiders, 
revealed that he "had been offered big money to go to Texas 
and organize Texas-Mexicans." Upon asking who was able to 
pay such handsome salaries, the colonel was advised "not to
33New York Times, December 1, 1915.
34Hanna to Lansing, December 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16946.
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worry about that" as the movement was "being backed by two 
of the richest nations in Europe, Germany and Austria."
Other officers in the Constitutionalist Army were reported 
to have been approached in a similar manner.
"I am told," Hanna continued, "that quite a large 
organization has existed in Monterrey for some time.” Its 
agents, however, had been less active since Carranza's re­
cognition, and especially since the First Chief's presence, 
in the Northeast and the appointment of General Ricaut as 
commander at Matamoras. Only a few days earlier, Hanna 
concluded, he had learned that "a certain European Consul" 
(German) had approached another one of Carranza's colonels
and "offered him very large pay for his services in Texas
35as a leader of the Texas revolution and invasion." Hanna's 
report must have been particularly disturbing to State De­
partment officials because the Consul-General was both an 
inveterate optimist and a strong supporter of the Carranza 
regime. He was not one to pass on idle rumors.
Disclosure of German involvement in the disturbances 
along the Lower Rio Grande prompted officials in Washington 
to take a much closer look at the Texas Liberation movement
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and the affiliated Plan of San Diego and to probe more deeply
into the intrigue. Rewarding results, more often than not
corroborated by a variety of sources, were soon forthcoming.
On or about December 14, Colonel Blocksam submitted
to Funston a summary of his findings regarding the origins
36and activities of the irredentist movement. There had 
existed since May, 1915, he reported, a conspiracy to in­
vade and detach the State of Texas from the United States. 
Those persons most immediately involved were Governor Caba­
llero, General Nafarrate, Luis de la Rosa, and an American 
Negro physician, Dr. Jesse M. Mosely, M. D. Many lesser 
officials of the State of Tamaulipas were also implicated.
The conspiracy, Blocksam charged, "was entered into before 
the bandit uprising on the border." It was "the direct 
cause of said uprising which was planned and carried out" 
by the aforementioned conspirators "through men who were 
subject to their orders." Headquarters of the movement was 
the city of Victoria, capital of the State of Tamaulipas. 
Blocksam*s information came from persons who had attended 
meetings of the conspirators there and who had been "present 
when orders were given" to open the Texas offensive.
36
Breckinridge to Lansing, December 22, .1915,
SDR 812.00/16999.
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Dr. Mosely, the Colonel disclosed, had recently 
"spent about three months in Texas and Oklahoma trying to 
enlist Negroes to join in an uprising against the Govern­
ment of Texas . . . ." Both he and de la Rosa had been in 
Victoria only a few days earlier, and the doctor had boasted 
that several platoons of Negro soldiers in the United States 
Army "had agreed to desert" and join the revolutionary move­
ment. Those parties were "still actively engaged in planning 
an uprising," Blocksam warned, "and have been heard to say 
that they could enlist in their cause a large number of 
Germans . . . German-Americans, [and] Japanese." Their 
present plans called for the creation of a disturbance at 
some point along the border in hopes of drawing American 
forces to that area while the main body of raiders crossed 
into Texas near Nuevo Laredo. The movement was well-financed, 
Blocksam concluded, and apparently had "an organization11 in
the States of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.
37The Plan of San Diego was authentic.
A little more than a week after the receipt of Block­
sam* s findings, the War Department received a corroborative 
report, in still greater detail, from the commander of the
37lbid.
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38Laredo garrison. Chief of organization for the irredentist 
movement, it was revealed, was the former school teacher 
from San Diego, Texas - General Agustin Garza. The General - 
"about 35 years old, tall, thin, pale, with a glass eye . • . 
and an elegant appearance" - had for weeks been traveling 
along the border between £1 Paso and Matamoros. He spent 
the greater part of his time "organizing this movement and 
perfecting his arrangements." Since the disintegration of 
the Villista movement, he had been much in £1 Paso and 
Ciudad Juarez fishing in troubled waters. It was said that 
Garza had "many followers among . . . Villista officers and 
soldiers" who were "in great sympathy” with the irredentist 
movement. His proposal for the invasion of Texas, moreover, 
was known to be "very popular all along the border with many 
Carrancista officers and soldiers" as well. The General, 
then, was believed to be enjoying considerable success in 
his recruiting efforts.
Operational headquarters for Garza and for the move­
ment generally was the Iturbide Hotel in Monterrey, a fact 
corroborated by the Consul-General's report. Apparently, 
Constitutionalist authorities permitted Garza and his aides
3ft'"Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
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to conduct their activities with a minimum of interference* 
Only recently, it was reported, those officials had re­
ceived an order for the General's arrest signed by the First 
Chief himself. Garza was promptly "informed of the purport 
of the order and advised to disappear." He did so, going 
to Matamoros "with the intention of inducing General Ricaut 
to join the movement and to show him how it would be to his 
interest" to go along.
Although Garza failed to suborn Ricaut, he did 
succeed in winning over Maurilio Rodriguez, a former Car- 
rancista general of some prominence along the lower border.
As late commander of the Osuna Brigade, the General had 
"many followers" among Constitutionalist officers and soldiers 
in the States of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon. Appointed com­
mander of the so-called Northeastern Division by Garza, 
Rodriguez soon raised some 300 men in Monterrey alone and 
another 200 men at other points along the border. In addi­
tion, he could count on the support of "a large number of 
confederates" across the border in Texas. Armaments pre­
sented no problem, as a Carrancista general in the City of 
Mexico promised Rodriguez 800 rifles, ammunition, and trans­
portation for the movement as well. By early December, then, 
the General was ready to move.
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On December 6 , it was understood, Rodriguez was to 
have proceeded to Nuevo Laredo preparatory to launching the 
offensive referred to in Blocksam's report. Failure, how­
ever, to receive the requisite arms and money in time had 
forced him to postpone the operation. As of late December, 
then, Rodriguez and his band were camped south of the Rio 
Grande, about thirty miles below San Ygnacio, Texas. There, 
the General expected to assemble a force of from 300 to 500 
men, cross the river near San Ygnacio, and lay waste to the 
surrounding countryside. Like Garza, Rodriguez had recently 
spent a good deal of time in San Antonio, El Paso, and Ciudad 
Juarez, "recruiting and organizing." He, too, had enjoyed 
notable success, particularly in attracting former Villista 
soldiers in the latter city. "The invasion of Texas," 
American authorities speculated, was "waiting the time when 
General Carranza will leave this part of the country.,"
There appeared to be no other explanation for the delay.
In a particularly damaging passage, the Laredo re­
port noted that Carranza himself, both immediately before 
and after his visit to the border on November 24, was be­
lieved to have conferred secretly in Monterrey with Luis 
de la Rosa. The orders which the First Chief has issued 
for the arrest of the raider captains, the report concluded.
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were now revealed to have been no more than "perfunctory and
39merely for American consumption." Apparently, then, the 
recurring charges of Carranza's complicity in the Texas 
rebellion had some substance after all. Certainly American 
authorities on the border were convinced of it.
The facts presented in the Brownsville, Monterrey, 
and Laredo reports constituted a damning indictment of 
Carrancista authorities in northeastern Mexico and, impli­
citly, of the First Chief as well. And in conjunction 
with extant intelligence relative to the origins, execution, 
and alleged suppression of the Texas rebellion, the afore­
mentioned reports were particularly embarrassing to Carranza 
himself. He stood thoroughly discredited on the grounds of 
duplicity or ineptness or both. Thereafter, as far as 
officials of the Departments of State and War were concerned, 
his credibility and that of all but a few of his aides were 
decidedly suspect. Whatever faith those officials might 
have had in the integrity of the Constitutionalist hierarchy 
at the moment of recognition had all but vanished by the be­
ginning of the new year.




Perhaps if the differences of the de facto Government 
with the United States had been limited to the disturbances 
along the lower border, better relations between it and the 
government in Washington might one day have been achieved. 
There were, however, so many other points of friction that 
any lasting reconciliation between the governments was out 
of the question. Those multiple irritants aggravated the 
existing tension, enhanced mutual animosity and suspicion, 
and finally destroyed what little confidence Lansing and 
other prominent Administration officials in Washington had 
in the intent of the Carranza regime to fulfill its pledges 
and in its ability to assure its own survival over the long 
term.
Increasingly, after December, 1915, to many in Wash­
ington and particularly to officials of the Department of 
State, further support for the First Chief and his party 
seemed to be more trouble than it was w o r t h . C a r r a n z a ' s  
prospects appeared hopeless. Rather soon, then, the position
40See, for example, Carothers to Canova, March 7, 
1916, SDR 812.00/20668; Anderson, "Memorandum on the Mexican 
Situation," May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47%; Long to Lansing, 
August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
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of the Antirevolutionists became the dominant one in the
Department of State and, in time, won important converts in
other executive departments as well. In Congress, too, it
had its vigorous supporters, particularly among the delega-
41tions from the southwestern border states. And, finally, 
in journalistic circles, it found a vociferous advocate in
jk ^
the editorial columns of the powerful Hearst chain.
Foremost among the aforementioned points of conten­
tion was the failure of the First Chief to consolidate his 
victory in the field. Throughout the remainder of his tenure, 
he was plagued by serious domestic disaffection emanating on 
the one hand from powerful secessionist or local-autonomist 
movements and, on the other, from essentially reactionary 
elements determined to overthrow his regime, suppress the 
Revolution, and re-establish conservative rule. Both ex­
tremes had been active in the pursuit of their various ob­
jectives for some time prior to Pan-American recognition of 
the Constitutionalist Government. And that development, 
other than inconveniencing the First Chief's opponents, had
4*See, for example. New York Times, January 13,
14, 15, and 16, 1916.
42W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst; A Biography of 
William Randolph Hearst (New York: Bantam Books, 1963),
352-354.
529
no effect on their determination to proceed with their re­
spective plans. From the first, then, Carranza was hard- 
pressed to exert his authority over large areas of the 
republic, and, within months of his recognition, even to
maintain himself in office in the face of an increasingly
43powerful counterrevolutionary opposition.
Officials in Washington, of course, followed post­
recognition developments below the border with surpassing 
interest. They could not tolerate, particularly in an 
election year, the eruption of new disorders in Mexico, 
attended as they most surely would be by further destruction 
of American and other foreign lives and property. Conse­
quently, relations between Washington and the de facto 
Government became increasingly strained as the First Chief 
proved unequal to the task at hand, and Administration
officials, in turn, were forced to admit, albeit privately,
44that they had backed a loser.
Early in November, having momentarily regained con­
trol over the restive Northeast, Carranza again turned his
43Carothers to Lansing, February 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17259; Carothers to Canova, June 16 and August 4, 1916,
SDR 812.00/20670 and 20761.
44Canova, "Confidential Memorandum," February 14,
1916, SDR 812.00/17271%.
attention to his opponents in the field. Preparations were 
made to launch the final campaigns against Villa in the 
Northwest and Zapata and Conventionist remnants in the 
South. Obregon, as already noted, was expected to complete 
the destruction of Villa's army and then to proceed on to 
Sonora to wage a "war of extermination" against the trouble­
some Yaquis. At the same time, south of Mexico City,
General Pablo Gonzalez was to open a new offensive against 
the Zapatistas in the State of Morelos. Having thereby 
removed the only immediate internal threats to Constitu­
tionalist ascendancy, the First Chief could turn at leisure 
upon the several regional caudillos and the many lesser 
guerrilla chieftains and crush them one by one. Assisted 
by the American embargo on the shipment of arms to their 
opponents and by the overt moral support of the United States 
Government, Constitutionalist leaders were unquestionably 
optimistic on the eve of the dual offensive. So, too, were 
their backers in Washington.
The campaign in the North, of course, proceeded as 
planned, and Villa's army was swept from the field. Per­
mitting the General himself to escape, however, was to prove 
the gravest of errors and certainly detracted from the success 
of the campaign. Within a matter of weeks, the de facto
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Government was faced with an outbreak of banditry and 
guerrilla activity in the north-central states which it 
was never able to overcome. In the South, meanwhile, the
45projected Constitutionalist offensive failed to materialize. 
There, near the end of the year, Conventionists and Zapatis­
tas, organized in bands of several thousand men each, seized 
and held the initiative. Moving in concert into the Federal 
District, southern and central Puebla, and southern Mexico 
State, they threatened the City of Mexico itself. At the 
same time, other columns moved southward into the State of 
Guerrero, recapturing Chilpancingo, the capital, and driving
the surviving Carrancista forces into a handful of fortified 
46
towns. By late January, 1916, Consul Clement Edwards at 
Acapulco could report "an absolute lack of control by Car- 
rancistas [in Guerrero] outside this town."^7 The decisive 
first phase of pacification fell far short of expectations.
Even less success attended attempts to break the 
power of the more important regional caudillos. In the
^Womack, Zapata, 249-250. ^Ibid., 249.
*7Edwards to Lansing, January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17256; Daniels to Lansing, February 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17291. Edwards, an attorney, newspaper editor, and business 
man, was consul at Acapulco from 1911 to 1917. Register,
1918, 107.
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oil-rich Huasteca, for instance, Manuel Pelaez, during the 
spring and summer of 1915, had not only maintained but 
appreciably strengthened his grip on the petroleum province. 
By the fall of that year, he had approximately 700 irregulars 
permanently stationed in the several producing oilfields 
and a considerably larger reserve capable of mobilization 
in the event of an emergency.48 For some time, Pelaez had 
been extorting money and supplies from the major foreign 
oil companies in exchange for "protection" of their highly 
vulnerable properties. The funds, in turn, were used to 
purchase arms and ammunition, both overtly abroad and 
clandestinely from the Carrancistas themselves.5  ^ Well- 
armed, paid regularly in gold, and fighting on home ground 
for their own ranches and petroleum properties, the Pelae- 
cistas constituted a highly-motivated, formidable force 
and an insurmountable obstacle to Constitutionalist control 
of the oilfields.5*
^Bevan to Lansing, October 13, 1915, SDK 812.00/
16476.
49Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 284-285.
^Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857.
51
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 280, 285-286. Doheny 
believed that Carranza wanted very much to drive Pelaez 
from the Huasteca - "the most valuable spot in Mexico, the 
most valuable spot in the whole world" - but that the First
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As of late 1915, although Candido Aguilar and 
various other Carrancista officials had already begun to 
hint at nationalization of the petroleum industry and con­
fiscation of foreign holdings in the Huasteca, American
oilmen were relatively sanguine as to the future security
52of their huge investments there. Pelaez, then, was still
viewed as a nuisance - and an expensive and potentially
53dangerous one at that. Unquestionably the General was a
blackmailer. Through the greater part of 1915 he repeatedly
threatened to halt the flow of oil from the fields to the
shipping terminals at Tampico and Tuxpam unless he received
54his customary fee. The oilmen, then, had not yet come to 
appreciate Pelaez as their sole effective defense against 
impending revolutionary expropriation. In reality, their 
overriding interests and those of the Pelaecistas were
Chief was simply unable to do so. Carranza's failure to 
defeat Pelaez and to occupy the oilfields were, in Doheny's 
words, "the one big blot on his claim of dominating Mexico 
. . . ." Ibid., 289.
52William F. Buckley noted that the oilmen lacked
"understanding" of the political situation in revolutionary 
Mexico. They assumed that they could secure their invest­
ments by bribing Constitutionalist officials. Testimony of 
Buckley, IMA,830-831. Doheny, for instance, gave the Con­
stitutionalists $100,000 in cash and agreed to furnish a
large quantity of fuel oil for their trains. Testimony of 
Doheny, Ibid., 278.
53Ibid., 280. 54Ibid., 280, 285-286.
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identical: both had an immense stake in preserving the
status quo in the Huasteca and in staving off Constitu­
tionalist control of the oilfields. The oilmen, however, 
were slower to grasp the full significance of a Carrancista 
victory in the Mexican civil war.
In the fall of 1915, American oilmen still hoped
for Pelaez1 demise and repeatedly solicited both Washington
55and Queretaro to that end. The Constitutionalists, of 
course, needed no prompting, but were never able to mount a
eg
successful offensive in the petroleum province. The
Wilson Administration, in turn, was equally anxious to see
de facto forces in control of the oilfields: first, in
order to stabilize a region of immense strategic importance
and, second, to guarantee to the impecunious Carrancista
57regime a steady flow of desperately-needed revenue. Con­
sequently, Lansing and the oilmen alike were highly pleased
when negotiations between Pelaez and Carrancista representa-
58tives were opened in early October, 1915. The talks, how­
ever, were strained and collapsed completely by the middle 
of the month. Pelaez then renewed his demands upon the
55Ibid., 281. 56Ibid., 280-281.
^Lansing to Bevan, October 16, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16476.
5testimony of Doheny, IMA, 285.
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operators for "general loans" and "taxes," and the oilmen,
59in turn, complained again to the Department of State. 
Accordingly, on October 16, Consul Bevan at Tampico was 
instructed to "urge General Carranza [to] take prompt action 
to put an end to the injurious activities of Pelaez and his 
lawless b a n d s . C a r r a n z a ,  of course, made every effort 
to do so. His forces in the Huasteca, however, were no 
match for the Pelaecistas.
On November 18, Bevan reported the resumption and 
subsequent failure of new negotiations between Pelaez and 
Constitutionalist authorities. The oilmen, he revealed, 
were "cooperating to the best of their ability for the 
success" of the Administration's new Mexican policy and 
doing "all in their power" to reconcile Pelaez with the 
de facto Government. Indeed, he noted, officials of the 
Huasteca Petroleum Company had initiated the latest nego­
tiations and had permitted the parties involved to conduct 
them over the company's long distance telephone line be­
tween Tampico and the oilfields.
59Bevan to Lansing, October 13, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16476.
60Lansing to Bevan, October 16, 1915, Ibid.
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At first all had gone well, Bevan recounted. But 
just as the negotiators appeared on the verge of a settle­
ment, Pelaez had received a large arms shipment from Pensa­
cola aboard the American schooner Lucy H, Thus strengthened, 
the General had abruptly terminated the talks. Bevan was 
discouraged. American workers in the Tuxpam fields, he 
closed, had since reported hard fighting south of the Tuxpam 
River and were themselves convinced that the prospects for 
peace were "not so bright."61
It was an astute observation. During the next 
month and a half, Pelaez blunted the Constitutionalist
offensive and drove his antagonists completely out of the
62petroleum province. Only the strong garrisons at Tampico 
and Tuxpam remained. Then, on December 21, the General
attacked Tampico Alto, only a few miles from the port it-
6 3self, seizing a large quantity of arms and ammunition. 
Resupplied and firmly in control of the oilfields, he upped
^Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857.
6^Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 280; Daniels to Lansing, 
January 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/17099; Bevan to Lansing,
February 1, 1916, SDR 812.00/17196.
6^Daniels to Lansing, January 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17099.
64his demands on the companies. Afraid that in complying
with Pelaez* demands they would antagonize Washington on
one hand and Queretaro on the other, representatives of the
Doheny firm "laid the question" before the appropriate
officials of both governments. In the end, they were ad- 
65vised to pay. They did so, and other foreign producers 
immediately followed suit. As galling as that decision must 
have been, neither government dared counsel resistance. The 
stakes were far too high. Ultimately, then, economic ne­
cessity transcended political expedience. By the beginning 
of the new year, there was no longer any doubt who con­
trolled the Huasteca - the richest province in the republic.
In addition to Pelaez, several other regional strong 
men had succeeded in establishing virtually autonomous 
fiefdoms during the prolonged struggle between rival revo­
lutionary factions. They, too, were able to successfully 
defy the First Chief and to deny to the de facto Government 
the manpower and resources of large areas of the republic.
64Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 280=281, 285.
65Ibid., 285-286.
^Bevan to Lansing, February 1, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17196.
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The effect was to seriously undermine the power and prestige 
of the Carranza regime domestically and to diminish still 
further what little confidence it had initially inspired 
abroad.
In the traditionally separatist State of Yucatan,
Constitutionalist Governor Salvador Alvarado went his own
way. One of the best-ordered states during the violent
phase of the Revolution, the Yucatan was also one of the
67most productive of revenue. As the sole source of sisal
hemp for North American grain growers, it was assured of at
least relative prosperity and should have been a major
contributor to the fiscal rehabilitation of the Carranza 
6 8regime. Early in 1915, however, Alvarado obtained con­
trol of the growers' marketing agency— the Comision Regula- 
dora de Heneguin— and compelled the planters to sell their 
crop to the Comision at a fixed price. Within a short while,
the Governor personally monopolized the marketing of the
69entire sisal crop. He then proceeded to raise the price
6?Guyant to Lansing, February 21, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17332; Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
69Ibid.; Daniels to Lansing, November 18, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16825.
of hemp to North American buyers, prompting the latter to 
press the Department of State to act on their behalf. The 
International Harvester Company, in particular, sought dip­
lomatic and, later, armed intervention to force Alvarado to
70release the 1915 sisal crop. President Wilson, however,
refused to countenance such a move, and the buyers were
forced to meet the Governor's price. Accordingly, during
the next four years, the price of the essential Yucatan
commodity rose by leaps and bounds. Alvarado profited
enormously. His "rake-off" in 1916 alone was estimated at
twenty million dollars, and it rose sharply in successive
years. The bulk of those revenues, of course, went to the
Governor and his staff and not to the Treasury of the
71chronically insolvent de facto Government. Meanwhile,
72
Alvarado's control of the Yucatan was absolute. Far re­
moved as he was from the base of Carranza's power, there 
was little that could be done to bring him to heel.
In October, 1915, in the extreme Northwest, another 
Constitutionalist governor broke with the First Chief.
70ibid.; H. L. Daniels to Canova, October 4, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16407. Daniels was manager of the International 
Harvester Company.
71
Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
72Guyant to Lansing, February 21, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17332.
Colonel Esteban Cantu, governor and military commander of 
the Northern District of Lower California, proclaimed the 
"absolute neutrality" of his province during the "interne­
cine strife of Mexico." Firmly established at Ensenada,
71Cantu had been virtually independent since December, 1914. 
However isolated and apparently insignificant his domain, 
its disaffection was nonetheless both painful and embarras­
sing to the Carranza regime. Considerable revenue from the 
border ports of Tijuana, Tecate, and Mexicali was thereby 
lost to the de facto Government, to say nothing of prestige 
in the eyes of American border-dwellers - the single most 
important segment of the United States population insofar 
as Mexican-American relations were concerned. The Northern 
District, moreover, was of no mean strategic importance. In 
the wrong hands, it would constitute a serious threat to the 
security of the de facto Government. Because of its proximity 
to the large, politically-active exile community in southern 
California, it might at any time have become the staging area 
for a powerful counterrevolutionary thrust into northwestern 
or north-central Mexico.
^Guyant to Lansing, October 25, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16668.
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Although in late December, 1915, an "understanding"
was concluded between Cantu and the de facto Government, it
served as little more than a face-saving device for the
First Chief, The Colonel's authority was confirmed, and,
for some time thereafter, Cantu was his own man and the
74Northern District an essentially autonomous province.
Excepting the activities of the Pelaecistas in the 
Huasteca, the most significant of the separatist movements 
to emerge during the Mexican civil war was that in the large 
and important south-central State of Oaxaca. There, the 
Constitutionalist governor. General Jesus Agustine Castro, 
made his headquarters in the Pacific coastal town of Salina 
Cruz. Southern terminus of the Isthmian Railroad, that 
port, in the hands of an able and energetic commander, might 
have become a bastion of Constitutionalist power in southern 
Mexico. Castro, however, was content to control no more than 
a narrow strip of territory along the Gulf of Tehuantepec.
He made little effort to extend his authority into the high­
lands that constituted by far the greater part of the state. 
In fact, from all accounts, he assiduously shunned the field 
and devoted himself instead to a life of license and
^Guyant to Lansing, December 27, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17018.
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75lechery. The Governor, Admiral Winslow reported, "does
not pay much attention to General Carranza, but runs the
7 6government of Oaxaca to suit himself."
The interior of the state, comprising twenty-five
of its twenty-eight political subdivisions, was controlled
from Oaxaca City by a genuinely popular regime under General
77Santibanez and Governor Guillermo Meixueiro. Originally
a Maderista and later a Constitutionalist, the General had
grown to distrust and despise Carranza. Ultimately, in
December, 1914, in a bizarre and bloody act of defiance,
he broke with the First Chief and withdrew his state com-
78pletely from the Mexican civil war. Commanding an army
75Castro, the Admiral revealed, "devoted much time 
to the ladies and on numerous occasions . . . has demanded 
that well-to-do Mexican families give up such daughters as 
he fancied. Refusal to obey such an order meant that the 
family would be thrown into jail and the girl forcibly taken." 
The Governor, however, had recently married, and it was said 
that he had "calmed down considerably." Daniels to Lansing, 
November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/16843.
?6Ibid.
^Ibid.; Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16889; Canada to Lansing, February 15, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17365.
78Fearing that Carranza planned to depose him, Santi­
banez invited the First Chief's brother, Jesus, the latter*s 
son, and a number of Carrancista lieutenants to dine with him 
at Salina Cruz. During the banquet the guests were seized 
and dragged from the hall. The following morning all but the 
Carranzas were summarily shot to death. The First Chief's
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of 10,000 to 15,000 Oaxaca Indians, and operating in terri­
tory ideally suited for guerrilla warfare, the General
"repeatedly defeated" Carrancista expeditions sent into
79the highlands against him. Oaxaca, consequently, was
less affected by the Revolution than any other Mexican
state, and foreign interests therein - primarily large
agricultural enterprises - maintained operations u n m o l e s t e d .
In June, 1915, Santibanez and Meixueiro declared
81their state independent. Loose alliances were subsequently 
concluded with the Zapatistas to the west and with the inde­
pendent General Higinio Aguilar who operated to the north
82and east in the States of Puebla and Veracruz. One re­
sult of those maneuvers in the summer of 1915 was the ef­
fective withdrawal of virtually the entire South from the 
rest of the Mexican Republic. Another was the isolation of
brother and nephew were subsequently taken into the mountains 
and executed. Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16843.
79Ibid.
®^Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16889; Canada to Lansing, February 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17365.
®1Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16889; Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
16843.
®^Ibid.; Womack, Zapata, 301-302.
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the Yucatan to such a degree that a reassertion of Carran­
cista control over the Alvarado regime was out of the 
question. Disaffection and loss of the State of Oaxaca 
was a major setback, economically as well as politically, 
for the new de facto Government of Mexico.
Obviously, it was very much in the First Chief’s 
interest to return that state to the Mexican union. And, 
in the fall of 1915, the opportunity to do so presented 
itself. Shortly after Pan-American recognition of the 
Constitutionalist Government, the Oaxaguenos sought a recon­
ciliation and peaceful reentry into the republic. Yet they
83were harshly rebuffed. Undoubtedly embittered over the 
treacherous assassination of his brother and nephew, Car­
ranza was determined to crush the secessionist state mili­
tarily and to even personal scores. "The Chief," Silliman 
explained in an awkward analogy, "looks at Oaxaca like 
Jackson did at South Carolina." However, if Carranza's 
insistence upon retribution was understandable, it was also 
most unwise and ultimately very costly. By repeatedly
^Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16889.
8^Silliman to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17135.
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refusing to compromise with Santibanez and Meixueiro and 
by making very clear what fate awaited them in event of 
the conquest of Oaxaca, the First Chief drove them to make 
common cause with a much more dangerous opponent - the 
counterrevolutionary Felix Diaz.85
IV.
The inability of the de facto Government to sup­
press or otherwise assert its control over the several se­
cessionist provinces obviously invited and ultimately 
assured attempts by one or more of the conservative or 
reactionary exile groups to return to the republic, estab­
lish itself in one of the disaffected areas, and use it as 
a base from which to launch the long-anticipated counter­
revolution.
Few developments could have posed a graver threat 
to the Carranza regime. Fully preoccupied with the restora­
tion of order and the extension of its authority over those 
areas already under its nominal control, it could ill afford 
another round of protracted civil strife. And against a 
powerful and determined adversary, financed and resupplied 
from abroad, its chances of surviving, much less of emerging
85Ibid.
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victorious, would be slight indeed. Those facts were well 
understood outside of Mexico - by the exile groups, by 
foreign investors in the republic, and by officials in 
Washington as well. Unquestionably, then, the emergence of 
a strong new counterrevolutionary coalition - particularly 
one with a secure base within the republic itself - would 
further undermine Washington's waning confidence in the 
viability of the Carranza regime and encourage its opponents 
both within and without the Wilson Administration to renew 
their efforts to bring it down.
Although, by late 1915, there were many in northern 
Mexico who would have joined the large exile community in 
the southwestern United States in an uprising against 
Carranza, the prospects for opening a counterrevolutionary 
front in that part of the republic were not good. The 
President of the United States, if not all members of his 
administration, was unalterably opposed to such a course 
and had already, almost single-handedly, frustrated a number 
of attempts to subvert the Revolution and restore the old 
order in Mexico. Discovery and suppression of the Huerta- 
Rintelen scheme had resulted in even stricter enforcement 
of the neutrality laws and much closer surveillance of the 
exile community. Finally, following Pan-American recognition
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of the Constitutionalist regime, Washington had embargoed 
arms shipments to all other Mexican factions and manifested 
its intent to assist that government materially in hastening 
the destruction of its domestic enemies. So long, then, as 
the Government of the United States favored the Carranza 
regime, successful counterrevolution in northern Mexico was 
out of the question. If the First Chief was to be over­
thrown, the impetus would have to come from another quarter.
The southern separatist states were admirably suited 
for such an endeavor. Both Oaxaca and the Yucatan were 
readily accessible by sea and possessed of adequate port 
facilities for resupply from abroad. In addition, they 
were sufficiently distant from the bases of Constitutionalist 
power to preclude serious interference by the de facto 
Government in the critical initial phase of an uprising. 
Governor Alvarado, however, if disloyal to the First Chief, 
was himself a thoroughgoing revolutionary who had even less 
in common with the exiles than did the head of the de^  facto 
Government. The Yucatan, then, was unavailable as a base 
from which to launch an anti-Constitutionalist offensive.
Not so, however, the State of Oaxaca, due in large part to 
the stubborn vindictiveness of the First Chief himself.
Thus, by late 1915, the latter state unquestionably offered
548
the best prospects for incipient counterrevolution. It was 
there, then, that Felix Diaz and his followers chose to 
establish themselves early in the new year. By mid-1916, 
the Felicista movement had become "the most serious oppo­
sition in Mexico.
For months prior to Pan-American recognition of 
the Carranza regime, the several exile groups in the United 
States had vied with one another for the favor of the Wilson 
Administration. It was their hope, of course, to obtain 
both a relaxation of the neutrality laws and the moral 
support of the government in Washington. Those concessions, 
in turn, would assure them not only a secure base from 
which to open their offensive, but also the substantial 
financial support of certain unnamed American interests 
eagerly seeking a reestablishment of the old order in 
Mexico. Although several of the exile groups, particularly 
the Xturbidistas, had indeed succeeded in winning important 
allies within the Administration, they were consistently 
frustrated in the pursuit of their objectives by the 
President himself, by Bryan, and, finally, by Lansing as 
well.
Q g
Womack, Zapata, 263. See also New York Times,
March 30, 1916.
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The apparent hopelessness, then, of obtaining the 
tacit support or even the strict neutrality of the United 
States Government in a counterrevolutionary venture unques­
tionably drove many impatient exiles to adopt desperate 
measures* They would proceed with their plans regardless 
of neutrality laws and the opposition of the United States 
Government. That attitude, in part, explains the readiness 
of so large a number of exiles to join General Huerta in 
his ill-fated, obviously hazardous scheme to start a new 
revolution along the northern border.
Following the General's arrest and the precipitate 
collapse of the Huertista movement, the more sophisticated 
exile leaders turned again to their friends in Washington. 
Iturbide, Dr. Vazquez Gomez, Manuel Calero, and other 
important Mexican conservatives were well aware of the 
Administration's disgust and impatience with the endlessly 
feuding revolutionary factions. And, through their ties 
with the Division of Mexican Affairs, they were also 
cognizant of the Lansing-Canova plan, then under considera­
tion by Administration officials. That scheme, it will be 
recalled, envisioned an imposed settlement of the Mexican 
civil war, conceivably through the installment and support 
of a prominent exile leader as provisional president of the
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republic. Thus encouraged, they renewed their bid for the
support of the Wilson Administration. And from late July
through early September, they vigorously pursued that 
87objective. In the end, however, they failed: first,
because of the President's unswerving committment to a 
revolutionary settlement in Mexico, and second, because 
Obregon's highly successful campaign in the North all but 
assured imminent Constitutionalist victory in the Mexican 
civil war.
Washington's subsequent decision to extend recog­
nition to the Veracruz regime utterly destroyed the exiles' 
hopes of obtaining the support of the Wilson Administration. 
It also effectively discouraged their plans to start a 
new revolution in the northern border states. There were, 
however, those exile leaders who remained convinced of the 
inherent weakness of the Carranza regime and who were 
determined to try another tack to bring it down. Foremost 
among them were the heads of the so-called Clerical Party. 
That group, in turn, descended for the most part from the
®^Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 
261-262. See, for example. Lane to Lansing, July 31, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/17538 and Fuller, "Conference of South American 
Republics," August 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/17561.
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Mexican Catholic Party, enjoyed both the confidence and the 
thinly disguised support of the American Roman Catholic 
hierarchy. Its ostensible chief was the perennial counter-
QQ
revolutionary— General Felix Diaz.
Nephew of the old dictator, Porfirio Diaz, the
General was a native of the State of Oaxaca and a personage
of some prominence in southern Mexico. Despite a lengthy
exile, he retained a sizable following in his home state
and in parts of neighboring Puebla and Veracruz as well.
Because of that support and the prestige attached to his
name, he seemed the logical choice to initiate and lead
a counterrevolutionary movement in the South.
Accordingly, in the spring of 1915, the General
had been brought into the Huerta-Rintelen scheme. Supported
by German arms and money, he was to have started a revolt
in one of the southern coastal states to coincide with
89Huerta's rising in the North. Having made the necessary 
arrangements for an uprising in the South, probably in the 
Yucatan, Diaz left New York as scheduled. Soon after,
88Carothers to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16870; New York Times.- November 28, 1915 and March 30, 1916.
88Ibid., November 25, 1915.
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however, Huerta was arrested, and the northern revolt
aborted. By that time, too. Constitutionalist authorities
in the South had been alerted and "were ready to welcome
90Diaz with an army." The General, then, called off his
own pending insurrection and returned to New York City.
Diaz, however, was by no means ready to quit. In
early September, he moved his headquarters to New Orleans
and commenced organizing a second counterrevolutionary 
91
venture. Felicista agents, meanwhile, had been active 
among the exile community in the Southwest. Establishing 
themselves at El Paso, they began a round of conferences 
with former Huerta generals and large landlords driven 
from their properties by the Revolution. Within a relatively 
short time, a Felicista junta had emerged in the border 
city.92
The new movement was well-organized and liberally 
financed. "In addition to the millions which the Catholic 
Church is said to be supplying through the . . . Clerical
90Ibid.
91Ibid., November 28, 1915; Wilson to Lansing,
January 19, 1916, SDR 812.00/17170^; Bielaski to Canova, 
January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/17220.
92New York Times, November 28, 1915.
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Party," the New York Times revealed, "the junta was pledged
to receive more millions from the old Cientifico crowd . . .
who have been driven out of Mexico . . . and see little
chance of returning under Carranza." Some of the wealthiest
men of Porfirian Mexico were affiliated with the movement,
including such great hacendados as Luis Terrazas and
Enrique Creel— the pre-revolutionary lords of Chihuahua.
So, too, were a number of prominent military men— Generals
Julian Medina, Manuel Mondragon, Canuto Reyes, and many
other former Federal officers. It was believed, moreover,
that the imprisoned Huerta would be released in time to
assume command of the Felicista army. By mid-November,
the junta was receiving from undisclosed sources "large
sums of money to assist in recruiting" in towns along the
border. At the same time, it was reported, Diaz himself
had purchased a steamer at Vancouver, B. C., preparatory to
shipping munitions to his followers at Puerto Angel, an
93isolated port on the Pacific coast of Oaxaca.
By late 1915, the Mexican exile community in the 
United States was in full ferment. Carothers, then on the 
Texas border, was able to use his ties with former Villistas
93Ibid,
to good advantage in discovering developments therein. lie, 
too, saw the old Catholic Party as the guiding hand in the 
emerging Felicista movement. Members of that body, he 
believed, "in connivance with the Madero family" were 
"attempting to get control of the Villa organization."
They were said to have offered Villa himself a military 
command contingent upon his agreeing to accept "a chief of 
their choosing."^4 On December 12, Carothers confirmed his 
earlier suspicions. The "third party movement" in El Paso, 
he informed Lansing, had "become very apparent." And it was 
"undoubtedly backed" by Felix Diaz and the Maderos— a 
cynical alliance indeed in view of La Decina Tragica. 
Moreover, it appeared that Iturbide, with his considerable 
financial support, would soon cast his lot with the new 
party. A number of American cities— New Orleans, El Paso, 
Los Angeles, and San Diego— were the centers of Felicista 
activity. It was Carothers' belief that "a financial group 
in New York" was ultimately directing the movement.®5 He 
did not elaborate.
®4Carothers to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16870.
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Carothers to Lansing, December 12, 1915, SDR
812.00/16938.
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Army commanders along the border were also cognizant
of the developing Felicista movement and able to supply
additional pertinent information concerning its progress.
Early in December, General Pershing reported from El Paso
that Felicista elements there were considering the seizure
of Ciudad Juarez to serve as a base for a secondary revolt
against the de facto Government in the North.96 And from
Mission, Texas, in the Lower Valley, came another interesting
rumor. The Felicistas, it was reported, planned to delay
major operations until the beginning of the presidential
campaign in the United States. Then they hoped to have
the support of the Republican Party and, after the elections,
"the sympathy of the American people through a Republican
97Administration.11 The conspirators, it seemed; had culti­
vated the opposition.
If an actual uprising and the opening of a counter­
revolutionary front against Carranza was being purposely 
delayed, recruiting and organizational activity proceeded 
apace* By the beginning of the new year, the Felicista
^6Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/16951.
97Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
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movement had grown to such proportions as to deeply alarm 
the de facto Government, On January 8 , 1916, its repre­
sentative in Washington lodged a formal complaint with the 
Department of State. A new revolutionary junta, Arredondo 
informed Lansing, had recently been organized in New York 
City. Composed of Felix Diaz and Generals Mondragon, 
Blanquet, and Rubio Navarrete— incidentally, all co­
conspirators in the overthrow of Madero— the junta had 
established a subordinate operational organization in New 
Orleans under General Gaudencio de la Llave and Javier 
Larrea. Their objective was "to send an expedition to 
Oaxaca." That force, in turn, was to land near Puerto 
Mexico, in southern Veracruz, where it would be met "by a 
band of rebels from Oaxaca" and escorted into the interior. 
His government, Arredondo closed, requested that the Wilson
Administration suppress the Felicista movement on the
9 8grounds of violation of American neutrality laws.
Lansing, who had himself been following the rise of 
the Felicistas with growing apprehension, moved immediately 
to comply with Arredondo's request. He forwarded the Con­
stitutionalist complaint to the Department of Justice and
88Arredondo to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17071.
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99urged that it be acted upon at once. Accordingly,
Justice Department agents intensified their surveillance
of Felicista activities in hopes of encountering violations
100of the neutrality laws. They failed, however, to
uncover sufficient evidence to bring charges against the
conspirators.
Exile leaders had learned much from the Huerta-
Rintelen fiasco. Anticipating just such a situation as
arose early in 1916, they had sought to conduct their
101
activities with the utmost discretion. And they suc­
ceeded admirably. Despite the fact that Administration 
officials soon possessed considerable intelligence on the 
Felicista operation they were unable legally to prevent 
its execution. Throughout the early weeks of 1916, then, 
the movement rapidly matured. Finally, sometime late in 
March, Diaz himself and a small band of followers managed 
to elude American authorities and cross the Gulf of Mexico
Lansing to American Legation, Guatemala, January 20, 
1916, SDR 812.00/17146a; Office of the Secretary of State, 
Memorandum, January 20, 1916, SDR 812.00/17170^; Bielaski 
to Canova, January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/17220.
^Carothers to Lansing, February 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17259.
102to southern Veracruz. Within a matter of weeks they 
were firmly established in the State of Oaxaca. Shortly 
thereafter* the counterrevolution commenced.
102
New York Times* March 30* 1916.
Chapter 12
PRELUDE TO INTERVENTION: DISAFFECTION,
DISORDER, AND DECAY
I.
If at any moment after recognition there was reason 
to hope that the die facto Government might somehow surmount 
the many problems besetting it and thereby endure, it was 
on the eve of Villa's anticipated arrival at Ciudad Juarez 
to begin American exile. Virtually overnight, however, 
those hopes were dashed. Instead of proceeding to the 
border. Villa's party struck westward for the Sierra Madre. 
Almost at once, for Washington and Queretaro alike, all 
went awry in Mexico. Within weeks of Villa's escape, the 
already strained relationship between those governments 
was subjected to sudden violent stress from which it never 
recovered. Thereafter, United States armed intervention 
in Mexico was only a matter of time.
By the end of 1915, with the greater part of 
northern Mexico ostensibly under Carrancista control, much 
of the danger which had caused the earlier mass exodus of
559
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Americans from that region was believed to have passed.
The de facto Government, moreover, went to great lengths 
to convince Americans and other foreigners that "Villa no 
longer constituted a threat" and that it was safe for them 
to return to their properties in former Villista territory. 
Although the government in Washington urged its citizens 
to "stay out of Mexico until conditions became more settled, 
[its] advice was ignored."^ Hundreds of Americans recrossed 
the border to assess the damage to their properties, to 
begin reconstruction, and, if possible, to resume opera- 
tions. By early January, 1916, an estimated 1000 Americans 
had returned to the State of Chihuahua, a somewhat larger 
number to the State of Sonora, and hundreds more to the 
north-central States of Durango, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes,
3
and San Luis Potosi.
Located on remote ranches or in equally isolated 
mining or agricultural communities, far from major concen­
trations of Constitutionalist troops, the returnees were
^Atkin, Revolution; Mexico, 1910-1920, 268.
^Parker to Lansing, December 30, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17028; Simpich to Lansing, December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17031; New York Times, December 21, 1915.
3Ibid., January 16, 1916.
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extremely vulnerable to attacks by guerrillas or by roving 
bands of outlaws. Without exception, each of the afore­
mentioned states contained sizable bodies of Villista 
sympathizers, to say nothing of large numbers of recently 
discharged Villista veterans.^ Consul Simpich foresaw the 
danger: "It would be too much," he advised Lansing, "to
expect that these people, after four years of license and 
lawlessness, should settle down— over night— to lives of
C
order and respect for law. And many of them did not.
To be sure, a degree of brigandage had been endemic 
in Mexico since the outbreak of revolution, but the wave 
of banditry which swept the North in the wake of the Villista- 
Conventionist collapse was without precedent. American and 
other foreign residents and investors in Mexico suffered 
accordingly, both in loss of life and in the seizure and 
destruction of property. Washington, of course, looked to 
the de facto Government for relief. Since recognition, 
however, that regime had been confronted with so many serious 
problems, each of which appeared to demand its immediate
^Edwards to Lansing, December 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17024.
5Simpich to Lansing, December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17031.
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attention, that its response to any one of them was almost 
certain to be insufficient and hence ineffective. And so 
it was with the problem of banditry. Washington, then, 
waited in vain for relief.
In the North, what little optimism attended the 
Villista collapse at year’s end was soon dispelled. General 
Jose Rodriguez, although defeated by Calles on December 11, 
was by no means finished. Driven out of Sonora, he moved 
into western Chihuahua at the same time that Villa himself 
was making for that district.6 Thus by the end of the 
month, a relatively large concentration of Villista guerrillas 
was established in the foothills of the Sierra Madre Occi­
dental, a region from which it was all but impossible to 
drive them.
Officials in Washington were much concerned over 
that development because so many Americans had recently 
returned to that very region. On December 24, then,
Carothers met with Obregon at El Paso to seek protection 
for his countrymen. The General, "very cordial" and
6Ibidi
7
Edwards to Lansing, December 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17024; New York Times, December 24, 1915.
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cooperative, informed the agent that he had been ordered
to "clear up" the State of Chihuahua and to "afford every
8
protection" to foreign interests therein. Washington 
could ask no more.
Unfortunately for future Mexican-American relations, 
the de facto Government failed to redeem its pledge. Al­
ready Villa had raided William Randolph Hearst's huge 
Babicora ranch near Madera. There, he drove off thousands
of head of cattle and kidnapped six American and English 
9
employees. He then proceeded on to Madera itself and 
sacked the American settlement there for the second time 
in less than a month. By the end of the year, he had 
established himself on the Bustillos ranch, another American 
owned property, in the Guerrero district of western Chi­
huahua.^ Carrancista forces made no move to dislodge him.
With some 4000 men under his command and Obregon's 
brother as hostage. Villa felt secure enough to pause at 
Bustillos and await the arrival of Generals Rodriguez and
g
Carothers to Lansing, December 24, 1915, SDR 
812.00/17013.
q
New York Times, December 25, 1915.
^Ibid., December 24, 1915.
11Ibid., December 29, 1915.
Medinavista from the northern portion of the state.12 His
confidence had fully returned. Accordingly, in late
December, he issued a proclamation renouncing his earlier
pledge to leave the republic and calling upon his former
comrades-in-arms to rejoin him in a new revolution. It
was his immediate intent, he revealed, to move south into
13the State of Jalisco and make common cause with Zapata.
For some time thereafter, nothing more was heard either 
from or about Villa from that quarter. An ominous calm 
descended over the State of Chihuahua.
Throughout the greater part of northern Mexico 
opposite conditions prevailed. In early November, Consti­
tutionalist forces in southern Tamaulipas had "made great 
headway" there against the Villista general, Alberto Carrera 
Torres. They had failed, however, to destroy his army. 
Consequently, that officer and some 5000 soldiers had made
their escape into San Luis Potosi and established themselves
14in a strong position at Ciudad del Maiz. From that moun­
tain fortress, the General had commenced raiding the sur­
rounding countryside. "Showing an ugly disposition toward
12Ibid., December 24 and 29, 1915. 13Ibid.
^Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857; Daniels to Lansing, December 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/ 
17014.
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. . . American colonists," he struck repeatedly at their
properties, seizing possessions and expelling the owners
15from the state. In time, he concluded a loose alliance 
with the independent Saturnino and Magdaleno Cedillo, the 
classic bandit chiefs of San Luis Potosi. The Cedillistas, 
in turn, were natives of the state who obtained their 
arms and supplies by "holding up trains and attacking 
inferior forces."^ By mid-November, then, "a great 
number of armed bandits alleging to be Villistas" were 
operating in the triangle between Ciudad Victoria, Tampico, 
and the city of San Luis Potosi.^ And Nafarrate and other 
Constitutionalist commanders in the area did little or 
nothing to restrain them.
By late in the month, Villista bands had extended 
their operations as far eastward as the Panuco oilfields.
On the 24th, one party entered the town of Panuco, sought 
out an American oil company employee, and deliberately shot
15Desteiguer to Daniels, November 16, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16808; Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 
812.00/16857.
^Bevan to Lansing, November 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16813.
•*-^ Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857.
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1 ft .him down. ° When asked to provide protection for foreigners
in that district, the Carrancista commander at Tampico
replied that he was "powerless" to do so. Although only
thirty miles distant, Panuco was not under his jurisdiction.
Only the First Chief himself, it was explained, could
19authorize such protection. None, however, was forth­
coming from that quarter. Ironically, when order was
eventually restored in the Panuco district, the benefactor
20was none other than Manuel Pelaez.
Further west, early in the new year, General Tomas 
Urbina moved south from Bustillos ranch into the State of 
Durango. There he assumed command of the new Villista 
revolutionary movement. Soon after, Consul Homer Coen 
reported from Durango City that some 4000 Villista guer­
rillas infested the countryside and that "absolute anarchy" 
prevailed in the outlying districts.21 Urbina1s men
^Daniels to Lansing, December 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17014.
^Ibid.
20Bevan to Lansing, February 1, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17196.
21Coen to Lansing, January 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17085. Homer C. Coen was United States Vice-Consul at 
Durango. An attorney and insurance agent, Coen went to 
Mexico in 1910 and entered the cattle business. He received 
his appointment as vice-consul in February, 1915. Register, 
1916, 81.
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operated freely along the important rail line between the
state capital and the strategic communications center of
Torreon, and Constitutionalist troops in the area "showed
2 2no disposition to engage them."
In fact, Coen declared, the Carrancista garrison 
at Durango City posed a graver threat to foreign interests 
in that part of the state than did the Villistas. Because 
of a jurisdictional dispute between the provisional 
governor. General Mariano Arrieta, and the regional mili­
tary commander, General Francisco Murguia, the former had 
received neither pay nor supplies for many weeks. Conse-
23quently, Arrieta1s men were forced to "live off the land." 
For some time, then, they had been requisitioning supplies 
from American and other foreign property owners in the 
vicinity, paying for them in worthless receipts. Already, 
foreigners around Durango City had lost property valued in 
excess of one-and-a-half million pesos. And the requisi-
ry j
tions continued. Lansing was distressed by Coen's report
22Lansing to Silliman, January 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17080.
23




and moved quickly to halt the confiscations. The matter 
was to be brought to Carranza's attention immediately, he 
instructed Silliman on January 12, and the First Chief was
informed that he must send reliable troops to Durango at
25once. There must be no repetition of the "outrages."
Around Torreon, meanwhile, conditions were far
graver. There, in the heart of the rich Laguna district,
where Americans and other foreigners owned and operated
huge cotton plantations, a new and potentially serious
revolt against the de facto Government was already in 
26
progress. Some time during late October or early November,
1915, twenty-five Villista, Zapatista, and ex-Federal or
Huertista generals had met at Santa Clara, Durango, and
27declared against the Carranza regime. Presided over by 
Lagos Chazaro, president of the moribund Convention of 
Aguascalientes, the Santa Clara Convention, through its 
affiliation with the former body, purported to represent
25Lansing to Silliman, January 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17080.
26Blocker to Lansing, January 24, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17172.
27New York Times, January 22, 1916; Cobb to Lansing,
February 4, 1916, SDR 812.00/17246.
569
the sovereignty of the Mexican people. Commanding a force
of some 4000 men, the assembled officers chose as General-
in-Chief the popular and able Zapatista leader, Benjamin
Argumedo. They then declared the State of Durango "center
of operations" against Carrancistas and Americans alike.
The latter were held to be enemies "for having united with
28Venustiano Carranza."
By the end of 1915, the new Convention had assumed
the offensive. During the first week in January, all
communications between Torreon and the rest of the republic
were severed. Argumedo then seized the town of Gomez
Palacio, only three miles from Torreon, and, on the 7th,
29very nearly took the city itself. Unopposed by the 3000 
Constitutionalists therein, the Conventionists thoroughly 
sacked Gomez Palacio and adjacent settlements and struck 
hard at foreign-owned haciendas in the vicinity.30 Finally, 
on the 10th, having terrorized the Laguna district for more 
than a week and fully exposed the impotence of the de facto
28Ibid.; New York Times, January 21, 1916.
^°Ibid., January 12, 1916.
30Ibid., January 11, 21, 1916; Coen to Lansing, 
January 27, 1916, SDR 812.00/17237; Williams to Lansing, 
January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17107. C. A. Williams was 
United States Consular Agent at Torreon.
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Government in a vital sector of the republic, Argumedo
31withdrew to the mountains.
In the days that followed, roving bands of Conven-
tionists extended their operations into northern Durango
and southern Chihuahua, "scouring the country" and "clearing
ranches, mines, and other property belonging to foreigners
32of everything valuable." And, in mid-January, General
Rosalio Hernandez seized and briefly occupied the important
33mining town of Parral. There, for some days, the lives 
of several hundred Americans and foreign property valued
34in the millions of dollars were in the gravest jeopardy.
35Again, Carranza did nothing.
II.
On January 11, 1916, a benevolent New York Times 
observed that "while the military situation in Mexico [had] 
been simplified by the surrender of the principal Villa 
forces, [it was] still far from being cleared up." The
31New York Times, January 12, 1916.
32Ibid., January 18,. 19, 20, 21, 1916.
33Ibid., January 12, 1916.
34Ibid., January 16, 1916.
35Blocker to Lansing, January 22, 24, 1916, SDR 
812.00/17132, 17172; Coen to Lansing, January 22, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17205.
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de facto Government, it acknowledge reluctantly, had "only
36fairly started the task of pacification." As well dis­
posed as it was to the Carranza regime and to Wilsonian 
Mexican policy as well, the journal could find no words of 
praise or encouragement for that campaign. Nor could the 
government in Washington. From all over Mexico— from 
consular officials, special agents, and naval officers 
alike— accounts of the situation therein were uniformly 
bleak.
Consul Thomas Edwards, reported from Ciudad Juarez,
outlined the problem in brief: Constitutionalist authorities,
he admitted, were "making every effort possible" to suppress
the hordes of guerrillas and bandits that infested the
countryside. The army, however, was not equal to the task.
Composed of soldiers from all factions and paid in worthless
Constitutionalist scrip, its motivation was minimal and its 
37morale low. Moreover, in many of the states both the 
soldiers and their quarry were of "the same class" and 
often related to one another. Consequently, the troops
36New York Times, January 11, 1915.
37Edwards to Lansing, January 14, 1916, SDK 812.00/
17095.
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38seldom pressed the bandits. In sum, large numbers of
Constitutionalist soldiers were neither loyal nor obedient.
And, with increasing frequency, they refused to carry out
their superiors' orders. The military situation had so
deteriorated in his district, Edwards noted, that Carran-
cista officers there had already moved most of their
ammunition across the border to El Paso. They had no
39"confidence in the future," he concluded. Nor were they 
alone. In Washington, too, knowledgeable officials had 
begun to question whether the de facto Government could 
long endure.
By the beginning of 1916, the problems confronting 
the Carranza regime were manifold and without apparent 
solution. Politically, in addition to widespread popular 
disaffection, internal disorders, and impending counter­
revolution, the First Chief had to contend with serious 
schism and rampant corruption within his own party. For 
some time it had been rumored that a break between Carranza
38Brown to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17113. A. Gordon Brown was United States Vice-Consul at 
Mazatlan.
39Edwards to Lansing, January 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17095.
573
and Obregon was imminent. And, despite assurances to the 
contrary from Belt and Silliman, officials in Washington 
continued to receive convincing evidence to that effect. 
Within less than a month after recognition, Parker reported 
from Mexico City the existence of serious friction there 
between the "military" and "civil" elements of the Consti­
tutionalist party. The former, headed by General Pablo 
Gonzalez, was closely associated with the First Chief; the 
latter, in turn, was led by the Sonora politician, Adolfo
de la Huerta, "the sub rosa representative of General 
40Obregon." Nor did time improve the relationship. Fol­
lowing the Villa collapse in the North, new differences 
arose over the spoils of victory. Late in December, 1915, 
a serious quarrel erupted over control of the State of 
Chihuahua. Obregon, logically enough, had assumed that 
that state would be placed under his jurisdiction and had 
planned to make his headquarters at Chihuahua City. Instead, 
that prize was conferred upon General Jacinto ,B. Trevino, a 
powerful member of the First Chief's personal entourage.
The result, Cobb reported on January 8, was new "political
40Parker to Lansing, November 16, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16896.
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conflict between the Sonora element of Obregon and the 
Coahuila element" of Carranza.4^ The rift, of course, 
continued to widen in the months that followed, seriously 
weakening the Constitutionalist Government, and culminating 
finally in the General's resignation and the rise of an 
Obregonista opposition.
No less harmful to the de facto regime was a per­
vasive corruption which spread to every branch of the civil 
bureaucracy and the armed forces and permeated every level 
of administration. In late 1915, Americans returning to 
the United States from the Mexican Northwest reported that 
"the entire fabric of authority" in that region had been 
"corrupted in the desire for graft.”4  ^ Similar accounts 
reached Washington from all parts of Constitutionalist 
Mexico. Zach Cobb, from his vantage point at El Paso, 
noted early in the new year that the deplorable trend 
"along the lines of graft that became distinctive of the 
Maderos and Villa" had already "set in."43 It was left to
4^Cobb to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17098.
42Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 
1915, SDR 812.00/17030.
43Cobb to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17098.
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an American banker at Hermosillo, however, to state suc­
cinctly the significance of that moral decay to the foreign 
investor in Mexico: "The Villista outfit was so bad we
couldn't stand it," he lamented, "but this crowd is worse.1,44
Economically, conditions were even more discouraging. 
Over great areas of the republic commercial and industrial 
activity had ceased, and agricultural production had so 
declined that many persons were starving.45 Communications, 
of course, were uncertain even in those areas nominally 
under Constitutionalist control and utterly unreliable 
elsewhere. Swarms of bandits operated largely unopposed 
along all the major railroads. Fiscally, the problems 
confronting the facto Government were overwhelming.
Huge foreign and domestic debts, long in default, continued 
to spiral upward as the interest on them went unpaid. Con­
sequently, the new government had no credit and was unable
A £
to borrow either at home or abroad. Moreover, because of 
its inability to assert its authority over the several
44Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915, 
SDR 812,00/17030.
4^Daniels to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17151.
46New York Times, February 7, 1916.
secessionist provinces, its revenues were sharply diminished.'
And shortsighted revolutionary economic policies coupled
with official peculation on a grand scale reduced them 
48still further. As a result, the regime was forced to 
turn to that most hazardous of monetary expedients, fiat 
money, in order to conduct its day-to-day affairs.40 From 
the moment of issue, however, Constitutionalist scrip 
rapidly depreciated. In time, it became virtually worth­
less, seriously exacerbating the existing economic crisis.
As of early 1916, then, the Mexican economy was a shambles.50
Some time before the beginning of the new year, the 
government in Washington began to receive the first of a 
battery of increasingly discouraging reports on the state 
of affairs in Mexico. Those reports, in turn, tended to 
confirm the harsh conclusions drawn by Boaz Long in his 
lengthy memorandum of the previous July and to vindicate 
the Antirevolutionist position generally. And in that
47Ibid.
A O
Daniels to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17151.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.; Cobb to Lansing, January 25, 1916, SDR
812.00/17178; New York Times, February 7, 1916.
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respect, they were extremely damaging to the de facto 
Government. In the end they utterly destroyed the waning 
confidence of Administration officials in the ability of 
the Carranza regime to endure and resigned them to its 
imminent collapse. From that point it was but a short 
step to intervention.
On December 23, the American commander at Nogales 
reported that the condition of Sonora and the entire west 
coast of Mexico as far south as Mazatlan was "far from 
meeting the expectations" that had accompanied recognition 
of the Carranza regime. Americans returning to the border 
from the interior of the Northwest were "unanimous in con­
demnation" of the state governments and were "exeedingly 
pessimistic of the development of any ability to control 
the situation or handle the problems confronting present 
Mexican authorities."5 -^ In addition to their disgust with 
the glaring ineptitude and venality of those regimes, the 
returnees were uniformly struck by the vindictiveness of 
Carrancista authorities.5^ "The promise of amnesty," it
51Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915, 
SDR 812.00/17030.
^Davis to Lansing, December 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17258.
was noted, had become "a mockery— a mere subterfuge to bait
the overconfident into their hands." Carranza's pledge
of reconciliation notwithstanding, "the spirit of revenge
[was] unsubdued." In fact, the "persecution and execution
of former political enemies [was] as flagrant and sanguinary
53as ever in Mexican history." It was no way to reunite a 
nation.
In their relations with foreigners as well, the 
Constitutionalists were found wanting. Despite the First 
Chief's assurances of good will and the official encourage­
ment of foreign firms to resume operations in the republic, 
returning Americans found their reception by Constitution­
alist authorities "not one of welcome." Although not 
actively hostile, those officials were surly, suspicious,
and uncooperative in their relations with foreigners
54generally and with Americans in particular.
While many commercial and mining interests had 
nonetheless resumed operations in the Northwest, there was 
"not manifest" in that region the official confidence which 
Obregon and other Constitutionalist spokesmen had "endeavored
53Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
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to convey in their remarks along the border." On the 
contrary, "the attitude and atmosphere permeating the whole 
situation" was one of "want of confidence and general sus­
picion" even among the authorities themselves. The antici­
pated return of "calm and confidence" had not materialized," 
the Nogales commander declared. Instead, reports of rapid 
deterioration in the Northwest were coming to him "from all 
directions." The consensus of opinion, he concluded, "is 
to the effect that the situation cannot last six months."
Some said two months. Much, however, appeared to depend 
upon the actions of Obregon. Meanwhile, the feeling was 
"strong" among Mexicans in the Northwest, even among "the 
better class of the so-called Carrancista party," that 
the First Chief could "never be accepted as President." 
Indeed, it was stated that his "elimination" was an essential
prerequisite for the "peaceful solution of Mexican prob- 
55lems."
Similar depressing accounts came from other areas 
of Constitutionalist Mexico as well. On January 6, 1916, 
Parker informed his superiors that conditions in and around 
the City of Mexico were causing "much uneasiness" among the
55
Ibid. See also Cobb to Lansing, January 25, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17198.
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foreign community. The Zapatistas continued to control the 
surrounding countryside, occasionally raiding into the 
suburbs of the city itself. Parker, too, took the authori­
ties to task: "Inumerable abuses," he complained, "small
in themselves but in the aggregate tending to create a lack 
of confidence in the administrative ability of the de facto 
Government" continued to be committed. That "unpleasant 
drift" in the conduct of the Constitutionalist regime was 
already well under way.56
III.
On the same day that Parker expressed his growing 
concern over the situation in the City of Mexico, certain 
members of the United States Senate were revealing their 
disgust and dissatisfaction with the entire state of affairs 
in the southern republic and with the Mexican policy of 
the Wilson Administration as well. On January 4, Republican 
Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico had made public a draft 
resolution calling on the President to release to Congress
57all pertinent information "regarding conditions in Mexico."
^6Parker to Lansing, Janury 6, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17060.
5?New York Times, January 5, 1916; "Senate resolution 
submitted by Mr. Fall," Foreign Relations, 1916, 463-464.
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The Senator, it was reported, took the position that the 
"latest information" Congress had received from the Adminis­
tration as to Mexican affairs was the President's address 
of April 20, 1914, "in which he said there was no government 
in Mexico and asked the authority to seize Veracruz." The 
resolution, then, began "by asking the President whether 
there is now a Government in Mexico, and, if so, where it 
is."58
The ostensible occasion for the inquiry was the 
recent receipt by the Senate of the President's nomination 
for Ambassador to Mexico. So, at least, contended Senator 
Lodge of Massachusetts, Fall's powerful colleague on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "After telling us that
there was no Government in Mexico," Lodge explained to 
reporters, the President had reopened the discussion by 
sending to the Senate the name of Henry Prather Fletcher, 
his selection as Ambassador to the Mexican Government.
Lodge professed to be puzzled. "Where," he queried, "is 
this Government and how long will it last?" Fletcher, then 
Ambassador to Chile and himself a prominent Republican, was 
an "excellent diplomat," the Senator conceded. Nonetheless,
^8New York Times, January 5, 1916.
r
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he concluded, "I think the Senate ought to know to what
59Government he is being sent." Apparently, then, the Fall 
resolution was a purely partisan measure designed primarily 
to embarrass the Wilson Administration.60 There are indi­
cations, however, that it might well have been something 
more.
To be sure, the motives of its author were suspect. 
Having spent some years in Mexico in one endeavor or another, 
Fall considered himself something of an expert on Mexican 
matters.6  ^ His frequently proferred advice on Mexican 
affairs, however, had been consistently ignored by the 
White House. Moreover, the Senator was well-acquainted with 
the old Porfirian ruling class and with many of the large 
and important American investors in Mexico as well. Unques­
tionably, he sympathized strongly with both groups.62
Finally, he was himself an investor in Mexican mining and
63ranching properties. The Senator, then, was more than
5^Ibid. 66Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 224.
6 ■'■Cl if ford W. Trow, "Senator Albert B. Fall and 
Mexican Affairs: 1912-1921" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Colorado, 1966), 8-12.
62Ibid.
6 3
Ibid.; Manuel A. Machado and James T. Judge,
"Tempest in a Teapot? The Mexican-United States Intervention
Crisis of 1919," SHQ, LXXIV (July, 1970), 8.
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casually interested in Mexico. Without doubt, he hoped to
force the President's hand in his relations with the de facto 
64Government. In short, the Senator wanted intervention. It
was, of course, an election year, and there were few areas
in which the Wilson Administration was more vulnerable than
in the conduct of its relations with revolutionary Mexico.
Self-interested and fiercely partisan, Fall recognized a
fortuitous opportunity in the rapidly deteriorating Mexican
situation. And he was determined to make the most of it.
On January 6, following an "acrid discussion" of
Mexican affairs, the Senate adopted the nine-point Fall 
6 5resolution. In supporting his measure, the Senator 
vigorously attacked the President's Mexican policy and 
raised a number of hard questions increasingly on the minds 
of his colleagues. Administration officials, and the Ameri­
can people alike:
"I want to know if in recognizing Carranza, the 
President has required that those guilty of inflicting 
suffering and outrages upon citizens of the United 
States are to be held to definite reckoning. I want 
to know what arrangements were made prior to the 
recognition with reference to the payment of damages
®^Trow, "Senator Albert B. Fall and Mexican Affairs: 
1912-1921," 8-12; Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 203.
65New York Times, January 7, 1915
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for property and assaults committed upon American 
citizens. I want to know, and I believe the Senate 
wants to know before we confirm an Ambassador, if there 
are any assurances that these outrages shall at least 
be paid for.
We have no information that Carranza is the 
president of the de facto government of Mexico; in 
fact, he does not pretend to be. He is merely desig­
nated as the First Chief of the de facto government.
Yet we read that he is forming a Cabinet, but not to 
meet in the City of Mexico; rather in a place two or 
three hundred miles from that city.
We have heard the President use strong words.
We have heard his use of the words 'strict accounta­
bility1 in his reference to the Lusitania, but we 
have yet to hear him employ the same language with 
regard to Mexico."66
Senator Lodge, in turn, ridiculed the conduct of 
the Administration's relations with Mexico and effectively 
made light of the Carranza regime. "We don't know what 
Government has been recognized," he chided Wilson's floor 
leaders, "but we learn through the newspapers, an excellent 
but unofficial source, . . . that it is the Government of 
Carranza." However, he queried, was it not a "normal re­
quirement of a Government seeking recognition that it should 
occupy the capital of its own country?" Was the American 
Ambassador to go to Mexico City, "where Carranza is not, 
owing to his due regard for his personal safety?" Perhaps, 
the Senator jeered, the Ambassador might "follow the flitting
66Ibid
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abode of Carranza from San Luis Potosi to Torreon and
Queretaro." Those things "we should know," he insisted,
67and "the President should inform us . . .  .
The "political effect" of the Fall resolution, the 
Mew York Times contended defensively, was "largely dis­
counted" by Administration strategy on the floor of the 
Senate itself. Some days earlier, it revealed, in antici­
pation of Fall's maneuver. Democratic Senator William J. 
Stone of Missouri, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, had conferred at length with President Wilson on 
the matter. Between them they had devised an effective 
defense. Stone, then, was prepared for the Republican 
attack. Accordingly, in response to Fall's demands, he 
calmly announced that he "knew of no opposition anywhere 
to the resolution and [that] there should be none." Thus 
assured of Democratic acquiescence, many Republicans who 
planned to speak on Administration Mexican policy allowed 
the resolution to come to a vote. Democrats, in turn,
following Stone's lead, "let the resolution pass without 
6 8opposition." The anticipated floor fight did not develop.
Two days later, in an editorial entitled "Fall's 
Fireworks Fizzle," the New York Times attempted to deprecate
67Ibid. 68Ibid.
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the Mexican resolution and Pall's attendant remarks in the 
Senate. Although the New Mexico Senator had introduced 
his measure "with great ado," the journal contended, he 
had "failed to obtain the display of political fireworks 
on which he had counted." Instead, the willingness of the 
Administration to comply with Fall's request had "reduced 
the demonstration to a sputter."69
The writer, however, perhaps purposely, omitted 
some salient points. Foremost, for the very first time, 
the new Administration Mexican policy had come under sharp 
attack in Congress. That development, in turn, served to 
focus the attention of the general public on conditions in 
Mexico at a critical moment in that country’s relations 
with the United States. Secondly, despite the journal's 
repeated assertions to the contrary, that policy was unques­
tionably the Achille's heel of the Wilson Administration.
And it was an election year. And, finally, as brief as it 
was, the Republican thrust was a telling one. It drew blood.
Neither Wilson nor Lansing were nearly as sanguine 
over the attack as Senator Stone's glib accomodation of 
Fall implied. Quite the contrary. More than six weeks
69Ibid., January 8, 1915.
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later, long after the "early day" of delivery pledged by 
Stone, the President and Lansing continued to debate 
whether or not to comply with the Pall resolution. The
7d
Secretary strongly counseled against it. Much more
clearly than the President, he foresaw the damage that
would result— not only politically but diplomatically as
well— from full disclosure of all data pertaining to United
States relations with revolutionary Mexico. Consequently,
at his behest, when the President ultimately chose to
comply with the Fall resolution, a great deal of pertinent
information was w i t h h e l d . B u t  to no avail. Those facts
released to the Senate, many of which were of a highly
7?inflammatory nature, were promptly made public. Unques­
tionably, they played a very significant role in preparing 
the American people for subsequent armed intervention in 
Mexico.
^Lansing to Wilson, February 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17062.
72»The President's message transmitting to the 




Fall's "fireworks" may indeed have sputtered, as
his critics jibed, but the Senator's purpose was served.
The train was laid, and all that was needed was a spark.
Four days after the passage of the Fall resolution, an
obscure Villista colonel applied the match. On the night
of January 10, Villista guerrillas under one Pablo Lopez
halted a train near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua, dragged off
seventeen American mining engineers, and summarily shot 
73them to death. Overnight the Senator's attack on Wil­
sonian Mexican policy was fully vindicated. And in the 
most sensational development in Mexican-American relations
since the seizure of Veracruz the United States stood poised
74to intervene in Mexico.
While tempers flared across the United States in 
response to the atrocity at Santa Ysabel, officials in 
Washington were treated to one of the broadest and most 
depressing analyses of the Mexican situation received in
7^Cobb to Lansing, January 11, 12, 1916, Ibid.,
651-652.
74New York Times, January 13, 14, 15, 16, 1916;
New York World, January 13, 1916.
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many months. It was all the more sobering because it 
came from a relatively disinterested source, a United States 
naval officer in no way influenced by or connected with 
Mexican exiles, Antirevolutionists, or major foreign inves­
tors in Mexico. The aforementioned officer was Captain 
D. E. Dismukes, commander of the battleship Kentucky. That 
vessel, in turn, had been stationed off the east coast of 
Mexico for some time. The Captain, then, was able to view 
firsthand the rapid deterioration of Constitutionalist 
authority.
Reporting to tiffe Secretary of the Navy early in 
January, Dismukes warned that it would be a "mistake" to 
take the momentary calm along the Mexican gulf coast as 
"an indication of a permanent settled condition of affairs" 
in the republic. He had been unable, he stressed, to find 
any knowledgeable person, "either foreign or Mexican," who 
considered conditions there "at all satisfactory." The 
essence of the problem, he contended, was economic: the
stagnation, accelerating decline, and apparently imminent 
collapse of the Mexican economy. That condition, in turn, 
gave rise to much of the political unrest which threatened
75Daniels to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17151.
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to tear the country apart. "Things were getting worse in 
so, far as the economic life of the country is concerned," 
he warned, and, unless the situation were soon reversed, 
there would be serious political repercussions. It was 
"difficult to believe" that the people would "remain quiet." 
At the moment, the Captain continued, the fiat scrip was 
"rapidly becoming worthless." Even more significant, how­
ever, was the fact that virtually every industry in the 
country except petroleum and sisal production, neither of 
which were under Carrancista control, was at "a standstill." 
And politically conditions were little better: "Each state
is an arbitrary little government all to itself." Although 
"more or less" subject to the First Chief, the several 
governors had assumed "the power to issue decrees of the 
most sweeping character independent of all outside authority 
or responsibility to the people of the state."7® The Mexican 
Republic was a union in name only. In view of Dismukes' 
account and the great number of corroborative reports that 
followed, officials in Washington were forced to admit, 
albeit privately, that Senator Fall had indeed raised some 
timely questions: was there a Government in Mexico, and if




Following the murders at Santa Ysabel, conditions 
in Mexico became increasingly intolerable as far as those 
officials were concerned. Recognition of the Carranza 
regime was generally if privately acknowledged to have been 
at best premature and at worst an unmitigated disaster for 
Mexico and the United States alike. Moreover, the list of 
American grievances against that government was growing.
In addition to the unchecked depredations of Villistas, 
Conventionists, Zapatistas, and various other guerrilla 
and outlaw bands, the actions of the de facto Government 
itself were fast becoming a source of serious Mexican- 
American friction. A systematic, quasi-legal campaign 
against American and other foreign investors in the republic 
was well under way.?7 Confiscatory taxation, increased 
government regulation, and other measures obviously pre­
liminary to eventual expropriation of the mining and
77See, for example, Cobb to Lansing, January 28, 
1916, SDR 812.00/17178; Canova, "Confidential Memorandum,1 
February 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/17271%; Carothers to Lansing, 
February 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/17259.
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7 ftpetroleum industries were already manifest. Harassment 
of the Mexican Church and persecution of the clergy not only 
continued but intensified. And, finally, the threat to 
American lives and property on both sides of the border was 
in no way diminished. The Yagui campaign in Sonora had 
already ground to a halt, and there was little indication 
that it was to be resumed. Consequently, new raiding into 
the Yaqui Valley was imminent. Far graver, of course, was 
the resurgence of the Plan of San Diego. It was well under­
stood that partisans of that movement were ready to resume 
offensive operations at a moment's notice. They were but 
biding their time, awaiting more propitious circumstances. 
And, by early 1916, Carrancista collusion in that movement 
was common knowledge. Meanwhile, politically fragmented, 
economically moribund, and torn by new civil strife, Mexico
^®See, for example, New York Times, January 12, 1916; 
Williams to Lansing, January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17107;
Funston to the Adjutant General, January 6, 1916, SDR 812.00/ 
17078; Bevan to Lansing, November 15, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
200; Vincent to Lansing, January 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/6363/ 
218; Bevan to Lansing, January 26, 1916, SDR 812.6363/211; 
Johnson to Canova, January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17095;
Parker to Lansing, November 16, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 951-952; Lansing to Silliman, December 28, 1915,
Ibid., 962-963.
was disintegrating as a nation and sliding rapidly into 
79anarchy.
The die was cast at Santa Isabel. What followed
t
was anticlimactic. As the initial furor over the murders 
began to subside, South Carolina Senator Benjamin R. Tillman 
expressed what was undoubtedly national as well as congres­
sional consensus on the matter: "I don't like this killing
of Americans," he declared, "[but] I do not believe [that] 
there should be immediate intervention." Carranza, the 
Senator contended, should be given one more chance to set 
things aright below the border. Should the First Chief 
fail, however, "measures must be taken to stop the slaughter. 
Clearly, Tillman had armed intervention in mind.®^
79"i have become reconciled to the hopelessness of 
the situation as it now exists," Cobb confided to Lansing 
late in January, 1916: "The element of confidence . . .
does not seem to exist. There is lack of confidence in 
the wisdom of the leaders, in the de facto government's 
money, that carries its tale to everybody, in the amnesties 
proclaimed, as to life, in the respect of rights, as to 
property— and in the power of the de facto government to 
make good. There are good elements among them (the Consti­
tutionalist leaders) who are trying hard enough. But the 
trend has set in wrong . . . .  The finish of Carranza is 
inevitable. Unless some great change comes, the Carranza 
forces will go on the rocks within less than ninety days."- 
Cobb to Lansing, January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/17178.
8QNew York Times, January 16, 1916.
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By the beginning of 1916, it was patently impossible 
for Carranza to provide the degree of protection for foreign 
lives and property in Mexico insisted upon by Tillman and 
his colleagues. Sooner or later, then, a new outrage was 
bound to occur. And when it did, the President would be hard 
pressed to withstand the clamor for retribution. Thus after 
the Santa Ysabel incident. United States armed intervention 
in Mexico was a foregone conclusion. Only the time and the 
place were uncertain. And, on the night of March 8-9, Villa 
determined them as well. The Columbus raid, in turn, forced 
Wilson's hand. Within less than a week, the Pershing 
Expedition had crossed into northern Mexico. The October 
rapprochement was a thing of the past; a new and virulent 
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